Filed 4/22/19 Myhand v. Orange Coast Auto Group CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

TAURUS MYHAND et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

ORANGE COAST AUTO GROUP et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

G055997

(Super. Ct. No. 30-2013-00667089)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, William D. Claster, Judge. Affirmed.

Rosner, Barry & Babbitt, Hallen D. Rosner, Christopher P. Barry and Arlyn L. Escalante for Appellants Taurus Myhand and Nastassia Myhand.

Callahan, Thompson, Sherman & Caudill, Robert W. Thompson, and Thomas R. O’Connor for Respondents, Orange Coast Auto Group and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America.

Severson & Werson, Jan T. Chilton, John B. Sullivan, Erik Kemp and Adam A. Hutchinson for Respondents, Ally Financial Inc. and Gateway One Lending & Finance.

* * *

Plaintiffs Taurus and Natassia Myhand appeal from the order denying their motion for class certification in a putative class action against a car dealership and two financing companies. The trial court concluded the case was unsuitable for class action treatment because plaintiffs failed to prove common issues predominate. (See Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021 (Brinker).) Plaintiffs challenge this finding of lack of commonality as unsupported by substantial evidence and, further, as based on improper criteria and erroneous legal assumptions. We find no merit to these arguments and, consequently, affirm.

I

BACKGROUND

The Myhands filed a putative class action lawsuit against Orange Coast Auto Group and two car loan financing companies (collectively, Orange Coast) on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated consumers who had purchased a new car from Orange Coast using as part of the purchase price a trade-in car on which they still owed money. Plaintiffs alleged that in these purchase transactions, Orange Coast artificially inflated the amount owing on the trade-in car by asking for and inputting on the retail installment sale contract at line 6B (“Less Prior Credit or Lease Balance”) the loan payoff amount rather than the balance owed as of the trade-in date.

Plaintiffs contended the payoff amount included future interest –– typically 10-15 days’ worth –– that was not due on the date of the trade-in. Plaintiffs argued that by inflating the amount owed on the trade-in, Orange Coast reduced the trade-in value, forcing the customer to borrow more for the new car and, thus, pay more in finance charges over the life of the new car loan.

The operative fourth amended complaint stated class claims against Orange Coast for violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.) (CLRA) and the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17200 et seq.) (UCL), alleging the car dealer’s routine practice of disclosing on a sales contract a trade-in vehicle’s “future payoff” rather than the current “balance” violates Civil Code section 2982, subdivision (a)(6)(B), of the Automobile Sales Finance Act and, by extension, the CLRA and UCL. The complaint sought statutory damages and compensatory damages for the overcharges on class members’ sales contracts.

A. The Motion for Class Certification

In October 2016, plaintiffs moved for class certification. They sought to certify a class defined, after some later revision, as all persons who, between August 6, 2009, and August 6, 2013, purchased a vehicle from Orange Coast for personal use pursuant to a retail installment sale contract (RISC), and who used as part of the down payment toward the new vehicle a trade-in vehicle that was subject to a prior lien for which Orange Coast obtained a “‘payoff’ amount . . . for a future date,” and whose RISC for the new vehicle, prepared by Orange Coast, “included a prior credit or lease balance due and owing” for the trade-in vehicle. (Italics added.)

As for the “commonality” element of class certification, the only element at issue in this appeal, plaintiffs’ motion argued the attached excerpts of deposition testimony of two former Orange Coast finance managers proved the dealer had a uniform practice of asking for the “payoff” when customers traded in their vehicles, and then input the payoff on line 6B of the RISC, rather than the statutorily mandated “balance.” Plaintiffs argued that in light of this uniform practice, Orange Coast’s liability for violating the CLRA and the UCL was subject to common proof among all class members, thereby satisfying the certification element of commonality.

Orange Coast’s opposition disputed plaintiffs’ evidence of a “uniform practice” for inputting trade-in loan balances, arguing that other deposition testimony of those same former finance managers proved they had no personal involvement in or knowledge of the procedures followed in requesting trade-in balances. Orange Coast submitted declarations from three other former employees, each of whom had been directly responsible for obtaining trade-in balances during the class period. Orange Coast argued these three declarations proved the company had no uniform practice for obtaining and inputting a customer’s trade-in balance.

According to these three supporting declarations, Orange Coast did not know the amount a customer owed on a trade-in vehicle and relied variously on the customer, the lienholder, or some other source, such as an online system called RouteOne to provide the balance information. Orange Coast argued it “has no way to determine whether the trade-in balance listed on any particular RISC was the trade-in balance as of that day or was overstated” and only the prior lienholder could confirm the balance on the trade-in date. Thus, Orange Coast argued, plaintiffs’ theory for holding Orange Coast liable for class violations of the CLRA and the UCL was not subject to common proof. Instead, individual issues predominated, making the case inappropriate for class action treatment.

In their reply, plaintiffs repeated their argument Orange Coast had a uniform policy of requesting future payoffs rather than balances, and moved to strike the three declarations Orange Coast proffered, complaining Orange Coast failed to identify these three former employees as persons knowledgeable on dealership practices.

B. Additional Discovery and Supplemental Briefing

The trial court continued the certification hearing to allow additional discovery and supplemental briefing on the “ascertainability and commonality elements of class certification,” citing as the “primary reason for the continuance . . . conflicting evidence with respect to whether there was truly a common practice for filling in line 6.B for an ascertainable group of consumers.”

Plaintiffs deposed the three former dealership employees whose declarations Orange Coast had submitted in opposition to the certification motion. In its supplemental briefing, Orange Coast pointed to excerpts of these employees’ deposition testimony proving they did not share plaintiffs’ understanding of the distinction between “payoffs” and “balances” when filling in line 6B of the RISC.

Two of these former Orange Coast employees, Mueller and Jackson, believed “payoff” and “balance” were interchangeable terms that meant the amount owed on a trade-in vehicle on the day they requested the information. The third former employee, Whitehead, thought the two terms had distinct meanings; Whitehead understood “balance” to mean “the amount owed at the time that you make the inquiry,” and he thought “payoff” was “an amount that a lender is giving you that would pay all that is owed . . . as of a certain date so that it would include possibly fees or additional interest[.]”

After receiving this first round of supplemental briefing, the trial court again continued the hearing, finding that “[t]he parties’ supplemental briefing does not satisfactorily address the commonality element—one way or the other. In a nutshell, the finance and sales employees offer conflicting accounts of Orange Coast’s policies and practices, and their declarations and deposition testimony paint an incomplete picture of how Orange Coast processed their retail installment sales contracts (‘the Contracts’) involving a trade-in vehicle. Thus, it appears to the Court that a better way to determine whether Orange Coast had a practice of using a future payoff date in its [RISCs] is by a review of a sampling of the records themselves.”

At that point in the case, the trial court felt sure the deal files held the key to both ascertainability and commonality. The court stated in its minute order: “It also appears that potential class members can be readily ascertained by reference to Orange Coast’s records (i.e.[,] the Contracts, coupled with the checks (or other documentation) issued by Orange Coast to the lender to pay off the Trade-In Vehicle). In other words, the fact that the balance amount in the Contract is the same or substantially similar to the actual check amount (which presumably is issued in the future and includes interest accrued as of that date or later) would indicate the amount listed in the Contract is a future ‘payoff’ amount and not the actual amount owed as of the date of the Contract.”

The court further noted, “If the amount of the check were less than the amount stated in the contract, then that would show that Orange Coast used a future payoff amount in the contract . . . [¶] If the amount of the check were substantially larger than the amount listed in the Contract, then that would tend to show that Orange Coast inputted the current balance amount in the contract.”

As for commonality, the court observed that “[t]he Mueller, Jackson and Whitehead Declarations tend to refute Plaintiffs’ contention that Orange Coast had a common practice of including the future balance payoff. They show that at least some Orange Coast employees used different means to obtain a payoff amount, but they fall short of persuading the Court that Orange Coast did not routinely seek or obtain a future payoff amount. At the end of the day, the conflicting memories of former and current employees regarding a practice that occurred [four]-[eight] years ago may not be the best evidence of whether or not a practice occurred. Documents and numbers, however, are less susceptible to change. For these reasons, a continuance is appropriate to allow Plaintiffs to review a sampling of Orange Coast’s records . . . to attempt to show that, notwithstanding the testimony of some sales managers, Orange Coast in fact routinely inputted the same amount for item 6.B in the Contract as was later paid out to the lienholder.”

Following the court’s order, the parties agreed upon a sampling procedure involving a total of 249 deal files selected by plaintiffs at random.

C. The Trial Court Ruling Denying Class Certification

After hearing argument and taking the matter briefly under submission, the trial court issued a minute order denying the motion for class certification. As is quickly apparent, the sampling of the deal files played a significant role in the court’s determination the case is not suitable for class action treatment.

The minute order began by noting that if “Orange Coast had a policy of requesting future ‘payoffs’ (as opposed to the actual current balance due) from lenders on trade-in vehicles when filling in Line 6B of the Retail Installment Sales Contract . . . then presumably the class action requirements of commonality and ascertainability could be satisfied.”

The trial court then noted the deal files “reviewed by the parties reveal a mixed pattern. For 38 percent of this sample, since the amounts of the checks issued to the lenders were essentially the same as the amounts on Line 6B, and since those checks were always issued a number of days after the Sales Contract was signed,” the court found it reasonable “to assume the amounts on line 6B were future payoff amounts and not the balance due. As it turns out, however, on a number of these deals . . . the amount of the issued check did not reflect the balance due, thereby raising a question as to whether the amount on Line 6B was actually a future payoff amount. As Orange Coast points out, “the only way to confirm the actual balance owed on the date a given Sales Contract was signed is via discovery from the lender.”

“More to the point, approximately 45 [percent] of the sample files include checks from Orange Coast that exceeded the amount on Line 6B. This evidence would suggest that the amount on Line 6B may not have been a future payoff amount on nearly half of the files. At the very least, it demonstrates the potential unreliability of looking solely at the deal files to establish a consistent policy or practice.”

Nor, the trial court concluded, did the rest of the sampled files prove plaintiffs’ assertion Orange Coast had a consistent policy or practice when its employees filled in Line 6.B of the sale contract. The court noted that even “[a]s to the remaining 17 [percent] or so of the sample files” in which the amount on line 6B exceeded the amount of the check sent to the lienholder, “a policy or practice [of including future interest on line 6B] is not clear” “[g]iven the evidence of lenders returning overpayments in some cases, along with the conflicting testimony of how payoff amounts were obtained for inclusion on the Sales Contracts[.]”

The trial court acknowledged there was certainly some evidence “of such a policy or practice,” citing the fact “[nine] of the deal files revealed the existence of a Finance Department preprinted checklist with the notation ‘if there is a trade[-]in, get . . . 10 day payoff.’” But the court noted that even in one of the files containing the checklist, “the payoff amount listed on line 6B is about $1000 less than the check written to pay off the loan.” Consequently, “this checklist does not necessarily reflect what actually occurred.” Moreover, the court stated, given “the limited use of that form as reflected in the files, the Court is hard-pressed to conclude that it actually was a policy routinely adhered to.”

The trial court summarized its findings and conclusion as follows: “The lack of a consistent policy or practice makes this case unsuitable for class action treatment. While there likely are a number of individuals who may have legitimate UCL and/or CLRA claims, Plaintiffs have not provided the Court with a reliable way to determine on a group-wide basis which Orange Coast customers have such claims without making critical individualized inquiries — i.e., what was the balance due on their loan on the day the Sales Contract was prepared, the source of that information, whether that source provided the balance due or a future payoff amount, and how the amount actually paid (after calculating refunds of excess amounts or additional payments made) was determined. In short, because Plaintiffs have not established that common issues predominate (see Brinker[, supra,] 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021), the motion for class certification is denied.”

II

DISCUSSION

“The decision to certify a class rests squarely within the discretion of the trial court, and we afford that decision great deference on appeal, reversing only for a manifest abuse of discretion: ‘Because trial courts are ideally situated to evaluate the efficiencies and practicalities of permitting group action, they are afforded great discretion in granting or denying certification.’ [Citation.] A certification order generally will not be disturbed unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it rests on erroneous legal assumptions. [Citations.]” (Fireside Bank v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1069, 1089.)

Plaintiffs level all three charges against the trial court’s certification order here, challenging the sufficiency of its evidentiary support and the criteria and legal assumptions on which it rests. None of these challenges succeeds.

A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Order Denying Class Certification

The trial court denied class certification based on its finding that individual issues, rather than common issues, predominate. “The ‘ultimate question’ the element of predominance presents is whether ‘the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate adjudication, are so numerous or substantial that the maintenance of a class action would be advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants.’ [Citations.] The answer hinges on ‘whether the theory of recovery advanced by the proponents of certification is, as an analytical matter, likely to prove amenable to class treatment.’ [Citation.] . . . ‘As a general rule if the defendant’s liability can be determined by facts common to all members of the class, a class will be certified even if the members must individually prove their damages.’ [Citations.]” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1021-1022.)

“Predominance is a factual question; accordingly, the trial court’s finding that common issues predominate generally is reviewed for substantial evidence. [Citation.] We must ‘[p]resum[e] in favor of the certification order . . . the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the record. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1022.)

Plaintiffs’ theory of recovery for class-wide violations of the UCL and CLRA was as follows: In every contract to finance a new vehicle purchase where the down payment included a trade-in subject to a lien, “Orange Coast asked for and inputted the trade[-in] payoff, rather than the balance owing” on the RISC. In the class certification motion, plaintiffs argued they can prove this theory of recovery for each class member by proving Orange Coast had a uniform practice of asking for and inputting the future payoff rather than the balance on line 6B.

Orange Coast challenged plaintiffs’ strategy for “common proof” of class-wide statutory violations with its own proof that Orange Coast had no such uniform practice when filling in the balance information on line 6B. Given the lack of a uniform practice, Orange Coast argued, the only way to prove that line 6B of a RISC failed to disclose the requisite “prior credit or lease balance” was to conduct an individualized inquiry on that RISC. Orange Coast contended the need for an individualized inquiry as to each class member demonstrated that individual issues predominated over common issues, making the case unsuitable for class treatment.

The trial court agreed. It found plaintiffs failed to prove Orange Coast had the claimed uniform practice and, consequently, failed to prove the crucial element of commonality. Substantial evidence supports that finding.

Orange Coast produced declarations and deposition testimony from former employees proving that they asked for and obtained trade-in balance information from various sources, including the customers themselves, and, thus, had no uniform practice for obtaining that information. In fact, Orange Coast disclaimed on the RISC any responsibility for the accuracy of the line 6B information as to the trade-in balance. Orange Coast’s evidence demonstrated it had no way of knowing whether the amount provided by whatever source was accurate; only the lienholder knew the exact balance on the trade-in date, and the lienholder would confirm the accuracy of the balance stated on line 6B when it either accepted Orange Coast’s payoff check “as is,” requested additional money, or refunded some amount.

While plaintiffs correctly asserted Orange Coast employees uniformly admitted asking for the “payoff” amount from whatever source, Orange Coast proved its employees had no shared understanding of what “payoff” meant. The employees did not all understand “payoff” to mean balance plus future interest, as plaintiffs defined the term. Instead, Orange Coast employees used the terms “payoff” and “balance” interchangeably. Moreover, plaintiffs did not prove that by asking for the payoff, Orange Coast employees received a “future payoff,” meaning the current balance plus some days’ of future interest, as plaintiffs asserted.

The sampling of the deal files further disproved plaintiffs’ claim Orange Coast had a uniform practice of inputting the “future payoff” rather than current loan balance on line 6B: In 45 percent of the sample files, Orange Coast sent a payoff check to the lienholder “that exceeded the amount on Line 6B.” In other words, the amount on line 6B was insufficient to pay off the loan, presumably because it did not cover the interest that accrued from the date of the trade-in to the date of the payoff. And as for the 38 percent of the sample files in which the checks to lenders “were essentially the same as the amounts on Line 6B,” the court found other evidence in the same files refuting plaintiffs’ assertion of a “uniform practice” to include future, unaccrued interest in line 6B. In at least 16 of these files, Orange Coast issued a subsequent check to the lienholder to correct an underpayment in the initial payoff check.

Curiously, plaintiffs try to turn the substantial evidence inquiry on its head by arguing the trial court erred in denying certification because plaintiffs submitted “sufficient” testimonial and documentary evidence “to grant class certification.” Plaintiffs go to considerable lengths in their brief pointing to all the evidence that supports their factual contentions. As Orange Coast aptly responds, however, “[W]e do not ask on this appeal whether [the Myhands’] evidence may have been sufficient to support class certification, but confine our analysis to whether the record contains substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that ‘individual facts and issues . . . requiring separate adjudication are more numerous and significant than the common issues.’” (Dailey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 974, 992; Quacchia v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1442, 1448-1449.) As explained above, a wealth of evidence here supported the trial court’s finding that plaintiffs failed to establish that common issues predominate.

We note plaintiffs make a seeming last ditch effort to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the ruling by arguing the court relied on hearsay. Plaintiffs failed to raise that objection to the evidence in the trial court, thereby waiving the argument on appeal.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Base its Order on Improper Criteria or Erroneous Legal Assumptions

Plaintiffs’ arguments that the trial court based its order on improper criteria and erroneous legal assumptions likewise fail.

Plaintiffs state their argument about “improper criteria” as follows: “The Myhands demonstrated that Orange Coast had a policy of always requesting payoffs, but the trial court based its class certification denial on improper criteria by focusing on the different sources of the payoff amount and the different amounts inputted by Orange Coast on line 6.B or purchase contracts.”

Plaintiffs argue both the source of the payoff information and the exact amounts inputted into line 6B on each RISC are irrelevant to class certification. Plaintiffs contend the amount inputted into line 6B will ultimately be relevant to proving individual damages, but is not relevant to certification. In plaintiffs’ view, the only relevant inquiry is whether Orange Coast had a uniform practice of asking for payoffs.

According to plaintiffs, Orange Coast’s uniform practice of asking for a trade-in vehicle’s payoff rather than its balance meant Orange Coast never received the balance information and, thus, never inputted the information statutorily required on the RISC. Instead, plaintiffs argued, Orange Coast always received and inputted the future payoff –the balance plus some additional days’ interest – thereby violating the CLRA and UCL.

Plaintiffs’ argument about “improper criteria” fails because it is based on a false premise: that plaintiffs proved Orange Coast had a uniform practice for obtaining and inputting balance information on line 6B, and that practice by necessity never resulted in accurate information as to balance. As already explained, the evidence on this key issue was conflicting and the trial court chose to believe Orange Coast’s evidence. That evidence proved Orange Coast had no uniform practice for obtaining balance information and there is no way of determining from the Orange Coast’s files alone whether the information on line 6B of any RISC is accurate. Plaintiffs are simply wrong in contending the trial court’s “focus” on the different sources of the balance information and the balance amounts reflected on individual deal files is irrelevant to certification.

Finally, plaintiffs argue the trial court based certification denial on the “erroneous legal assumption” that “it would be too difficult to prove whether and how each class member was harmed because the source and the exact amount of the trade-in balance was unknown without further individualized inquiry.” Again, plaintiffs argue that it is improper to deny certification because proof of damages will require individualized inquiries. But plaintiffs mischaracterize the nature of the individualized inquiries underlying the court’s finding that individual issues predominate. The court concluded proof of the claimed statutory violations will depend on individualized inquiries. That finding was based on substantial evidence and provided an undeniably sound basis for denying certification here.

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.

III

DISPOSITION

The order denying the motion to certify the class is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to costs on appeal.

ARONSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

FYBEL, J.

Case Number: 19STCV13924 Hearing Date: June 18, 2019 Dept: 85

Inhance Digital Corporation v. Maziar Farzam, et al., 19STCV13924

Tentative decision on (1) motion to seal: denied; (2) application for preliminary injunction: granted in part

Cross-Complainant Maziar Farzam (“Farzam”) applies for a preliminary injunction against Cross-Defendants Penn Arthur (“Arthur”) and Ari Kaplan (“Kaplan”), as well as Inhance Digital Corporation (“Inhance” or “the Company”) as a nominal Cross-Defendant.

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition,[1] and reply,[2] and renders the following tentative decision.

A. Statement of the Case

1. Complaint

Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Inhance filed its Complaint on April 22, 2019, alleging causes of action for (1) breach of fiduciary duties, (2) breach of contract, (3) interference with prospective economic relations and, (4) accounting. The Complaint alleges in pertinent part as follows.

After years of working together, the founders of Inhance, Arthur and Farzam are no longer able to do business together for the benefit of the company. In conjunction with the company’s Chief Financial Officer, Kaplan, Arthur made the decision to terminate Farzam as the company’s President and Secretary. To that end, the two have executed shareholders’ resolutions and notified Farzam of their intent.

The catalyst for the dispute with Farzam arose from his insistence that his wife, Michelle Farzam (“Michelle”) be employed by and continue to work for Inhance. Farzam has become autocratic, angry, volatile, and threatening in recent years, creating a culture of fear and hostile work environment. While working at Inhance, Michelle engaged in volatile behavior that was detrimental to Inhance’s culture. She was condescending towards Arthur and consistently undermined his authority. She also berated, ridiculed, and harassed Inhance’s employees regularly, creating a hostile work environment and inducing several employees to quit.

A consultant hired to evaluate Inhance’s company culture confirmed that Michelle’s presence was highly detrimental to the company, and Farzam conceded and reduced the amount of time Michelle spent at the office. Despite this, Inhance has lost many valued employees and had its business disrupted, despite Arthur’s best efforts to resolve the situation.

In February 2019, Michelle began coming to the office every day once again, against Arthur’s wishes. Arthur sent Farzam an email and letter objecting, which induced Farzam to begin a campaign to take over operations of the company to the exclusion of Arthur. Farzam has since made several decisions to that effect, including cutting off Kaplan’s access to Inhance’s bank accounts and attempting to fire Kaplan.

Farzam and Michelle have also expended inordinate amounts of expenses charged to the company over the years, including trips to various locales with luxury accommodations. Farzam also insisted on paying Michelle a salary that is unreasonable and disproportionate to her contributions to the company.

Arthur’s attempts to terminate Michelle have caused Farzam to also begin behaving in an increasingly volatile and abusive manner. Farzam has on various occasions berated and verbally abused Inhance employees, on some occasions threatening physical harm. Farzam’s behavior has been detrimental to Inhance in the form of lost employees and a damaged reputation within the industry.

2. Cross-Complaint

Cross-Complainant Farzam filed his Cross-Complaint on April 29, 2019, alleging causes of action for (1) fraud, (2) breach of written contract, (3) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (4) breach of fiduciary duty (on behalf of Farzam against Arthur), (5) breach of fiduciary duty (on behalf of Inhance against Arthur), (6) breach of fiduciary duty (on behalf of Farzam against Arthur and Kaplan), (7) conversion (on behalf of Farzam), (8) conversion (on behalf of Inhance), (9) accounting, (10) declaratory relief, (11) injunctive relief[3], (12) appointment of receiver, and (13) judicial dissolution. The Cross-Complaint alleges in pertinent part as follows.

Farzam has learned that Arthur and Kaplan have looted Inhance and fraudulently misclassified hundreds of thousands of dollars of these funds as various company expenses. When Farzam discovered this malfeasance and terminated Kaplan, Kaplan and Arthur joined forces and purported to amend the bylaws with the intent to ultimately remove Farzam as President. Arthur also locked Farzam out of Inhance and cut off his access to Inhance’s bank account.

Though Arthur’s position requires him to travel for work, in recent years his travel has become excessive such that he has little to no involvement in the actual operations of Inhance. Arthur does not take a salary but rather a $15,000 dividend twice a month. He has also recently begun taking additional funds to pay his personal expenses. Arthur’s spending appears wildly disproportionate with the income he grosses in shareholder dividends, based on his ownership of expensive cars and his frequent personal trips.

On April 15, 2019, Farzam discovered evidence that Kaplan had been fraudulently entering his own personal expenses as company expenses and was paying off personal credit card debt with company funds. Farzam promptly terminated Kaplan, which prompted Arthur to lock Farzam and Michelle out of the company by cutting off their network access. Farzam’s further investigation revealed that Arthur was also using company expenses to pay off personal credit cards, in excess of $50,000. Further forensic investigation revealed that Arthur and Kaplan have collectively looted in excess of $613,508 of the Inhance’s funds, which represents a substantial misappropriation of funds and assets carrying likely adverse tax consequences for Inhance.

3. Course of Proceedings

On April 26, 2019, Judge Beckloff, sitting in Department 86, denied Plaintiff Inhance’s ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and order to show cause re: preliminary injunction (“OSC”) seeking to restrain Farzam from coming to the office, accessing Inhance’s books and records, or representing himself as an officer of the Company. Judge Beckloff made alternative orders which would be considered by this court on April 30, 2019.

On April 30, 2019, the court denied Farzam’s ex parte application for appointment of a receiver. The court also clarified the continued ex parte application for a TRO/OSC. The parties agreed to a number of mutual restraints which were ordered by the court. The court noted that the only remaining issue for the OSC is an injunction against payments of any kind to Arthur and Kaplan. The parties subsequently stipulated to continue the hearing to the instant date.

B. Motion to Seal

Inhance seeks to seal the Financial Declaration of Arthur in Support of the Opposition to OSC re: preliminary injunction.

1. Applicable Law

CRC Rules 2.550 and 2.551 set forth the standards and procedures for sealing court records.

The rules are derived from the holding in NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178. Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open. CRC 2.550(c).

A court may order records sealed only if it expressly finds all of the following: (1) there exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record; (2) the overriding interest supports sealing the record; (3) a substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; (4) the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) no less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest. CRC 2.550(d).

As to procedures, CRC 2.551(b) provides: (1) a party requesting that a record be filed under seal must file a noticed motion for an order sealing the record. The motion must be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities and a declaration containing facts sufficient to justify the sealing; (2) the party requesting that a record be filed under seal must lodge it with the court under (d) when the motion is made, unless good cause exists for not lodging it. Pending the determination of the motion, the lodged record will be conditionally under seal; (3) if necessary to prevent disclosure, the motion, any opposition, and any supporting documents must be filed in a public redacted version and lodged in a complete version conditionally under seal; (4) if the court denies the motion to seal, the clerk must return the lodged record to the submitting party and must not place it in the case file.

A record filed publicly in the court must not disclose material contained in a record that is sealed, conditionally under seal, or subject to a pending motion to seal. CRC 2.551(c).

The party requesting that a record be filed under seal must put it in a manila envelope or other appropriate container, seal the envelope or container, and lodge it with the court. CRC 2.551(d)(1). The envelope or container lodged with the court must be labeled “CONDITIONALLY UNDER SEAL.” CRC 2.551(d)(2). The party submitting the lodged record must affix to the envelope or container a cover sheet that: (i) contains all the information required on a caption page under rule 201; and (ii) states that the enclosed record is subject to a motion to file the record under seal. CRC 2.551(d)(3).

Upon receipt of a record lodged under this rule, the clerk must endorse the affixed cover sheet with the date of its receipt and must retain but not file the record unless the court orders it filed. CRC 243.2(d)(4).

The Advisory Committee Comment to Rule 2.550 provides that the rules recognize the First Amendment Right of Access to documents used at trial or as a basis of adjudication, but do not apply to records that courts must keep confidential by law.

Before sealing a record, a court must find an “overriding interest” that support the sealing. KNBC-TV, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 1217-1218.

Under appropriate circumstances, such interests may include protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment; privacy interests of a prospective juror during individual voir dire; protection of witnesses from embarrassment or intimidation so extreme that it would traumatize them or render them unable to testify; of trade secrets, protection of information within the attorney-client privilege, and enforcement of binding contractual obligations not to disclose; safeguarding national security, ensuring the anonymity of juvenile offenders in juvenile court; and ensuring the fair administration of justice, and preservation of confidential investigative information. Id. at 1222, fn. 46.

The leading case with respect to sealing orders under CRC 243.1 et seq. is Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Superior Court, (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1273.

To determine whether records should be sealed, the court must hold a hearing and expressly find that (i) there exists an overriding interest supporting closure and/or sealing; (ii) there is a substantial probability that the interest will be prejudiced absent closure and/or sealing; (iii) the proposed closure and/or sealing is narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest; and (iv) there is no less restrictive means of achieving the overriding interest. Universal City Studios, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at 1279.

2. Analysis

Inhance notes that the Arthur declaration provides an extremely detailed account of his spending in a typical month, including high personal expenses. Arthur Seal Decl. ¶ 2. Arthur asserts that the declaration should be sealed as he has a constitutional right to privacy. Arthur Seal Decl. ¶3. Arthur also argues that Inhance could be irreparably damaged if any of its customers were to decline to do business based on the information regarding his financials. Arthur Seal Decl. ¶4.

The privacy argument is untenable. Arthur has a privacy right and need not submit a declaration in support of Inhance’s opposition at all. But when he voluntarily does so, he comes into court, a public forum, where embarrassing information and humiliating details must be aired as a matter of course. No privacy right protects against the unsealed submission of information such as personal finances or even general health information. A declaration may be sealed only if it would reveal specific information which could cause financial harm or other real damage.

The financial harm to Arthur and Inhance also is untenable. The declaration provides no specific account numbers or other personal information from which Arthur’s identity could be stolen. For damage to Inhance, Plaintiff must show how Arthur’s financial information could be linked to Inhance so that a competitor would obtain advantage. Inhance has not done so.

