CHARLES LI v. DEMAS YAN

October 18, 2019, 6:16 pm

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Filed 10/18/19 Li v. Yan CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

CHARLES LI,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

DEMAS YAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

A155731

(City & County of San Francisco

Super. Ct. No. CGC14537574)

Demas Yan appeals from a post-judgment order appointing a receiver. We will dismiss the appeal.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

We draw much of the background facts of this case from our prior appellate decision, and briefly set out these facts for context only. (See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 897, 907, fn. 10; Stephenson v. Drever (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1167, 1170, fn. 1.)

Yan entered into an agreement in 2000 with Tony Fu to develop a residential building on 23rd Avenue in San Francisco (hereafter “the property”). Fu assigned his ownership interest in the property to Charles Li. Li sued Yan in 2004 to enforce his rights under the assignment and also filed a claim against Yan in Yan’s bankruptcy proceedings. When Yan disputed the validity of the assignment from Fu to Li, Li sued Fu alleging fraud. Yan, then a law student, convinced Li to dismiss his case against Yan and the bankruptcy claim so the two of them could join forces against Fu. After Li dismissed his case against Yan with prejudice and also the bankruptcy clam, Yan sued Li for malicious prosecution while still assisting Li in his action against Fu. In January 2009, after Yan was admitted to the California Bar, Li retained Yan to represent him in the suit against Fu. During a settlement conference, however, a mediator opined the assignment from Fu was enforceable against Yan, and Yan had undisclosed conflicts of interest in his representation of Li.

Li then hired a new attorney and sued Yan in March 2010 for professional negligence and related claims. Following a 2012 bench trial, Li prevailed and obtained a judgment against Yan. In 2016, the trial court entered a fourth amended judgment, awarding Li damages, prejudgment interest, attorney fees, costs, and post-judgment interest totaling $1,086,001.12. While trying to enforce that judgment, Li learned Yan transferred the property to a wholly owned limited liability company (LLC) in 2007. Then, in 2012, Yan transferred his ownership interest in that LLC to relatives, allegedly to repay debts. In late 2013 the property was transferred to a newly formed LLC with the same owners as the last.

In February 2014, Li brought an action against Yan, Yan’s parents and two brothers-in-law, and the two LLCs, seeking to set aside the transfers as fraudulent and alleging violations of Civil Code sections 3439.04 and 3439.05. Alleging the property conveyances between the defendants were done to prevent Li from satisfying the judgment from the 2010 case the complaint sought an order declaring them void to the extent necessary to satisfy that judgment, as well as an order enjoining the sale, encumbrance, damaging, impairing, or disposal of the property.

Default was entered against Yan and the LLCs. The remaining defendants (Yan’s relatives) proceeded to trial where a jury returned special verdicts against all of them, finding them liable for fraud. The trial court then entered default judgments against Yan and the two LLCs, and judgments against the remaining defendants. The court set aside the conveyances as fraudulent, and declared “[f]or the purpose of satisfying plaintiff’s Underlying Judgment, and for that purpose only, Demas Yan is . . . the sole owner of all legal and equitable title or interest in the Subject Property.” The judgment ordered all defendants to collect all rents, pay all reasonable expenses and taxes, and render an accounting upon Li’s request. The judgment enjoined all defendants from selling or transferring the property without a court order. The court awarded Li attorney fees in the amount of $802,059.50 and amended the judgment to incorporate it. Yan and the other defendants filed an appeal and, in an unpublished decision issued on May 31, 2018, this court ordered that the amended judgment be modified to provide that the attorney fee award was imposed solely against Yan. This court then affirmed the judgment in all other respects.

In June 2018, Li moved for an order appointing a receiver, the genesis of this appeal. The trial court granted this unopposed motion and appointed a receiver for the property on July 26, 2018. Among other things, the appointment order required all defendants to turn over possession of the property (including rents and property management funds) to the receiver, and enjoined all defendants from interfering in any manner with the discharge of the receiver’s duties, which included managing the property and its accounts and potentially selling the property.

On August 20, 2018, Yan filed a motion to set aside the order appointing a receiver pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). While Yan did not include the complete motion in his appendix, his notice of motion (which is in his appendix) argued that the order was void “for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and/or for lack of due process.” Accompanying the motion was Yan’s declaration stating he became personally aware of the order appointing the receiver on August 1, 2018 after receiving an email from Li’s attorney purporting to be a notice of entry of order. He then reviewed the trial court’s docket, which showed that the notice of Li’s motion was served only on Albert Boasberg, who Yan claimed was not his attorney in this action and not authorized to be served on his behalf. Boasberg also filed a declaration stating that he was the attorney for defendants other than Yan, that Yan did not retain him for post-judgment proceedings in the action, and that he told Li’s attorney he was not representing any of the defendants post-judgment.

Li opposed Yan’s motion to set aside the appointment order, arguing Yan had no right to participate in post-judgment proceedings or to be served with Li’s motion because default was entered against Yan. Furthermore, Boasberg was listed as counsel of record for the defendants, and Li served Boasberg with both Li’s motion and the resulting order appointing a receiver. Li cited to supporting evidence which is not included in Yan’s appendix.

On October 15, 2018, the trial court denied Yan’s motion to set aside the order on three separate and independent grounds: “First, Mr. Yan is in default status now and was at the time the motion for appointment of receiver was filed, so he had no right to contest the appointment of a receiver. Second, Mr. Yan’s counsel of record, Mr. Boasberg, was served with all relevant papers on a timely basis. Third, Mr. Yan has failed to provide any grounds for opposing the appointment of a receiver.”

Yan filed a notice of appeal on October 17, 2018.

DISCUSSION

Li filed a motion to dismiss this appeal under the doctrine of disentitlement. Li argues dismissal is warranted because Yan refuses: (1) to pay sanctions that Division Two of this court imposed in a related appeal that it found to be frivolous (Li v. Yan (Jan. 28, 2016, A140798) [nonpub. opn.]), and to pay sanctions imposed by the trial court in 2013, 2015, and 2017; and (2) to abide by post-judgment discovery orders to produce his tax returns that have twice been affirmed by Division Two of this court. (Li v. Yan (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 56; Li v. Yan (Jun. 27, 2018, A151549) [nonpub. opn.].)

We agree that Yan’s willful disobedience of the post-judgment discovery orders to produce his tax returns justifies dismissal of this appeal.

“An appellate court has the inherent power, under the ‘disentitlement doctrine,’ to dismiss an appeal by a party that refuses to comply with a lower court order. [Citations.] . . . ‘A party to an action cannot, with right or reason, ask the aid and assistance of a court in hearing his demands while he stands in an attitude of contempt to legal orders and processes of the courts of this state.’ ” (Stoltenberg v. Ampton Investments, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1229–1230 (Stoltenberg).) The equitable rationale underlying the doctrine is as follows: “ ‘ “Dismissal is not ‘ “a penalty imposed as a punishment for criminal contempt. It is an exercise of a state court’s inherent power to use its processes to induce compliance” ’ with a presumptively valid order. [Citation.]” [Citation.] . . . [¶] Appellate disentitlement “is not a jurisdictional doctrine, but a discretionary tool that may be applied when the balance of the equitable concerns make it a proper sanction . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] No formal judgment of contempt is required; an appellate court ‘may dismiss an appeal where there has been willful disobedience or obstructive tactics.’ ” (Id. at p. 1230.)