Paragraphs 3 through 5 refer to Arthur’s family, their health, and the expenses he incurs supporting each family member. There is no overriding interest in sealing these statements. While Arthur includes details about his family members’ health issues, mere embarrassment is insufficient to justify sealing. None of the information would financially harm Inhance or Arthur.

Paragraph 6 details Arthur’s personal credit card debt. Arthur provides no rationale for why this should be sealed other than a speculative argument that Inhance could lose customers who may decline to deal with the Company based on Arthur’s financials. This is insufficient to justify sealing.

Paragraphs 7 and 8 detail Arthur’s payments for his house and cars. There is no overriding interest supporting sealing, and no showing of financial harm to Inhance or Arthur.

Paragraphs 9 through 12 detail Arthur’s assertion that he cannot go without compensation for his services to Inhance; he will be subject to foreclosure on his assets without payment. Arthur also details his total outstanding debts and obligations and provides a summary of his monthly expenses. Ex. 1. Arthur provides no overriding interest justifying sealing of this information other than his speculation that Inhance might lose customers as a result of knowledge of his financials. Again, this speculation is insufficient and mere embarrassment is insufficient to justify sealing.

3. Conclusion

Arthur’s application to seal the Financial Declaration of Penn Arthur is denied. Inhance may either elect to withdraw the declaration or allow it to be filed unsealed. The court will discuss the matter with counsel at the hearing.

C. Preliminary Injunction

Cross-Plaintiff Farzam seeks a preliminary injunction restraining Inhance from making payments of any kind to Cross-Defendants Arthur and Kaplan.

1. Applicable Law

An injunction is a writ or order requiring a person to refrain from a particular act; it may be granted by the court in which the action is brought, or by a judge thereof; and when granted by a judge, it may be enforced as an order of the court. CCP §525. An injunction may be more completely defined as a writ or order commanding a person either to perform or to refrain from performing a particular act. See Comfort v. Comfort, (1941) 17 Cal.2d 736, 741. McDowell v. Watson, (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1160.[4] It is an equitable remedy available generally in the protection or to prevent the invasion of a legal right. Meridian, Ltd. v. City and County of San Francisco, et al., (1939) 13 Cal.2d 424.

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final resolution upon a trial. See Scaringe v. J.C.C. Enterprises, Inc., (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1536. Grothe v. Cortlandt Corp., (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316; Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn., (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 623. The status quo has been defined to mean the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. Voorhies v. Greene (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 989, 995, quoting United Railroads v. Superior Court, (1916) 172 Cal. 80, 87. 14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp., (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402.

A preliminary injunction is issued after hearing on a noticed motion. The complaint normally must plead injunctive relief. CCP §526(a)(1)-(2).[5] Preliminary injunctive relief requires the use of competent evidence to create a sufficient factual showing on the grounds for relief. See e.g. Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v. Green, (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 146, 150. Injunctive relief may be granted based on a verified complaint only if it contains sufficient evidentiary, not ultimate, facts. See CCP §527(a). For this reason, a pleading alone rarely suffices. Weil & Brown, California Procedure Before Trial, 9:579, 9(ll)-21 (The Rutter Group 2007). The burden of proof is on the plaintiff as moving party. O’Connell v. Superior Court, (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.

A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show the absence of an adequate damages remedy at law. CCP §526(4); Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors, (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 300, 307; Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1565. The concept of “inadequacy of the legal remedy” or “inadequacy of damages” dates from the time of the early courts of chancery, the idea being that an injunction is an unusual or extraordinary equitable remedy which will not be granted if the remedy at law (usually damages) will adequately compensate the injured plaintiff. Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1565.

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the trial court considers two factors: (1) the reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial (CCP §526(a)(1)), and (2) a balancing of the “irreparable harm” that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. CCP §526(a)(2); 14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp., (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402; Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Schectman, (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1283; Davenport v. Blue Cross of California, (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 435, 446; Abrams v. St. Johns Hospital, (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 628, 636. Thus, a preliminary injunction may not issue without some showing of potential entitlement to such relief. Doe v. Wilson, (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 296, 304. The decision to grant a preliminary injunction generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Thornton v. Carlson, (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1255.

A preliminary injunction ordinarily cannot take effect unless and until the plaintiff provides an undertaking for damages which the enjoined defendant may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction. See CCP §529(a); City of South San Francisco v. Cypress Lawn Cemetery Assn., (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 916, 920.

2. Statement of Facts

a. Cross-Complainant’s Evidence

Inhance is a digital marketing company which averages about $17 million in annual revenues. Farzam Decl. ¶3. Farzam is the co-founder of Inance, owns 48% of its outstanding shares, and is a member of the Board of Directors. Farzam Decl. ¶4, Ex. A. Farzam is the President, Secretary, and interim Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) of Inhance. Farzam Decl. ¶4. Prior to April 23, 2019, Farzam oversaw the day-to-day management of Inhance. Farzam Decl. ¶4. Farzam also is the number one salesperson at the business. Farzam Decl. ¶5.

Arthur is the other member of the Board of Directors and owns 48% of the outstanding shares of Inhance. Farzam Decl. ¶8, Ex. A. Arthur is the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of Inhance and is primarly responsible for sales. Farzam Decl. ¶8. Arthur’s job requires him to travel for work, although there is an expectation that he work from the office and attend weekly meetings. Over the past few years, Arthur’s travel has become excessive such that he is rarely in the office and has little to no involvement in the actual operations of Inhance. Farzam Decl. ¶8.

Arthur does not take a salary with Inhance. Instead he takes a $15,000 “draw” or dividend twice a month. Farzam estimates Arthur grosses approximately $360,000 in income from the Company, although Farzam recently learned Arthur has taken additional sums from the Company, without consent, to pay his personal expenses and these expenses were disguised on the Company’s accounting records as Company expenses. Farzam Decl. ¶9.

Arthur’s wife does not work. He has three children, two of whom are grown adults, and all live with him in a condominium in West Hollywood. Arthur, his wife, and two of his children drive expensive cars. Arthur frequents high end restaurants and takes frequent personal trips. Arthur travels more than is necessary for business and rare makes appearances at Inhance. Arthur started a scotch and whiskey collection. Arthur has confided in Farzam certain facts indicating he has trouble managing his money and has a personal tax liability of $300,000 to the IRS as of 2016. Farzam Decl. ¶9

In 2015, Arthur and Farzam agreed to exit the industry and sell the Company. They agreed to attempt to maximize their return by working to increase Inhance’s value, and hired Kaplan for his experience in mergers and acquisitions. Farzam Decl. ¶15. Kaplan is a certified public accountant (“CPA”). Kaplan was given the title of CFO of Inhance. Kaplan holds 4% of the outstanding shares of the Company. Farzam Decl. ¶10, Ex. A.

Between 2015 and 2018, Inhance failed to secure a viable agreement from any potential buyers and began struggling to pay its employees. This resulted in a $3.5 million IRS tax liability, and tax liens assessed against Farzam and Arthur for the trust portion of the liability, which is comprised of employee withholdings that had not been paid to the IRS. Farzam Decl. ¶17. As a result, Farzam is now personally liable for ensuring approximately half of the $3.5 million owed to the IRS is paid in in full. In addition, the Company’s former bank, Montecito Bank & Trust called its $1.2 million line-of-credit against the Company because Inhance ran a recurring deficit. Farzam Decl. ¶¶ 15-17. On March 29, 2019, Inhance entered in to an agreement with the IRS to make payments on its $3.5 million in tax liability. Farzam Decl. ¶23, Ex. E.

Farzam and Michelle personally loaned the Company $324,623.44 to cover various shortfalls between 2015 and 2018. In addition, they accumulated $31,709.21 in business expenses, which they allowed the Company to postpone payment on out of concern for the well-being Company. To this day, these expenses remain unreimbursed. Farzam Decl. ¶18.

In December 18, 2018, Michelle alerted Farzam that Kaplan was using his personal credit card to book another employee’s travel expenses, which Farzam thought was unusual. Farzam Decl. ¶21. Farzam decided to assume COO duties to oversee Kaplan and his departments. Farzam Decl. ¶22. After several weeks, he noticed serious management problems throughout the Company and notified Arthur of these issues. Farzam Decl. ¶22, Ex. D.

On March 30, 2019, Farzam and Arthur met at Dupar’s to discuss Kaplan’s termination for failure to improve the Company’s finances or valuation. Farzam also raised his concerns about the usage of personal credit cards for Company expenses. Arthur responded he had charged some things on his personal credit card that he should not have, but he disagreed with Farzam’s suggestion to hire a controller to review and approve travel and to control costs. Farzam Decl. ¶24.

Farzam continued to have disagreements with Arthur about the direction of the Company. On April 3, 2019, in response to Farzam’s suggestion that Inhance terminate Kaplan, Arthur stated that Kaplan was not the source of the Company problems. He told Farzam to buy him out of the Company. Farzam Decl. ¶25.

On April 4, 2019, Kaplan sent Farzam a message indicating he was taking a weekend trip with his wife. He also defended his use of his personal American Express credit card, despite the fact that Farzam had not previously discussed the matter of his credit card use with him. Farzam Decl. ¶ 26, Ex. F. Farzam later learned that Kaplan logged into the Company’s QuickBooks and changed ledger entries for quarterly overpayments related to his American Express credit card. Farzam Decl. ¶27, Ex. N.

Farzam consulted with the Company’s employment counsel, who in turn hired a forensic consultant to investigate Kaplan’s financial dealings. On April 15, 2019, the forensic accountant submitted evidence showing that Kaplan fraudulently entered his personal expenses as Company expenses and confirmed that Kaplan was paying off his personal credit card every month with Company funds. Farzam Decl. ¶28. Company counsel communicated with both Farzam and Arthur regarding the findings. Farzam Decl. ¶28, Ex. G.

Farzam terminated Kaplan from his position with Inhance on April 15, 2019. Farzam Decl. ¶29. The same day, Farzam held a Company meeting and advised that an investigation was taking place into financial abuse at the Company. Farzam Decl. ¶29, Ex. H. Farzam then notified Inhance’s business banker that all wire transfers from Inhance’s bank account would require approval from Farzam and Arthur. Farzam copied the correspondence to Arthur. Farzam Decl. ¶30, Ex. F.

On the same day, unbeknownst to Farzam, Arthur and Kaplan purported to enter into a corporate resolution in which they claimed to amend the by-laws to appoint and elect a third director of the Company named Brandon Becker (“Becker”). Farzam Decl. ¶31, Ex. J. Becker is a close friend of Arthur. Farzam Decl. ¶32. Farzam would never have agreed to allow Becker to be part of the Company due to his belief that Becker was prosecuted by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) for credit card laundering and illegal factoring of credit card transactions. Farzam Decl. ¶32, Ex. K.

On April 22, 2019, Farzam learned that his email account had been compromised and was being read by Donald Shrum, the IT Manager. Farzam Decl. ¶33.

Subsequent to his firing, Kaplan retained legal counsel, who sent a letter to Farzam on April 19, 2019 accusing him of exceeding his authority, breaching his fiduciary duty to the Company, and of creating a hostile work environment at Inhance. Farzam Decl. ¶34. Inhance’s counsel prepared a response letter, which was distributed to both Arthur and Farzam and which identified Kaplan’s embezzlement of company funds and his improper taking of Company property. Farzam Decl. ¶34, Ex. L.

On April 23, 2019, Arthur locked Farzam and his wife, Michelle, out of the Company, cutting off their Company network access, in reliance upon a invalid corporate resolution adopted by Kaplan and Arthur. Arthur cut off Farzam’s ability to view the Company’s bank account balances so that he could not verify whether further embezzlement was taking place. Farzam Decl. ¶35.

Farzam has since learned that Arthur, like Kaplan, has used Company funds to pay off his personal credit cards, which in turn pay for exorbitant personal expenditures, including payments for luxury vehicles and luxury lodgings, totaling $271,965. Farzam Decl. ¶36, Ex. M; Connelly Decl. ¶4.

On April 23, 2019, Arthur purported to notice a special meeting of the board of directors to terminate Farzam on Thursday, April 25, 2019, despite lacking the authority to do so. Farzam Decl. ¶35. The same day, the Company’s forensic accountant issued a preliminary report outlining Kaplan’s illicit activities by causing the Company to pay $361,410.16 of his personal expenses. Farzam Decl. ¶38, Ex. N; see Connelly Decl. ¶5.

Farzam thereafter noticed a special meeting of the Board with the intent to offer a resolution that the Company hire an independent third party to conduct a forensic examination of the Company’s books and records. Farzam Decl. ¶38, Exs. N, O.

After Arthur initiated his lawsuit against Farzam, Farzam learned that Arthur terminated the Company’s employment counsel who had hired the forensic accountant. Farzam Decl. ¶41.

Farzam never agreed to retain the law firm of Julander, Brown & Bollard, which is illegitimately acting on behalf of Inhance and in the interest of Arthur, not the Company. Farzam Decl. ¶42.

Farzam retained David B. Connelly (“Connelly”) to investigate matters pertaining to Inhance. Connelly has examined the preliminary investigation report containing the findings of the previous forensic investigation into Arthur and Kaplan. Connelly Decl. ¶2.

The investigation is ongoing but has thus far identified significant misappropriations by both Arthur and Kaplan, arising from their inappropriate use of their credit card accounts. Arthur and Kaplan’s subject charges to their cards were paid by Inhance, and generally charged as expenses of the corporation. Connelly Decl. ¶3.

With respect to Arthur, Connelly has identified personal transactions totaling at least `$271,965, that were charged to Arthur’s various credit card accounts during the period from March 2017 through March 2019. Connelly’s understanding is that the transactions were inappropriate personal expenses, corroborated by Connelly’s review of QuickBooks records and transaction descriptions. These transactions included airfare and lodging in Hawaii and Mammoth Lakes (family vacations), Paris, Amsterdam, and Rio de Janeiro, as well as repeated charges for Scotch whiskey that exceeded $10,000. Connelly Decl. ¶4, Schedules. 1, 2.

Connelly has been able to corroborate the previous investigation’s conclusion that suggest that Kaplan misappropriated funds totaling $341,543 from Inhance. Connelly Decl. ¶5, Exs. 2, 3.

Collectively, these inappropriate transactions total at least $613,508 during the past two years and represent substantial misappropriations of Inhance funds/assets. These diversions of corporate funds for the benefit of Arthur and Kaplan likely have adverse tax consequences to the corporation. Connelly Decl. ¶6.

b. Cross-Defendant’s Evidence[6]

Inhance was originally organized in 1997 by Arthur and Farzam. Arthur Decl. ¶3. The chasm between Arthur and Farzam followed after Farzam insisted that his wife work at the Company and receive compensation even when she was not working. Arthur Decl. ¶5.

After Arthur insisted that Kaplan be given a chance to defend himself, Farzam fired Kaplan against Arthur’s wishes. Farzam unilaterally terminated Kaplan. Arthur Decl. ¶6.

On April 18, 2019, Arthur and Kaplan amended the bylaws to add a tie breaking director, appointing Becker as an independent director. Arthur Decl. ¶6, Ex. 3; Julander Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6.

Since April 23, 2019, Arthur has investigated the allegations regarding Kaplan’s misappropriation of company funds through improper credit card reimbursements. Arthur Decl. ¶7. He has secured Kaplan’s voluntary suspension, and, contrary to Farzam’s assertion, Kaplan has not utilized his credentials to access the Company’s QuickBooks. Arthur Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, Ex. 4. Arthur is committed to terminating Kaplan, if appropriate, in a way that does not bring potential liability to the company for a wrongful termination lawsuit. Arthur Decl. ¶9.

Over the last decade, Arthur has taken issue with Farzam’s opulence, funded by a $105,000 salary that Farzam insisted Inhance pay Michelle. Farzam and Michelle have owned expensive cars and taken numerous vacations to various foreign locales. They have also spent inordinate amounts of money in expenses charged to Inhance. Expenditures include luxury accommodations and first-class travel. Arthur Decl. ¶¶ 11-12.

Arthur has made loans to the Company in April 2018 and February 2019 which have not been repaid. Arthur Decl. ¶13. Farzam has made no loans to the Company that have not been repaid. Arthur Decl. ¶13.

Farzam has been charging monthly loan obligations to the Company on a loan he took out on his house to pay personal taxes, a total of approximately $20,270.52 in such payments. Arthur Decl. ¶13. Farzam took another $55,961.79 in December 2018 to pay personal taxes. Arthur Decl. ¶13.

These actions by Farzam contributed to Arthur’s decision to amend the bylaws and appoint Becker. The resolutions are not unlawful due to Kaplan’s participation because Kaplan is not a controller of Inhance and does not own more than 50% of the voting power. Arthur Decl. ¶¶ 14-15, Exs. 3, 7.

On April 23, 2019, Arthur and Becker gave notice of the meeting of the board schedule for April 26, 2019. Becker and Arthur attended the meeting but Farzam did not. Becker and Arthur voted to terminate Farzam from his position at Inhance. Farzam is no longer an employee of Inhance but remains a minority shareholder. Arthur Decl. ¶¶16-17, Exs. 7, 8, 9; Julander Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.

At the direction of the court, Arthur discussed with Farzam the circumstances under which the parties can work together going forward. Farzam’s continued presence at Inhance will not work for the Company. All but one of Inhance’s executive team objected to Farzam returning to the Company. Farzam has been a toxic presence at the Company for some time and bringing him back is not in Inhance’s interests. Arthur Decl. ¶18; Julander Decl. ¶9.

Inhance has offered to pay Farzam $15,000 every two weeks until a mediation with the parties can be conducted in July. Inhance offered those payments as an advance against a future sale of the company and a purchase of Farzam’s interest, but also agreed that the characterization of those funds could be the subject of negotiation at the mediation. During this timeframe, Inhance offered to keep Farzam affiliated with the company as a consultant who would be available to Arthur to assist with client issues. Also during this time, further litigation activities would be put on hold pending the outcome of the mediation. Julander Decl. ¶9.

In response, Farzam countered that both he and Arthur would be paid $15,000 every two weeks as independent contractor Sales Agents, subject to funds being available. As a Sales Agent, Farzam further proposed that he be permitted to work on his client accounts without restriction and “be permitted to access, use, and rely upon Inhance’s creative directors and executive producers chosen by Farzam, and any subordinate employees under the creative directors’ and executive producers’ supervision.” Under his proposal, Farzam would have access to Inhance’s facilities on an as-needed basis and he would be restored to his email account, the Salesforce CRM and full access to QuickBooks. Farzam proposed that he and Arthur would both attend three identified trade shows and that all expenses would be reimbursed subject to the other’s approval. Farzam’s proposal was that he would return to the company as a sales agent with full access to the company’s employees, records and resources. Julander Decl. ¶10, Ex. 3.

On May 3, 2019, Inhance provided Farzam with read-only access to the bank accounts and QuickBooks accounting records. Arthur Decl. ¶19.

Contrary to Farzam’s statements to the court, Arthur did not, and has not, fired the attorney’s that Farzam hired to look into Kaplan’s financial activities. Julander Decl. ¶3, Ex. 2.

Farzam’s presence is not required for the success of the Company. Arthur continues to be the primary business developer for Inhance. His accounts generate an average of $8 million per year in revenue. Arthur flies about 250,000 miles every year from his sales activities. Arthur Decl. ¶25. Arthur has consistently originated more business than Farzam. Arthur Decl. ¶20.

Inhance has many projects set to debut at the Paris Airshow and Farzam has no involvement with any of these projects. Hendrie Decl. ¶4; Bluestein Decl. ¶6. Farzam previously behaved inappropriately at prior shows and his attendance at the Paris Air Show will be detrimental and possibly damaging to Inhance. Hendrie Decl. ¶¶ 4-7.

Inhance will benefit from Farzam’s continued absence and can continue its work on its projects without Farzam’s presence. Yates Decl. ¶2; Leland Decl. ¶6; Nelson Decl. ¶5; Hendrie Decl. ¶3; Bluestein Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.

Inhance has a plan for each of Farzam’s accounts going forward. Arthur Decl. ¶21-22. Farzam’s allegations that Inhance has failed to pay some of its payroll tax obligations are groundless. Inhance’s payroll taxes and IRS installment payments are all current. Arthur Decl. ¶¶ 23.

In removing Farzam and Michelle as employees of Inhance, Arthur has taken on an increased work load and works over 70 hours per week conducting various activities on Inhance’s behalf. This includes working with the Finance, Marketing, Production, and Creative departments, among others. Arthur Decl. ¶24. Inhance regularly pays its sales staff a 5% commission. Inhance employs two full-time salespeople, one with a $150,000 base salary with 5% commission, and the other with a $150,000 draw against 5% commissions. On that basis Arthur would be expected to earn $400,000 from his sales activities. Arthur Decl. ¶26.

On May 4, 2019, the Board of Directors passed a resolution to grant Arthur a salary for his continuing work at Inhance equal to his prior compensation with net payments of $15,000 every two weeks for a period of six months during which tie the Board will retain a third-party compensation expert who will recommend any future compensation going forward. Becker and Arthur voted in favor of the resolution and Farzam voted against it. Arthur Decl. ¶27, Ex. 4.

Arthur asked Peter Stephan (“Stephan”), a CPA and managing partner of SST CPAS, Inc., to examine the Company’s ledger and other books and records to provide an opinion as to whether Inhance will be able to pay Arthur $15,000 net salary every two weeks while still keeping its payroll, tax and vendor obligations current. After examining the general ledger and other books and records of the company, Stephan opines that Inhance can easily meet this objective given the parameters that certain obligations will be eliminated going forward and also assuming that certain nonrecurring charges are indeed nonrecurring. Stephan Decl. ¶¶ 1, 4-5.

Stephan used the Company’s general ledger for the year 2018 and the most recent first quarter of 2019 as indicative of the company’s expected performance going forward. From the company’s actual outflows, Stephan added back the nonrecurring obligations and charges to normalize with the Company’s expected outflows. Stephan assumed that the draw, salary and expense obligations of Farzam, Michelle, and Kaplan, will not be continuing. Stephan Decl. ¶5, Exs. 1, 2. In addition, Stephan noted that penalties in 2018 amounting to $383,632 were not significantly recurring in 2019. For the year 2018, there was free cash flow after adjustment for nonrecurring expenses of $1,675,781. For the first quarter of 2019 there was free cash flow after adjustment for nonrecurring expenses of $384,147. Stephan Decl. ¶5, Exs. 1, 2.

c. Reply Evidence

After the April 30, 2019 hearing, counsel for Inhance, Dirk Julander (“Julander”) informed counsel for Farzam, Christopher Reeder (“Reeder”), that Arthur had unilaterally noticed the Board meeting of May 4, 2019. Julander did not notify Reeder that he planned to attend the meeting, and Reeder would have objected had he known, as counsel’s presence was not appropriate. Reeder Decl. ¶4.

On May 10, Julander’s office transmitted to Reeder a copy of the purported resolutions adopted at the meeting. Reeder responded by letter informing Julander that the resolutions did not accurately reflect those presented at the meeting or the conduct of the directors and Julander, as reflected by the meeting minutes. Reeder Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, Exs. 3, 4.

Subsequent discussions between Julander and Reeder in attempting to negotiate a settlement were unsuccessful. Julander rejected Reeder’s proposal and did not provide a counter-proposal. Reeder Decl. ¶7.

After noticing an unexplained increase in the Company’s payroll, Farzam, through Reeder, made a shareholder demand for relevant documentation regarding Inhance’s payroll for the last three months. Inhance is required to make this information available. Reeder Decl. ¶8, Ex. 5. Julander’s office responded that he was unable to comply with the demand because Julander was on vacation. Reeder Decl. ¶9, Ex. 6.

As of April 24, 2019, Inhance owed the IRS $171,563.53 in past due payroll tax obligations from April 3, 2019 and April 17, 2019. Farzam[7] Reply Decl. ¶3. Rather than direct funds toward the Company’s outstanding tax obligations, Arthur caused Inhance to pay his personal credit card him on April 24, 2019 in the amount of $65,419.12 and again on April 25, 2019 in the amount of $33,635.08. Farzam Reply Decl. ¶4, Ex. 2.

Farzam attend the Board of Directors meeting on May 4, 2019, and immediately prepared minutes of the discussions after leaving the meeting. Farzam transmitted the meeting minutes to Arthur on May 6, 2019 but never received a response. Farzam Reply Decl. ¶6, Ex. 3.

At the meeting, Julander spoke with Farzam about matters relating to this litigation without Farzam’s attorney being present, including by arguing with Farzam about the propriety of Arthur continuing to receive dividends from Inhance. Farzam Reply Decl. ¶7. Also at the meeting, Arthur attempted to reinstate his biweekly $15,000 shareholder dividend compensation over Farzam’s objections. When Farzam advised Arthur that he was forbidden from doing so due to Inhance’s financial status and relevant corporations law for California and Delaware, Arthur recharacterized his dividend as a salary. Arthur and Becker voted to reinstate the payments over Farzam’s objections. Farzam Reply Decl. ¶8, Ex. 3.

Despite the court order, Arthur and Julander refused to discuss with Farzam his role in the Company moving forward. Instead, they purported to pass a Board Resolution requiring Farzam to negotiate his role directly with the court. Farzam Reply Decl. ¶9.

Farzam received a copy of the resolutions with regard to the meeting, but these resolutions contradict the minutes Farzam prepared and what actually occurred at the meeting. Farzam Reply Decl. ¶10.

Since April 30, 2019, Farzam has monitored Inhance’s Wells Fargo account and QuickBooks, consistent with the court’s order. The records reflect that on May 10, 2019, Inhance made a payment of $40,721.16 to Arthur’s personal credit card account. Farzam Reply Decl. ¶11, Exs. 5, 6.

From 2016 through 2018, Inhance failed to pay employment taxes to the IRS resulting in its $3.5 million present installment obligation and Agreement with the IRS. Connelly’s review of the Agreement that Arthur executed with the IRS on March 29, 2019 revealed the following: (i) Inhance owed the IRS $3,536,918 in unpaid employment taxes as of March 25, 2019, for the quarters March 2016 through March 2018; and (ii) Inhance’s monthly installment payments of $30,000 were to commence May 28, 2019, with subsequent monthly payments increasing to $50,000 on November 28, 2019, and further increasing to $100,000 on May 28, 2021. The terms of the Agreement require Inhance to file all federal tax returns and pay federal taxes owed on time while the Agreement is in effect. Further, the IRS can terminate the Agreement, and collect the entire amount owed, including seizure of the company or its assets, if Inhance does not pay any other federal tax debt when due, or make the agreed upon monthly installment payments. Connelly Reply Decl. ¶7, Ex. A.

As of May 10, 2019, Inhance owed the IRS approximately $84,098.46 in payroll tax obligations, which were due on April 17, 2019 and over $85,000 in payroll tax obligations, which were due on May 1, 2019. Farzam Reply Decl. ¶12.

On May 23, 2019, Inhance’s payroll, which does not include payroll taxes, appears to have increased to $235,892.31 from the last payroll on May 9, 2019 in the amount of $212,884.09. Farzam Reply Decl. ¶14, Ex. 8.

On May 28, 2019, Arthur’s company debit card was used for a $103.00 cash withdrawal at an ATM at the LAX Terminal. Arthur also used the Company’s ATM card to withdraw $43.00 at LAX on May 6, 2019. Farzam Reply Decl. ¶15, Ex. 9.

Inhance has made significant payments for (i) Arthur’s personal credit card account 0-95001 of $65,419.12 on April 24, 2019 and $40,721.16 on May 10, 2019, and (ii) Penn Arthur’s Inhance business account 9-11005 of $33,635.08 on April 25, 2019 and its $22,670.52 payment on May 29, 2019 was also apparently for such account. These payments were identified during Connelly’s recent review of transaction statements for Inhance’s Wells Fargo main checking account 1056448580 and the corresponding QuickBooks records. Connelly Reply Decl. ¶5; Farzam Reply Decl. ¶16, Ex. 10.

Due to continuing cash shortfalls, Inhance has failed to make the requisite timely employment tax payments in 2019, thereby serving to jeopardize its $3.5 million Agreement with the IRS. Specifically, Inhance did not turnover/pay its federal employment taxes on time for the following payroll dates: (i) March 29, 2019 – $87,059 due IRS by April 3, 2019, for first post-Agreement payroll, was not paid until April 25, 2019; (ii) April 12, 2019 – $84,098 due IRS by April 17, 2019 was apparently not paid until May 12, 2019; and (iii) April 26, 2019 – $87,753 due IRS by May 1, 2019 was not paid until May 7, 2019. Similarly, Inhance did not turnover/pay its state employment taxes on a timely basis for those payroll dates. Connelly Reply Decl. ¶8.

Contrary to Stephan’s conclusions, the QuickBooks accounting records report net shortfalls in cash, for both the year ended December 31, 2018 and the three months ended March 31, 2019. The net cash decrease for 2018 reported in Inhance’s QuickBooks records did not agree with the two different annual change in cash totals reported in the SST report for such period. Connelly Reply Decl. ¶9.

Stephan’s analysis did not include adjustments for significant events adversely affecting Inhance’s future cash flows, resulting in substantial overstatements of his determined “free cash flow” available to compensate Arthur on a go forward basis. Connelly Reply Decl. ¶10. Specifically, the analysis did not account for (1) the devastating impact on the Company should the IRS terminate the Installment Agreement; or (2) any adjustments for Inhance’s loss of future sales revenue previously generated by Farzam. Connelly Decl. ¶¶ 11-12, Exs. A, B.

Inhance has sustained annual losses and maintained negative retained earnings balances and is insolvent. Accordingly, Delaware General Corporation Law section 170(a) and California Corporations Code §500 prohibit the issuance of dividends. Connelly Reply Decl. ¶¶ 17-19, Ex. E.

In violation of the court’s order enjoining any payments to Arthur or Kaplan until further order of the court, Inhance has made significant payments to Arthur’s accounts after the April 30, 2019 hearing. Connelly Reply Decl. ¶22, Ex. G.

3. Analysis

Cross-Defendant Farzam applies for a preliminary injunction enjoining Inhance from issuing any payments of any kind, including dividends, draws, salaries, and expense reimbursements, to Arthur and Kaplan.

The court need not address the issues of Kaplan’s termination, improper expense reimbursement by Arthur and Kaplan, Farzam’s termination, the addition of Becker as a director, or Farzam’s access to Inhance’s records. Nor does the court need to address the adequacy of the court-ordered May 7, 2019 board meeting and the resolutions that resulted from it, or the viability of the Company without Farzam’s sales effort — the parties present conflicting evidence on this issue – except as it bears on payments to Arthur.

The only issue that remains unresolved is payment to Arthur for his services. Kaplan is no longer a Company officer and is entitled to no payments. Nor does Kaplan oppose, or Inhance on his behalf. Arthur does not personally oppose, although Inhance does so for him.

a. Probability of Success

Arthur’s position is simple. He previously received a $15,000 draw every two weeks. Now, he has an increased work load of over 70 hours per week. Arthur Decl. ¶24. Inhance pays its sales staff a 5% commission and $150,000 salary or draw. If he were a salesman, Arthur would expect to earn $400,000 from his sales activities. Arthur Decl. ¶26. The Board of Directors supports paying Arthur because it passed a resolution to grant him a salary of $15,000 every two weeks for a period of six months until the Board retains a compensation expert who will recommend any future compensation.

Arthur asserts that Inhance continues to be profitable despite Farzam’s absence. Opp. at 10. Arthur argues that without the financial burden of paying Farzam’s draw and expenses ($390,00), his wife’s salary and tax burden ($109,000), and Kaplan’s salary and tax burden ($274,176), Inhance is easily able to pay Arthur while still having sufficient income to meet its obligations. Stephan Decl. ¶4, Ex.2. Opp. at 10-11.

Farzam argues that Inhance is not financially able to continue making payments to Arthur. Contrary to Stephan’s conclusions, the QuickBooks accounting records report net shortfalls in cash for both the year ended December 31, 2018 and the first quarter. Connelly Reply Decl. ¶9.

Due to continuing cash shortfalls, Inhance has failed to make timely employment tax payments in 2019, thereby serving to jeopardize its $3.5 million Agreement with the IRS. Specifically, Inhance made untimely payroll tax payments to the IRS for the following payroll dates: (i) $87,059 due by April 3, 2019 for first post-Agreement payroll, was not paid until April 25, 2019; (ii) $84,098 due by April 17, 2019 was apparently not paid until May 12, 2019; and (iii) $87,753 due by May 1, 2019 was not paid until May 7, 2019. Similarly, Inhance did not turnover/pay its state employment taxes on a timely basis for those payroll dates. Connelly Reply Decl. ¶8.

Inhance has sustained annual losses and maintained negative retained earnings balances and, under both Delaware and California law, the Company cannot issue dividends. Connelly Reply Decl. ¶¶ 17-19, Ex. E. Inhance’s expert, Stephan, did not include (1) the impact should the IRS terminate the Installment Agreement or (2) any adjustments for Inhance’s loss of future sales revenue previously generated by Farzam. Connelly Decl. ¶¶ 11-12, Exs. A, B.

Despite Farzam’s evidence, Arthur should be entitled to some compensation when working for the benefit of shareholders (himself, Farzam, and Kaplan). He previously received $15,000 every two weeks in draws and now is receiving nothing. He cannot be expected to continue working on the prospect of turning the Company around without compensation.

On the other hand, the Company’s priority must be payment of employees, payment of payroll taxes, and payment of back payroll taxes. Moreover, Arthur cannot be permitted to run expenses through the Company, either personal or business, without some supervision or concurrence of Farzam.

Additionally, Farzam presents evidence that Arthur has violated the TRO. Since the April 30, 2019 TRO, Inhance’s records reflect that Inhance made a payment of $40,721.16 for Arthur’s personal credit card account on May 10, 2019. Farzam Reply Decl. ¶11, Exs. 5, 6. Additionally, Arthur’s company debit card was used for a $103.00 cash withdrawal at an ATM at the LAX Terminal on May 28, 2019, and again for $43.00 at LAX on May 6, 2019. Farzam Reply Decl. ¶15, Ex. 9. These are serious issues, with the $40,721.16 payment as the most serious violation. Arthur is entitled to little compensation if he deliberately violated the court’s TRO, even if these payments were business related.

Farzam has shown a probability of success on his claim.

b. Balance of Hardships

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the second factor which a trial court examines is the interim harm that plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. Donahue Schriber Realty Group, Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach, (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1177. This factor involves consideration of the inadequacy of other remedies, the degree of irreparable harm, and the necessity of preserving the status quo. Id.

Farzam has shown that Inhance is insolvent and at risk of having its assets seized and its shareholders exposed to legal action by the IRS if an injunction is not issued. Farzam has also provided evidence that Inhance continues to make payments to Arthur in violation of the court’s TRO, demonstrating that further improper payments are likely to occur without an injunction. Connelly Reply Decl. Ex. G; Farzam Reply Decl. Exs. 8-9. If an injunction is issued, Arthur will only suffer monetary harm.

The balance of hardships favors issuance of a preliminary injunction.

4. Conclusion

The preliminary injunction is granted in part. Inhance will be enjoined from issuing any payments of any kind, including, but not limited to, dividends, draws, salaries, or expense reimbursements to Arthur and Kaplan, with the exception of a salary to be determined by the court at hearing. Additionally, Arthur may not cause Inhance to pay (1) his business credit card, or any other employee’s credit card incurring an expense on Arthur’s behalf, or (2) his personal credit card, without Farzam’s initial review and approval of the expenses, or the Board of Directors’ decision overriding Farzam’s objection.

The court must require a bond supporting the preliminary injunction. The purpose of a bond is to cover the defendant’s damages from an improvidently issued injunction. CCP §529(a). In setting the bond, the court must assume that the preliminary injunction was wrongly issued. Abba Rubber Co. v. Seaquist, (“Abba“) (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1, 15. The attorney’s fees necessary to successfully procure a final decision dissolving the injunction also are damages that should be included in setting the bond. Abba, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at 15-16. The greater the likelihood of the plaintiff prevailing, the less likely the preliminary injunction will have been wrongly issued, and that is a relevant factor for setting the bond. Oiye v. Fox, (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1062. Neither party discusses the matter of a bond. The court will discuss the bond amount with counsel at the hearing.

[1] Inhance failed to lodge its courtesy copy of its Appendix of Declarations and Exhibits with exhibit tabs. Inhance’s counsel is admonished to do so for all future courtesy copies.

[2] Farzam’s 15-page reply exceeds the ten-page limit of CRC 3.1113(d) by five pages. The court has exercised its discretion to read and consider only the first ten pages.

[3] Injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action.

[4] The courts look to the substance of an injunction to determine whether it is prohibitory or mandatory. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 709, 713. A mandatory injunction — one that mandates a party to affirmatively act, carries a heavy burden: “[t]he granting of a mandatory injunction pending trial is not permitted except in extreme cases where the right thereto is clearly established.” Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. v. Furlotti, (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 187, 1493.

[5] However, a court may issue an injunction to maintain the status quo without a cause of action in the complaint. CCP §526(a)(3).

[6] The court has ruled on Farzam’s objections to the Declaration of Dirk O. Julander, sustaining the first and overruling the second.

[7] Farzam’s Reply Declaration incorporates much of the information from his previous Declarations.

Case Number: BS172171 Hearing Date: June 18, 2019 Dept: 85

Casey Crow Casey Crow v. City of Long Beach, et al., BS 172171

Tentative decision on (1) motion to strike FAP: granted in part; (2) Elevated’s demurrer to FAP: sustained in part; (3) City’s demurrer to FAP: sustained

Defendants City of Long Beach (“City”) and Elevated Experience Inc. (“Elevated”), separately demur and Elevated separately moves to strike portions of the First Amended Petition (“FAP”) of Plaintiff Casey Crow Collective (“Casey Crow”).

The court has read and considered the moving papers, oppositions, and reply,[1] and renders the following tentative decision.

A. Statement of the Case

1. The Petition/Complaint

Petitioner/Plaintiff Casey Crow commenced this proceeding on January 18, 2018, asserting causes of action for (1) peremptory writ of mandate, (2) injunctive relief,[2] (3) declaratory relief, (4) intentional interference with prospective business advantage, and (5) violation of the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code §17200, et seq.). The operative pleading is the verified FAP filed on February 13, 2019, which alleges in pertinent part as follows.

Respondent/Defendant City of Long Beach (“City”) held a lottery (“Lottery”) on September 28, 2017 in which the winner was granted a license to operate a medical marijuana dispensary. Both Casey Crow and Elevated entered real property into the Lottery. Elevated’s real property located at 6150 Cherry Avenue, Long Beach, CA (“6150 Cherry”) was selected for licensure in the Lottery even though Elevated had asked the City for its removal from the Lottery.

The real property entered by Casey Crow was not selected but placed first on the wait list for a license. If 6150 Cherry is disqualified for licensure, then the property entered by Casey Crow will be eligible for licensure. Casey Crow appealed the City’s selection of the 6150 Cherry to the City Council, and its appeal was summarily rejected.

Crow Casey Crow requests a traditional writ of mandate directing the City to reverse its determination for licensing 6150 Cherry and proceed to Casey Crow as the applicant next in line for a license. Casey Crow contends that the City failed to comply with its legal ministerial duty set forth in Long Beach Municipal Code (“LBMC”) section 5.90.230 by granting a license to Elevated, which does not own or have possession over 6150 Cherry and because Elevated expressly asked that the 6150 Cherry be removed from Lottery selection.

2. Course of Proceedings

On January 3, 2019, the court granted Casey Crow’s motion to compel Elevated to attend a deposition and produce documents and to compel Elevated’s co-owner, Chris Francy (“Francy”), to appear for deposition and produce documents.

On January 29, 2019, Casey Crow moved for leave to file the FAP, which the court granted on February 5, 2019.

B. The Demurrers[3][4]

1. Applicable Law

Demurrers are permitted in administrative mandate proceedings. CCP §§1108, 1109. A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleading alone and will be sustained where the pleading is defective on its face.

Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer or motion to strike or by motion for judgment on the pleadings. CCP §430.30(a); Coyne v. Krempels, (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257. The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object by demurrer or answer to the pleading. CCP §430.10. A demurrer is timely filed within the 30-day period after service of the complaint. CCP § 430.40; Skrbina v. Fleming Companies, (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1364.

A demurrer may be asserted on any one or more of the following grounds: (a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading; (b) The person who filed the pleading does not have legal capacity to sue; (c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action; (d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties; (e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; (f) The pleading is uncertain (“uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible); (g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct; (h) No certificate was filed as required by CCP §411.35 or (i) by §411.36. CCP §430.10. Accordingly, a demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. CCP §430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan, (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.

The face of the pleading includes attachments and incorporations by reference (Frantz v. Blackwell, (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94); it does not include inadmissible hearsay. Day v. Sharp, (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 904, 914.

The sole issue on demurrer for failure to state a cause of action is whether the facts pleaded, if true, would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Garcetti v. Superior Court, (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1547; Limandri v. Judkins, (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 339. The question of plaintiff’s ability to prove the allegations of the complaint or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court. Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 47. The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403. Nevertheless, this rule does not apply to allegations expressing mere conclusions of law, or allegations contradicted by the exhibits to the complaint or by matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Vance v. Villa Park Mobilehome Estates, (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 698, 709.

For all demurrers filed after January 1, 2016, the demurring party must meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. CCP §430.31(a). As part of the meet and confer process, the demurring party must identify all of the specific causes of action that it believes are subject to demurrer and provide legal support for the claimed deficiencies. CCP §430.31(a)(1). The party who filed the pleading must in turn provide legal support for its position that the pleading is legally sufficient or, in the alternative, how the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer could be amended to cure any legal insufficiency. Id. The demurring party is responsible for filing and serving a declaration that the meet and confer requirement has been met. CCP §430.31(a)(3).

2. Elevated’s Demurrer

Elevated demurs to each of the FAP’s causes of actions on the grounds that (1) they do not state valid claims for relief and are impermissibly vague and uncertain, (2) are barred as a matter of law for failing to plead all of the necessary elements including a ministerial duty (as to the First and Second Causes of Action), the existence of an actual controversy (as to the Third Cause of Action), the existence of an economic relationship (as to the Fourth Cause of Action), and the existence of a wrongful act (as to the Fifth Cause of Action). Dem. at 5. Casey Crow opposes.

a. First Cause of Action for Mandamus

Elevated demurs to Casey Crow’s first cause of action for traditional mandamus on the grounds that the FAP fails to identify a ministerial duty and fails to identify any abuse of a discretion, Casey Crow lacks standing to pursue mandamus, and Casey Crow fails to show no adequate remedy at law. Dem. at 13-18.

i. Beneficial Interest

Elevated argues that Casey Crow lacks standing to pursue mandamus because it has failed to show that it is beneficially interested. Dem. at 17.

A petitioner may only obtain a writ of mandate if they have a special interest to be served or a particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the interest held in common with the public at large. The interest must be concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. SJJC Aviation Servs., LLC v. City of San Jose, (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1053.

Casey Crow’s claim is based on the City’s failure to remove Elevated from the Lottery process after Elevated withdrew its request to be removed. Elevated asserts that Casey Crow fails to allege a beneficial interest because the randomness of the Lottery means that Casey Crow cannot establish that the outcome would have favored Casey Crow if Elevated had been removed. Dem. at 17. Elevated also notes that it has not been issued a license, meaning that the issue is not ripe and the FAP fails to allege any legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent. Dem. at 17.

Casey Crow asserts that, while Elevated’s argument might bear on the application withdrawal issue, it does not affect Casey Crow’s allegations of disqualification for submitted false Owner Authorization Forms and change of ownership. Casey Crow has demonstrated that it is “next in line” for licensure if Elevated is removed. Opp. at 15, 16-17. Elevated’s argument that the issue is not ripe is irrelevant that Elevated has not yet completed the licensure process. The City has already determined that Elevated qualifies for the license, so there is no issue of ripeness. Opp. at 17.

Casey Crow’s argument is persuasive. It has a beneficial interest in seeing Elevated disqualified so that it will be next in line. A lack of a beneficial interest on the application withdrawal issue does not undermine the entire cause of action.

ii. Adequate Remedy at Law

CCP section 1086 requires that a petitioner have no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy other than mandamus before pursuing a petition for mandamus.

Elevated alleges that the FAP improperly and incorrectly states that Casey Crow has no adequate remedy at law besides mandamus. Dem. at 18. Elevated notes that Casey Crow has two pending lawsuits against Elevated regarding the same conduct, and these pending lawsuits preclude Casey Crow from claiming it has no remedy other than mandamus. Dem. at 18; Reply at 4.

The short answer is that Casey Crow does not have any other lawsuit pending against the City for mandamus.

iii. Ministerial Duty/Abuse of Discretion

Elevated asserts that Casey Crow has not identified a ministerial duty that the City failed to perform, as is required in a mandamus action. Elevated Dem. at 13-14.

The duty sought to be compelled must usually be a ministerial duty. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water Dist., (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 247, 261. A ministerial duty is an act that must be performed in a prescribed manner according to the mandate of legal authority without the exercise of discretion, judgment “or opinion concerning such act’s propriety or impropriety.” Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma Cnty. Union High School Dist., (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916. “Where a statute or ordinance clearly defines the specific duties or course of conduct that a governing body must take, that course of conduct becomes mandatory and eliminates any element of discretion.” Rodriguez v. Solis, (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 495, 504-05; see State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Super. Ct., (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 348-349.

Casey Crow contends that the FAP identifies three separate policies that the City violated: (1) requiring any application withdrawal or alteration in status to be requested in writing; (2) prohibiting any lessee applicant from obtaining a license if the City is advised the property owner does not consent to a medical marijuana business at the property; and (3) prohibiting any ownership changes of an applicant prior to license issuance. Opp. at 5-6, 14.

(a) Fraudulent Application

Casey Crow seeks to compel the City to disqualify 6250 Cherry on the basis that the Owner Authorization form signed and submitted with Elevated’s application for 6150 Cherry, submitted by the owner of 6150 Cherry, CSC Holdings LLC (“CSC”), was fraudulent and the City had a ministerial duty to discover as much under LBMC sections 5.90.230 and 5.90.210.

Elevated asserts that the LBMC provisions relied upon by Casey Crow do not identify a ministerial duty. Elevated Dem. at 14. Elevated notes that neither LBMC section 5.90.230 nor section 5.90.210 imposes a ministerial duty on the City. Dem. at 14-15. The former simply lists the items for an applicant to include in an application and the latter concerns violations by persons who are licensed or operating without a license. Opp. at 14. Elevated is not licensed; it remains an applicant. Id. Elevated argues that because LBMC section 5.90.230 and 5.90.210 do not impose any duty on the City, it cannot have abused its discretion by violating it. Dem. at 16.

Casey Crow argues that the law requires an agency to follow its own rules and regulations where they are valid and unambiguous. Gregory v. State Board of Control, (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 584, 595; Galzinki v. Somers, (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1170-75. Opp. at 7. The FAP explicitly identifies the City’s pertinent policies and provides evidence that explain the policies and describe their sources. Elevated Dem. Opp. at 5-6. Casey Crow contends that the City’s policy is to never issue a license to an applicant leasing property where the property owner had advised that City that it prohibited operation of a medical marijuana business on the property. FAP ¶34. Opp. at 6. In violation of that policy, the City permitted Elevated to pursue a license even though CSC, the owner of 6150 Cherry, advised the City that it expressly prohibited Elevated from using the property for that purpose. Opp. at 6.

An agency’s ministerial duty is a duty stemming from a statute or ordinance that clearly defines the specific duties or course of conduct. Rodriguez v. Solis, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th 495 at 540-05. Whether a statute imposes a ministerial duty for which mandamus is available, or a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation. AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health, (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 701. An agency also can be compelled to follow its own rules where those rules are a matter of published procedure. Galzinski, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at 1172 (written procedure for investigating complaints against employees published in brochure). But Casey Crow cites no case law that an agency has a ministerial duty based on an unwritten and unpublished policy or procedure. To conclude otherwise would undermine the requirement that an agency’s employees must have a clear and present ministerial duty without regard to their own judgment of the act’s propriety. See Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School District, (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916.

Casey Crow also argues that Elevated misinterprets and oversimplifies LBMC sections 5.90.230 and 5.90.210 in arguing that these provisions do not impose a ministerial duty on the City. Casey Crow argues that LBMC section 5.90.230 imposes a duty on the City to deny an application where the property owner falsely affirms its consent to the operation of a marijuana business. Opp. at 8. Casey Crow notes that both sections use the word “shall,” thereby invoking a mandatory duty.

According to Casey Crow, the two provisions create a clear discretionary duty for the City to confirm that the authorization forms are truthful. Opp. at 9. By requiring an applicant to sign a notarized Owner Authorization Form in which the property owner provided consent under penalty of perjury, the City had a discretionary duty to ensure the truthfulness of each statement on the form. Opp. at 10. The City violated this discretionary duty by failing to act when Elevated presented documents showing the falsity of its Owner Authorization Form – i.e., that CSC and Elevated lied about that consent to qualify 6150 Cherry for licensure. Elevated Dem. Opp. at 10-12.

Elevated does not dispute that LBMC section 5.90.230 mandates the submission of an authorization form, but argues that the provisions do not impose a duty on the City to investigate and confirm the validity of such forms. Elevated notes that Casey Crow does not dispute that the required form was submitted and no part of LBMC section 5.90.230 requires any further action on the City’s part. Elevated Reply at 3.

The court agrees. Elevated submitted an authorization form in compliance with LBMC section 5.90.230 and nothing in that provision requires the City to inquire into its validity. Rather, the City may rely on the truthfulness of the applicant.

Apart from ministerial duty, traditional mandamus relief is unavailable unless the petitioner can demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Mandamus will not lie to compel the exercise of a public agency’s discretion in a particular manner. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 247, 261. Mandamus is only available to correct an abuse of discretion actually exercised. Manjares v. Newton, (1966) 64 Cal.2d 365, 370-71. An agency decision is an abuse of discretion if it is “arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, unlawful, or procedurally unfair.” Kahn v. Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System, (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 98, 106.

The FAP does not adequately allege an abuse of discretion by the City. That is, it does not allege that the City investigated Elevated’s authorization form and arbitrarily ignored the fact that Elevated lied about property owner consent. Rather, the FAP alleges that the City had documents in its files contradicting the owner authorization forms (FAP ¶30), and took the position that it would rely on the form under penalty of perjury and not investigate. FAP ¶32. As the city had no duty to investigate, this decision was not arbitrary and capricious.

(b) Withdrawal of 6150 Cherry

The FAP alleges that, while Elevated submitted an application for 6150 Cherry (and two other properties) in February 2017, Elevated withdrew the 6150 Cherry application six weeks before the Lottery. Elevated then informed the City that there was an error in the deletion of the 6150 Cherry application, which the City interpreted to mean that Elevated did not want 6150 removed. 6150 was selected as a Lottery winner on September 28, 2017. Casey Crow was not one of the first ten lottery balls selected, and the FAP alleges that it is next in line if 6150 is disqualified. The FAP asserts that the City failed to adhere to internal policies and procedures.

Elevated again argues that internal policies and procedures are an insufficient basis for a ministerial duty because such duties can only arise from statute or ordinance, not from an internal procedure under Kavanaugh, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 916. Dem. at 10-11, 15.

Casey Crow responds that Elevated is incorrect in asserting that a ministerial duty cannot arise from an internal procedure. Opp. at 7. The FAP alleges that the City had a policy requiring an applicant to submit a written request to withdraw or alter the status of its application and attaches supporting emails to prove it. FAP ¶¶ 12, 37. Opp. at 5.

As Elevated replies, a City policy requiring owners to submit application withdrawal requests in writing does not impose any duty on the City to act with respect to Elevated’s application. Reply at 1. A policy requiring that an application withdrawal must be made in writing has no bearing on the FAP’s mandamus claim. Elevated properly made its request in writing, but the City had no duty to accept the written application to withdraw.

(c) Change in Ownership

The FAP alleges that Elevated has changed ownership. Elevated’s application identified Christ Francy (“Francy”) and Aaron Herzberg (“Herzberg”) as 50/50 co-owners. The FAP alleges that, in early July 2018, Herzberg assigned his 50% interest to Francy. Herzberg denies that he did so, and rather in September 2018 he assigned his entire interest to Elliot Lewis, Casey Crow’s agent. Either way, the FAP alleges that either change in ownership violates LBMC section 5.90.150, which “permits changes of ownership of licensees under certain delineated conditions. See Dem. at 12-13.

Elevated points out that LBMC section 5.90.150 applies to licensees, not applicants. Elevated Dem. at 15. Casey Crow acknowledges this fact and argues that the clear intent of the drafters was to wholly prohibit applicants from changing ownership. Opp. at 13. The FAP alleges a City policy to that effect. FAP ¶¶ 43-44. Casey Crow asserts that the City initially did not allow applicants to change ownership, and then impermissibly violated the section by creating a form permitting changes applicant ownership. Opp. at 6, 14.

Casey Crow’s argument is spurious. LBMC section 5.90.150 does not apply to applicants, and Casey Crow acknowledges that the City’s current policy permits applicants to change ownership. The FAP fails to sufficiently allege that the City violated a ministerial duty with respect to a change in ownership.

iv. Conclusion

Casey Crow fails to show that the City failed to perform a ministerial duty or abused its discretion. The demurrer to the first cause of action for mandamus is sustained without leave to amend.

b. Second Cause of Action

Injunctive relief is not itself a cause of action and requires that a cause of action exist before such relief is granted. Injunctive relief cannot be issued if the underlying cause of action is not established. Shell Oil Co. v. Richter, (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 164, 168; City of South Pasadena v. Department of Transportation, (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1293.

Elevated demurs to the FAP’s second cause of action for injunctive relief on the grounds that it is devoid of any specific detail and is thus impermissibly uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible. Dem. at 18. Specifically, the FAP fails to present details regarding the precise form of injunction sought, or the reasons why an injunction should be granted. Dem. at 18. Alternatively, Elevated argues that the claim for injunctive relief is derivative of the mandamus claim. Dem. at 18; Reply at 5.

Casey Crow does not address or dispute Elevated’s argument regarding its second cause of action, which is subsumed within the mandamus claim. Elevated’s demurrer to Casey Crow’s second cause of action is sustained without leave.

c. Third Cause of Action

A complaint for declaratory relief is sufficient if it sets forth facts showing the existence of an actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties under a written instrument and requests that these rights and duties be adjudged by the court.” Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, (1978) 21 Cal.3d 943, 947. A court may refuse to grant such relief where its declaration or determination is not necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances.” CCP §1061. For instance, the availability of another form of adequate relief justifies denial of declaratory relief; a declaratory relief action will not lie to determine issues raised in other causes of action before the court. C.J.L. Const., Inc. v. Universal Plumbing, (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 376, 390. Moreover, declaratory relief is not appropriately addressed to past conduct. Roberts v. Los Angeles County Bar Assn., (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 604, 618.

Elevated demurs to Casey Crow’s third cause of action for declaratory relief on the grounds that Casey Crow does not have standing to allege the claims on which declaratory relief claim is predicated. Dem. at 19. Elevated asserts that Casey Crow’s declaratory relief claim is predicated on past conduct: the City’s failure to remove Elevated from the lottery. Elevated argues that Casey Crow has not sufficiently alleged an actual controversy over whether it was entitled to remove another party’s Lottery application. Dem. at 19; Reply at 5. Elevated further contends that the matter is not ripe. Elevated has not yet been granted a license and if it is disqualified then the next applicant in line, Casey Crow allegedly will then be eligible. Dem. at 19.

Casey Crow correctly argues that its claim against Elevated is not based on past conduct, but rather a present controversy. The FAP seeks a judicial determination that Elevated should have been disqualified so that Casey Crow could step in as next in line under both change in ownership and fraudulent application theories. The City’s lack of a ministerial duty to investigate these issues does not undermine this controversy. Nor does Casey Crow’s inability to compel the City to disqualify Elevated and accept Casey Crow as next in line. Casey Crow may have a damages remedy based on a judicial determination that it should have been approved. As such, Casey Crow is not basing its claim on past conduct. See Opp. at 18.

Casey Crow further correctly argues that Elevated’s ripeness argument is irrelevant. Casey Crow’s claim is unrelated to whether Elevated will obtain the City’s approval for licensure, but rather challenges whether Elevated was even eligible for the process. As the City has already determined that Elevated was eligible, there is no ripeness issue. Opp. at 18.

The demurrer to the third cause of action is overruled.

3. Conclusion

Elevated’s demurrer is sustained without leave to amend for the mandamus and injunctive relief causes of action and is overruled as to the declaratory relief cause of action.[5]

3. City’s Demurrer

The City demurs to each of the FAP’s causes of actions on the grounds that they do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and are also impermissibly uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible. Dem. at 1.

a. First Cause of Action

The City demurs to the FAP’s first cause of action for mandamus on the ground that Casey Crow fails to show the City has a ministerial duty, traditional mandamus cannot be used to compel the exercise of discretion in a particular manner, and the FAP fails to establish that Casey Crow has a beneficial interest in mandamus relief. Dem. at 12-14.

The court has ruled on this same issue for Elevated’s demurrer, and the same ruling applies. The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend to the mandamus claim.

b. Second Cause of Action

The City demurs to the FAP’s second cause of action for injunctive relief on the grounds that Casey Crow fails to state a cause of action that supports such relief. Dem. at 14.

Again, injunctive relief is not itself a cause of action and requires that a cause of action exist before such relief is granted. Injunctive relief cannot be issued if the underlying cause of action is not established. Shell Oil Co. v. Richter, (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 164, 168; City of South Pasadena v. Department of Transportation, (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1293.

As discussed ante, the FAP fails to assert with specificity a cause of action that justifies the issuance of injunctive relief. The City’s demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained without leave to amend.

c. Third Cause of Action

The City demurs to Casey Crow’s third cause of action for declaratory relief on the grounds that it is duplicative of the other cause of action in the FAP and fails to state a cause of action. The City additionally argues that declaratory relief is not appropriate addressed to past conduct. Dem. at 15.

Casey Crow asserts that the City’s argument against declaratory relief should fail for the same reasons that Elevated’s argument against the same should fail. Opp. at 18.

As discussed ante, Casey Crow is correct in asserting that it is not seeking relief for past conduct, and that its claims are ripe. However, the City also is correct in arguing that Casey Crow’s claims against the City is mostly duplicative of mandamus. The City has no ministerial duty to investigate Casey Crow’s change in ownership and fraudulent application theories. Nor does it have a duty to disqualify Elevated and approve Casey Crow as next in line. Casey Crow has no declaratory relief claim against the City.