Here, Li sets out the facts underlying Yan’s refusal to comply with orders to produce his tax returns and provides a declaration from counsel in support. These facts include that Li obtained a court order for Yan to produce his tax returns to aid Li in enforcing the judgment obtained in the 2010 case. After Division Two of this court affirmed the order to produce the tax returns in 2016, Yan continued to refuse to comply, leading Li to obtain an order to show cause why Yan should not be held in contempt. After the trial court discharged the order to show cause and gave Yan one last chance to comply, he still did not do so and instead filed yet another appeal challenging the order to produce his tax returns. In 2018, Division Two of this court again ordered Yan to comply, and to this date, Yan refuses to do so.

Yan does not deny he is willfully failing to produce his tax returns and he makes no attempt to justify his disobedience. His sole argument is that the doctrine of disentitlement is inapplicable because he has not violated any order in this particular underlying action, or frustrated the enforcement of the judgment or order appointing a receiver entered in the underlying action. Yan, however, presents no reasoned argument and cites no authority supporting these arguments. Case law establishes that application of the disentitlement doctrine “is not limited to cases in which the appellant is in violation of the order from which he or she appeals” (In re E.M. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 467, 477 (E.M.)), or to cases where the order being disobeyed was entered in the same case giving rise to the appeal. (Stoltenberg, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1232–1234.)

Yan also fails to acknowledge the 2014 case arises from the judgment obtained in the 2010 case and Yan’s efforts to frustrate enforcement of that judgment. We see no reason why the disentitlement doctrine should not apply under these facts. Essentially, Yan is asking for relief this case (which Li had to file in order to stop Yan from further frustrating efforts to enforce the judgment obtained in the 2010 case) while at the same time egregiously flouting the trial court’s orders (which we have twice affirmed) aimed at enforcing the judgment in the 2010 case. (E.M., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 477 [“the disentitlement doctrine is not only applicable to disobedience of the order being appealed; it also applies to ‘egregious’ conduct that frustrates the juvenile court from carrying out its orders”]; Stone v. Bach (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 442, 444 [“ ‘[I]t would be a flagrant abuse of the principles of equity and of the due administration of justice to consider the demands of a party who becomes a voluntary actor before a court and seeks its aid while he stands in contempt of its legal orders and processes’ ”].)

Given the facts here, we conclude the balance of all equitable concerns justifies applying the disentitlement doctrine to this appeal. (Stoltenberg, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230 [the disentitlement doctrine “ ‘is based upon fundamental equity and is not to be frustrated by technicalities’ ”].)

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. Li shall be entitled to recover his costs on appeal.

_________________________

Fujisaki, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Petrou, J.

_________________________

Wick, J.*

↧

JIL BRITT v. DOUG BRITT

October 18, 2019, 6:17 pm

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Filed 10/18/19 Marriage of Britt CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re the Marriage of JIL BRITT and DOUG BRITT. H042734

(Santa Clara County

Super. Ct. No. FL147798)

JIL BRITT,

Appellant,

DOUG BRITT,

Respondent.

Appellant Jil Britt challenges an order reducing spousal support and finding that there were no child or spousal support arrearages. She contends that the court erred in reducing spousal support because, among other things, it should not have found that she had the capacity to earn $5,000 a month in wages and $5,000 a month in investment income, neither of which she had ever earned in the past. She also claims that the trial court erred in finding that respondent Doug Britt had not incurred child support arrearages when, without obtaining a court order modifying child support, he ceased paying child support for each older child when that child graduated from high school. In addition, Jil argues that the court erred in failing to enter a new child support order for the youngest child. We find no abuse of discretion in connection with the child support issues, but we find that the court abused its discretion with respect to spousal support because there was no evidence to support the court’s earning capacity findings. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s order.

I. Background

Doug and Jil were married for more than 20 years and had three children together. During their marriage, Jil was “a full time mother and homemaker.” When the couple separated in 2008, all three of their children were minors, and Doug immediately began paying child and spousal support.

In July 2009, the parties stipulated to an order requiring Doug to pay base spousal support of $8,186 per month and base monthly child support of $7,453 for the three children. A “DissoMaster” printout attached to the order showed separate child support amounts for each child, with the largest amount attributed to “Child 3,” the youngest child The $7,453 figure was broken down to $1,491 for “Child 1,” the eldest child, $2,236 for “Child 2,” the middle child, and $3,727 for Child 3. Child 3 received 50 percent of the total, while Child 2 received 30 percent, and Child 1 received 20 percent. The 2009 order also required Doug to pay additional child and spousal support (referred to as Ostler/Smith payments ) when he had “bonus” income above his base salary. An attached chart set forth the applicable percentages of bonus income that he was required to pay, which were approximately 13 percent for additional child support and 28 percent for additional spousal support.

In 2010, the court entered a judgment that incorporated the provisions of the July 2009 order regarding spousal support and child support. The 2010 judgment provided: “The current amount of child support of $7,453 and the spousal support of $8,186 shall remain in effect until further order of court. It shall be subject to the conditions of the Stipulation of July 15, 2009 attached hereto.” By incorporating the July 2009 stipulated order, the 2010 judgment continued the Ostler/Smith provisions requiring Doug to pay “additional spousal support” and “additional child support” if he had “additional income.” The judgment also required Jil to pursue a “program of business administration concentrating in accounting” leading to an AA degree no later than November 2011 and provided for review of her spousal support at that time. The judgment provided that support was “modifiable retroactively . . . .” The parties stipulated as part of the judgment that Jil’s “Marital Standard of Living” (MSOL) would be “set at $13,100 per month after tax.”

Child 1 graduated from high school in June 2010. After that, Doug ceased paying the base child support and the Ostler/Smith amount associated with Child 1. Doug testified that he “was always under the impression . . . that when the kids are 18, they emancipate.” He adjusted the Ostler/Smith amount by utilizing the same percentages that applied to the base child support (50%/30%/20%).

Jil obtained an AA degree in “medical billing” in January 2012 and obtained full-time employment “[r]ight away.” In October 2012, her hours were cut to 30 hours a week.

Child 2 graduated from high school in June 2013. After that, Doug paid child support for only Child 3, which included both the base amount and the Ostler/Smith amount associated with Child 3. Jil and Doug shared custody of Child 3, with Doug having a 20 percent timeshare under the 2010 judgment.

In March 2013, Doug filed a request for modification of spousal and child support, termination of spousal support, and termination of the Ostler/Smith additional spousal support provision. The only change Doug sought to child support was a recognition that he was required to pay only amounts associated with Child 3 after Child 2 graduated from high school in June 2013. He pointed out that he was paying all of the college expenses for Child 1 and would do so for all three of the children. Doug’s request for a modification of spousal support was based on the fact that Jil had completed her “accountancy course” but “is still not self supporting.” He asked the court to “set a step down and termination date for ongoing spousal support to $7,000 per month commencing immediately and $5,000 per month in the next year and a reduction to zero when [Child 3] emancipates.” Doug sought immediate termination of the Ostler/Smith additional spousal support provisions.