The demurrer to the third cause of action against the City is sustained without leave.

3. Conclusion

The City’s demurrer is sustained without leave to amend as to all causes of action.

E. Motion to Strike

1. Applicable Law

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. CCP §435(b)(1). The notice of motion to strike shall be given within the time allowed to plead, and if a demurrer is interposed, concurrently therewith, and shall be noticed for hearing and heard at the same time as the demurrer. CRC 3.1322(b). The notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading shall quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count or defense. CRC 3.1322(a).

The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or form any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. CCP §437(a). Matter to be judicially noticed shall be specified in the notice of motion. CCP §437(b). The court then may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. CCP §436. When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend. Perlman v. Municipal Court, (1979) 99 Cal. App. 3d 568, 575.

2. Statement of Facts

On February 5, 2019, counsel for Elevated, Vicki Nash (“Nash”), attended the hearing on Casey Crow’s ex parte Application For Order Shortening Time For Hearing On Motion For Leave To File Amended Petition. Nash Decl. ¶3. During the hearing, the court expressly stated that Casey Crow was to remove all argument from any amended petition and to plead exclusively ultimate alleged facts. Nash. Decl. ¶4.

The FAP does not comply with that instruction and a large portion of it consists of legal argument and conclusions. Nash contacted Casey Crow’s counsel regarding resolution of the FAP’s noncompliance issues, but the two were unable to agree on any resolution, leading to the filing of the instant motion. Nash Decl. ¶¶ 5-7, Ex. 1.

3. Analysis

Elevated moves to strike portions of the FAP as conclusory, argumentative, irrelevant, and/or improper. Elevated also moves to strike language identifying CSC Holdings, LLC (“CSC”) as a party, to strike the prayer for punitive damages for failure to state facts sufficient to support such recovery, and to strike the prayer for relief for attorney’s fees for failure to properly plead entitlement to the same.

a. Conclusory, Argumentative, or Irrelevant

Elevated moves to strike significant portions of the FAP on the grounds that Casey Crow’s arguments are irrelevant and improper under and in violation of a court order pursuant to CCP section 436. Mot. at 12.

CCP section 436 permits the court to strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter, as well as any part of any pleading not in conformity with an order of the court. Irrelevant matters are defined as those allegations that are not essential to the statement of a claim or that are neither pertinent nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim. CCP §431.10(b).

Elevated asserts that on February 5, 2019 the court ordered Casey Crow to remove all argument from any amended petition and to plead only ultimate facts. Nash Decl. ¶3. Elevated argues that large portions of Casey Crow’s FAP have conclusory and argumentative language in violation of this instruction, which also is irrelevant or improper under CCP section 436. Mot. at 13, 17; Reply at 1.

Casey Crow asserts that the court made no such order, so Casey Crow therefore cannot be in violation of it. Opp. at 4. Casey Crow additionally argues that Elevated fails to provide any legal authority supporting its contention that content can be stricken for being conclusory or argumentative. Mot. Opp. at 5-7. Casey Crow also argues that all the items at issue are material to its mandamus claim and cannot be stricken pursuant to CCP section 431.10(a). Opp. at 5.

Whether or not the court ordered it, pleadings are supposed to plead ultimate facts, not argument. Conclusions from fact pled, however, are acceptable. The motion is granted as to the paragraphs and lines set forth in items 5-14, 17, and 19-20 of Elevated’s notice of motion.

b. Identification of CSC as a Party

Elevated moves to strike paragraph 7 of the FAP for identifying CSC as a party to the action. Elevated notes that Casey Crow dismissed CSC as a party with prejudice on September 5, 2018, making it improper to continue to identify CSC as a party. Elevated asserts the allegation is no longer relevant nor essential to the FAP’s claims. Mot. at 18.

Casey Crow does not dispute that CSC is no longer a party and does not oppose Elevated’s motion with respect to this portion of the FAP.

Elevated’s motion is granted with respect to portions identifying CSC as a party.

c. Prayer for Punitive Damages

Elevated moves to strike the FAP’s prayer for punitive damages for intentional interference with a business relationship, asserting that Casey Crow fails to show the requisite economic relationship or that Elevated’s actions were malicious. Mot. at 18-21.

This issue is subsumed within the fourth cause of action which will be addressed by the I/C court.

d. Prayer for Attorney’s Fees

Generally, each party in an action is to bear its own attorney’s fees in the absence of a special agreement, statutory provision, or exceptional circumstances. CCP §1021.

Elevated moves to strike the FAP’s prayer for attorney’s fees for failure to show any facts that demonstrate either a contractual or statutory right to such fees. Elevated argues that because Casey Crow fails to cite to any statute or law, it has not shown it is entitled to attorney’s fees and the relevant sections of the FAP should therefore be stricken. Mot. at 21.

Casey Crow states that it is currently unaware of any statutory basis for recovery of attorney’s fees on its mandamus claims and does not oppose that relevant portions be stricken. Mot. Opp. at 15-16.

Elevated’s motion is granted with respect to the prayer for attorney’s fees.

4. Conclusion

Elevated’s motion to strike is granted for the specified argumentative portions of the FAP, for the portions identifying CSC as a party, and for the prayer for attorney’s fees.

F. Conclusion

The demurrers are sustained without leave on the claims stated ante. The motion to strike also is granted in part. The remaining claims against Elevated (three, four, and five) are transferred to Department 1 for reassignment to an I/C court.

G. Supplemental Analysis of Casey Crow’s Offer of Proof[6]

At the hearing, the court gave Petitioner an opportunity to present evidence, as an offer of proof, that the City had an official policy set by a decision-maker creating a ministerial duty. Petitioner fails to present sufficient evidence to support an offer of proof that the City’s pertinent policies imposed a ministerial duty on it.

1. Withdrawal of the Application

At the demurrer hearing, the court held that the City’s policy requiring owners to submit application withdrawal requests in writing did not impose any duty on the City to act with respect to Elevated’s withdrawal application.

Casey Crow alleges that, while Elevated submitted an application for 6150 Cherry (and two other properties) in February 2017, Elevated wanted another nearby property (2119 Curry) controlled by its two owners (Francy and Herzberg) to win. Under the City’s buffer rules, the properties were too close together to both be selected. At Francy’s instruction, Chis McCarthy (“McCarthy”), then employed by an entity affiliated with Elevated, sent an email six weeks before the Lottery asking the City to pull 6150 Cherry from the Lottery. In response, the City stated that an “owner and principal” needed to provide a letter of withdrawal. Francy did so, stating that he wanted to withdraw his application for 6150 Cherry, but wanted to ensure that Elevated’s applications for 1718 Hayes and 4401 Los Coyotes were still active. Augustini Decl. Ex. A. The City then informed McCarthy that it would administratively close the account. Augustini Decl. Ex. B.

An administrative closure is the first step in the process of withdrawing an application. The City must also separately manually remove the property from the published list of Lottery applicants. The City never removed 6150 from the applicant list. Augustini Decl. Ex. C, p.60.

The reason why is that 24 hours after notification that the City would remove 6150 Cherry’s Lottery application, McCarthy sent City employee Emily Armstrong (“Armstrong”) an email stating that “it seems there was an error in the deletion of the 6150 Cherry application” because 1718 Hayes had received a point demotion. Augustini Decl. Ex. B. Segretti Decl. Ex. 2, p.63. Armstrong interpreted McCarthy’s email to mean that Elevated still wanted 1718 Hayes and 4401 Los Coyotes to be in the Lottery, but she did not interpret it to mean that 6150 Cherry should be deleted. Ex. 2, p.65.

Armstrong met with two other City employees and informed them that an applicant originally wanted to withdraw their application and now they want back in. She asked: How should we handle it? Ex. 2, p.66. Armstrong was asked if she had closed the 6150 Cherry account and she said she had not had time to do so. Ex. 2, p.66. Given that less than 24 hours had passed between Elevated’s withdrawal and the McCarthy email, she was instructed to keep the 6150 Cherry application open. Ex. 2, p.66.

Armstrong then received a phone call from McCarthy. Ex. 2, p.67. He was “freaking out” over 1718 Hayes in which Elevated was very invested. Ibid. Armstrong informed him that 1718 Hayes was a lost cause; it was out of the Lottery. Ibid. Based on his email and telephonic agreement, 6150 Cherry was placed back in the Lottery. Ibid. McCarthy said he would talk to the owners and get back to her if that was a problem. Ex. 2, pp. 67-69. He did not get back to her with any issues. Ibid. Although she required written authorization from an Elevated owner to withdraw, she did not require one to reinstate the application. Ex. 2, pp. 67-68.

Casey Crow asserts that the City’s had official policies regarding withdrawal or changes to licensee applications as follows: (1) only someone listed as an owner, or who possessed the official email address listed for the applicant, could (in writing) withdraw an application; and if such a request was made, the City would then close the account and withdraw the application; (2) no one other than an owner or listed authorized representative could make changes to an application; and (3) once an application was withdrawn, a new application signed by all owners was required to reinstate or revive the application. Pet. Supp. Br. at 3.

Casey Crow alleges that the City violated this policy because it did not comply with Francy’s withdrawal request for 6150 Cherry and instead did not withdraw the application based on the communications with McCarthy, whom the City admits was neither an owner nor authorized agent of Elevated. Pet. Supp. Br. at 3.

The evidence does not support an allegation that the City had a ministerial duty to process the 6150 Cherry withdrawal. Casey Crow’s assertion that the City had a policy that a new application signed by the owners is required to reinstate a withdrawn application is unsupported. The City only admitted that changes to an application were required to be made by an owner, business manager, or authorized representative. Augustini Ex. F, p.8. The City did not make any admission that it had any duty to act on a withdrawal application or that it could not exercise its discretion to permit reinstatement of a withdrawn application that had not yet been processed.

Similarly, Armstrong only confirmed that, to withdraw an application, the City required a statement from either the owner’s email address or a statement signed by the owner. At no point did she testify about a City duty to act on a withdrawal application or on the reinstatement of a withdrawn application.[7]

Casey Crow fails to provide sufficient evidence to support an offer of proof that the City had a ministerial duty to process Elevated’s 6150 withdrawal or not to permit reinstatement without a new application signed by the owner.

2. Owner Authorization Form

The court ruled at the demurrer hearing that the City had no ministerial duty under LBMC sections 5.90.230 and 5.90.210 to investigate whether the Owner Authorization Form signed by CSC and submitted by Elevated with its application for 6150 Cherry was fraudulent.

Casey Crow states that the undisputed facts show that CSC consistently stated that it would not permit Elevated to conduct any marijuana-related activity at the 6150 Cherry property so long as CSC owned it. Pet. Supp. Br. at 4. According to Casey Crow, the City’s policy is that it will never issue a license to an applicant when the owner of the property sought to be licensed had advised the City it did not consent to the operation of a medical marijuana business at the property. Pet. Supp. Br. at 5. Casey Crow restates its argument that the City violated this discretionary duty by failing to act when Casey Crow submitted evidence to the City that Elevated’s Owner Authorization Form was false. Ibid.

Casey Crow provides no evidence of a City policy requiring it to investigate a competitor’s allegations concerning an Owner Authorization Form. Resp. Supp. Br. at 3. The relevant interrogatory response from the City states: “[The City] has never nor will ever issue a medical marijuana dispensary license to an applicant who was leasing a property from a landowner who had advised [the City] that it prohibited the operation of a medical marijuana business on its property.” Augustini Decl. Ex. AA, p.19. The relevant statement from the City’s PMK, Ajay Kolluri (“Kolluri”), states: “[I]f [the applicant] no longer had the ability to operate a cannabis business from that location, they would not receive a license.” Augustini Decl. Ex. Y, p.80.

This evidence says nothing about a City policy to investigate applications – even license applications. The stated policy also has nothing to do with an application for a lottery in which the winning applicant does not necessarily receive a license. Assuming that an application is fraudulent, the City retains discretion not to issue a license to the winning lottery applicant or to revoke a license improvidently issued. See Resp. Supp. Br. at 3.

Casey Crow fails to provide sufficient evidence to support an offer of proof that the City had a ministerial duty under either LBMC 5.90.230 or a City policy to investigate to Elevated’s Ownership Authorization Form as fraudulent.

3. Change in Ownership

At the demurrer hearing, the court ruled that Casey Crow could not rely on LBMC section 5.90.150, which “permits changes of ownership of licensees” under certain delineated conditions. because the provision applies to licensees, not applicants. The court also noted that Casey Crow acknowledged that the City’s current policy permits applicants to change ownership.

Casey Crow alleges the change in ownership facts. Elevated’s application identified Christ Francy (“Francy”) and Aaron Herzberg (“Herzberg”) as 50/50 co-owners. Elevated claims that in early July 2018 Herzberg assigned his 50% interest to Francy. Herzberg denies that he did so, and he contends that in September 2018 he assigned his entire interest to Elliot Lewis, Casey Crow’s agent. Pet. Supp. Br. at 5.

Casey Crow argues that the clear intent of LBMC Chapter 5.90 is to prohibit applicants from changing ownership. Prior to the alleged assignment to Francy in 2018, the City’s official policy prohibited any change in ownership or the application would be denied. Pet. Supp. Br. at 6. After the alleged Francy assignment, the City modified its policy so that a change of ownership between existing owners is not disqualifying. The alleged assignment to Francy violated the former policy, and the assignment from Herzberg to third party Elliot Lewis still would violate the new City policy.

Armstrong testified that an applicant cannot change ownership during the application process; they have to be licensed to do so. Resp. Ex. 3, pp.40, 43; Ex. Y (Kollura Depo.) pp. 82, 123-24. Applicants have asked various questions about change of ownership, and Armstrong has informed them that they cannot change ownership during the application process. Augustini Ex. X. There is no process for an applicant to obtain permission to transfer or change ownership. Id., pp. 46-47. If an applicant were to try to submit a transfer of ownership application – which is only available to licensees — it would be rejected. Id., pp.44-45. The transfer could not take place, and the original application would be valid and would go forward. Id., p. 45.

The City has no process in place to deal with a change in ownership that occurs during the application process. Resp. Ex. 3, p.40. If the Herzberg to Francy transfer occurred, Armstrong would have to consult with the City Attorney, but without an application for permission to change ownership through the City’s process the City would not consider it a change of ownership. Id., p.46. Similarly, because the City does not have a process for applicants, she would not consider the Herzberg to Lewis assignment as a change in ownership. Id., pp.48-49. It did not “kick off any process” for her. Id., p. 49.

The evidence does not support Casey Crow’s position that the City had a policy that would impose a ministerial duty to deny Elevated’s application as a result of a change in ownership. Prior to its recent change of policy, the City did not permit a change in ownership for applicants, and an applicant had no ability to obtain City approval for an ownership transfer. If information submitted to the City showed that a transfer had occurred without City permission, it would not trigger any process because the City would not deem the change of ownership to be valid. Instead, the City would process the original application.

Thus, information submitted to the City about Elevated’s change in ownership would be disregarded and it would not affect Elevated’s placement in the Lottery. Its impact on Elevated’s ability to obtain a license now that it has won the Lottery remains to be determined. The City currently permits existing applicants to consolidate ownership shares among existing owners, meaning that the alleged in-house transfer of ownership between Francy and Herzberg would be expressly authorized. While the new policy would not permit the alleged transfer between Herzberg and Elliot, the parties’ dispute over which transfer occurred has not been resolved and any purported City duty is not ripe. Resp. Br. at 4.

Casey Crow fails to provide sufficient evidence to support as an offer of proof that the City had a ministerial duty under LBMC section 5.90.150 or a City policy regarding Elevated’s change of ownership.

4. Conclusion

Casey Crow’s offer of proof fails to present sufficient evidence that the City had a ministerial duty under policy set by a decision-maker.

Casey Crow asks that the demurrer not be sustained with prejudice on the change in ownership theory so that it can establish that the Herzberg/Lewis violated City policy, thereby disqualifying Elevated from licensure. Pet. Supp. Br. at 6. It is not clear how Casey Crow could prevail if the Herzberg/Lewis transaction is valid where Lewis is its agent. However, the parties have not briefed whether the City would retroactively apply its new policy to permit the Herzberg/Francy transfer. Therefore, one or both of these arguments eventually may be available to Casey Crow. The change in ownership theory will be dismissed without prejudice as not ripe. The demurrer is sustained without leave for the withdrawal of the application and Owner Authorization Form theories.

[1] The City failed to lodge with a courtesy copy of their demurrer in violation of the Presiding Judge’s First Amended General Order Re: Mandatory Electronic Filing. The City’s counsel is admonished to provide courtesy copies in all future filings.

The court has not read or considered any of the footnotes in the parties’ briefs, all of which violate the 12-point type requirement of CRC 2.104.

[2] Injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action.

[3] Casey Crow requests judicial notice of: (1) Elevated’s demurrer to Casey Crow’s Second Amended Complaint in Case No. BC720859 (Ex. A), (2) Casey Crow’s opposition to Elevated’s Demurrer in Case No. BC720859 (Ex. B), (3) the final order denying Elevated’s demurrer in Case No. BC720859 (Ex. C). The requests are granted. Evid. Code §452(d).

[4] Elevated requests judicial notice of: (1) the court’s February 5, 2019 minute order regarding Casey Crow’s Ex Parte Application For Order Shortening Time For Hearing On Motion For Leave To File Amended Petition (Ex. 1), (2) The file-stamped copy of Casey Crow’s Request for Dismissal with prejudice of Defendant CSC Holdings, LLC, dated September 5, 2018 (Ex. 2), (3) The Second Amended Complaint in Casey Crow Casey Crow v. Elevated Experience, Inc., Chris Francy, CSC Holdings, LLC, LASC Case No. BC720859 (Ex. 3), (4) The Complaint in Elliot Lewis v. Elevated Experience, Inc., Chris Francy, LASC Case No. 19LBCV00020 (Ex. 4), (5) LBMC sections 5.90.150, 5.90.210, 5.90.230 and 5.90.270 (Ex. 5). There is no need to judicially notice documents from files in the instant action (Exs. 1, 2). The judge can always review those files. Elevated’s requests as to (3), (4), and (5) are granted. Evid. Code §452(b), (d).

The court overruled all of Casey Crow’s evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Vicki Nash.

[5] The court will not rule on Elevated’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action (intentional interference with prospective business advantage) and fifth cause of action (violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200), which will be heard by an I/C court. See Opp. at 4, n.1.

[6] Casey Crow failed to submit exhibit tabs for the 28 exhibits attached to the Declaration of Jeff Augustini, and its counsel is directed to provide exhibits for courtesy copies submitted in the future. Casey Crow’s motion to strike is denied.

[7] Respondents also correctly assert that Casey Crow lacks standing on this issue, a point acknowledged by both Casey Crow and the court in its demurrer ruling. Resp. Br. at 2. The randomness of the Lottery means that Casey Crow cannot establish that the outcome would have favored Casey Crow if Elevated had been removed.

Case Number: BC646268 Hearing Date: June 18, 2019 Dept: SWB

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Southwest District

Torrance Dept. B

NORAH DEBELLIS, et al.,

Plaintiff,

Case No.:

BC646268

vs.

[Tentative] RULING

CITY OF TORRANCE, et al.,

Defendants.

Hearing Date: June 18, 2019

Moving Parties: Defendant and cross-defendant La Terrazza HOA

Responding Party: Plaintiffs Norah Debellis and Eric Debellis

Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, for Summary Adjudication

The court considered the moving, opposition, supplemental opposition, and reply papers.

RULING

The motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On January 9, 2017, plaintiff Norah Debellis and Eric Debellis filed a complaint against defendants City of Torrance and La Terrazza Homeowners Association (“La Terrazza”) for premises liability, dangerous condition of public property, and loss of consortium based on a trip and fall on a sidewalk on October 29, 2015.

On April 20, 2017, La Terrazza filed a cross-complaint against City of Torrance for contribution and indemnity.

On May 5, 2017, City of Torrance filed a cross-complaint against La Terrazza.

On May 14, 2018, La Terrazza filed an amended cross-complaint.

On July 30, 2018, City of Torrance filed an amended cross-complaint.

LEGAL AUTHORITY

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843. “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1119.

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1519. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” CCP § 437c(p)(2). “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” CCP § 437c(p)(2). “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 463, 467.

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” Avivi, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 467; CCP §437c(c).

DISCUSSION

Defendant La Terrazza HOA (“La Terrazza”) requests summary judgment against plaintiff on the ground there are no triable issues of material facts and, as a matter of law, it is entitled to judgment in its favor. Defendant La Terrazza also requests summary judgment in its favor on the City of Torrance’s cross-complaint. For ease of locating the motion in the court file, the court notes that the motion was filed on February 23, 2018.

In the complaint, plaintiffs allege that the sidewalk located on the north side of Sepulveda Blvd., between the Courtyard Marriott Hotel and Hickory Avenue in front of and adjacent to the La Terrazza condominium complex is a public sidewalk in Torrance. Complaint, ¶2. Defendant La Terrazza HOA owned, managed, and operated the condominium complex. Defendant had ongoing and continuous control over, and responsibility for, the sidewalk and the location described in para. 2. Id., ¶3.

Under the 1st cause of action for negligence, plaintiffs allege that defendants so negligently, carelessly, and without due regard or concern for the life and safety of plaintiff Norah, did so own, design, maintain, lease, operate, control, repair, supervise, or occupy those certain premises located as described in para. 2 in such a manner so as to create, design, cause, allow, contribute to or assist in the creation of a dangerous and defective condition of the premises, which existed in sufficient time for defendants to have actual and/or constructive notice, and for defendants to correct or warn plaintiff of the existence of such condition, which defendants negligently and carelessly failed and neglected to do. The condition included the sidewalk area, which caused plaintiff to fall, contained a severely heaved, high, lifted black asphalt “ramp” in the sidewalk. It also contained a raised, uneven section of the sidewalk that was not filled with asphalt making it just gray which blended in with the next section/block of the pathway and making it difficult to see that it is uneven. Id., ¶12. As a direct and proximate result of the defective and dangerous condition and the negligence of defendants, on October 29, 2015, at about 5:00 a.m., plaintiff was caused to trip and fall. Id., ¶13. Plaintiff Eric alleges a loss of consortium claim.

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.” Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal. App. 4th 994, 998 (citing Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 1200, 1205; Civil Code § 1714(a)).

“A defendant cannot be held liable for the defective or dangerous condition of property which it [does] not own, possess, or control. Where the absence of ownership, possession, or control has been unequivocally established, summary judgment is proper.” Donnell v. California Western School of Law (1988) 200 Cal. App. 3d 715, 720 (citation omitted). “Without the ‘crucial element’ of control over the subject premises, no duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury on such property can be found.” Gray v. America West Airlines, Inc. (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 76, 81 (citation omitted).

“A person controls property that he or she does not own or lease when he or she uses the property as if it were his or her own. A person is responsible for maintaining, in reasonably safe condition, all areas he or she controls.” CACI 1002.

“[I]n the absence of a statute or ordinance, a person has no affirmative duty to keep premises not in his possession or ownership in a safe condition. Thus, where a particular abutter does not possess or own the street easement, and does not undertake maintenance of it, we see no legal basis for imposing liability for failure to properly maintain the sidewalk or planning strip in the absence of statute or ordinance.” Williams v. Foster (1989) 216 Cal. App. 3d 510, 521.

“But an adjoining landowner nonetheless may be liable ‘for defects created by special construction for the particular needs of the abutting property.’” Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal. 4th 1149, 1172 (citing Williams, supra).

Defendant argues that Streets and Highway Code § 5610 limits an abutting landowner’s tort liability for injuries to third parties, unless the landowner created the unsafe condition. Defendant also argues that this section does not create a duty to indemnify municipalities for third parties’ injuries occurring on a sidewalk abutting a landowner’s property unless the landowner created the unsafe condition.

Streets and Highway Code § 5610 states:

“The owners of lots or portions of lots fronting on any portion of a public street or place when that street or place is improved or if and when the area between the property line of the adjacent property and the street line is maintained as a park or parking strip, shall maintain any sidewalk in such condition that the sidewalk will not endanger persons or property and maintain it in a condition which will not interfere with the public convenience in the use of those works or areas save and except as to those conditions created or maintained in, upon, along, or in connection with such sidewalk by any person other than the owner, under and by virtue of any permit or right granted to him by law or by the city authorities in charge thereof, and such persons shall be under a like duty in relation thereto.”

Section 5610 “does not create tort liability to injured pedestrians, . . . except where a property owner created the defect or exercised dominion or control over the abutting sidewalk.” Jordan v. City of Sacramento (2007) 148 Cal. App. 4th 1487, 1490.

Defendant La Terrazza argues that neither plaintiffs nor City of Torrance has any evidence that the HOA’s tree caused the defect in the sidewalk where plaintiff tripped and fell.

Defendant cites to City of Torrance’s response to Special Interrogatory No. 1, which asked, “If you contend that a tree located on the property owned [defendant La Terrazza] caused or contributed to the incident involving plaintiff, on October 29, 2015, please state all facts that support your contention.” On January 25, 2018, the City responded with objections and stated that the roots of the offending tree caused adjacent sections of the sidewalk located at 2801 Sepulveda Blvd., Torrance, to move. In or around March 2011, Marco Gonzalez, Public Works Supervisor/Concrete, inspected the sidewalk at 2801 Sepulveda Blvd. and noticed displacement caused by tree roots from a tree located at 2801 Sepulveda Blvd. Thereafter, Gonzalez’ crews replaced the displaced section of sidewalk. Sometime between October 29, 2015 and December 4, 2014, Gonzalez inspected the sidewalk at 2801 Sepulveda Blvd. and notified the adjacent landowner, La Terraza HOA, that its tree had damaged the City’s sidewalk. La Terrazza HOA removed its offending tree and replaced the subject sidewalk in April and May 2016. Discovery and investigation is ongoing. Kamau Edwards decl., Exh. C. In plaintiff’s response to special interrogatory no. 2, that asked her to state all facts on which she based her contentions of fault or responsibility on the part of each defendant, she reiterated her allegations. Edwards decl., Exh. D. As to the unsafe condition that caused her injury, she identified “the raised, heaved, poor, incompetent, negligent and deficient maintenance of the sidewalk pathway. At the location where I tripped, there were two sequential raised, lifted, heaved sections of sidewalk. The first section caught my foot and caused me to trip. The second section is what my head and face hit when I fell.” Edwards decl., Exh. D, No. 12.

La Terazza also presents plaintiff’s declaration where she testified that as she ran toward the subject sidewalk, she observed raised sections of concrete filled in with black asphalt that looked “extremely dangerous” and it “got my attention.” Edwards decl., Plaintiff’s depo., 121. She was so focused on the black asphalt that she did not see another area immediately before her which her left toe caught and caused her to fall. Id., 123, 125, 128. On a diagram, plaintiff identified Area 2 as the portion of the sidewalk with black asphalt; she identified Area 1 as the portion of the sidewalk which her foot got caught on.

Defendant further presents evidence that on October 24, 2012, the City received a report from La Terrazza HOA’s property manager regarding a trip hazard at the subject sidewalk. Kamau decl., Steve Finton depo. On January 22, 2013, the property manager reported to the City that the sidewalk was a trip hazard. On October 23, 2013, City crews constructed two asphalt ramps at location. From October 1, 2013 through October 30, 2013, a City contractor performed concrete sidewalk grinding at location. Finton depo., June 14, 2016 memo.

Defendant also presents the deposition of city employee Marco Gonzalez, who on October 29, 2015, inspected the sidewalk and observed that the damage to the sidewalk was from the roots of the private trees because he could see the roots. Gonzalez depo., 69-70. He also testified that when he inspected the sidewalk he did not know where plaintiff had fallen. Id., 88. He also testified that on December 4, 2015, he sent a letter to La Terrazza that its privately-owned tree located on the south side of the property at 2801 Sepulveda had caused damage to the sidewalk and that La Terrazza needed to remove the tree(s). Id., December 4, 2015 letter.

In opposition, defendant City of Torrance argues that La Terrazza fails to meet its initial burden because La Terrazza has not shown that it cannot be established that La Terrazza created the defect. In any event, Torrance presents the declaration of certified arborist Judy Emerson, who opines that the sidewalk displacement was caused by La Terrazza’s trees. She also opined that it was extremely unlikely that the City-owned podocarpus trees near the subject location caused any damage to the City sidewalk. Judy Emerson decl.

Torrance also presents evidence that in March 2011, Gonzales had inspected the sidewalk and took several photos, which purport to depict damage to the sidewalk from a private tree. In La Terrazza’s Board of Director Meeting Minutes dated March 24, 2011, it states that “[a] rep from the City of Torrance had called a meeting regarding a City sidewalk in front of the property that has buckled, which they feel was caused by roots from one of our trees and from our tree trimming crew driving their truck up on the sidewalk. . . . Ray [Garcia, La Terrazza’s arborist] took responsibility for the sidewalk repair due to his crew’s truck being up on the sidewalk. The City agreed to let us handle the repair and let them know when it was completed.”