Doug’s accompanying income and expense declaration stated that his gross monthly income was $41,666 and his monthly expenses were $21,875. After filing his motion, Doug continued paying the base spousal support amount but stopped sending Ostler/Smith additional spousal support payments to Jil; instead he placed those payments in a segregated bank account in case the court rejected his request to end those payments. Doug continued to pay child support and the Ostler/Smith additional child support payments for the children who had not yet graduated from high school.

Jil responded to Doug’s motion by asking the court to “determine and set child and spousal support arrears, [and] support payments unpaid under the existing Ostler/Smith orders.” She also asked the court to award her attorney’s fees and costs. Jil complained that Doug had “unilaterally lowered child support” to $5,961 in June 2010 after Child 1 graduated from high school even though the child support order stated that it would “remain in effect until further order of the court.” Jil asked the court to award “guideline [child] support.” She claimed that Doug had not complied with the existing Ostler/Smith provisions. Jil opposed Doug’s request for a reduction in spousal support and requested that the court “increase it to the MSOL . . . .” Jil’s April 2013 income and expense declaration asserted that her monthly gross wages were $2,851 and her monthly expenses were $14,045. She reported $1.5 million in liquid assets.

In a March 2014 income and expense declaration, Doug asserted that Jil received $6,219 a month in wages and investment income. He reported monthly expenses of $25,999. His September 2014 income and expense declaration reported a small increase in his base pay to $43,750 a month and additional income that averaged more than $50,000 a month. His monthly expenses had dropped to $18,017. Jil was laid off from her job in October 2014.

The case was tried in January 2015. Jil asserted at trial that “there’s not a substantial change of circumstances warranting a modification at all.” She claimed that she had “wisely invested her share of community property to produce income,” “retrained” and gotten a job, and “controlled her spending,” but she “will never be self supporting.” She asked the court to modify child support “based on” Doug’s request. Jil claimed that Doug owed child support arrears because the judgment did not allow him to unilaterally reduce child support based on an “unincorporated Dissomaster breakdown” of the amounts attributable to each child.

Doug produced evidence that Jil’s “investment income” was $3,357 per month in 2013, and her total income in 2013, including both investment income and income from employment, was $74,633. Doug’s expert had analyzed Jil’s claimed expenses and found them to be greatly overestimated. He concluded that her actual monthly expenses were $7,560. The expert calculated that Jil could meet those expenses with her wages from part-time work, her investment income, and approximately $3,830 in monthly spousal support.

Jil’s position was that her investment income was just under $1,000 a month. She claimed that her monthly expenses were $18,078. Jil testified that her average monthly expenses in 2013 were $23,558.87, and her expenses were similar throughout the period from 2010 to 2014. She claimed that she had needed to “invade” her “principal assets” in order to meet her monthly expenses. Jil testified that she was currently cohabiting with an unemployed man who did not contribute to household expenses except to pay for his food and for his children’s food when his children were there living with them, which was half of the time. She claimed that the presence of this man and his children did not increase her expenses. Jil insisted that she actually spent $3,500 a month on food and $3,000 a month on car expenses, just for herself. Jil’s mortgage payment was $1,800 a month for her $1.5 million home, and she had no other debts.

The court issued a statement of decision in which it credited Doug’s evidence and discredited Jil’s evidence. The court concluded that there were no child support arrearages. In its view, Doug had properly stopped paying child support for each older child when those children graduated from high school because the judgment’s “appendix” “clearly specifies the amounts and discretely raises the amounts for the younger children.” The court concluded that the child support order did not “trump” or “obviate[] what is the law of this state regarding child support,” which did not ordinarily obligate a parent to support a child after the child graduated from high school. With regard to spousal support, the court found that Jil had the capacity to earn $10,000 a month in income from wages and investments. It reduced spousal support to $5,000 a month effective on the date of Doug’s March 2013 motion and terminated Doug’s obligation to pay additional Ostler/Smith spousal support effective at the time of Doug’s motion. Jil timely filed a notice of appeal from the court’s order.

II. Discussion

A. Child Support

Jil raises two issues on appeal concerning child support. She contends that the trial court erred in ratifying Doug’s cessation of child support payments for Child 1 and Child 2 upon their graduations from high school. Jil also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to calculate a new child support amount for Child 3.

1. Cessation of Child Support for Child 1 and Child 2

Jil claims that Doug was in arrears for child support because he was not permitted to cease paying child support for Child 1 and Child 2 upon their graduations from high school. Her position is that the 2010 judgment required Doug to bring a motion to modify child support and obtain a new child support order each time a child graduated from high school.

Jil acknowledges that her contention requires us to interpret the 2010 judgment. “We examine a dispute concerning the legal effect of [a] judgment utilizing the following standards of review: ‘The meaning and effect of a judgment is determined according to the rules governing the interpretation of writings generally. [Citations.] “ ‘[T]he entire document is to be taken by its four corners and construed as a whole to effectuate the obvious intention.’ ” [Citations.] “ ‘No particular part or clause in the judgment is to be seized upon and given the power to destroy the remainder if such effect can be avoided.’ ” [Citations.] [¶] Where an ambiguity exists, the court may examine the entire record to determine the judgment’s scope and effect. [Citations.] The court may also “ ‘refer to the circumstances surrounding the making of the order or judgment, [and] to the condition of the cause in which it was entered.’ ” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Richardson (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 941, 948-949 (Richardson).)

The 2010 judgment provided that “Child support is ordered as set forth in the attached” stipulation. The attached stipulation stated that the $7,453 child support amount was “subject to the conditions of” the July 2009 order and “shall remain in effect until further order of court.” The July 2009 order set the total child support amount at $7,453 and stated that the “amounts of support are guideline calculations as set forth in [the attached DissoMaster printout].” The DissoMaster printout identified a separate amount of “guideline” child support for each child. Because the incorporated printout set the child support for each child, the judgment’s incorporation of this printout meant that the judgment ordered a separate amount of child support for each child.

Jil isolates the language stating that the child support “shall remain in effect until further order of court” and insists that this meant that Doug was required to pay the total amount of child support for all three children, even if they graduated from high school, unless he obtained a “further order of court.” Her interpretation of the 2010 judgment ignores the fact that we must construe the judgment “ ‘ “ ‘as a whole to effectuate the obvious intention’ ” ’ ” and that “ ‘ “ ‘[n]o particular part or clause in the judgment is to be seized upon and given the power to destroy the remainder if such effect can be avoided.’ ” ’ ” (Richardson, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at pp. 948-949.) We must “examine the entire record” and consider all of the surrounding circumstances in determining the meaning of the judgment. (Ibid.)