Torrance further presents evidence that in the Board of Directors Meeting Minutes dated September 17, 2015, it states, “Bernie Melchionne stated that the City sidewalk on Sepulveda in front of the complex was really getting bad, the cracking and buckling continues to increase. She plans to speak with the City.” After the incident, La Terrazza undertook to remove the “one large tree that is uplifting the City sidewalk.” La Terrazza HOA Meeting Minutes dated February 18, 2016; RG Landscape & Design, Inc.’ Tree Trimming Proposal dated February 10, 2016. Defendant City presents the declaration of Mathew Garland, president of Garland Development, Inc. (“GDI”), who states that on February 1, 2016, GDI was asked by Bali Management Group on behalf of La Terrazza to submit a bid for the replacement of one section of the City sidewalk along the north side of Sepulveda Blvd., adjacent to La Terrazza along with replacement of sidewalk sections within the complex. On February 19, 2016, Bali approved the proposal, and on May 11, 2016, GDI obtained a permit from the City. GDI completed work on May 19, 2016. GDI removed concrete and roots and formed and graded the job. He testified that a significant amount of root growth beneath the concrete walkway was seen during this removal of concrete and roots phase. Mathew Garland decl. La Terrazza’s arborist Ray Garcia confirmed that the subject liquidambar was removed because it was a “problem.”

In opposition, plaintiff argues that a triable issue of material facts exists as to whether La Terrazza caused the unsafe condition on the sidewalk upon which plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff argues that La Terrazza failed to meet its burden because the evidence cited by defendant is insufficient. The special interrogatory responses were made only four months after the case was filed and before La Terrazza produced any documents. Further, La Terrazza’s documents from the Board of Directors meetings indicate that its tree was causing damage to the sidewalk where plaintiff tripped and fell. Plaintiff also cites to the photos taken by Gonzalez in 2011.

Evidentiary objections

The court rules as follows on La Terrazza’s objections: OVERRULED as to Nos. 1-10.

The court finds that there is a triable issue as to whether La Terrazza’s tree created the defective condition. Although La Terrazza tries to distinguish the sidewalk as Area 1 and Area 2, La Terrazza does not meet its burden of showing that the areas are unrelated or that plaintiff or Torrance cannot present evidence that La Terrazza’s tree caused damage in the area where plaintiff fell. In any event, Torrance and plaintiff present sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact that La Terrazza’s tree caused damage to the sidewalk. In the reply, La Terrazza even acknowledges that it caused some damage to the sidewalk in general and presents no evidence that it did not cause damage to the specific area where plaintiff tripped.

The motion is therefore DENIED.

Case Information

17-CIV-01975 | SEPEHR MASHHOUD, et al vs. QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP., et al

Case Number
17-CIV-01975

Court
Civil Unlimited

File Date
05/04/2017

Case Type
(26) Unlimited Other Real Property

Case Status
On Appeal

Party
Plaintiff
MASHHOUD, SEPEHR

Active Attorneys

Lead Attorney
LAPHAM, MARK W.
Retained

Plaintiff
PEREZ, MARILYN

Active Attorneys

Lead Attorney
LAPHAM, MARK W.
Retained

Defendant
QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP.

Active Attorneys

Lead Attorney
GOULDING, DANIEL J., ESQ
Retained

Defendant
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION CO.

Active Attorneys

Lead Attorney
ADDIEGO, JOSEPH E, III
Retained

Attorney
MCNEILL, MARY
Retained

Defendant
DOES 1 THROUGH 20, INCLUSIVE

Cause of Action

File Date
Cause of Action
Type
Filed By
Filed Against
05/04/2017 Complaint Action MASHHOUD, SEPEHR
PEREZ, MARILYN
DOES 1 THROUGH 20, INCLUSIVE
QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP.
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION CO.
Events and Hearings

05/04/2017 New Filed Case

05/04/2017 Complaint

Complaint

05/04/2017 Civil Case Cover Sheet

Civil Case Cover Sheet

05/04/2017 Summons Issued / Filed

Summons Issued / Filed

05/04/2017 Notice of Case Management Conference

Notice of Case Management Conference

05/04/2017 Cause Of Action

Action
Complaint File Date
05/04/2017
07/03/2017 Proof of Service on CORPORATION, LLC, etc.

Proof of Service on CORPORATION, LLC, etc. SUMMONS/COMPLAINT, ETC. SERVED TO GLADYS AGUILERA, AGENT

Comment
SUMMONS/COMPLAINT, ETC. SERVED TO GLADYS AGUILERA, AGENT
07/03/2017 Proof of Service on CORPORATION, LLC, etc.

Proof of Service on CORPORATION, LLC, etc. SUMMONS/COMPLAINT, ETC SERVED TO BOUNLET LOUVAN, AGENT

Comment
SUMMONS/COMPLAINT, ETC SERVED TO BOUNLET LOUVAN, AGENT
07/28/2017 Notice

Notice of QUALITY’S DECLARATION OF NONMONETARY STATUS

Comment
of QUALITY’S DECLARATION OF NONMONETARY STATUS
07/28/2017 Declaration

Declaration OF NONMONETARY STATUS

Comment
OF NONMONETARY STATUS
07/28/2017 Proof of Service by MAIL of

Proof of Service by MAIL of NOTICE OF QUALITY’S DECLARATION OF NONMONETARY STATUS; ETC

Comment
NOTICE OF QUALITY’S DECLARATION OF NONMONETARY STATUS; ETC
07/31/2017 Declaration

Declaration OF MARY MCNEILL IN SUPPORT OF GOOD FAITH ATTEMPT TO MEET AND CONFER AND 30-DAY EXTENSION

Comment
OF MARY MCNEILL IN SUPPORT OF GOOD FAITH ATTEMPT TO MEET AND CONFER AND 30-DAY EXTENSION ON TIME TO FILE A DEMURRER, ETC.
08/01/2017 First Paper Fee Paid (Unlimited)

Comment
Paid by: OAKLAND SERVICE OF PROCESS, INC
08/29/2017 Case Management Statement

Case Management Statement

08/29/2017 Case Management Statement

Case Management Statement


08/31/2017 Case Management Conference

*CIV Minute Order – Case Management Conference 08/31/2017

Judicial Officer
Karesh, Jonathan E.

Hearing Time
9:00 AM

Result
Held –

Parties Present
Plaintiff

Attorney: LAPHAM, MARK W.

Plaintiff

Attorney: LAPHAM, MARK W.

Defendant

Attorney: ADDIEGO, JOSEPH E, III

09/13/2017 Demurrer to

Demurrer to TO COMPLAINT

Comment
TO COMPLAINT
09/13/2017 Court Reporter service less than one hour

09/13/2017 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

Comment
OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT
09/13/2017 Declaration

Declaration OF TAHIYA SULTAN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.’S DEMURRER TO COMPLAI

Comment
OF TAHIYA SULTAN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.’S DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT
09/13/2017 Request for Judicial Notice

Request for Judicial Notice IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER TO COMPAINT.

Comment
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER TO COMPAINT.
09/13/2017 Proposed Order Received

Proposed Order Received SUSTAINING DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

Comment
SUSTAINING DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT
09/13/2017 Proof of Service by MAIL of

Proof of Service by MAIL of NOTICE OF DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO

Comment
NOTICE OF DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT
09/27/2017 First Amended Complaint

First Amended Complaint

09/27/2017 Proof of Service by PERSONAL SERVICE of

Proof of Service by PERSONAL SERVICE of FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Comment
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

10/11/2017 Hearing on Demurrer

*CIV Minute Order – Hearing on Demurrer 10/11/2017

Judicial Officer
Novak, Lisa A.

Hearing Time
9:00 AM

Result
Not Held

10/18/2017 Case Management Statement

Case Management Statement

10/24/2017 Declaration

Declaration OF TAHIYA SULTAN IN SUPPORT OF GOOD FAITH ATTEMPT TO MEET AND CONFER, ETC.

Comment
OF TAHIYA SULTAN IN SUPPORT OF GOOD FAITH ATTEMPT TO MEET AND CONFER, ETC.
10/24/2017 Case Management Statement

Case Management Statement

10/31/2017 Case Management Statement

Case Management Statement

10/31/2017 Proof of Service – ELECTRONIC of

Proof of Service – ELECTRONIC of CASE MANAGEMENT STATMENT served on JOE ADDIEGO AND TAHIYA ULTAN

Comment
CASE MANAGEMENT STATMENT served on JOE ADDIEGO AND TAHIYA ULTAN

11/02/2017 Case Management Conference

*CIV Minute Order – Case Management Conference 11/02/2017

Judicial Officer
Miram, George A.

Hearing Time
9:00 AM

Result
Held –

Parties Present
Plaintiff

Attorney: LAPHAM, MARK W.

Plaintiff

Attorney: LAPHAM, MARK W.

11/27/2017 Demurrer to

Demurrer to AND DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Comment
AND DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
11/27/2017 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support OF DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Comment
OF DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
11/27/2017 Declaration

Declaration OF TAHIYA SULTAN IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Comment
OF TAHIYA SULTAN IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
11/27/2017 Request for Judicial Notice

Request for Judicial Notice IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Comment
IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
11/27/2017 Proposed Order Received

Proposed Order Received ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Comment
ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
11/27/2017 Proof of Service by MAIL of

Proof of Service by MAIL of NOTICE OF DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO

Comment
NOTICE OF DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA.’S DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, ETC served on MARK W. LAPHAM
12/26/2017 Opposition

Opposition TO DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Comment
TO DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
12/26/2017 Declaration

Declaration OF MARK W. LAPHAM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER TO PLAINT

Comment
OF MARK W. LAPHAM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
12/26/2017 Objection

Objection AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF IN

Comment
AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF IN SUPPORT OF ITS DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
12/28/2017 Notice

Notice OF NON-OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE, N.A.’S DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Comment
OF NON-OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE, N.A.’S DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
12/28/2017 Notice

Notice OF CHANGE IN HANDLING ATTORNEY

Comment
OF CHANGE IN HANDLING ATTORNEY
01/03/2018 Proof of Service by MAIL of

Proof of Service by MAIL of COURTCALL APPEARANCE served on MARK LAPHAM

Comment
COURTCALL APPEARANCE served on MARK LAPHAM

01/05/2018 Hearing on Demurrer

*CIV Minute Order – Hearing on Demurrer 01/05/2018

Judicial Officer
Scott, Joseph C.

Hearing Time
9:00 AM

Result
Held –

Comment
TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

01/08/2018 Proof of Service by MAIL of

Proof of Service by MAIL of ORDER SUSTAINING DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.’S DEMURRER TO FIRST

Comment
ORDER SUSTAINING DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.’S DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND
01/11/2018 Proof of Service by MAIL of

Proof of Service by MAIL of COURTCALL APPEARANCE – SERVICE COPY

Comment
COURTCALL APPEARANCE – SERVICE COPY
01/23/2018 Order

Order Type: SUSTAINING DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND Si

Comment
Type: SUSTAINING DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND Signed by: JUDGE SCOTT Date Signed: 01/05/18
01/24/2018 Notice of Court Hearing

Notice of Court Hearing Notice of CMC: 3/29/18

Comment
Notice of CMC: 3/29/18
01/25/2018 Notice of Entry of Judgment/Order

Notice of Entry of Judgment/Order

02/05/2018 Non-Opposition to

Non-Opposition to QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORPORATION’S DECLARATION OF NONMONETARY STATUS

Comment
QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORPORATION’S DECLARATION OF NONMONETARY STATUS
02/05/2018 Proof of Service by MAIL of

Proof of Service by MAIL of NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORPORATION’S DECLARATI

Comment
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORPORATION’S DECLARATION OF NONMONETARY STATUS, EXHIBIT 1
03/16/2018 Notice of Appeal

Notice of Appeal

03/16/2018 Proof of Service by MAIL of

Proof of Service by MAIL of

03/16/2018 Notice of Filing of Appeal

Notice of Filing of Appeal

03/29/2018 Notice RE: Appellant’s Default

Notice RE: Appellant’s Default A153913

Comment
A153913
04/11/2018 Appellant’s Notice of Designation

Appellant’s Notice of Designation A153913

Comment
A153913
04/11/2018 Proof of Service by MAIL of

Proof of Service by MAIL of Appellant’s Notice Designating Record on Appeal

Comment
Appellant’s Notice Designating Record on Appeal
04/11/2018 Clerk’s Certificate RE: Dismiss Appellant’s Default

Clerk’s Certificate RE: Dismiss Appellant’s Default A153913

Comment
A153913
05/01/2018 Notice of Cost of Clerk’s Transcript Fee

Notice of Cost of Clerk’s Transcript Fee Appellant – A153913

Comment
Appellant – A153913
05/01/2018 Notice of Cost of Clerk’s Transcript Fee

Notice of Cost of Clerk’s Transcript Fee Respondent – A153913

Comment
Respondent – A153913
05/18/2018 Transmittal of Record on Appeal

Transmittal of Record on Appeal A153913

Comment
A153913
11/27/2018 Clerk’s Certificate RE: Certifying Record to Court of Appeal

Clerk’s Certificate RE: Certifying Record to Court of Appeal First Appellate District A153913

Comment
First Appellate District A153913
12/04/2018 Respondent’s brief received

Respondent’s brief received RESPONDENT’S OPPOSITION BRIEF

Comment
RESPONDENT’S OPPOSITION BRIEF
04/03/2019 Opinion received

Opinion received THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDMENT IS AFFIRMED. COSTS ON APPEAL ARE AWARDED TO RESPONDENT.

Comment
THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDMENT IS AFFIRMED. COSTS ON APPEAL ARE AWARDED TO RESPONDENT.
06/04/2019 Remittitur

Remittitur Affirmed.

Judicial Officer
Scott, Joseph C. Comment
Affirmed.

Case Number: BC610320
ROCKY ORTEGA VS A STEPHEN CORVI JR ET AL
Filing Courthouse: Stanley Mosk Courthouse

Filing Date: 02/17/2016
Case Type: Collections Case – Seller Plaintiff (General Jurisdiction)
Status: Motion for Nonsuit Granted 02/14/2018

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FUTURE HEARINGS
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

None

PARTY INFORMATION
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

20TH CENTURY FUNDING – Defendant

CORVI A. STEPHEN JR. – Defendant

FRACTIONS SPORTWEAR INC. – Defendant

GROSS MARTIN D. ESQ. – Attorney for Defendant

Documents Filed
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

Documents Filed (Filing dates listed in descending order)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
09/29/2017 08/18/2016

05/29/2019 Appeal – Remittitur – Affirmed (B289510)
Filed by Clerk

08/09/2018 PLAINTIFF’PEAL BRIEF

08/09/2018 PLAINTIFF’S OPENING APPEAL BRIEF

08/09/2018 Brief
Filed by Plaintiff

08/09/2018 Brief
Filed by Plaintiff

04/30/2018 Designation of Record on Appeal
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

04/30/2018 APPELLANT’S NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL

04/17/2018 NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION)

04/16/2018 NOTICE OF APPEAL

04/16/2018 NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE) (APPELLATE)

04/16/2018 Notice of Appeal
Filed by Appellant

02/15/2018 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT/DISMISSAL/OTHER ORDER

02/15/2018 Notice of Entry of Judgment
Filed by Clerk

02/14/2018 JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS A. STEPHEN CORVI, JR., FRACTIONS SPORTSWEAR, INC., 20TH CENTURY FUNDING, INC.

02/14/2018 Judgment

02/14/2018 JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 0F DEFENDANTS A. STEPHEN CORVI, JR., FRACTIONS SPORTS WEAR, INC., 20TH CENTURY FUNDING, INC.

01/29/2018 MEMORANDUM OF COSTS (SUMMARY)

01/29/2018 Memorandum of Costs
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

01/24/2018 Minute Order

01/24/2018 Stipulation and Order
Filed by Court

01/24/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-01-24 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/24/2018 STIPULATION, RECEIPT AND ORDER RE RELEASE OF CIVIL EXHIBITS

01/23/2018 Motion to Dismiss
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant); Fractions Sportwear, Inc. (Defendant); 20th Century Funding (Defendant)

01/23/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-01-23 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/23/2018 Minute Order

01/23/2018 MOTION TO DISMISS

01/22/2018 Minute Order

01/22/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-01-22 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/17/2018 PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO MOTION IN LIMINE RE GENUINENESS OF ATTORNEY FEE AGREEMENT

01/17/2018 Minute Order

01/17/2018 PLAINTIFF.S OPPOSITION TO MOTION RE SATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

01/17/2018 PLAINTIFF.S TRIAL BRIEF

01/17/2018 JOINT WITNESS LIST

01/17/2018 Opposition Document

01/17/2018 Exhibit List
Filed by Plaintiff

01/17/2018 Brief
Filed by Plaintiff

01/17/2018 Opposition Document

01/17/2018 Witness List
Filed by Plaintiff

01/17/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-01-17 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/17/2018 JOINT EXHIBIT LIST

01/12/2018 Minute Order

01/12/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-01-12 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/10/2018 TRIAL BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS A. STEPHEN CORVI, JR., FRACTIONS SPORTSWEAR, INC., 20TH CENTURY FUNDING, INC.

01/10/2018 Brief
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant); Fractions Sportwear, Inc. (Defendant); 20th Century Funding (Defendant)

01/08/2018 MOTION IN LIMINE RE GENUINENESS OF ATTORNEY FEE AGREEMENT; DECLARATION OF MARTIN D. GROSS

01/08/2018 Motion in Limine
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant); Fractions Sportwear, Inc. (Defendant); 20th Century Funding (Defendant)

01/04/2018 Minute Order

01/04/2018 Order
Filed by Court

01/04/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-01-04 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/04/2018 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL

12/27/2017 REPLY TO MOTION TO COMPEL ALL DISCOVERY FROM ALL DEFENDANTS AND FOR ISSUE SANCTIONS NO OPPOSITION FILED OR SERVED

12/27/2017 Reply/Response

12/11/2017 BRIEF FOR ISSUE SANCTIONS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

12/11/2017 Motion to Compel
Filed by Defendant

12/11/2017 Brief
Filed by Plaintiff

12/11/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL ALL DISCOVERY FROM ALL DEFENDANTS; AND FOR ISSUE SANCTIONS,; ETC.

10/10/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-10-10 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

10/05/2017 Minute Order

10/05/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-10-05 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 09/29/2017 08/18/2016

09/29/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-09-29 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/29/2017 Minute Order

09/26/2017 MOTION IN LIMINE RE TRIAL BY JURY; DECLARATION OF MARTIN D. GROSS

09/26/2017 MOTION IN LIMINE RE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RE BREACH OF CONTRACT AS TO BOTH WRITTEN AND ORAL CONTRACT; DECLARATION OF MARTIN D. GROSS

09/26/2017 Motion in Limine
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant); Fractions Sportwear, Inc. (Defendant)

09/26/2017 Motion in Limine
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

09/26/2017 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
Filed by Clerk

09/26/2017 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
Filed by Clerk

09/26/2017 NOTICE RE: CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

09/14/2017 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
Filed by Clerk

09/14/2017 NOTICE RE CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

09/08/2017 Receipt

09/08/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-09-08 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/08/2017 Minute Order

09/08/2017 CIVIL DEPOSIT

08/31/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-08-31 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

08/22/2017 NOTICE RE: CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

08/22/2017 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
Filed by Clerk

07/11/2017 Notice of Case Reassignment and Order for Plaintiff to Give Notice
Filed by Clerk

07/11/2017 NOLICE OF CASE REASSIGNMENT AND OF ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE

07/10/2017 Minute Order

07/10/2017 ANSWER TO COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT FRACTIONS SPORTSWEAR INC

07/10/2017 Answer
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant)

07/10/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-07-10 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

06/15/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR RELIEF OF ENTRY OF DEFAULT PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 473.5; ETC

06/15/2017 Motion
Filed by Fractions Sportwear, Inc. (Defendant)

12/06/2016 Minute Order

12/06/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-12-06 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

12/01/2016 Case Management Statement
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant)

12/01/2016 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

11/28/2016 Case Management Statement
Filed by Plaintiff

11/28/2016 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

11/09/2016 NOTICE RE: CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

11/09/2016 NOTICE RE: CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

11/09/2016 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
Filed by Clerk

11/09/2016 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
Filed by Clerk

11/08/2016 ANSWER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT A. STEPHEN CORVI, JR.,

11/08/2016 Answer
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant)

11/03/2016 Answer
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant); Fractions Sportwear, Inc. (Defendant)

11/03/2016 ANSWER TO COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANTS A. STEPHEN CORVI, JR., FRACTIONS SPORTSWEAR INC., 20TH CENTURY FUNDING, INC.

11/01/2016 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

11/01/2016 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

10/31/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-10-31 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

10/31/2016 Minute Order

10/24/2016 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO A. STEPHEN CORVI, JR., DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT

10/24/2016 Points and Authorities

10/24/2016 Declaration

10/24/2016 DECLARATION OF ROCKY ORTEGA AND EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO A. STEPHEN CORVI, JR., DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT

09/28/2016 Proof of Service

09/28/2016 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Plaintiff

09/28/2016 Proof-Service/Summons

09/28/2016 PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

09/16/2016 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR RELIEF OF ENTRY OF DEFAULT PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 473.5; ETC.

09/16/2016 Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 09/29/2017 08/18/2016

08/18/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-08-18 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

08/18/2016 Minute Order

08/15/2016 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

08/15/2016 Default Entered
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

08/15/2016 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

08/15/2016 Case Management Statement
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

07/27/2016 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

07/27/2016 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

06/07/2016 Proof-Service/Summons

06/07/2016 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Plaintiff

06/07/2016 PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

06/07/2016 Minute Order

06/07/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-06-07 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

06/07/2016 PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

05/31/2016 Case Management Statement
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

05/31/2016 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

04/18/2016 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

04/18/2016 Default Entered
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/02/2016 DECLARATION OF DILIGENCE

03/02/2016 PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

03/02/2016 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Plaintiff

03/02/2016 Declaration

03/02/2016 Proof-Service/Summons

03/02/2016 PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

02/18/2016 NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

02/18/2016 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Clerk

02/17/2016 SUMMONS

02/17/2016 OMPLAINT; 1.BREACH OF CONTRACT, FEE AGREEMENT,; ETC

02/17/2016 Complaint
Filed by null

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 09/29/2017 08/18/2016

Proceedings Held
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

Proceedings Held (Proceeding dates listed in descending order)

01/24/2018 at 10:30 AM in Department 74
Unknown Event Type – Held

01/23/2018 at 08:30 AM in Department 74
(Trial; Trial Started Previously) –

01/22/2018 at 10:00 AM in Department 74
(Trial; Start of Trial) –

01/17/2018 at 08:31 AM in Department 74
Final Status Conference – Held

01/12/2018 at 08:31 AM in Department 74
Final Status Conference – Held – Continued

01/04/2018 at 08:30 AM in Department 74
Hearing on Motion to Compel ((Denied)) –

10/10/2017 at 10:00 AM in Department 74
(Trial; Matter continued) –

10/05/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 74
Final Status Conference (Final Status Conference; Matter continued) –

09/29/2017 at 09:00 AM in Department 74
Final Status Conference (Final Status Conference; Matter continued) –

09/08/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 74
Mandatory Settlement Conference (MSC) (Mandatory Settlement Conference; Transferred to different departmnt) –

08/31/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 74
Mandatory Settlement Conference (MSC) (Mandatory Settlement Conference; Continued by Court) –

07/17/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 74
Unknown Event Type

07/10/2017 at 09:00 AM in Department 74
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default (CCP 473.5) – Held – Motion Granted

12/06/2016 at 1:30 PM in Department 74
Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Trial Date Set) –

11/28/2016 at 09:00 AM in Department 74
Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Continued by Court) –

10/31/2016 at 09:00 AM in Department 74
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) – Held – Motion Granted

08/18/2016 at 09:00 AM in Department 74
Case Management Conference – Held – Continued

06/07/2016 at 1:30 PM in Department 74
Case Management Conference – Held – Continued

Register Of Actions
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

Register of Actions (Listed in descending order)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
09/29/2017 09/16/2016

05/29/2019 Appeal – Remittitur – Affirmed (B289510)
Filed by Clerk

08/09/2018 Brief
Filed by Plaintiff

08/09/2018 Brief
Filed by Plaintiff

08/09/2018 PLAINTIFF’S OPENING APPEAL BRIEF

08/09/2018 PLAINTIFF’PEAL BRIEF

04/30/2018 APPELLANT’S NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL

04/30/2018 Designation of Record on Appeal
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

04/17/2018 NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION)

04/16/2018 Notice of Appeal
Filed by Appellant

04/16/2018 NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE) (APPELLATE)

04/16/2018 NOTICE OF APPEAL

02/15/2018 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT/DISMISSAL/OTHER ORDER

02/15/2018 Notice of Entry of Judgment
Filed by Clerk

02/14/2018 JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 0F DEFENDANTS A. STEPHEN CORVI, JR., FRACTIONS SPORTS WEAR, INC., 20TH CENTURY FUNDING, INC.

02/14/2018 Judgment

02/14/2018 JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS A. STEPHEN CORVI, JR., FRACTIONS SPORTSWEAR, INC., 20TH CENTURY FUNDING, INC.

01/29/2018 MEMORANDUM OF COSTS (SUMMARY)

01/29/2018 Memorandum of Costs
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

01/24/2018 at 10:30 AM in Department 74
Unknown Event Type – Held

01/24/2018 Stipulation and Order
Filed by Court

01/24/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-01-24 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/24/2018 STIPULATION, RECEIPT AND ORDER RE RELEASE OF CIVIL EXHIBITS

01/24/2018 Minute Order

01/23/2018 at 08:30 AM in Department 74
(Trial; Trial Started Previously) –

01/23/2018 Motion to Dismiss
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant); Fractions Sportwear, Inc. (Defendant); 20th Century Funding (Defendant)

01/23/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-01-23 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/23/2018 Minute Order

01/23/2018 MOTION TO DISMISS

01/22/2018 at 10:00 AM in Department 74
(Trial; Start of Trial) –

01/22/2018 Minute Order

01/22/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-01-22 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/17/2018 at 08:31 AM in Department 74
Final Status Conference – Held

01/17/2018 Witness List
Filed by Plaintiff

01/17/2018 Opposition Document

01/17/2018 Minute Order

01/17/2018 Exhibit List
Filed by Plaintiff

01/17/2018 PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO MOTION IN LIMINE RE GENUINENESS OF ATTORNEY FEE AGREEMENT

01/17/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-01-17 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/17/2018 Opposition Document

01/17/2018 JOINT WITNESS LIST

01/17/2018 PLAINTIFF.S OPPOSITION TO MOTION RE SATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

01/17/2018 Brief
Filed by Plaintiff

01/17/2018 PLAINTIFF.S TRIAL BRIEF

01/17/2018 JOINT EXHIBIT LIST

01/12/2018 at 08:31 AM in Department 74
Final Status Conference – Held – Continued

01/12/2018 Minute Order

01/12/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-01-12 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/10/2018 Brief
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant); Fractions Sportwear, Inc. (Defendant); 20th Century Funding (Defendant)

01/10/2018 TRIAL BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS A. STEPHEN CORVI, JR., FRACTIONS SPORTSWEAR, INC., 20TH CENTURY FUNDING, INC.

01/08/2018 Motion in Limine
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant); Fractions Sportwear, Inc. (Defendant); 20th Century Funding (Defendant)

01/08/2018 MOTION IN LIMINE RE GENUINENESS OF ATTORNEY FEE AGREEMENT; DECLARATION OF MARTIN D. GROSS

01/04/2018 at 08:30 AM in Department 74
Hearing on Motion to Compel ((Denied)) –

01/04/2018 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL

01/04/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-01-04 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/04/2018 Order
Filed by Court

01/04/2018 Minute Order

12/27/2017 Reply/Response

12/27/2017 REPLY TO MOTION TO COMPEL ALL DISCOVERY FROM ALL DEFENDANTS AND FOR ISSUE SANCTIONS NO OPPOSITION FILED OR SERVED

12/11/2017 BRIEF FOR ISSUE SANCTIONS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

12/11/2017 Brief
Filed by Plaintiff

12/11/2017 Motion to Compel
Filed by Defendant

12/11/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL ALL DISCOVERY FROM ALL DEFENDANTS; AND FOR ISSUE SANCTIONS,; ETC.

10/10/2017 at 10:00 AM in Department 74
(Trial; Matter continued) –

10/10/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-10-10 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

10/05/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 74
Final Status Conference (Final Status Conference; Matter continued) –

10/05/2017 Minute Order

10/05/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-10-05 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 09/29/2017 09/16/2016

09/29/2017 at 09:00 AM in Department 74
Final Status Conference (Final Status Conference; Matter continued) –

09/29/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-09-29 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/29/2017 Minute Order

09/26/2017 MOTION IN LIMINE RE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RE BREACH OF CONTRACT AS TO BOTH WRITTEN AND ORAL CONTRACT; DECLARATION OF MARTIN D. GROSS

09/26/2017 Motion in Limine
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant); Fractions Sportwear, Inc. (Defendant)

09/26/2017 MOTION IN LIMINE RE TRIAL BY JURY; DECLARATION OF MARTIN D. GROSS

09/26/2017 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
Filed by Clerk

09/26/2017 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
Filed by Clerk

09/26/2017 NOTICE RE: CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

09/26/2017 Motion in Limine
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

09/14/2017 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
Filed by Clerk

09/14/2017 NOTICE RE CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

09/08/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 74
Mandatory Settlement Conference (MSC) (Mandatory Settlement Conference; Transferred to different departmnt) –

09/08/2017 Receipt

09/08/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-09-08 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/08/2017 Minute Order

09/08/2017 CIVIL DEPOSIT

08/31/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 74
Mandatory Settlement Conference (MSC) (Mandatory Settlement Conference; Continued by Court) –

08/31/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-08-31 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

08/22/2017 NOTICE RE: CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

08/22/2017 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
Filed by Clerk

07/17/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 74
Unknown Event Type

07/11/2017 Notice of Case Reassignment and Order for Plaintiff to Give Notice
Filed by Clerk

07/11/2017 NOLICE OF CASE REASSIGNMENT AND OF ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE

07/10/2017 at 09:00 AM in Department 74
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default (CCP 473.5) – Held – Motion Granted

07/10/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-07-10 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

07/10/2017 Answer
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant)

07/10/2017 ANSWER TO COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT FRACTIONS SPORTSWEAR INC

07/10/2017 Minute Order

06/15/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR RELIEF OF ENTRY OF DEFAULT PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 473.5; ETC

06/15/2017 Motion
Filed by Fractions Sportwear, Inc. (Defendant)

12/06/2016 at 1:30 PM in Department 74
Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Trial Date Set) –

12/06/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-12-06 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

12/06/2016 Minute Order

12/01/2016 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

12/01/2016 Case Management Statement
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant)

11/28/2016 at 09:00 AM in Department 74
Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Continued by Court) –

11/28/2016 Case Management Statement
Filed by Plaintiff

11/28/2016 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

11/09/2016 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
Filed by Clerk

11/09/2016 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
Filed by Clerk

11/09/2016 NOTICE RE: CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

11/09/2016 NOTICE RE: CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

11/08/2016 ANSWER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT A. STEPHEN CORVI, JR.,

11/08/2016 Answer
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant)

11/03/2016 ANSWER TO COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANTS A. STEPHEN CORVI, JR., FRACTIONS SPORTSWEAR INC., 20TH CENTURY FUNDING, INC.

11/03/2016 Answer
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant); Fractions Sportwear, Inc. (Defendant)

11/01/2016 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

11/01/2016 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

10/31/2016 at 09:00 AM in Department 74
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) – Held – Motion Granted

10/31/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-10-31 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

10/31/2016 Minute Order

10/24/2016 Declaration

10/24/2016 DECLARATION OF ROCKY ORTEGA AND EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO A. STEPHEN CORVI, JR., DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT

10/24/2016 Points and Authorities

10/24/2016 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO A. STEPHEN CORVI, JR., DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT

09/28/2016 Proof-Service/Summons

09/28/2016 Proof of Service

09/28/2016 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Plaintiff

09/28/2016 PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 09/29/2017 09/16/2016

09/16/2016 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR RELIEF OF ENTRY OF DEFAULT PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 473.5; ETC.

09/16/2016 Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default
Filed by A. Stephen Jr. Corvi (Defendant)

08/18/2016 at 09:00 AM in Department 74
Case Management Conference – Held – Continued

08/18/2016 Minute Order

08/18/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-08-18 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

08/15/2016 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

08/15/2016 Case Management Statement
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

08/15/2016 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

08/15/2016 Default Entered
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

07/27/2016 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

07/27/2016 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

06/07/2016 at 1:30 PM in Department 74
Case Management Conference – Held – Continued

06/07/2016 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Plaintiff

06/07/2016 Proof-Service/Summons

06/07/2016 Minute Order

06/07/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-06-07 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

06/07/2016 PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

06/07/2016 PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

05/31/2016 Case Management Statement
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

05/31/2016 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

04/18/2016 Default Entered
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

04/18/2016 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

03/02/2016 Proof-Service/Summons

03/02/2016 PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

03/02/2016 DECLARATION OF DILIGENCE

03/02/2016 PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

03/02/2016 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Plaintiff

03/02/2016 Declaration

02/18/2016 NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

02/18/2016 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Clerk

02/17/2016 Complaint
Filed by null

02/17/2016 OMPLAINT; 1.BREACH OF CONTRACT, FEE AGREEMENT,; ETC

02/17/2016 SUMMONS

Case Number: BC507797
ROSA ROSAS ET AL VS KENSINGTON CATERERS INC ET AL
Filing Courthouse: Stanley Mosk Courthouse

Filing Date: 05/03/2013
Case Type: Wrongful Termination (General Jurisdiction)
Status: Pending

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FUTURE HEARINGS
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

06/19/2019 at 08:30 AM in Department 45 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012
Status Conference

07/16/2019 at 08:30 AM in Department 45 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012
Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees

07/30/2019 at 08:30 AM in Department 45 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Judgment (CCP 473)

PARTY INFORMATION
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

CASAS JULIO – Pltf/X-Deft/Respondent in Pro Per

CRUZ & DEL VALLE – Attorney for Defendant

HERRERA MARVIN – Defendant

IWUCHUKU DONALD – Cross-Defendant

KENSINGTON CATERERS INC. – Defendant

LAW OFFICES OF DONALD IWUCHUKU – Cross-Defendant

LAW OFFICES OF METU C. OGIKE – Cross-Defendant

MOONEY DAVID – Defendant

MOONEY RICHARD – Defendant

MULLEN WILLIE MC – Assignee

OGIKE METU – Cross-Defendant

ROSAS ROSA – Pltf/X-Deft/Respondent in Pro Per

STRATEGIC COLLECTIONS – Defendant/Respondent’s DBA

Documents Filed
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

Documents Filed (Filing dates listed in descending order)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

06/17/2019 Request for Judicial Notice
Filed by Willie Mc Mullen (Assignee)

06/17/2019 Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Judgment
Filed by Willie Mc Mullen (Assignee)

06/14/2019 Motion for Attorney Fees
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); Richard Mooney (Defendant)

05/30/2019 Appeal – Remittitur – Affirmed (B285944)
Filed by Clerk

05/30/2019 Appeal – Remittitur – Affirmed (B286505)
Filed by Clerk

04/29/2019 Notice (of Status Conference)
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant)

04/26/2019 Minute Order ( (Further Status Conference))
Filed by Clerk

04/08/2019 Notice (of Status Conference)
Filed by Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

03/27/2019 Minute Order ( (Status Conference))
Filed by Clerk

02/05/2019 Notice of Status Conference and Order
Filed by Clerk

06/22/2018 Notice
Filed by Clerk

06/21/2018 CLERK’S DECLARATION RE SEARCH AND ORDER TO DEEM COPY AS ORIGINAL

06/21/2018 Order – Other
Filed by Court

04/30/2018 NOTICE OF FEES DUE FOR CLERK’S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL (CIVIL)

04/30/2018 Ntc to Prty re fee Clk’s Transcpt
Filed by Clerk

04/23/2018 NOTICE OF FEES DUE FOR CLERK’S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

04/23/2018 Ntc to Prty re fee Clk’s Transcpt
Filed by Clerk

03/08/2018 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Assignee

02/13/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-02-13 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

02/13/2018 ORDER

02/13/2018 Minute Order

02/13/2018 Order
Filed by Court

02/09/2018 CROSS-DEFENDANTS DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE’S SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION

02/09/2018 Opposition Document
Filed by Cross-Defendant

02/07/2018 CROSS-COMPLAINTS’ KENSTNGTON CATERERS, INC. AND RICHARD MOONEY’S COURT ORDERED BRIEF REGARDING STAY OF MATTER PENDING APPEAL

02/07/2018 Brief
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

02/01/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-02-01 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

02/01/2018 REPLY OF DEFENDANTS AND CROSS-COMPLAINANTS TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ISSUE, EVIDENTIARY OR TERMINATING SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF JULIO CASAS

02/01/2018 ORDER

02/01/2018 Minute Order

02/01/2018 Order
Filed by Court

01/30/2018 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

01/30/2018 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

01/30/2018 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

01/30/2018 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party); Metu Ogike (Cross-Defendant)

01/25/2018 RESPONDENT 5 NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

01/25/2018 Designation of Record on Appeal
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant)

01/23/2018 NOTICE TO REPORTER TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL)

01/23/2018 Ntc to Reptr/Mon to Prep Transcrpt
Filed by Clerk

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

01/22/2018 REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITIONS OF PLAINTIFF ROSA ROSAS AND CROSS-DEFENDANT DONALD IWUCHUKU, ETC

01/22/2018 Reply/Response
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); Richard Mooney (Defendant)

01/19/2018 CROSS-DEFENDANTS DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE’S OPPOSITION TO CROSS COMPLAINANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF DONALD IWUCHUKU ESQ; ETC

01/19/2018 Opposition Document
Filed by Cross-Defendant

01/05/2018 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL ROSA ROSAS AND DONALD IWUCHUKU AND TO ATTEND DEPOSITIONS; ETC.

01/05/2018 Motion to Compel
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); Richard Mooney (Defendant)

12/19/2017 APPELLANT’S NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL

12/19/2017 Notice of Designation of Record
Filed by Appellant

12/11/2017 RESPONDENTS NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

12/11/2017 Response
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant)

12/01/2017 APPELLANTS NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

12/01/2017 NOTICE OF DEFAULT (UNLIMITED CIVIL APPEALS)

12/01/2017 Notice of Designation of Record
Filed by Willie Mc Mullen (Assignee)

12/01/2017 Notice
Filed by Clerk

11/30/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR ISSUE, EV1DENTIARY OR TERMINATING SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF JULIO CASAS PURSUANT TO CCP 2031.310(H), 2023.010(G]; ETC.

11/30/2017 AMENDMENT TO FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT

11/30/2017 Amendment to Complaint

11/30/2017 Motion for Sanctions
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); Richard Mooney (Defendant)

11/29/2017 Offer to Compromise and Acceptance under CCP998

11/28/2017 Ntc to Attorney re Notice of Appeal
Filed by Clerk

11/22/2017 NOTICE OF APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

11/22/2017 Notice of Appeal
Filed by Respondent

11/21/2017 ORDER

11/21/2017 Order
Filed by Court

11/20/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-11-20 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

11/20/2017 Minute Order

11/17/2017 ANSWERS OF CROSS DEFENDANT ROSA ROSAS TO CROSS-COMPLAINANTS’ UNVERIFIED CROSS COMPLAINT

11/17/2017 ANSWERS OF CROSS DEFENDANT JULIO CASAS TO CROSS COMPLAINANTS’ UNVERIFIED CROSS COMPLAINT

11/17/2017 Answer to Cross-Complaint
Filed by Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

11/17/2017 Answer to Cross-Complaint
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party)

11/16/2017 SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF REQUEST AND SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER MOTION TO VACATE VOID ORDERS; AND VACATE ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT; ETC

11/15/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-11-15 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

11/15/2017 Minute Order

11/08/2017 PROOF OF SERVICE CIVIL

11/08/2017 MCMULLEN’S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS INC’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO VACATE VOID ORDERS; ETC.

11/08/2017 PROOF OF SERVICE CIVIL

11/08/2017 PROOF OF SERVICE CIVIL

11/08/2017 PROOF OF SERVICE CIVIL

11/08/2017 PROOF OF SERVICE CIVIL

11/08/2017 PROOF OF SERVICE CIVIL

11/08/2017 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Willie Mc Mullen (Assignee); Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party)

10/27/2017 OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO WILLIE MC MC MULLEN’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE COURT JUDGMENTS; DECLARATION OF SONIA DEL VALLE IN SUPPORT

10/27/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

10/25/2017 NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION)

10/25/2017 Ntc to Attorney re Notice of Appeal
Filed by Clerk

10/24/2017 NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

10/24/2017 Notice of Appeal
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

10/18/2017 CIVIL DEPOSIT

10/18/2017 Miscellaneous-Other
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

10/16/2017 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

10/16/2017 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

10/16/2017 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

10/16/2017 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

10/16/2017 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party)

10/16/2017 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Law Offices of Metu C. Ogike (Cross-Defendant)

10/16/2017 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party)

10/16/2017 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

10/12/2017 FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT FOR: 1. CONVERSION 2. MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

10/12/2017 CROSS-COMPLAINTS’ FIRST AMENDED STATEMENT OF DAMAGES (PUNITIVE DAMAGES)

10/12/2017 AMENDED SUMMONS CROSS-COMPLAINT

10/12/2017 Statement of Damages (Personal Injury or Wrongful Death)
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); Richard Mooney (Defendant)

10/12/2017 Summons
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); Richard Mooney (Defendant)

10/12/2017 First Amended Cross Complaint
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); Richard Mooney (Defendant)

10/11/2017 NOTICE OF REQUEST AND REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT 0F MOTION TO RECONSIDER MOTION TO VACATE VOID ORDERS;

10/11/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO RECONSIDER MOTION TO VACATE VOID ORDERS; AND ETC

10/11/2017 Request for Judicial Notice
Filed by Cross-Defendant

10/11/2017 Motion for Reconsideration
Filed by Strategic Collections (Legacy Party)

09/29/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-09-29 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/29/2017 ORDER

09/29/2017 Minute Order

09/29/2017 Order
Filed by Court

09/27/2017 Order
Filed by Court

09/22/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-09-22 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/22/2017 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

09/22/2017 Minute Order

09/22/2017 CROSS DEFENDANT DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE SUPPLEMENTARY REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION TO SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE

09/22/2017 Request for Judicial Notice
Filed by Donald Iwuchuku (Cross-Defendant); Metu Ogike (Cross-Defendant)

09/22/2017 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party)

09/19/2017 ROTICE OF ERRATA TO CROSS DEFENDANTS DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION TO SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE

09/19/2017 Notice
Filed by Cross-Defendant

09/18/2017 CROSS-DEFENDANTS, DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE, REPLY TO DEFENDANTS SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTION; REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE; [PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 425.16];

09/18/2017 CROSS DEFENDANT DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION TO SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE

09/18/2017 DECLARATION OF DEANNA WELCH (PROOF OF SERVICE)

09/18/2017 Reply/Response
Filed by Cross-Defendant

09/18/2017 Declaration
Filed by Willie Mc Mullen (Assignee)

09/15/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-09-15 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/15/2017 Minute Order

09/15/2017 ORDER

09/15/2017 Order
Filed by Court

09/11/2017 OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS TO WILLIE MC MULLEN’S MOTION TO VACATE; DECLARATION OF SONIA DEL VALLE IN SUPPORT

09/11/2017 SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION OF CROSS- COMPLAINANTS KENSINGTON CATERERS AND RICHARD MOONEY TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTION; ETC.

09/11/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Defendant and Cross-Complainant

09/11/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

09/05/2017 NOTICE OF RE-SCHEDULING OF HEARING ON MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF JULIO CASAS TO PROVIDE A FURTHER RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; ETC.

09/05/2017 Notice
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

08/29/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-08-29 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

08/29/2017 DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO TAX COSTS; ETC.

08/29/2017 DECLARATION OF LIZ GONZALES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO TAX COSTS

08/29/2017 Minute Order

08/29/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

08/24/2017 WILLIE MCMULLEN’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO VACATE VOID ORDERS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIE MCMULLEN IN SUPPORT OF

08/24/2017 Notice of Motion
Filed by Cross-Defendant

08/16/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-08-16 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

08/16/2017 Minute Order

08/10/2017 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT PER COURT ORDER

08/10/2017 Miscellaneous-Other
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

07/26/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO TAX COSTS SOUGHT BY DEFENDANTS KENSINGTON CATERERS AND RICHARD MOONEY; ETC

07/26/2017 Motion to Tax Costs
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party)

07/21/2017 NOTICE OF RULING

07/21/2017 Notice of Ruling
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

07/07/2017 NOTICE OF STATUS CONFERENCE AND ORDER

07/07/2017 MEMORANDUM OF COSTS ON APPEAL

07/07/2017 Memo of Costs on Appeal
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

07/07/2017 Notice of Status Conference filed
Filed by Clerk

06/21/2017 REMITTITUR

06/21/2017 Unknown Document Type
Filed by Clerk

10/05/2016 CLERK’S CERTIFICATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL

10/05/2016 Miscellaneous-Other
Filed by Clerk

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

09/19/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-09-19 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/19/2016 ORDER

09/19/2016 Minute Order

09/19/2016 Order
Filed by Court

09/12/2016 CROSS-DEFENDANTS, DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE, REPLY TO DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTION [PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 425.16]

09/12/2016 NOTICE OF FEES DUE FOR CLERK’S TRANSCRIPT ON MULTIPLE APPEALS

09/12/2016 Reply/Response
Filed by Cross-Defendant

09/12/2016 Miscellaneous-Other
Filed by Clerk

09/02/2016 OPPOSITION OF CROSS-COMPLAINANTS KENSINGTON CATERERS AND RICHARD MOONEY TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTION; ETC.

09/02/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Defendant and Cross-Complainant

08/19/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-08-19 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

08/19/2016 Minute Order

08/19/2016 ORDER

08/19/2016 Order
Filed by Court

08/15/2016 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Clerk

08/12/2016 REPLY OF DEFENDANTS AND CROSS-COMPLAINANTS TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO LIFT DISCOVERY STAY; DECLARATION OF SONIA DEL VALLE IN SUPPORT

08/12/2016 Reply/Response
Filed by Defendant and Cross-Complainant

08/08/2016 CROSS-DEFENDANTS, DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE, OPPOSITION TO CROSS DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO LIFT DISCOVERY STAY

07/18/2016 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO LIFT DISCOVERY STAY; ETC

07/18/2016 Motion
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

07/05/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-07-05 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

07/05/2016 Minute Order

06/30/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-06-30 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

06/30/2016 EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME FOR MOTION LIFTING DISCOVERY STAY, AND ETC.

06/30/2016 Minute Order

06/30/2016 Ex-Parte Application
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant)

06/24/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-06-24 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

06/22/2016 NOTICE OF RULING ON DEFENDANTS AND CROSS-COMPLAINANTS’ MOTION PURSUANT TO CCP SECTION 170.6

06/15/2016 NOTICE TO REPORTER TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

06/15/2016 Ntc to Reptr/Mon to Prep Transcrpt
Filed by Clerk

06/13/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-06-13 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

06/13/2016 Minute Order

06/10/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-06-10 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

06/10/2016 Minute Order

06/07/2016 PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL OFFICER (CODE CIV. PROC., 170.6)

06/07/2016 PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL OFFICER (CODE CIV. PROC., 170.6)

06/07/2016 Challenge To Judicial Officer – Peremptory (170.6)
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

06/03/2016 PLAINTIFF JULIO CASAS OPPOSITION TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR PRODCUTION OF DOCUMENTS AND TO ATTEND DEPOSITION; DECL OF DON IWUCHUKU

06/02/2016 NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE & ATTACHED ORDERS THEREON

06/02/2016 NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE & ATTACHED ORDERS THEREON

06/02/2016 Notice of Trial Setting Conference and Attached Orders Thereon
Filed by Clerk

06/02/2016 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Clerk

05/31/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-05-31 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

05/31/2016 Minute Order

05/26/2016 PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL OFFICER (CODE CIV. PROC., 170.6)

05/26/2016 CROSS-DEFENDANTS, DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE, NOTICE OF ANTI-SLAPP MOTION AND ANTI-SLAPP MOTION [PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 425.16]; ETC

05/26/2016 PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL OFFICER (CODE CIV. PROC., 170.6)

05/26/2016 Motion to Strike
Filed by Donald Iwuchuku (Cross-Defendant); Metu Ogike (Cross-Defendant)

05/26/2016 Challenge To Judicial Officer – Peremptory (170.6)
Filed by Metu Ogike (Cross-Defendant)

05/26/2016 Challenge To Judicial Officer – Peremptory (170.6)
Filed by Donald Iwuchuku (Cross-Defendant)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

05/25/2016 Declaration
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

05/17/2016 Proof-Personal Service
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

05/17/2016 Statement of Facts
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

05/17/2016 Motion to Compel
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

05/17/2016 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF JULIO CASAS TO PROVIDE A FURTHER RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND TO ATTEND HIS DEPOSITION; ETC.

05/17/2016 SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF JULIO CASAS TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS

05/17/2016 PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

05/17/2016 PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

04/27/2016 Notice of Designation of Record
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

04/27/2016 APPELLANT’S NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

04/22/2016 Notice of Designation of Record
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

04/22/2016 APPELLANT’S NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL

04/19/2016 Summons
Filed by Defendant and Cross-Complainant

04/19/2016 Summons on Cross Complaint

04/12/2016 Cross-Complaint
Filed by Defendant and Cross-Complainant

04/12/2016 Order
Filed by Defendant and Cross-Complainant

04/12/2016 Notice
Filed by Clerk

04/12/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-04-12 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

04/12/2016 Minute Order

04/12/2016 CROSS-COMPLAINT FOR: 1. CONVERSION 2. MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

04/12/2016 ORDER RE CROSS-COMPLAINT

04/11/2016 Objection Document
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

04/11/2016 OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERER INC.’S [PROPOSED] CROSS-COMPLAINT/STATEMENT OF DAMAGES (PUNITIVE DAMAGES) [PURSUANT TO CRC 3.1312)

04/07/2016 Notice
Filed by Clerk

04/07/2016 NOTICE OF DEFAULT (UNLIMITED CIVIL APPEALS)

04/05/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-04-05 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

04/05/2016 Minute Order

03/17/2016 Ntc to Attorney re Notice of Appeal
Filed by Clerk

03/17/2016 NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION)

03/16/2016 Notice of Appeal
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

03/16/2016 NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE) (APPELLATE)

03/07/2016 Ntc to Attorney re Notice of Appeal
Filed by Clerk

03/07/2016 NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION)

03/04/2016 Notice of Ruling
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

03/04/2016 Notice of Appeal
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

03/04/2016 NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE) (APPELLATE)

03/04/2016 NOTICE OF RULING

03/02/2016 Order
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

03/02/2016 Stipulation and Order to use Certified Shorthand Reporter
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/02/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-03-02 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

03/02/2016 STIPULATION AND ORDER TO USE CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

03/02/2016 ORDER FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY

03/02/2016 Minute Order

02/23/2016 Reply/Response
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

02/23/2016 DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. REPLY RE MOTION FOR COURT ORDER COMPELLING RETURN OF PROPERTY; OR TN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR AN ORDER ALLOWING DEFENDANTS FILING OF CROSS-COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF SONIA DEL VALLE IN SUPPORT

02/18/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

02/18/2016 PLAINTIFF ROSA ROSAS, JULIO CASAS AND COUNSEL DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU C. OGIKE OPPOSITION TO,ETC.

02/09/2016 Stipulation and Order to use Certified Shorthand Reporter
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/09/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-02-09 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

02/09/2016 STIPULATION AND ORDER TO USE CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

02/09/2016 Minute Order

02/08/2016 Case Management Statement
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

02/08/2016 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

02/04/2016 Declaration
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

02/04/2016 Motion to Compel
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

02/04/2016 DECLARATION OF DEFENDANT RICHARD MOONEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY ETC.

02/04/2016 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. FOR COURT ORDER COMPELLING RETURN OF PROPERTY; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR AN ORDER ALLOWING DEFENDANTS’ FILING OF CROSS-COMPLAINT; ETC.

02/01/2016 Reply/Response
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

02/01/2016 PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO THEIR MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

01/27/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-01-27 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/27/2016 Minute Order

01/25/2016 Declaration
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

01/25/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

01/25/2016 OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.

01/25/2016 DECLARATION OF SONIA DEL VALLE IN SUPPORT DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

01/12/2016 Request
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

01/12/2016 REQUEST FOR REFUND

01/08/2016 Case Management Statement
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant)

01/08/2016 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

12/18/2015 Order
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

12/18/2015 ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT; AND RECALLING WRIT OF EXECUTION

12/03/2015 Motion for Reconsideration
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

12/03/2015 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT’S ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF DONALD IWUCHUKU

12/02/2015 Notice of Ruling
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

12/02/2015 NOTICE OF RULING

11/24/2015 Stipulation and Order to use Certified Shorthand Reporter
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/24/2015 Minute order entered: 2015-11-24 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

11/24/2015 Minute Order

11/24/2015 STIPULATION AND ORDER TO USE CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

11/17/2015 Minute order entered: 2015-11-17 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

11/17/2015 Minute Order

11/06/2015 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

11/06/2015 NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE OF HEARING ON MOTION AND MOTION OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AND RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION

10/30/2015 Minute order entered: 2015-10-30 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

10/30/2015 Minute Order

10/13/2015 Cost Bill After Judgment
Filed by Assignee

10/13/2015 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

10/13/2015 MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AFTER JUDGMENT, ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF CREDIT, AND DECLARATION OF ACCRUED INTEREST

10/13/2015 NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE OF HEARING ON MOTION AND MOTION OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AND RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION

10/08/2015 Minute order entered: 2015-10-08 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

10/07/2015 Assignment of Judgment
Filed by Assignee

10/07/2015 Assignment of Judgment
Filed by Assignee

10/07/2015 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 673

10/07/2015 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 673

10/01/2015 Request for Judicial Notice
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

10/01/2015 Reply/Response
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

10/01/2015 DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

10/01/2015 REPLY OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT

09/25/2015 Opposition Document
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

09/25/2015 Request for Judicial Notice
Filed by Assignee

09/25/2015 Opposition Document
Filed by Assignee

09/25/2015 WILLIE MC MULLEN’S OPPOSITION TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR(S) KENSINGTON CATERERS INC. AND RICHARD MOONEY MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AND RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION; ETC

09/25/2015 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT; STAY OF EXECUTION; RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION

09/25/2015 WILLIE MC MULLEN’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF WILLIE MCMULLEN’S OPPOSITION TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR(S) KENSINGTON CATERERS INC. AND RICHARD MOONEY MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION; ETC

09/14/2015 Abstract of Judgment – Civil and Small Claims
Filed by Clerk

09/09/2015 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/09/2015 Declaration
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/09/2015 DECLARATION OF SONIA DEL VALLE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.

09/09/2015 Proof of Service

09/04/2015 Answer
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 Declaration
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 Declaration
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 Declaration
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 Declaration
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 Points and Authorities
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 Motion
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 Opposition Document
Filed by Assignee

09/04/2015 Declaration
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

09/04/2015 Minute order entered: 2015-09-04 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/04/2015 Declaration
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

09/04/2015 Ex-Parte Application
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

09/04/2015 DECLARATION OF SONIA DEL VALLE IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.

09/04/2015 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT; STAY OF EXECUTION; RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION

09/04/2015 DECLARATION OF MICHAEL SULLIVAN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.

09/04/2015 DECLARATION OF LEO BURGARA IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.

09/04/2015 EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME FOR HEARING OF NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENTS; STAY OF EXECUTION; RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION

09/04/2015 PROOF OF SERVICE

09/04/2015 DECLARATION OF DEFENDANT RICHARD MOONEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.

09/04/2015 DECLARATION OF DEFENDANT RICHARD MOONEY IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR RELEEF FROM DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.

09/04/2015 DECLARATION OF MARVIN HERRERA IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.

09/04/2015 Minute Order

09/04/2015 ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT

09/04/2015 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AND RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION

09/04/2015 WILLIE MC MULLEN’S OPPOSITION TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR(S) KENSINGTON CATERERS INC. AND RICHARD MOONEY EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME; ETC.

08/26/2015 Abstract of Judgment – Civil and Small Claims
Filed by Assignee

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

08/20/2015 Abstract of Judgment – Civil and Small Claims
Filed by Clerk

08/05/2015 Writ-Other Issued
Filed by Assignee

08/05/2015 Abstract of Judgment – Civil and Small Claims
Filed by Creditor

07/28/2015 Order on Court Fee Waiver (Superior Court)
Filed by Clerk

07/28/2015 Request to Waive Court Fees
Filed by Willie Mc Mullen (Assignee)

07/28/2015 ORDER ON COURT FEE WAIVER

04/16/2015 DECLARATION OF ACCRUED INTEREST (C.C.P. 685.050)

04/16/2015 Writ issued
Filed by Assignee

04/16/2015 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 673

04/16/2015 DECLARATION OF ACCRUED INTEREST (C.C.P. 685.050)

04/16/2015 Declaration
Filed by Assignee

04/16/2015 Assignment of Judgment
Filed by Assignee

04/16/2015 Writ issued
Filed by Assignee

04/16/2015 Declaration
Filed by Assignee

04/16/2015 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 673

04/16/2015 Assignment of Judgment
Filed by Assignee

04/10/2015 Writ-Other Issued
Filed by Clerk

03/19/2015 Minute order entered: 2015-03-19 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

03/19/2015 Minute order entered: 2015-03-19 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

03/19/2015 JUDGMENT BY COURT AFTER DEFAULT

03/19/2015 REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL

03/19/2015 SUMMARY OF THE CASE

03/19/2015 DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF JULIO CASAS PURSUANT TO C.C.P. SECTION 585(D)

03/19/2015 DECLARATION OF DONALD IWUCHUKU IN SUPPORT OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT.

03/19/2015 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

03/19/2015 Minute Order

03/19/2015 Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 Statement of the Case
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 Minute Order

03/19/2015 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 Partial Dismissal (w/o Prejudice)
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

03/19/2015 SUMMARY OF THE CASE

03/19/2015 JUDGMENT BY COURT AFTER DEFAULT

03/19/2015 DECLARATION OF DONALD IWUCHUKU IN SUPPORT OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT.