We decline Jil’s invitation to focus solely on the isolated “shall remain in effect” language in the judgment. That language was immediately followed by “shall be subject to the conditions of the Stipulation of July 15, 2009 attached hereto.” The 2009 stipulation, by incorporating the DissoMaster printout, set forth an individual amount of child support for each child. We also must construe the judgment in conjunction with the statutory basis for the child support award it contained. Family Code section 3901 provides: “The duty of support imposed by Section 3900 continues as to an unmarried child who has attained 18 years of age, is a full-time high school student, . . . and who is not self-supporting, until the time the child completes the 12th grade or attains 19 years of age, whichever occurs first. [¶] . . . This section does not limit a parent’s ability to agree to provide additional support or the court’s power to inquire whether an agreement to provide additional support has been made.” (Fam. Code, § 3901.) It is also a relevant consideration that Jil apparently understood the 2010 judgment the same way that Doug did at the time because she did not challenge his 2010 elimination of child support for Child 1 when she graduated from high school.

Neither the 2010 judgment nor the 2009 order contained anything suggesting that Doug had agreed to provide child support for any child after that child graduated from high school. By incorporating the DissoMaster printout, the July 2009 stipulation set forth different amounts for each child and explicitly provided that the parties to the stipulation were agreeing to “guideline amounts.” If Doug had been agreeing to pay a specific amount of child support regardless of whether all of the children were still subject to the provisions of Family Code section 3901, there would have been no need for a separate amount for each child nor would it make sense to refer to those amounts as “guideline amounts,” since the “guidelines” do not require child support beyond the dictates of Family Code section 3901. We interpret the 2010 judgment, as the trial court did, to require Doug to pay the separate “guideline” amount specified in the July 2009 stipulation for each child only for so long as that child remained subject to Family Code section 3901. The trial court did not err in finding that Doug’s elimination of child support for Child 1 and Child 2 after they graduated from high school was not a violation of the 2010 judgment.

2. No New Child Support Order

Jil claims that the trial court erred in failing to modify the existing child support order and calculate a new child support amount for Child 3. She notes that her responsive pleading requested “guideline support,” Doug’s motion mentioned child support, and Doug acknowledged at trial that “ongoing support” was at issue.

Doug’s motion did not seek any modification of child custody or visitation. While his motion had boxes checked for seeking a modification of child support, he sought only an acknowledgement that he was not required to pay child support for a child who had graduated from high school. Jil’s motion did not seek any modification of child custody, visitation, or support but only a determination of arrears and an award of attorney’s fees. Jil claimed at trial that the 20 percent timeshare upon which the judgment’s child support was based was invalid because Child 3 was actually spending 100 percent of his time with Jil. When Jil objected to the court’s statement of decision, she claimed that the court should have made income and timeshare “findings” and a ruling “on setting support” for the two children who were still minors when Doug filed his motion.

We reject Jil’s claim that the trial court was required to enter a new child support order in response to the motions that were before it. Neither motion challenged the 20 percent timeshare or sought a modification of child custody or visitation. A timeshare is a custody or visitation issue. The simple fact that Child 3 no longer actually spent 20 percent of his time with Doug did not obligate the court to modify a custody and visitation order that neither party had placed at issue. With no motion to modify the visitation order before it, the trial court did not err in failing to modify the timeshare and leaving the child support order incorporated into the 2010 judgment intact as to Child 3.

B. Spousal Support

1. Change of Circumstance

Jil claims that Doug failed to show that there had been a change of circumstance that justified a reduction of spousal support. Her claim lacks merit. At the time of the 2010 judgment, Jil had three minor children at home, was unemployed, and had not worked in nearly 20 years. The 2010 judgment required Jil to obtain an AA degree within 18 months and explicitly provided for a review of spousal support at that time. When Doug filed his motion in March 2013, three years had passed, Jil had obtained an AA degree, and she was soon to have only one minor child at home. She had obtained employment from which she had income, and she was also reaping some income from her investments. All of these changes of circumstance were relevant to Jil’s ability to provide for at least some of her own support, which could justify a reduction in spousal support. Doug did not fail to show a change of circumstance.

2. Jil’s Earning Capacity From Wages and Investments

Jil challenges the court’s findings that attributed earning capacity to her of $5,000 a month in wages and $5,000 a month in investment income. She claims that there was no evidence to support these figures.

“ ‘An award of spousal support is a determination to be made by the trial court in each case before it, based upon the facts and equities of that case, after weighing each of the circumstances and applicable statutory guidelines. [Citation.] In making its spousal support order, the trial court possesses broad discretion so as to fairly exercise the weighing process contemplated by section 4320, with the goal of accomplishing substantial justice for the parties in the case before it. “The issue of spousal support, including its purpose, is one which is truly personal to the parties.” [Citation.] In awarding spousal support, the court must consider the mandatory guidelines of section 4320. Once the court does so, the ultimate decision as to amount and duration of spousal support rests within its broad discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. [Citation.] “Because trial courts have such broad discretion, appellate courts must act with cautious judicial restraint in reviewing these orders.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of McLain (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 262, 269

“In ordering spousal support under this part, the court shall consider all of the following circumstances: [¶] (a) The extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into account all of the following: [¶] (1) The marketable skills of the supported party; the job market for those skills; the time and expenses required for the supported party to acquire the appropriate education or training to develop those skills; and the possible need for retraining or education to acquire other, more marketable skills or employment. [¶] (2) The extent to which the supported party’s present or future earning capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment that were incurred during the marriage to permit the supported party to devote time to domestic duties. [¶] . . . [¶] (l) The goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time.” (Fam. Code, § 4320.)

The trial court was required to consider Jil’s “earning capacity” in determining whether to reduce spousal support in response to Doug’s motion. The trial court found that, if Jil “taps the interest on the [$1.5 million] Morgan Stanley account, the court finds that at a rate of 4% return, she could generate $5000 per month.” It also found that Jil had the capacity to earn “$5000 per month in income” from wages. It premised this finding on Jil’s “fail[ure] to pursue education/employment in a manner the court believes is reasonable . . . [and her capability] of earning this amount in an accounting job . . . .”

Jil argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that as of March 2013 she had the capacity to earn $5,000 a month in wages and $5,000 a month in investment income. She maintains that there was no evidence presented at trial that could support these figures, and the court “picked these figures out of thin air.” Jil’s argument has merit.

While the trial court could have reasonably found that Jil had the capacity to earn wages despite her unemployed state at the time of trial, the record does not contain any support for the $5,000 a month figure selected by the court. A vocational assessment, which was not in evidence, had determined that Jil should pursue an AA degree in accounting. Instead of doing so, Jil pursued an AA degree in medical billing without making any effort to learn that this field had limited job prospects and low pay. After she obtained a job in medical billing that paid poorly, she did not seek a job that paid better or seek to develop additional skills even after her hours were cut from full time to part time. Jil’s actions as a whole showed that she was not committed to becoming even partially self-sufficient.

Nevertheless, while the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Jil had the capacity to work full time at the $19 an hour wage that she had been earning at her medical billing job and that she should seek to improve her skills so that she could earn better pay in the future, there was no evidence that she had the capacity as of March 2013, when Doug filed his motion, to obtain full-time work at $30 an hour (which is the approximate equivalent of $5,000 a month). Certainly the court could have concluded that she had the capacity to earn $19 an hour for full-time work, but that would amount to less than $3,500 a month. No other evidence of Jil’s earning capacity appears in the record before us. Consequently, the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Jil had the capacity to earn $5,000 a month in wages.

The same is true with regard to the court’s determination that she had the capacity to earn $5,000 a month in investment income from her $1.5 million investment account. There was no evidence that Jil had ever earned that amount from her account, and no evidence was presented at trial that her account, which appeared to be her retirement funds, could reliably produce such earnings. Doug’s expert testified that Jil had earned $3,557 per month on her investments in 2013, and there was no evidence that she had ever earned more on her investments. Jil testified that she was earning less than $1,000 a month from her investment account at the time of the 2015 trial. While this record could support a finding that Jil had the capacity to earn the $3,557 per month that she had earned from that account in 2013, the court had no basis for its finding that she could earn $5,000 a month (or four percent a year) on the account. Without evidence, the court’s finding was based on nothing more than speculation. It follows that the court abused its discretion in finding that Jil had the capacity to earn $5,000 a month from her investment account to contribute to her support.

Because these findings were critical to the court’s assessment of the Family Code section 4320 factors in making its decision to reduce Jil’s spousal support, reversal is required, and we need not address the remainder of Jil’s contentions.

III. Disposition

The trial court’s order is reversed, and the matter is remanded with directions to vacate the portion of the order modifying spousal support and to reconsider that issue. Jil shall recover her appellate costs.

_______________________________

Mihara, J.

WE CONCUR:

_____________________________

Elia, Acting P. J.

_____________________________

Bamattre-Manoukian, J.

Britt v. Britt

H042734

↧

Luis Damian Robles v. Francisco Barajas, Jr

October 18, 2019, 6:56 pm

≫ Next: GALE REAVES VS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELS PROBATION DEPT case docket

≪ Previous: JIL BRITT v. DOUG BRITT

Case Number: BC721468 Hearing Date: October 18, 2019 Dept: 5

Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Department 5

Luis Damian Robles, et al.,

Plaintiff,

Francisco Barajas, Jr., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: BC721468

Hearing Date: October 18, 2019

[TENTATIVE] order RE:

defendantS’ motion for order compelling plaintiff’s attendance and testimony at deposition

Defendants Francisco Barajas, Jr. and Letitia Barajas (collectively, “Defendants”) move for an order compelling Plaintiff Luis Damian Robles to submit to deposition. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, if after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action, without having served a valid objection, fails to appear for examination, or proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, the party giving notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (a).) A motion to compel the deposition of a party to the action must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration, or, when the deponent failed to attend the deposition, a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2).)

Defendants served on Plaintiff an initial Notice of Taking Deposition, setting the deposition for April 18, 2019. Plaintiff’s counsel then informed defense counsel that Plaintiff was not available for that date, but did not provide alternate dates to reschedule. Defendants re-noticed the deposition a few more times until August 22, 2019, when Plaintiff again failed to appear. (Hsu Decl., ¶ 10, Exh. E.) Defendants took a Certificate of Nonappearance. (Hsu Decl., ¶ 10, Exh. E.) On August 29, 2019, Defendants’ counsel sent a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel inquiring as to Plaintiff’s non-appearance. As of the filing of this motion to compel deposition, Plaintiff has not contacted defense counsel to reschedule the deposition. Plaintiff has not opposed this motion.

Based upon the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to compel deposition is granted. Plaintiff is ordered to appear for deposition on October 30, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. unless Defendants’ counsel stipulates to a different date.

Defendants also request sanctions against Plaintiff. The Court finds Plaintiff’s failure to appear for deposition a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2023.010, subd. (d).) Sanctions have been sufficiently noticed against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel, Jonathan M. Kashani. The Court orders sanctions in the amount of $768.15, as requested by Defendant’s counsel, as that amount is reasonable under the circumstances.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Defendants’ motion to compel deposition is granted. Plaintiff is ordered to appear for deposition on October 30, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. at the Law Offices of Mark R. Weiner & Associates, 655 North Central Avenue, Suite #1125, Glendale, California, 91203-1434 unless Defendants’ counsel stipulates to a different date, time, and/or location.

Plaintiff Luis Damian Robles and Plaintiff’s counsel, Jonathan M. Kashani, jointly and severally, are ordered to pay sanctions in the amount of $768.15 to Defendants, by and through their counsel, within twenty (20) days of this order.

Defendants are ordered to provide notice of this order and file proof of service of such.

DATED: October 18, 2019 ___________________________

Hon. Stephen I. Goorvitch

Superior Court Judge

↧

GALE REAVES VS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELS PROBATION DEPT case docket

October 19, 2019, 6:22 pm

≫ Next: Torres v University of California case docket

≪ Previous: Luis Damian Robles v. Francisco Barajas, Jr

Case Number: BC489065
GALE REAVES VS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELS PROBATION DEPT ET AL
Filing Courthouse: Stanley Mosk Courthouse

Filing Date: 07/25/2012
Case Type: Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction)
Status: Court-Ordered Dismissal – Before Trial – Lack of Prosecution 01/08/2018

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None

AKUDINOBI EMMANUEL C. ESQ. – Attorney for Plaintiff

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – Defendant

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELS PROBATION DEPT. –

HOUSE CALVIN R. ESQ. – Attorney for Defendant

REAVES GALE – Plaintiff

ROJAS MARINA – Defendant

WASHINGTON ANDREA – Defendant

WILLIAMS LA CAR – Defendant

Documents Filed (Filing dates listed in descending order)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
10/27/2017 02/14/2017 04/10/2014 06/19/2013 09/17/2012

04/11/2018 NOTICE TO REPORTER TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

04/11/2018 Ntc to Reptr/Mon to Prep Transcrpt
Filed by Clerk

03/19/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-03-19 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

03/19/2018 Minute Order

03/16/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-03-16 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

03/12/2018 APPELLANT’S NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL

03/12/2018 Designation of Record on Appeal
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

03/09/2018 PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO MOTTION TO STRIKE OR TAX COST; DECLARATION OF EMMANUEL, C. AKUDINOBI IN SUPPORT THEREOF.

03/09/2018 Opposition Document
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

03/05/2018 DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO TAX COSTS; DECLARATION OF NICHOLAS A. HNATIUK IN SUPPORT THEREOF

03/05/2018 Opposition Document
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant)

02/23/2018 NOTICE OF DEFAULT (UNLIMITED CIVIL APPEALS)

02/23/2018 Notice
Filed by Clerk

02/20/2018 PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO TAX COST; DECLARATION OF EMMANUEL C. AKUDINOBI IN SUPPORT THEREOF

02/20/2018 Motion to Tax Costs
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

02/05/2018 NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL

02/05/2018 Ntc to Attorney re Notice of Appeal
Filed by Clerk

02/02/2018 NOTICE OF APPEAL

02/02/2018 Notice of Appeal
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

01/26/2018 MEMO COSTS SUMMARY

01/26/2018 Memo of Costs
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party)

01/08/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-01-08 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/08/2018 CIVIL DEPOSIT

01/08/2018 Minute Order

01/08/2018 Receipt
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

01/08/2018 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); County of Los Angeles (Defendant)

01/05/2018 DEFENDANTS’ SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 5 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE CONCERNING INFORMATION PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVIDE TO WRITTEN DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO PRIOR COURT ORDER

01/05/2018 DEFENDANTS’ STATEMENT OF THE CASE

01/05/2018 DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION IN LIMINE NO.5 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE CONCERNING INFORMATION PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVIDE TO WRITTEN DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO PRIOR COURT ORDER

01/05/2018 DEFENDANTS’ LIST OF [PROPOSED] JURY INSTRUCTIONS

01/05/2018 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant) et al.