03/19/2015 Statement of the Case
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF ROSA ROSAS PURSUANT TO C.C.P. SECTION 585(D)

02/05/2015 Minute order entered: 2015-02-05 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

02/05/2015 Minute Order

02/05/2015 RULING

08/07/2014 PLAINTIFFS ROSA ROSAS AND JULIO CASAS NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO VACATE DISSMISAL; POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATIONS OF DONALD IWUCHUKU, ESQ

08/07/2014 Notice of Motion
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

06/16/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-06-16 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

06/16/2014 Minute Order

05/12/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-05-12 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

05/12/2014 Minute Order

04/15/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-04-15 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

04/15/2014 Minute Order

03/11/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-03-11 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

03/11/2014 Minute Order

01/09/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-01-09 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/09/2014 Minute Order

11/08/2013 Minute order entered: 2013-11-08 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

11/08/2013 Minute Order

11/08/2013 REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL

11/08/2013 Partial Dismissal (w/o Prejudice)
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

09/24/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

09/24/2013 Default Entered
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

09/09/2013 Minute order entered: 2013-09-09 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/09/2013 Minute Order

09/06/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

09/06/2013 PLAINTTFF ROSA ROSAS STATEMENT OF DAMAGES

09/06/2013 PLAINTIFF JULIO CASAS STATEMENT OF DAMAGES

09/06/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

09/06/2013 Statement of Damages (Personal Injury or Wrongful Death)
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

09/06/2013 Statement of Damages (Personal Injury or Wrongful Death)
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

09/06/2013 Default Entered
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

09/06/2013 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

08/20/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

08/20/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

08/20/2013 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

08/20/2013 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

08/20/2013 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

08/20/2013 Case Management Statement
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

07/29/2013 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

07/29/2013 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

07/29/2013 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

07/29/2013 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

07/29/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

07/29/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

07/29/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

07/29/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

06/21/2013 NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

06/19/2013 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Court

06/19/2013 NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

05/22/2013 Proof-Service/Summons
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

05/22/2013 PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

05/10/2013 PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

05/10/2013 Proof-Service/Summons
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

05/10/2013 PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

05/10/2013 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

05/03/2013 SUMMONS

05/03/2013 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES: 1. WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY; ETC

05/03/2013 Complaint
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

Proceedings Held
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

Proceedings Held (Proceeding dates listed in descending order)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
04/12/2016

06/14/2019 at 08:30 AM in Department 45, Mel Red Recana, Presiding
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Judgment (CCP 473) – Not Held – Rescheduled by Party

04/26/2019 at 08:30 AM in Department 45, Mel Red Recana, Presiding
Further Status Conference – Held

03/27/2019 at 08:30 AM in Department 45, Mel Red Recana, Presiding
Status Conference – Held

02/13/2018 at 08:34 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Motion for Sanctions (MOTION-SANCTIONS; Court makes order) –

02/01/2018 at 08:34 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Motion to Compel ((Continued by Court)) –

11/20/2017 at 08:34 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration – Held – Taken under Submission

11/15/2017 at 08:34 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration (Motion for Reconsideration; Continued by Court) –

09/29/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 45
Unknown Event Type – Held – Taken under Submission

09/22/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) – Held – Taken under Submission

09/15/2017 at 08:33 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Motion to Tax Costs (Motion to Tax Costs; Denied) –

08/29/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 45
Status Conference (Status Conference; Court makes order) –

08/16/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 45
Status Conference (Status Conference; Continued by Court) –

09/19/2016 at 08:35 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Motion to Strike ((Off Calendar)) –

08/19/2016 at 08:35 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Motion for Order (Motion for an Order; Continued by Court) –

07/05/2016 at 08:30 AM in Department 45
Ruling on Submitted Matter (Ruling on Submitted Matter; Court makes order) –

06/30/2016 at 08:30 AM in Department 45
Ex-Parte Proceedings – Held – Taken under Submission

06/24/2016 at 08:32 AM in Department 31
Unknown Event Type – Not Held – Advanced and Vacated

06/13/2016 at 08:30 AM in Department 31
(Affidavit of Prejudice; Case is reassigned) –

06/10/2016 at 08:29 AM in Department 31
Trial Setting Conference (Trial Setting Conference; Off Calendar) –

05/31/2016 at 00:00 AM in Department 56
(Affidavit of Prejudice; Court Disqualifies Self) –

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 04/12/2016

04/12/2016 at 00:00 AM in Department 56
Court Order – Held

04/05/2016 at 08:31 AM in Department 56
(Order to Show Cause; OSC Discharged) –

03/02/2016 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Hearing on Motion for Order – Held – Motion Granted

02/09/2016 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration (Motion for Reconsideration; Motion Denied) –

01/27/2016 at 08:31 AM in Department 56
Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Proceeding continued) –

11/24/2015 at 08:32 AM in Department 56
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) – Held – Motion Granted

11/17/2015 at 08:32 AM in Department 56
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) (Motion Set Aside Default/Judgment; Proceeding continued) –

10/30/2015 at 08:32 AM in Department 56
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) (Motion Set Aside Default/Judgment; Proceeding continued) –

10/08/2015 at 08:32 AM in Department 56
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) (Motion Set Aside Default/Judgment; Continued by Court) –

09/04/2015 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Ex-Parte Proceedings (Exparte proceeding; Motion Denied) –

03/19/2015 at 10:30 AM in Department 56
Default Prove Up Hearing (Civil Default Prove Up Hearing; Finding in favor of Plaintiff) –

03/19/2015 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
Default Prove Up Hearing (Hrng; Default Prove-up/Quiet Title; Transferred to different departmnt) –

02/05/2015 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
Unknown Event Type – Held – Motion Granted

06/16/2014 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
(OSC-Failure to File Default Judg; Order of Dismissal) –

05/12/2014 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
(OSC-Failure to File Default Judg; Continued by Court) –

04/15/2014 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
(OSC-Failure to File Default Judg; Continued by Court) –

03/11/2014 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
(OSC-Failure to File Default Judg; Continued by Court) –

01/09/2014 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
(OSC-Failure to File Default Judg; Continued by Court) –

11/08/2013 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
Unknown Event Type – Held

09/09/2013 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Continued by Court) –

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 04/12/2016

Register Of Actions
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

Register of Actions (Listed in descending order)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

06/17/2019 Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Judgment
Filed by Willie Mc Mullen (Assignee)

06/17/2019 Request for Judicial Notice
Filed by Willie Mc Mullen (Assignee)

06/14/2019 at 08:30 AM in Department 45, Mel Red Recana, Presiding
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Judgment (CCP 473) – Not Held – Rescheduled by Party

06/14/2019 Motion for Attorney Fees
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); Richard Mooney (Defendant)

05/30/2019 Appeal – Remittitur – Affirmed (B285944)
Filed by Clerk

05/30/2019 Appeal – Remittitur – Affirmed (B286505)
Filed by Clerk

04/29/2019 Notice (of Status Conference)
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant)

04/26/2019 at 08:30 AM in Department 45, Mel Red Recana, Presiding
Further Status Conference – Held

04/26/2019 Minute Order ( (Further Status Conference))
Filed by Clerk

04/08/2019 Notice (of Status Conference)
Filed by Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

03/27/2019 at 08:30 AM in Department 45, Mel Red Recana, Presiding
Status Conference – Held

03/27/2019 Minute Order ( (Status Conference))
Filed by Clerk

02/05/2019 Notice of Status Conference and Order
Filed by Clerk

06/22/2018 Notice
Filed by Clerk

06/21/2018 Order – Other
Filed by Court

06/21/2018 CLERK’S DECLARATION RE SEARCH AND ORDER TO DEEM COPY AS ORIGINAL

04/30/2018 NOTICE OF FEES DUE FOR CLERK’S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL (CIVIL)

04/30/2018 Ntc to Prty re fee Clk’s Transcpt
Filed by Clerk

04/23/2018 Ntc to Prty re fee Clk’s Transcpt
Filed by Clerk

04/23/2018 NOTICE OF FEES DUE FOR CLERK’S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

03/08/2018 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Assignee

02/13/2018 at 08:34 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Motion for Sanctions (MOTION-SANCTIONS; Court makes order) –

02/13/2018 Minute Order

02/13/2018 Order
Filed by Court

02/13/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-02-13 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

02/13/2018 ORDER

02/09/2018 CROSS-DEFENDANTS DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE’S SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION

02/09/2018 Opposition Document
Filed by Cross-Defendant

02/07/2018 CROSS-COMPLAINTS’ KENSTNGTON CATERERS, INC. AND RICHARD MOONEY’S COURT ORDERED BRIEF REGARDING STAY OF MATTER PENDING APPEAL

02/07/2018 Brief
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

02/01/2018 at 08:34 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Motion to Compel ((Continued by Court)) –

02/01/2018 Order
Filed by Court

02/01/2018 Minute order entered: 2018-02-01 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

02/01/2018 REPLY OF DEFENDANTS AND CROSS-COMPLAINANTS TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ISSUE, EVIDENTIARY OR TERMINATING SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF JULIO CASAS

02/01/2018 ORDER

02/01/2018 Minute Order

01/30/2018 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

01/30/2018 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party); Metu Ogike (Cross-Defendant)

01/30/2018 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

01/30/2018 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

01/25/2018 RESPONDENT 5 NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

01/25/2018 Designation of Record on Appeal
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant)

01/23/2018 NOTICE TO REPORTER TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL)

01/23/2018 Ntc to Reptr/Mon to Prep Transcrpt
Filed by Clerk

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

01/22/2018 Reply/Response
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); Richard Mooney (Defendant)

01/22/2018 REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITIONS OF PLAINTIFF ROSA ROSAS AND CROSS-DEFENDANT DONALD IWUCHUKU, ETC

01/19/2018 Opposition Document
Filed by Cross-Defendant

01/19/2018 CROSS-DEFENDANTS DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE’S OPPOSITION TO CROSS COMPLAINANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF DONALD IWUCHUKU ESQ; ETC

01/05/2018 Motion to Compel
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); Richard Mooney (Defendant)

01/05/2018 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL ROSA ROSAS AND DONALD IWUCHUKU AND TO ATTEND DEPOSITIONS; ETC.

12/19/2017 Notice of Designation of Record
Filed by Appellant

12/19/2017 APPELLANT’S NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL

12/11/2017 Response
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant)

12/11/2017 RESPONDENTS NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

12/01/2017 Notice of Designation of Record
Filed by Willie Mc Mullen (Assignee)

12/01/2017 NOTICE OF DEFAULT (UNLIMITED CIVIL APPEALS)

12/01/2017 APPELLANTS NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

12/01/2017 Notice
Filed by Clerk

11/30/2017 Motion for Sanctions
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); Richard Mooney (Defendant)

11/30/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR ISSUE, EV1DENTIARY OR TERMINATING SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF JULIO CASAS PURSUANT TO CCP 2031.310(H), 2023.010(G]; ETC.

11/30/2017 Amendment to Complaint

11/30/2017 AMENDMENT TO FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT

11/29/2017 Offer to Compromise and Acceptance under CCP998

11/28/2017 Ntc to Attorney re Notice of Appeal
Filed by Clerk

11/22/2017 Notice of Appeal
Filed by Respondent

11/22/2017 NOTICE OF APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

11/21/2017 Order
Filed by Court

11/21/2017 ORDER

11/20/2017 at 08:34 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration – Held – Taken under Submission

11/20/2017 Minute Order

11/20/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-11-20 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

11/17/2017 ANSWERS OF CROSS DEFENDANT ROSA ROSAS TO CROSS-COMPLAINANTS’ UNVERIFIED CROSS COMPLAINT

11/17/2017 ANSWERS OF CROSS DEFENDANT JULIO CASAS TO CROSS COMPLAINANTS’ UNVERIFIED CROSS COMPLAINT

11/17/2017 Answer to Cross-Complaint
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party)

11/17/2017 Answer to Cross-Complaint
Filed by Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

11/16/2017 SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF REQUEST AND SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER MOTION TO VACATE VOID ORDERS; AND VACATE ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT; ETC

11/15/2017 at 08:34 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration (Motion for Reconsideration; Continued by Court) –

11/15/2017 Minute Order

11/15/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-11-15 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

11/08/2017 PROOF OF SERVICE CIVIL

11/08/2017 PROOF OF SERVICE CIVIL

11/08/2017 PROOF OF SERVICE CIVIL

11/08/2017 MCMULLEN’S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS INC’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO VACATE VOID ORDERS; ETC.

11/08/2017 PROOF OF SERVICE CIVIL

11/08/2017 PROOF OF SERVICE CIVIL

11/08/2017 PROOF OF SERVICE CIVIL

11/08/2017 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Willie Mc Mullen (Assignee); Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party)

10/27/2017 OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO WILLIE MC MC MULLEN’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE COURT JUDGMENTS; DECLARATION OF SONIA DEL VALLE IN SUPPORT

10/27/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

10/25/2017 NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION)

10/25/2017 Ntc to Attorney re Notice of Appeal
Filed by Clerk

10/24/2017 Notice of Appeal
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

10/24/2017 NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

10/18/2017 Miscellaneous-Other
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant)

10/18/2017 CIVIL DEPOSIT

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

10/16/2017 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

10/16/2017 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

10/16/2017 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

10/16/2017 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

10/16/2017 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party)

10/16/2017 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Law Offices of Metu C. Ogike (Cross-Defendant)

10/16/2017 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party)

10/16/2017 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

10/12/2017 Summons
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); Richard Mooney (Defendant)

10/12/2017 Statement of Damages (Personal Injury or Wrongful Death)
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); Richard Mooney (Defendant)

10/12/2017 FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT FOR: 1. CONVERSION 2. MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

10/12/2017 AMENDED SUMMONS CROSS-COMPLAINT

10/12/2017 First Amended Cross Complaint
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); Richard Mooney (Defendant)

10/12/2017 CROSS-COMPLAINTS’ FIRST AMENDED STATEMENT OF DAMAGES (PUNITIVE DAMAGES)

10/11/2017 Motion for Reconsideration
Filed by Strategic Collections (Legacy Party)

10/11/2017 Request for Judicial Notice
Filed by Cross-Defendant

10/11/2017 NOTICE OF REQUEST AND REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT 0F MOTION TO RECONSIDER MOTION TO VACATE VOID ORDERS;

10/11/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO RECONSIDER MOTION TO VACATE VOID ORDERS; AND ETC

09/29/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 45
Unknown Event Type – Held – Taken under Submission

09/29/2017 Minute Order

09/29/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-09-29 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/29/2017 Order
Filed by Court

09/29/2017 ORDER

09/27/2017 Order
Filed by Court

09/22/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) – Held – Taken under Submission

09/22/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-09-22 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/22/2017 CROSS DEFENDANT DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE SUPPLEMENTARY REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION TO SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE

09/22/2017 Request for Judicial Notice
Filed by Donald Iwuchuku (Cross-Defendant); Metu Ogike (Cross-Defendant)

09/22/2017 Minute Order

09/22/2017 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party)

09/22/2017 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

09/19/2017 ROTICE OF ERRATA TO CROSS DEFENDANTS DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION TO SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE

09/19/2017 Notice
Filed by Cross-Defendant

09/18/2017 Reply/Response
Filed by Cross-Defendant

09/18/2017 Declaration
Filed by Willie Mc Mullen (Assignee)

09/18/2017 CROSS-DEFENDANTS, DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE, REPLY TO DEFENDANTS SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTION; REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE; [PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 425.16];

09/18/2017 CROSS DEFENDANT DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION TO SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE

09/18/2017 DECLARATION OF DEANNA WELCH (PROOF OF SERVICE)

09/15/2017 at 08:33 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Motion to Tax Costs (Motion to Tax Costs; Denied) –

09/15/2017 ORDER

09/15/2017 Minute Order

09/15/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-09-15 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/15/2017 Order
Filed by Court

09/11/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

09/11/2017 OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS TO WILLIE MC MULLEN’S MOTION TO VACATE; DECLARATION OF SONIA DEL VALLE IN SUPPORT

09/11/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Defendant and Cross-Complainant

09/11/2017 SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION OF CROSS- COMPLAINANTS KENSINGTON CATERERS AND RICHARD MOONEY TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTION; ETC.

09/05/2017 NOTICE OF RE-SCHEDULING OF HEARING ON MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF JULIO CASAS TO PROVIDE A FURTHER RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; ETC.

09/05/2017 Notice
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

08/29/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 45
Status Conference (Status Conference; Court makes order) –

08/29/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-08-29 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

08/29/2017 DECLARATION OF LIZ GONZALES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO TAX COSTS

08/29/2017 Minute Order

08/29/2017 DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO TAX COSTS; ETC.

08/29/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

08/24/2017 Notice of Motion
Filed by Cross-Defendant

08/24/2017 WILLIE MCMULLEN’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO VACATE VOID ORDERS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIE MCMULLEN IN SUPPORT OF

08/16/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 45
Status Conference (Status Conference; Continued by Court) –

08/16/2017 Minute order entered: 2017-08-16 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

08/16/2017 Minute Order

08/10/2017 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT PER COURT ORDER

08/10/2017 Miscellaneous-Other
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

07/26/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO TAX COSTS SOUGHT BY DEFENDANTS KENSINGTON CATERERS AND RICHARD MOONEY; ETC

07/26/2017 Motion to Tax Costs
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party)

07/21/2017 NOTICE OF RULING

07/21/2017 Notice of Ruling
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

07/07/2017 MEMORANDUM OF COSTS ON APPEAL

07/07/2017 Notice of Status Conference filed
Filed by Clerk

07/07/2017 Memo of Costs on Appeal
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

07/07/2017 NOTICE OF STATUS CONFERENCE AND ORDER

06/21/2017 Unknown Document Type
Filed by Clerk

06/21/2017 REMITTITUR

10/05/2016 Miscellaneous-Other
Filed by Clerk

10/05/2016 CLERK’S CERTIFICATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

09/19/2016 at 08:35 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Motion to Strike ((Off Calendar)) –

09/19/2016 Minute Order

09/19/2016 Order
Filed by Court

09/19/2016 ORDER

09/19/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-09-19 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/12/2016 Reply/Response
Filed by Cross-Defendant

09/12/2016 CROSS-DEFENDANTS, DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE, REPLY TO DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTION [PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 425.16]

09/12/2016 NOTICE OF FEES DUE FOR CLERK’S TRANSCRIPT ON MULTIPLE APPEALS

09/12/2016 Miscellaneous-Other
Filed by Clerk

09/02/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Defendant and Cross-Complainant

09/02/2016 OPPOSITION OF CROSS-COMPLAINANTS KENSINGTON CATERERS AND RICHARD MOONEY TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTION; ETC.

08/19/2016 at 08:35 AM in Department 45
Hearing on Motion for Order (Motion for an Order; Continued by Court) –

08/19/2016 ORDER

08/19/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-08-19 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

08/19/2016 Order
Filed by Court

08/19/2016 Minute Order

08/15/2016 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Clerk

08/12/2016 REPLY OF DEFENDANTS AND CROSS-COMPLAINANTS TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO LIFT DISCOVERY STAY; DECLARATION OF SONIA DEL VALLE IN SUPPORT

08/12/2016 Reply/Response
Filed by Defendant and Cross-Complainant

08/08/2016 CROSS-DEFENDANTS, DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE, OPPOSITION TO CROSS DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO LIFT DISCOVERY STAY

07/18/2016 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO LIFT DISCOVERY STAY; ETC

07/18/2016 Motion
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

07/05/2016 at 08:30 AM in Department 45
Ruling on Submitted Matter (Ruling on Submitted Matter; Court makes order) –

07/05/2016 Minute Order

07/05/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-07-05 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

06/30/2016 at 08:30 AM in Department 45
Ex-Parte Proceedings – Held – Taken under Submission

06/30/2016 Ex-Parte Application
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant)

06/30/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-06-30 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

06/30/2016 EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME FOR MOTION LIFTING DISCOVERY STAY, AND ETC.

06/30/2016 Minute Order

06/24/2016 at 08:32 AM in Department 31
Unknown Event Type – Not Held – Advanced and Vacated

06/24/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-06-24 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

06/22/2016 NOTICE OF RULING ON DEFENDANTS AND CROSS-COMPLAINANTS’ MOTION PURSUANT TO CCP SECTION 170.6

06/15/2016 NOTICE TO REPORTER TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

06/15/2016 Ntc to Reptr/Mon to Prep Transcrpt
Filed by Clerk

06/13/2016 at 08:30 AM in Department 31
(Affidavit of Prejudice; Case is reassigned) –

06/13/2016 Minute Order

06/13/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-06-13 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

06/10/2016 at 08:29 AM in Department 31
Trial Setting Conference (Trial Setting Conference; Off Calendar) –

06/10/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-06-10 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

06/10/2016 Minute Order

06/07/2016 Challenge To Judicial Officer – Peremptory (170.6)
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

06/07/2016 PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL OFFICER (CODE CIV. PROC., 170.6)

06/07/2016 PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL OFFICER (CODE CIV. PROC., 170.6)

06/03/2016 PLAINTIFF JULIO CASAS OPPOSITION TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR PRODCUTION OF DOCUMENTS AND TO ATTEND DEPOSITION; DECL OF DON IWUCHUKU

06/02/2016 NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE & ATTACHED ORDERS THEREON

06/02/2016 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Clerk

06/02/2016 Notice of Trial Setting Conference and Attached Orders Thereon
Filed by Clerk

06/02/2016 NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE & ATTACHED ORDERS THEREON

05/31/2016 at 00:00 AM in Department 56
(Affidavit of Prejudice; Court Disqualifies Self) –

05/31/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-05-31 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

05/31/2016 Minute Order

05/26/2016 CROSS-DEFENDANTS, DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU OGIKE, NOTICE OF ANTI-SLAPP MOTION AND ANTI-SLAPP MOTION [PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 425.16]; ETC

05/26/2016 PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL OFFICER (CODE CIV. PROC., 170.6)

05/26/2016 PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL OFFICER (CODE CIV. PROC., 170.6)

05/26/2016 Motion to Strike
Filed by Donald Iwuchuku (Cross-Defendant); Metu Ogike (Cross-Defendant)

05/26/2016 Challenge To Judicial Officer – Peremptory (170.6)
Filed by Donald Iwuchuku (Cross-Defendant)

05/26/2016 Challenge To Judicial Officer – Peremptory (170.6)
Filed by Metu Ogike (Cross-Defendant)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

05/25/2016 Declaration
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

05/17/2016 Proof-Personal Service
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

05/17/2016 Statement of Facts
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

05/17/2016 Motion to Compel
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

05/17/2016 PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

05/17/2016 SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF JULIO CASAS TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS

05/17/2016 PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

05/17/2016 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF JULIO CASAS TO PROVIDE A FURTHER RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND TO ATTEND HIS DEPOSITION; ETC.

04/27/2016 Notice of Designation of Record
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

04/27/2016 APPELLANT’S NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

04/22/2016 APPELLANT’S NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL

04/22/2016 Notice of Designation of Record
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

04/19/2016 Summons on Cross Complaint

04/19/2016 Summons
Filed by Defendant and Cross-Complainant

04/12/2016 at 00:00 AM in Department 56
Court Order – Held

04/12/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-04-12 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

04/12/2016 ORDER RE CROSS-COMPLAINT

04/12/2016 Cross-Complaint
Filed by Defendant and Cross-Complainant

04/12/2016 Notice
Filed by Clerk

04/12/2016 CROSS-COMPLAINT FOR: 1. CONVERSION 2. MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

04/12/2016 Minute Order

04/12/2016 Order
Filed by Defendant and Cross-Complainant

04/11/2016 Objection Document
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

04/11/2016 OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERER INC.’S [PROPOSED] CROSS-COMPLAINT/STATEMENT OF DAMAGES (PUNITIVE DAMAGES) [PURSUANT TO CRC 3.1312)

04/07/2016 Notice
Filed by Clerk

04/07/2016 NOTICE OF DEFAULT (UNLIMITED CIVIL APPEALS)

04/05/2016 at 08:31 AM in Department 56
(Order to Show Cause; OSC Discharged) –

04/05/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-04-05 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

04/05/2016 Minute Order

03/17/2016 Ntc to Attorney re Notice of Appeal
Filed by Clerk

03/17/2016 NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION)

03/16/2016 NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE) (APPELLATE)

03/16/2016 Notice of Appeal
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

03/07/2016 Ntc to Attorney re Notice of Appeal
Filed by Clerk

03/07/2016 NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION)

03/04/2016 NOTICE OF RULING

03/04/2016 Notice of Appeal
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

03/04/2016 Notice of Ruling
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

03/04/2016 NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE) (APPELLATE)

03/02/2016 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Hearing on Motion for Order – Held – Motion Granted

03/02/2016 STIPULATION AND ORDER TO USE CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

03/02/2016 ORDER FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY

03/02/2016 Stipulation and Order to use Certified Shorthand Reporter
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/02/2016 Order
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

03/02/2016 Minute Order

03/02/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-03-02 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

02/23/2016 Reply/Response
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

02/23/2016 DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. REPLY RE MOTION FOR COURT ORDER COMPELLING RETURN OF PROPERTY; OR TN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR AN ORDER ALLOWING DEFENDANTS FILING OF CROSS-COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF SONIA DEL VALLE IN SUPPORT

02/18/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

02/18/2016 PLAINTIFF ROSA ROSAS, JULIO CASAS AND COUNSEL DONALD IWUCHUKU AND METU C. OGIKE OPPOSITION TO,ETC.

02/09/2016 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration (Motion for Reconsideration; Motion Denied) –

02/09/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-02-09 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

02/09/2016 STIPULATION AND ORDER TO USE CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

02/09/2016 Stipulation and Order to use Certified Shorthand Reporter
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/09/2016 Minute Order

02/08/2016 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

02/08/2016 Case Management Statement
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

02/04/2016 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. FOR COURT ORDER COMPELLING RETURN OF PROPERTY; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR AN ORDER ALLOWING DEFENDANTS’ FILING OF CROSS-COMPLAINT; ETC.

02/04/2016 Motion to Compel
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

02/04/2016 Declaration
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

02/04/2016 DECLARATION OF DEFENDANT RICHARD MOONEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY ETC.

02/01/2016 Reply/Response
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

02/01/2016 PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO THEIR MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

01/27/2016 at 08:31 AM in Department 56
Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Proceeding continued) –

01/27/2016 Minute Order

01/27/2016 Minute order entered: 2016-01-27 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/25/2016 OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.

01/25/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

01/25/2016 DECLARATION OF SONIA DEL VALLE IN SUPPORT DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

01/25/2016 Declaration
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

01/12/2016 REQUEST FOR REFUND

01/12/2016 Request
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

01/08/2016 Case Management Statement
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant)

01/08/2016 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

12/18/2015 Order
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

12/18/2015 ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT; AND RECALLING WRIT OF EXECUTION

12/03/2015 Motion for Reconsideration
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

12/03/2015 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT’S ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF DONALD IWUCHUKU

12/02/2015 Notice of Ruling
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

12/02/2015 NOTICE OF RULING

11/24/2015 at 08:32 AM in Department 56
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) – Held – Motion Granted

11/24/2015 Stipulation and Order to use Certified Shorthand Reporter
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/24/2015 Minute order entered: 2015-11-24 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

11/24/2015 Minute Order

11/24/2015 STIPULATION AND ORDER TO USE CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

11/17/2015 at 08:32 AM in Department 56
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) (Motion Set Aside Default/Judgment; Proceeding continued) –

11/17/2015 Minute order entered: 2015-11-17 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

11/17/2015 Minute Order

11/06/2015 NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE OF HEARING ON MOTION AND MOTION OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AND RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION

11/06/2015 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

10/30/2015 at 08:32 AM in Department 56
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) (Motion Set Aside Default/Judgment; Proceeding continued) –

10/30/2015 Minute Order

10/30/2015 Minute order entered: 2015-10-30 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

10/13/2015 MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AFTER JUDGMENT, ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF CREDIT, AND DECLARATION OF ACCRUED INTEREST

10/13/2015 Cost Bill After Judgment
Filed by Assignee

10/13/2015 NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE OF HEARING ON MOTION AND MOTION OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AND RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION

10/13/2015 Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

10/08/2015 at 08:32 AM in Department 56
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) (Motion Set Aside Default/Judgment; Continued by Court) –

10/08/2015 Minute order entered: 2015-10-08 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

10/07/2015 Assignment of Judgment
Filed by Assignee

10/07/2015 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 673

10/07/2015 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 673

10/07/2015 Assignment of Judgment
Filed by Assignee

10/01/2015 Request for Judicial Notice
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

10/01/2015 DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

10/01/2015 REPLY OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT

10/01/2015 Reply/Response
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/25/2015 Request for Judicial Notice
Filed by Assignee

09/25/2015 Opposition Document
Filed by Assignee

09/25/2015 WILLIE MC MULLEN’S OPPOSITION TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR(S) KENSINGTON CATERERS INC. AND RICHARD MOONEY MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AND RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION; ETC

09/25/2015 Opposition Document
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

09/25/2015 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT; STAY OF EXECUTION; RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION

09/25/2015 WILLIE MC MULLEN’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF WILLIE MCMULLEN’S OPPOSITION TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR(S) KENSINGTON CATERERS INC. AND RICHARD MOONEY MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION; ETC

09/14/2015 Abstract of Judgment – Civil and Small Claims
Filed by Clerk

09/09/2015 Proof of Service

09/09/2015 DECLARATION OF SONIA DEL VALLE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.