01/05/2018 Motion in Limine
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant) et al.

01/05/2018 Statement of the Case
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant) et al.

01/05/2018 Jury Instructions
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant) et al.

01/04/2018 EVIDENCE AND DECLARATION OF NICHOLAS A. HNATIUK IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE NOS. 1-5; AND DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

01/04/2018 DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE NOS. 1-5

01/04/2018 Exhibit List
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

01/04/2018 Request for Judicial Notice
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

01/04/2018 Declaration
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

01/03/2018 DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1 TO DEEM THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF UNDERLYING CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CASE NO. 11-314 AS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

01/03/2018 DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY AND OPINION OF PLAINTIFF’S DESIGNATED EXPERT WITNESS DR. JUBIN MERATI, PH.D. AT TRIAL

01/03/2018 DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3 TO ESTABLISH THAT PLAINTIFF CONSENTED TO THE 30-DAY SUSPENSION THAT WAS THE SUBJECT OF UNDERLYING CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CASE NO. 12-370

01/03/2018 DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 2 TO PRECLUDE LIABILITY BASED UPON MATTERS PREVIOUSLY ADJUDICATED AS PART OF THIS LAWSUIT

01/03/2018 Motion in Limine
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

01/03/2018 Motion in Limine
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant)

12/19/2017 NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL.

12/19/2017 Notice
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

11/29/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-11-29 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

11/29/2017 Minute Order

11/06/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-11-06 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

11/06/2017 Minute Order

11/06/2017 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

11/06/2017 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by County of Los Angeles (Defendant)

11/01/2017 DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE FILED BY PLAINTIFF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA TO MICHAEL ODEN AND TO CLAUDIA CHASE; [PROPOSED] ORDER

11/01/2017 Objection Document
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

10/31/2017 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF MICHAEL ODEN AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS OF $2,511.00; SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF NICHOLAS A. HNATIUK

10/31/2017 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR MONETARY, EVIDENCE, ISSUE AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS; SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF NICHOLAS A. KNATIUK

10/31/2017 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF CLAUDIA CHASE AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS OF $750.00; ETC.

10/31/2017 Reply/Response
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

10/31/2017 Reply/Response
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 10/27/2017 02/14/2017 04/10/2014 06/19/2013 09/17/2012

10/27/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-10-27 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

10/27/2017 AMENDED PROOF OF SERVICE RE: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR MONETARY, EVIDENCE, ISSUE AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS

10/27/2017 Amended Proof of Service
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

10/26/2017 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR MONETARY, EVLDENTIARY, ISSUE, AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS; DECLARATION OF CHIJIOKE 0. IKONTE IN SUPPORT THEREOF

10/26/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

10/25/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

10/25/2017 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS OF MICHAEL ODEN; DECLARATION OF EMMANUEL C. AKUDINOBI IN SUPPORT THEREOF

10/25/2017 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS ON CLAUDIA CHASE; DECLARATION OF EMMANUEL C. AKUDINOHI IN SUPPORT THEREOF

10/24/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-10-24 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

10/19/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

10/19/2017 DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES MOST QUALIFIED PERSON

10/13/2017 Objection Document
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

10/13/2017 Miscellaneous-Other
Filed by Court

10/13/2017 Stipulation and Order to use Certified Shorthand Reporter
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

10/13/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-10-13 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

10/13/2017 STIPULATION AND OFDER TO USE CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

10/13/2017 Minute Order

10/13/2017 PLAENTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO CONSOLIDATION OF CASE NO., BC 489065 AND CASE NO., BC 631171 FOR TRIAL

10/13/2017 MOTION RULING AND RULINGS ON MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS

10/12/2017 Objection Document
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

10/12/2017 Motion for Sanctions
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

10/12/2017 Declaration
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party)

10/12/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR MONETARY, EVIDENCE, ISSUE AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS

10/12/2017 DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF’S REPLY, NOTICE OF ERRATA, AND ATTACHED EVIDENCE FILED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES MOST QUALIFIED PERSON; [PROPOSED] ORDER

10/12/2017 DECLARATION OF NICHOLAS A. HNATIUK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR MONETARY, EVIDENCE, ISSUE AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS

10/10/2017 Declaration
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant)

10/10/2017 DECLARATION OF MICHAEL ODEN IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF MICHAEL ODEN

10/06/2017 Notice
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

10/06/2017 Reply to Opposition
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

10/06/2017 NOTICE OF ERRATA RE: MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES PERSON(S) MOST QUALIFIED (PMQ) REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,310; ETC

10/06/2017 REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES MOST QUALIFIED PERSON (PMQ) REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,310; ETC

10/05/2017 Motion to Quash
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

10/05/2017 Declaration
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

10/05/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-10-05 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

10/05/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF MICHAEL ODEN; ETC.

10/05/2017 Minute Order

10/05/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF CLAUDIA CHASE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS OF $750.00; DECLARATION OF NICHOLAS A. HNATIUK

10/05/2017 DECLARATION OF CLAUDIA CHASE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF CLAUDIA CHASE

09/29/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

09/29/2017 Notice
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant)

09/29/2017 STATEMENT OF NON-OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO BIFURCATE

09/29/2017 DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES MOST QUALIFIED PERSON; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF NICHOLAS A. HNATIUK

09/20/2017 Motion to Compel
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

09/20/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL. DEPOSITION OF COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES MOST QUALIFIED PERSON (PMQ) REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,310; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF; ETC

09/11/2017 Notice of Motion
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

09/11/2017 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party)

09/11/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-09-11 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/11/2017 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

09/11/2017 Minute Order

09/11/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION BIFURCATE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

09/01/2017 Notice
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant)

09/01/2017 STATEMENT OF NON-OPPOSITIONS TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF’S DISCOVERY RESPONSES

08/07/2017 Motion to Compel
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

08/07/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR AN ORDER COMPELLING PLAINTIFF TO RESPOND TO EMPLOYMENT FORM INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE); ETC.

08/07/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR AN ORDER COMPELLING PLAINTIFF TO RESPOND TO FORM INTERROGATORIES, GENERAL (SET ONE);ETC.

08/07/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DEEM ADMISSIONS BE ADMITTED; ETC.

08/07/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR AN ORDER COMPELLING PLAINTIFF TO RESPOND TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE); ETC.

03/28/2017 Receipt
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

03/28/2017 Notice
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant)

03/28/2017 DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF POSTING JURY FEE DEPOSIT

03/28/2017 CIVIL DEPOSIT

03/21/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-03-21 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

03/21/2017 Minute Order

03/17/2017 Reply/Response
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

03/17/2017 REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S BRIEF FOR THE 3/27/17 CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

03/14/2017 Points and Authorities
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

03/14/2017 Brief
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

03/14/2017 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES REGARDING THE VIABILITY OF A CLAIM FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS. AND/OR A PROSPECTIVE BUSINESS/ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE.

03/14/2017 DEFENDANTS’ POSITIONAL BRIEF FOR THE 3/27/17 CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

03/14/2017 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES REGARDING THE VIABILITY OF A CLAIM FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP AND/OR A PROSPECTIVE BUSINESS /ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE

02/28/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-02-28 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

02/28/2017 Minute Order

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 10/27/2017 02/14/2017 04/10/2014 06/19/2013 09/17/2012

02/14/2017 Brief
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

02/14/2017 DEFENDANTS’ TRIAL BRIEF FOR CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

02/06/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-02-06 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

02/06/2017 Minute Order

01/25/2017 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Clerk

01/25/2017 NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

01/24/2017 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Clerk

01/13/2017 Request
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

01/13/2017 REQUEST TO SET STATUS CONFERENCE OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

01/11/2017 Notice of Related Case
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

01/11/2017 NOTICE OF RELATED CASE

12/14/2016 Notice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

12/14/2016 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS

06/16/2016 Answer to Third Amended Complaint
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

06/16/2016 DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF’S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

04/20/2016 Third Amended Complaint
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

04/20/2016 THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

02/26/2016 Unknown Document Type
Filed by Clerk

02/26/2016 REMITTITUR

02/25/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-02-25 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

02/25/2016 Minute Order

06/20/2014 Notice of Ruling
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant) et al.

06/20/2014 NOTICE OF RULING ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO STRIKE COSTS

06/18/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-06-18 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

06/18/2014 Minute Order

06/05/2014 Opposition Document
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant) et al.

06/05/2014 DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO TAX COSTS

06/03/2014 Designation of Record on Appeal
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

06/03/2014 APPELLANTS NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

05/12/2014 Motion to Strike
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

05/12/2014 PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO STRIKE COSTS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TAX COSTS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AN]) AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF.

04/28/2014 Ntc to Attorney re Notice of Appeal
Filed by Clerk

04/28/2014 NOTICE TO ATTORNEY IN RE NOTICE OF APPEAL

04/25/2014 Notice of Appeal
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

04/25/2014 NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE) (APPELLATE)

04/23/2014 Notice of Entry of Judgment
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

04/23/2014 Memorandum of Costs
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

04/23/2014 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

04/14/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-04-14 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 10/27/2017 02/14/2017 04/10/2014 06/19/2013 09/17/2012

04/10/2014 Judgment
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

04/10/2014 Order
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

04/10/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-04-10 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

04/10/2014 JUDGMENT

04/10/2014 ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

04/10/2014 Minute Order

04/10/2014 JUDGMENT

03/27/2014 Notice of Ruling
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party)

03/27/2014 NOTICE OF RULING AT HEARING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

03/26/2014 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/26/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-03-26 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

03/26/2014 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

03/26/2014 Minute Order

03/24/2014 Opposition Document
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

03/24/2014 Reply/Response
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

03/24/2014 Declaration
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

03/24/2014 Opposition Document
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

03/24/2014 PLAINTIFF – GALE REAVES MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND/OR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION.

03/24/2014 PLAINTIFF – GALE REAVES DECLARATION IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND/OR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

03/24/2014 PLAINTIFFS RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND PLAINTIFFS OWN STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

03/24/2014 DECLARATION OF EMMANUEL C. AKUDINOBI IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND/OR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION.

03/21/2014 Reply/Response
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party)

03/21/2014 DEFENDANTS REPLY IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF THE ISSUES

03/18/2014 Declaration
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party)

03/18/2014 Motion in Limine
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party)

03/18/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-03-18 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

03/18/2014 DECLARATION OF SCOTT NENNI RE MEET AND CONFER RE MOTIONS IN LIMINE

03/18/2014 COUNTY’S MOTION IN LLMINE NO. I TO ADMIT FORMER TESTIMONY IN EVIDENCE

03/18/2014 [JETENDANTS NOTICE 01 MOTION AND MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 2 (THAT THE FINAL ACTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BE AFFORDED COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL)

03/14/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-03-14 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

03/04/2014 Notice of Ruling
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/04/2014 NOTICE OF RULING ON THE PLAINTIFFS EX PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL DATE AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING DATES AND FOR A RULING ON WHEN DATE THE COUNTY, ETC

02/28/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-02-28 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

02/28/2014 Minute Order

02/19/2014 Opposition Document
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

02/19/2014 Ex-Parte Application
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/19/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-02-19 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

02/19/2014 EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER CONTINUING THE HEARING DATE FOR THE DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND/OR ADJUDICATION AND TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL AND FINAL STATUS CONFERENCE DATES IN THIS MATTER, AND FOR AN ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS SUPPLEMENTAL

02/19/2014 DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS EX PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATES

02/19/2014 Minute Order

01/22/2014 Stipulation and Order to use Certified Shorthand Reporter
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

01/22/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-01-22 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/22/2014 STIPULATION AND ORDER TO USE CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

01/22/2014 Minute Order

01/08/2014 Opposition Document
Filed by County of Los Angeles (Defendant)

01/08/2014 Miscellaneous-Other
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party)

01/08/2014 DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES, AND FOR $1,550.00 IN SANCTIONS; DECLARATION OF SCOTT NENNI

01/08/2014 DEFENDANTS SEPARATE STATEMENT OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES

01/07/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-01-07 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/07/2014 Minute Order

12/30/2013 Miscellaneous-Other
Filed by Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant) et al.

12/30/2013 Statement of Facts
Filed by County of Los Angeles (Defendant)

12/30/2013 Motion for Summary Judgment
Filed by County of Los Angeles (Defendant)

12/30/2013 DEFENDANTS SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

12/30/2013 DEFENDANTS NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES

12/30/2013 DEFENDANTS EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – VOL.2 OF 2

12/30/2013 DEFENDANTS EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – VOL. 1 OF 2

12/13/2013 Motion to Compel
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

12/13/2013 Miscellaneous-Other
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

12/13/2013 NOTICE OF MOTION & MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS FORM INTEROGATORIES – EMPLOYMENT LAW; REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCION $6,250 AGAINST THE COUNTY AND ITS COUNSELS RECORD, SCOTT NENI AND CALVIN R. HOUSE; DECLARATION OF EMMANUEL C. AKUDINOBI

12/13/2013 PLAINTIFFS SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO HER FORM INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED TO DEFENDANT THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.

11/20/2013 Notice of Motion
Filed by County of Los Angeles (Defendant)

11/20/2013 DEFENDANTS NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR AN ORDER COMPELLING PLAINTIFF TO APPEAR FOR DEPOSITION, AND ETC

08/15/2013 Answer to Second Amended Complaint
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); County of Los Angeles (Defendant)

08/15/2013 DEFENDANTS ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

07/10/2013 Second Amended Complaint
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

07/10/2013 COMPLAINTPERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH – [I] AMENDED (NUMBER): SECOND

07/02/2013 Minute order entered: 2013-07-02 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

07/02/2013 NOTICE OF RULING RE: PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL OF HER LAWSUIT WITH PREJUDICE

07/02/2013 Notice of Ruling
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

07/02/2013 MINUTE ORDER

07/02/2013 CIVIL DEPOSIT

06/25/2013 PLAINTIFFS REPLY TO DEFENDANT COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES OPPOSITION TO HER MOTION FOR MANDATORY RELIEF FROM AN ORDER DISMISSING HER LAWSUIT WITH PREJUDICE; DECLARATION OF EMMANUEL C. AKUDINOBI IN SUPPORT THEREOF

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TOP 10/27/2017 02/14/2017 04/10/2014 06/19/2013 09/17/2012

06/19/2013 Opposition Document
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party)

06/19/2013 DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR MANDATORY RELIEF FROM AN ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS LAWSUIT WITH PREJUDICE AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES; DECLARATION OF SCOTT NENNI IN SUPPORT THEREOF

06/05/2013 Motion
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

06/05/2013 NOTICE OF MOTION & MOTION FOR MANDATORY RELIEF FROM AN ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS LAWSUIT WITH PREJUDICE

05/31/2013 Minute order entered: 2013-05-31 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

04/30/2013 NOTICE OF RULING AT CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

04/30/2013 Notice of Ruling
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

04/29/2013 Minute order entered: 2013-04-29 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

04/29/2013 MINUTE ORDER

04/11/2013 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

04/11/2013 Case Management Statement
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant) et al.

01/22/2013 DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

01/22/2013 Answer to First Amended Complaint
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant) et al.

01/11/2013 NOTICE OF RULING RE: DEFENDANTS DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STAY; AND NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT HEARING

01/11/2013 Notice of Ruling
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

01/10/2013 Minute order entered: 2013-01-10 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/10/2013 Minute Order

01/03/2013 DEFENDANTS REPLY IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY

01/03/2013 DEFENDANTS REPLY IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

01/03/2013 Reply/Response
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

12/14/2012 PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS DEMURRER TO HER FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

12/14/2012 PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION TO STAY

12/14/2012 Opposition Document
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

12/06/2012 DEFENDANTS AMENDED NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

12/06/2012 DEFENDANTS NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STAY CIVIL LAWSUIT PENDING OUTCOME OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HEARING; DECLARATION OF DANIEL C. CARMICHAEL III AND EXHIBITS THERETO

12/06/2012 Motion
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

12/06/2012 Defendant’s Demurrer
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

12/05/2012 INDEX OF FEDERAL CASES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

12/05/2012 DEFENDANTS NOTICE OF DEMURRFR AND DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

12/05/2012 Miscellaneous-Other
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant) et al.

12/05/2012 Demurrer
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant) et al.

11/30/2012 COMPLAINT- PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH FIRST AMENDED

11/30/2012 Amended Complaint
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

11/26/2012 Minute order entered: 2012-11-26 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

11/21/2012 Notice
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/21/2012 DEFENDANTS’ AMENDED NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

11/16/2012 Minute order entered: 2012-11-16 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

11/16/2012 Minute Order

11/09/2012 Case Management Statement
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/09/2012 Challenge To Judicial Officer – Peremptory (170.6)
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); Marina Rojas (Defendant); La Car Williams (Defendant)

11/09/2012 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

11/09/2012 AFFIDAVIT OF PREJUDICE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL OFFICER

11/05/2012 Miscellaneous-Other
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant) et al.

11/05/2012 Demurrer
Filed by County of Los Angels Probation Dept. (Legacy Party); Marina Rojas (Defendant); Andrea Washington (Defendant) et al.

11/05/2012 DEFENDANTS NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT

11/05/2012 INDEX OF FEDERAL CASES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT

10/26/2012 Proof-Service/Summons
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

10/26/2012 PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 10/27/2017 02/14/2017 04/10/2014 06/19/2013 09/17/2012

09/17/2012 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Clerk

09/17/2012 NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

07/25/2012 COMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES)

07/25/2012 SUMMONS

07/25/2012 Complaint
Filed by Gale Reaves (Plaintiff)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 10/27/2017 02/14/2017 04/10/2014 06/19/2013 09/17/2012

Proceedings Held (Proceeding dates listed in descending order)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
02/28/2014

03/19/2018 at 00:00 AM in Department 12
Ruling on Submitted Matter (Ruling on Submitted Matter; Granted in Part) –

03/16/2018 at 09:30 AM in Department 12
Hearing on Motion to Tax Costs – Held – Taken under Submission

01/08/2018 at 10:00 AM in Department 12
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Order of Dismissal) –

11/29/2017 at 00:00 AM in Department 12
Ruling on Submitted Matter – Held – Motion Granted

11/06/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 12
Unknown Event Type – Not Held – Advanced and Vacated

11/06/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 12
Unknown Event Type – Held – Taken under Submission

10/27/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 12
Final Status Conference – Not Held – Advanced and Vacated

10/24/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 12
Final Status Conference (Final Status Conference; Off Calendar) –

10/13/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 12
Hearing on Motion to Compel ((Denied)) –

10/05/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 12
Unknown Event Type – Held – Motion Granted

09/11/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 12
Unknown Event Type – Held – Motion Granted

03/21/2017 at 09:00 AM in Department 12
Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Trial Date Set) –

02/28/2017 at 09:00 AM in Department 12
Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Matter continued) –

02/06/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 12
Court Order – Held – Motion Granted

02/25/2016 at 00:00 AM in Department 12
Court Order

06/18/2014 at 09:30 AM in Department 12
Unknown Event Type – Held – Motion Granted

04/14/2014 at 10:00 AM in Department 12
Jury Trial

04/10/2014 at 00:00 AM in Department 12
Court Order – Held – Motion Granted

03/26/2014 at 09:30 AM in Department 12
Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment – Held – Motion Granted

03/18/2014 at 08:45 AM in Department 26
Mandatory Settlement Conference (MSC)

03/14/2014 at 09:30 AM in Department 12
Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion for Summary Judgment; Continued by Court) –

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 02/28/2014

02/28/2014 at 00:00 AM in Department 12
Court Order – Held – Motion Granted

02/19/2014 at 08:30 AM in Department 12
Ex-Parte Proceedings

01/22/2014 at 09:30 AM in Department 12
Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses (MOTION – COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES; Granted in Part) –

01/07/2014 at 09:30 AM in Department 12
Unknown Event Type – Not Held – Taken Off Calendar by Court

07/02/2013 at 09:30 AM in Department 12
Unknown Event Type – Held – Motion Granted

05/31/2013 at 08:32 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Demurrer – without Motion to Strike (Hearing on Demurrer; Off Calendar) –

04/29/2013 at 09:00 AM in Department 12
Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Order of Dismissal) –

01/10/2013 at 09:30 AM in Department 12
Hearing on Demurrer – without Motion to Strike (Hearing on Demurrer; Sustained) –

11/26/2012 at 08:30 AM in Department 45
Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Off Calendar) –

11/16/2012 at 08:30 AM in Department 45
Unknown Event Type – Held – Motion Granted