09/09/2015 Declaration
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/09/2015 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Ex-Parte Proceedings (Exparte proceeding; Motion Denied) –

09/04/2015 Declaration
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

09/04/2015 Declaration
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

09/04/2015 WILLIE MC MULLEN’S OPPOSITION TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR(S) KENSINGTON CATERERS INC. AND RICHARD MOONEY EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME; ETC.

09/04/2015 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AND RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION

09/04/2015 Opposition Document
Filed by Assignee

09/04/2015 Motion
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 Points and Authorities
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 Declaration
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 Declaration
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 Declaration
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 Declaration
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 Answer
Filed by Kensington Caterers Inc. (Defendant); David Mooney (Defendant)

09/04/2015 Ex-Parte Application
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

09/04/2015 DECLARATION OF DEFENDANT RICHARD MOONEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.

09/04/2015 DECLARATION OF DEFENDANT RICHARD MOONEY IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR RELEEF FROM DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.

09/04/2015 DECLARATION OF MARVIN HERRERA IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.

09/04/2015 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT; STAY OF EXECUTION; RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION

09/04/2015 DECLARATION OF MICHAEL SULLIVAN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.

09/04/2015 DECLARATION OF LEO BURGARA IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.

09/04/2015 DECLARATION OF SONIA DEL VALLE IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ETC.

09/04/2015 EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME FOR HEARING OF NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENTS; STAY OF EXECUTION; RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION

09/04/2015 Minute order entered: 2015-09-04 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/04/2015 PROOF OF SERVICE

09/04/2015 ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD MOONEY AND KENSINGTON CATERERS, INC. TO UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT

09/04/2015 Minute Order

08/26/2015 Abstract of Judgment – Civil and Small Claims
Filed by Assignee

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

08/20/2015 Abstract of Judgment – Civil and Small Claims
Filed by Clerk

08/05/2015 Abstract of Judgment – Civil and Small Claims
Filed by Creditor

08/05/2015 Writ-Other Issued
Filed by Assignee

07/28/2015 ORDER ON COURT FEE WAIVER

07/28/2015 Order on Court Fee Waiver (Superior Court)
Filed by Clerk

07/28/2015 Request to Waive Court Fees
Filed by Willie Mc Mullen (Assignee)

04/16/2015 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 673

04/16/2015 DECLARATION OF ACCRUED INTEREST (C.C.P. 685.050)

04/16/2015 DECLARATION OF ACCRUED INTEREST (C.C.P. 685.050)

04/16/2015 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 673

04/16/2015 Assignment of Judgment
Filed by Assignee

04/16/2015 Writ issued
Filed by Assignee

04/16/2015 Declaration
Filed by Assignee

04/16/2015 Writ issued
Filed by Assignee

04/16/2015 Assignment of Judgment
Filed by Assignee

04/16/2015 Declaration
Filed by Assignee

04/10/2015 Writ-Other Issued
Filed by Clerk

03/19/2015 at 10:30 AM in Department 56
Default Prove Up Hearing (Civil Default Prove Up Hearing; Finding in favor of Plaintiff) –

03/19/2015 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
Default Prove Up Hearing (Hrng; Default Prove-up/Quiet Title; Transferred to different departmnt) –

03/19/2015 DECLARATION OF DONALD IWUCHUKU IN SUPPORT OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT.

03/19/2015 DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF JULIO CASAS PURSUANT TO C.C.P. SECTION 585(D)

03/19/2015 SUMMARY OF THE CASE

03/19/2015 REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL

03/19/2015 JUDGMENT BY COURT AFTER DEFAULT

03/19/2015 Minute order entered: 2015-03-19 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

03/19/2015 Minute order entered: 2015-03-19 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

03/19/2015 Minute Order

03/19/2015 Statement of the Case
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 Partial Dismissal (w/o Prejudice)
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 Statement of the Case
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/19/2015 DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF ROSA ROSAS PURSUANT TO C.C.P. SECTION 585(D)

03/19/2015 DECLARATION OF DONALD IWUCHUKU IN SUPPORT OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT.

03/19/2015 JUDGMENT BY COURT AFTER DEFAULT

03/19/2015 SUMMARY OF THE CASE

03/19/2015 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

03/19/2015 Minute Order

03/19/2015 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

02/05/2015 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
Unknown Event Type – Held – Motion Granted

02/05/2015 Minute order entered: 2015-02-05 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

02/05/2015 RULING

02/05/2015 Minute Order

08/07/2014 Notice of Motion
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

08/07/2014 PLAINTIFFS ROSA ROSAS AND JULIO CASAS NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO VACATE DISSMISAL; POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATIONS OF DONALD IWUCHUKU, ESQ

06/16/2014 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
(OSC-Failure to File Default Judg; Order of Dismissal) –

06/16/2014 Minute Order

06/16/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-06-16 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

05/12/2014 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
(OSC-Failure to File Default Judg; Continued by Court) –

05/12/2014 Minute Order

05/12/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-05-12 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

04/15/2014 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
(OSC-Failure to File Default Judg; Continued by Court) –

04/15/2014 Minute Order

04/15/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-04-15 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

03/11/2014 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
(OSC-Failure to File Default Judg; Continued by Court) –

03/11/2014 Minute Order

03/11/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-03-11 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

01/09/2014 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
(OSC-Failure to File Default Judg; Continued by Court) –

01/09/2014 Minute Order

01/09/2014 Minute order entered: 2014-01-09 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

11/08/2013 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
Unknown Event Type – Held

11/08/2013 Minute order entered: 2013-11-08 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

11/08/2013 Minute Order

11/08/2013 REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL

11/08/2013 Partial Dismissal (w/o Prejudice)
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

09/24/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

09/24/2013 Default Entered
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

09/09/2013 at 08:30 AM in Department 53
Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Continued by Court) –

09/09/2013 Minute Order

09/09/2013 Minute order entered: 2013-09-09 00:00:00
Filed by Clerk

09/06/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

09/06/2013 PLAINTIFF JULIO CASAS STATEMENT OF DAMAGES

09/06/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

09/06/2013 PLAINTTFF ROSA ROSAS STATEMENT OF DAMAGES

09/06/2013 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

09/06/2013 Default Entered
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

09/06/2013 Statement of Damages (Personal Injury or Wrongful Death)
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

09/06/2013 Statement of Damages (Personal Injury or Wrongful Death)
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

08/20/2013 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

08/20/2013 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

08/20/2013 Case Management Statement
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

08/20/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

08/20/2013 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

08/20/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

07/29/2013 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

07/29/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

07/29/2013 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

07/29/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

07/29/2013 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

07/29/2013 Request for Entry of Default / Judgment
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

07/29/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

07/29/2013 REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

06/21/2013 NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 01/22/2018 10/16/2017 09/19/2016 05/25/2016 01/27/2016 08/20/2015 06/19/2013

06/19/2013 NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

06/19/2013 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Court

05/22/2013 PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

05/22/2013 Proof-Service/Summons
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

05/10/2013 PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

05/10/2013 Proof-Service/Summons
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

05/10/2013 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

05/10/2013 PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

05/03/2013 SUMMONS

05/03/2013 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES: 1. WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY; ETC

05/03/2013 Complaint
Filed by Rosa Rosas (Legacy Party); Julio Casas (Legacy Party)

Case Number: BC584826
RAYMOND VASQUEZ ET AL VS STADIUM PROPERTIES LLC
Filing Courthouse: Stanley Mosk Courthouse

Filing Date: 06/12/2015
Case Type: Other Breach of Contract/Warranty (not fraud or negligence) (General Jurisdiction)
Status: Jury Verdict 04/14/2017

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FUTURE HEARINGS
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

None

PARTY INFORMATION
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

DALE WASHINGTON ATTORNEY AT LAW – Attorney for Plaintiff

DOLLAR SELF STORAGE – Defendant/Respondent’s DBA

HALLIBURTON JULIE – Plaintiff

NANCY A. HALAS LAW OFFICES OF – Attorney for Defendant

STADIUM PROPERTIES LLC – Defendant

VASQUEZ RAYMOND DISMISSED – Plaintiff

YOKA & SMITH LLP – Attorney for Legacy Party

Documents Filed
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

Documents Filed (Filing dates listed in descending order)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
03/02/2017 11/18/2016 11/04/2015

11/13/2017 Minute Order

10/27/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

10/27/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO TAX COSTS

10/17/2017 Minute Order

10/17/2017 Minute Order

10/10/2017 Notice of Designation of Record
Filed by Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

10/10/2017 APPELLANT’S NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

09/13/2017 Notice
Filed by Clerk

09/13/2017 NOTICE OF DEFAULT (UNLIMITED CIVIL APPEALS)

09/01/2017 Ntc to Attorney re Notice of Appeal
Filed by Clerk

09/01/2017 NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL

08/30/2017 Motion to Tax Costs
Filed by Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

08/30/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TAX COSTS

08/25/2017 Notice of Appeal
Filed by Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

08/25/2017 MEMORANDUM OF COSTS (SUMMARY)

08/25/2017 NOTICE OF APPEAL (CCP 904.1)

08/24/2017 Memorandum of Costs
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

07/11/2017 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

07/11/2017 Minute Order

07/11/2017 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

07/03/2017 Notice of Hearing of Motion for New Trial
Filed by Clerk

07/03/2017 Judgment
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

07/03/2017 JUDGMET ON SPECIAL VERDICT

07/03/2017 NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

06/12/2017 Declaration
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

06/12/2017 DECLARATION OF REBECCA S. HUMMEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S, OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT

06/05/2017 DECLARATION OF DALE WASHINGTON LODGING TRIAL TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF JNOV MOTION; ALTERNATIVELY MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

06/05/2017 Brief-Supplemental
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

06/05/2017 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

06/05/2017 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

06/05/2017 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

06/05/2017 Motion for New Trial
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

06/05/2017 Motion
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

06/05/2017 FURTHER BRIEFING IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL [CCP 656, 657]; DECLARATION OF DALE WASHINGTON

06/05/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL [CCP 656, 657]; DECLARATION OF DALE WASHINGTON

06/05/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOT WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT (JNOV) CCP 629 & 659; DECLARATION OF DALE WASINGTON

06/05/2017 DECLARATION OF DALE WASHINGTON IN SUPPORT OF JNOV MOTION; ALTERNATIVELY MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

06/05/2017 DECLARATION OF GENE MORAN IN SUPPORT OF POST TRIAL MOTIONS AND FILING ATTEMPTS

05/08/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

05/08/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

05/08/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC S, OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT;

05/08/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC S, OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF LAUREN A. R. LOFTON

04/14/2017 Jury Instructions
Filed by Clerk

04/14/2017 Special Verdict
Filed by Clerk

04/14/2017 Jury Question
Filed by Clerk

04/14/2017 Receipt for Exhibits
Filed by Clerk

04/14/2017 Receipt
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

04/14/2017 SPECIAL JURY VERDICT FORM

04/14/2017 RECEIPT FOR EXHIBITS/RECORDS

04/14/2017 JURY REQUEST

04/14/2017 CIVIL DEPOSIT

04/14/2017 INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN

04/14/2017 Minute Order

04/13/2017 Brief
Filed by Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

04/13/2017 Notice of Lodging
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

04/13/2017 Notice of Lodging
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

04/13/2017 POCKET BRIEF RE: OPINION AS THE OWNER OF PROPERTY

04/13/2017 NOTICE OF LODGING DEPOSITIONS/COURT TRANSCRIPTS FOR TRIAL

04/13/2017 NOTICE OF LODGING DEPOSITIONS/COURT TRANSCRIPTS FOR TRIAL

04/13/2017 Minute Order

04/12/2017 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

04/12/2017 Minute Order

04/12/2017 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

04/11/2017 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

04/11/2017 Minute Order

04/11/2017 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

04/10/2017 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by Certified Shorthand Reporter

04/10/2017 Minute Order

04/10/2017 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

04/07/2017 Exhibit List
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

04/07/2017 AMENDED [PROPOSED] JOINT TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 03/02/2017 11/18/2016 11/04/2015

03/02/2017 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

03/02/2017 PROOF OF PERSONAL SERVICE

02/27/2017 Amended List of Witnesses
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

02/27/2017 AMENDED JOINT WITNESS LIST FOR TRIAL

02/22/2017 Reply to Motion
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/22/2017 Notice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/22/2017 REPLY ON MOTION TO BIFURCATE LIABILITY FOR BENCH TRIAL PRIOR TO SEATING A JURY FOR DAMAGE PHASE

02/22/2017 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS:

02/21/2017 Minute Order

02/17/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

02/17/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO.1 TO REDACT DIRECT AND INDIRECT EXCULPATORY PROVISIONS AS LEGAL ISSUES WITH POTENTIAL TO CONFUSE THE JURY

02/15/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO BIFURCATE LIABILITY FOR BENCH TRIAL PRIOR TO SEATING A JURY FOR DAMAGES PHASE; DECLARATION OF REBECCA S. HUMMEL

02/15/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

02/15/2017 IPROPOSED] JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR TRIAL

02/14/2017 Motion in Limine
Filed by Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

02/14/2017 PLAINTIFFS MOTION IN LIMINE NO.1 ETC.

02/08/2017 Brief
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/08/2017 Motion
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/08/2017 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO BIFURCATE LIABILITY FOR BENCH TRIAL PRIOR TO SEATING A JURY FOR DAMAGE PHASE

02/08/2017 Minute Order

02/08/2017 PLAINTIFF’S TRIAL BRIEF

02/07/2017 Jury Instructions
Filed by Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

02/07/2017 PLAINTIFF’S JURY INSTRUCTIONS (PROPOSED)

02/03/2017 Miscellaneous-Other
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

02/03/2017 [PROPOSED] JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR TRIAL

01/31/2017 Minute Order

01/26/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

01/26/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

01/26/2017 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION IN LIMINE 3 TO PRECLUDE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND REPLACEMENT OR PECULIAR VALUE DAMAGES

01/26/2017 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION IN LIMINE 1

01/24/2017 Motion in Limine
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

01/24/2017 Motion in Limine
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

01/24/2017 Motion in Limine
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

01/24/2017 Statement of the Case
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

01/24/2017 Witness List
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

01/24/2017 Exhibit List
Filed by Raymond DISMISSED Vasquez (Plaintiff); Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

01/24/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO.2 TO BIFURCATE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

01/24/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO.3 ETC.

01/24/2017 [PROPOSED] JOINT TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST

01/24/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO.1 ETC.

01/24/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S WITNESS LIST FOR TRIAL

01/24/2017 DEFENDANT STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC S IPROPOSEDI STATEMENT OF THE CASE

01/06/2017 Minute Order

01/05/2017 Partial Dismissal (w/o Prejudice)
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

12/06/2016 Minute Order

12/05/2016 Receipt
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

12/05/2016 CIVIL DEPOSIT

11/30/2016 Notice of Ruling
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant)

11/30/2016 NOTICE OF RULING

11/29/2016 Minute Order

11/29/2016 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S, EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRIAL CONTINUANCE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATIONS OF PETER W. FELCHLIN AND REBECCA S. HUMMEL AND EXHIBITS

11/29/2016 Ex-Parte Application
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/22/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Yoka & Smith LLP (Attorney)

11/22/2016 Ex-Parte Application
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/22/2016 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC DBA DOLLAR SELF STORAGE OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF RELATED CASE

11/22/2016 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S, EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRIAL CONTINUANCE; ETC.

11/22/2016 Minute Order

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 03/02/2017 11/18/2016 11/04/2015

11/18/2016 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

11/18/2016 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant)

11/18/2016 Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel
Filed by Raymond DISMISSED Vasquez (Plaintiff)

11/18/2016 Declaration
Filed by Raymond DISMISSED Vasquez (Plaintiff); Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

11/17/2016 Ex-Parte Application
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/17/2016 Minute Order

11/17/2016 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S, EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRIAL CONTINUANCE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; ETC.

11/16/2016 DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY’S MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL – CIVIL

11/16/2016 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL – CIVIL

10/21/2016 Association of Attorney
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

10/21/2016 ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL

10/03/2016 ORDER AND STIPULATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL

10/03/2016 Stipulation and Order
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

08/11/2016 Notice of Change of Firm Name
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

08/11/2016 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF FIRM NAME

04/28/2016 Answer
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

04/28/2016 ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

04/04/2016 Order
Filed by Court

04/04/2016 ORDER RE: DEMURRER & MOTION TO STRIKE

04/04/2016 Minute Order

03/18/2016 Minute Order

03/11/2016 Reply to Opposition
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

03/11/2016 Reply to Opposition
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

03/11/2016 REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

03/11/2016 REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

02/19/2016 RULING RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO RECONSIDER RULINGS FROM 1/19/2016; ALTERNATIVELY FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO CCP 473.

02/19/2016 Order
Filed by Court

02/19/2016 Minute Order

02/17/2016 Reply to Motion
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/17/2016 REPLY NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO RECONSIDER RULINGS FROM 1/19/2016; ALTERNATIVELY FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO CCP 473

02/08/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

02/08/2016 OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO RECONDISER RULING FROM 1/1912016; ALTERNATIVELY FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO CCP 473(B)

02/03/2016 Notice of Ruling
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

02/03/2016 NOTICE OF RULING

01/20/2016 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO RECONSIDER RULINGS FROM 1/19/20 16; ALTERNATIVELY FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO CCP 473; POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION QF DALE WASHINGTON

01/20/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

01/20/2016 Motion for Reconsideration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

01/20/2016 OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

01/20/2016 OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

01/19/2016 RULING RE: DEMURRER OF STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT MOTION THEREOF TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT MOTION THEREOF TO SEVER PLAINTIFFS’ ACTION.

01/19/2016 Order
Filed by Court

01/19/2016 Minute Order

01/12/2016 REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SEVER THE PLAINTIFFS IN THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

01/12/2016 Reply/Response
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant)

01/04/2016 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE RE OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SEVER

01/04/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Raymond DISMISSED Vasquez (Plaintiff); Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

01/04/2016 OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SEVER

01/04/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Raymond DISMISSED Vasquez (Plaintiff); Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

11/24/2015 NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; [PROPOSED] ORDER

11/24/2015 DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; [PROPOSED] ORDER

11/24/2015 STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC DBA DOLLAR SELF STORAGE’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO SEVER PLAINTIFFS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF RYAN REDFIELD; [PROPOSED] ORDER

11/24/2015 Motion
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/24/2015 Motion to Strike
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/24/2015 Defendant’s Demurrer
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/10/2015 Notice
Filed by Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

11/10/2015 NOTICE OF ORDER

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 03/02/2017 11/18/2016 11/04/2015

11/04/2015 Minute Order

10/28/2015 Opposition Document
Filed by Raymond DISMISSED Vasquez (Plaintiff)

10/28/2015 Demand for Jury Trial
Filed by Raymond DISMISSED Vasquez (Plaintiff)

10/28/2015 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT

10/28/2015 OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SEVER

10/07/2015 Minute Order

10/02/2015 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

10/02/2015 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

09/28/2015 Motion
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant)

09/28/2015 Motion to Strike
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant)

09/28/2015 Demurrer
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant)

09/28/2015 STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC DBA DOLLAR SELF STORAGE’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO SEVER PLAINTIFFS; ETC.

09/28/2015 NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER; ETC.

09/28/2015 DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT; ETC.

08/24/2015 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Clerk

08/24/2015 NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

06/12/2015 SUMMONS

06/12/2015 COMPLAINT FOR: 1) BREACH OF CONTRACT; ETC

06/12/2015 Complaint
Filed by Raymond DISMISSED Vasquez (Plaintiff); Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 03/02/2017 11/18/2016 11/04/2015

Proceedings Held
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

Proceedings Held (Proceeding dates listed in descending order)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
10/21/2016

11/13/2017 at 09:50 AM in Department 36
Ruling on Submitted Matter (Ruling on Submitted Matter; Granted in Part) –

11/03/2017 at 4:30 PM in Department 36
Non-Appearance Case Review

10/17/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 36
Hearing on Motion to Tax Costs (MOTION – TAX COSTS; Matter continued) –

07/11/2017 at 08:34 AM in Department 36
Hearing on Motion for New Trial (Motion for New Trial; Denied) –

05/23/2017 at 09:00 AM in Department 36
Non-Appearance Case Review

04/14/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 36
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Verdict Reached) –

04/13/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 36
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Full Day of Trial Held) –

04/12/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 36
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Full Day of Trial Held) –

04/11/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 36
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Start of Trial) –

04/10/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 36
Jury Trial – Held

02/21/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 36
Jury Trial – Not Held – Trailed

02/08/2017 at 12:00 PM in Department 6
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Matter continued) –

01/31/2017 at 08:33 AM in Department 36
(Trial; Matter continued) –

01/06/2017 at 08:35 AM in Department 36
Hearing on Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – Held – Motion Granted

12/13/2016 at 08:33 AM in Department 36
Unknown Event Type

12/06/2016 at 08:32 AM in Department 36
Final Status Conference – Held

11/29/2016 at 09:40 AM in Department 36
Ex-Parte Proceedings (Exparte proceeding; Denied) –

11/22/2016 at 09:35 AM in Department 36
Ex-Parte Proceedings (Exparte proceeding; Denied) –

11/17/2016 at 09:10 AM in Department 36
Ex-Parte Proceedings (Exparte proceeding; Denied) –

10/28/2016 at 08:33 AM in Department 36
Unknown Event Type

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 10/21/2016

10/21/2016 at 08:32 AM in Department 36
Final Status Conference

04/04/2016 at 09:50 AM in Department 36
Ruling on Submitted Matter (Ruling on Submitted Matter; Overruled) –

03/18/2016 at 08:36 AM in Department 36
Unknown Event Type – Held – Taken under Submission

02/19/2016 at 08:35 AM in Department 36
Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration – Held – Motion Granted

01/19/2016 at 08:35 AM in Department 36
Hearing on Demurrer – without Motion to Strike (Hearing on Demurrer; Demurrer sustained without leave) –

11/04/2015 at 08:35 AM in Department 36
Hearing on Demurrer – without Motion to Strike (DEMURRER; Off Calendar) –

10/07/2015 at 08:30 AM in Department 36
Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Matter continued) –

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 10/21/2016

Register Of Actions
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

Register of Actions (Listed in descending order)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
04/10/2017 11/30/2016 01/12/2016

11/13/2017 at 09:50 AM in Department 36
Ruling on Submitted Matter (Ruling on Submitted Matter; Granted in Part) –

11/13/2017 Minute Order

11/03/2017 at 4:30 PM in Department 36
Non-Appearance Case Review

10/27/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO TAX COSTS

10/27/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

10/17/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 36
Hearing on Motion to Tax Costs (MOTION – TAX COSTS; Matter continued) –

10/17/2017 Minute Order

10/17/2017 Minute Order

10/10/2017 APPELLANT’S NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

10/10/2017 Notice of Designation of Record
Filed by Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

09/13/2017 Notice
Filed by Clerk

09/13/2017 NOTICE OF DEFAULT (UNLIMITED CIVIL APPEALS)

09/01/2017 NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL

09/01/2017 Ntc to Attorney re Notice of Appeal
Filed by Clerk

08/30/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TAX COSTS

08/30/2017 Motion to Tax Costs
Filed by Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

08/25/2017 MEMORANDUM OF COSTS (SUMMARY)

08/25/2017 NOTICE OF APPEAL (CCP 904.1)

08/25/2017 Notice of Appeal
Filed by Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

08/24/2017 Memorandum of Costs
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

07/11/2017 at 08:34 AM in Department 36
Hearing on Motion for New Trial (Motion for New Trial; Denied) –

07/11/2017 Minute Order

07/11/2017 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

07/11/2017 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

07/03/2017 Judgment
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

07/03/2017 Notice of Hearing of Motion for New Trial
Filed by Clerk

07/03/2017 JUDGMET ON SPECIAL VERDICT

07/03/2017 NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

06/12/2017 Declaration
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

06/12/2017 DECLARATION OF REBECCA S. HUMMEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S, OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT

06/05/2017 Motion for New Trial
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

06/05/2017 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

06/05/2017 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

06/05/2017 FURTHER BRIEFING IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL [CCP 656, 657]; DECLARATION OF DALE WASHINGTON

06/05/2017 Brief-Supplemental
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

06/05/2017 DECLARATION OF DALE WASHINGTON LODGING TRIAL TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF JNOV MOTION; ALTERNATIVELY MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

06/05/2017 DECLARATION OF DALE WASHINGTON IN SUPPORT OF JNOV MOTION; ALTERNATIVELY MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

06/05/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOT WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT (JNOV) CCP 629 & 659; DECLARATION OF DALE WASINGTON

06/05/2017 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL [CCP 656, 657]; DECLARATION OF DALE WASHINGTON

06/05/2017 Motion
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

06/05/2017 DECLARATION OF GENE MORAN IN SUPPORT OF POST TRIAL MOTIONS AND FILING ATTEMPTS

06/05/2017 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

05/23/2017 at 09:00 AM in Department 36
Non-Appearance Case Review

05/08/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

05/08/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

05/08/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC S, OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF LAUREN A. R. LOFTON

05/08/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC S, OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT;

04/14/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 36
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Verdict Reached) –

04/14/2017 Special Verdict
Filed by Clerk

04/14/2017 RECEIPT FOR EXHIBITS/RECORDS

04/14/2017 SPECIAL JURY VERDICT FORM

04/14/2017 Jury Question
Filed by Clerk

04/14/2017 Receipt for Exhibits
Filed by Clerk

04/14/2017 Receipt
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

04/14/2017 Jury Instructions
Filed by Clerk

04/14/2017 INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN

04/14/2017 CIVIL DEPOSIT

04/14/2017 JURY REQUEST

04/14/2017 Minute Order

04/13/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 36
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Full Day of Trial Held) –

04/13/2017 POCKET BRIEF RE: OPINION AS THE OWNER OF PROPERTY

04/13/2017 Notice of Lodging
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

04/13/2017 NOTICE OF LODGING DEPOSITIONS/COURT TRANSCRIPTS FOR TRIAL

04/13/2017 Minute Order

04/13/2017 Notice of Lodging
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

04/13/2017 NOTICE OF LODGING DEPOSITIONS/COURT TRANSCRIPTS FOR TRIAL

04/13/2017 Brief
Filed by Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

04/12/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 36
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Full Day of Trial Held) –

04/12/2017 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

04/12/2017 Minute Order

04/12/2017 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

04/11/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 36
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Start of Trial) –

04/11/2017 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

04/11/2017 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

04/11/2017 Minute Order

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 04/10/2017 11/30/2016 01/12/2016

04/10/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 36
Jury Trial – Held

04/10/2017 Minute Order

04/10/2017 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

04/10/2017 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by Certified Shorthand Reporter

04/07/2017 AMENDED [PROPOSED] JOINT TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST

04/07/2017 Exhibit List
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

03/02/2017 PROOF OF PERSONAL SERVICE

03/02/2017 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

02/27/2017 Amended List of Witnesses
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

02/27/2017 AMENDED JOINT WITNESS LIST FOR TRIAL

02/22/2017 Reply to Motion
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/22/2017 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS:

02/22/2017 Notice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/22/2017 REPLY ON MOTION TO BIFURCATE LIABILITY FOR BENCH TRIAL PRIOR TO SEATING A JURY FOR DAMAGE PHASE

02/21/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 36
Jury Trial – Not Held – Trailed

02/21/2017 Minute Order

02/17/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

02/17/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO.1 TO REDACT DIRECT AND INDIRECT EXCULPATORY PROVISIONS AS LEGAL ISSUES WITH POTENTIAL TO CONFUSE THE JURY

02/15/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO BIFURCATE LIABILITY FOR BENCH TRIAL PRIOR TO SEATING A JURY FOR DAMAGES PHASE; DECLARATION OF REBECCA S. HUMMEL

02/15/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

02/15/2017 IPROPOSED] JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR TRIAL

02/14/2017 PLAINTIFFS MOTION IN LIMINE NO.1 ETC.

02/14/2017 Motion in Limine
Filed by Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

02/08/2017 at 12:00 PM in Department 6
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Matter continued) –

02/08/2017 Brief
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/08/2017 PLAINTIFF’S TRIAL BRIEF

02/08/2017 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO BIFURCATE LIABILITY FOR BENCH TRIAL PRIOR TO SEATING A JURY FOR DAMAGE PHASE

02/08/2017 Motion
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/08/2017 Minute Order

02/07/2017 Jury Instructions
Filed by Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

02/07/2017 PLAINTIFF’S JURY INSTRUCTIONS (PROPOSED)

02/03/2017 Miscellaneous-Other
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

02/03/2017 [PROPOSED] JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR TRIAL

01/31/2017 at 08:33 AM in Department 36
(Trial; Matter continued) –

01/31/2017 Minute Order

01/26/2017 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION IN LIMINE 3 TO PRECLUDE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND REPLACEMENT OR PECULIAR VALUE DAMAGES

01/26/2017 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION IN LIMINE 1

01/26/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

01/26/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

01/24/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO.2 TO BIFURCATE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

01/24/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S WITNESS LIST FOR TRIAL

01/24/2017 DEFENDANT STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC S IPROPOSEDI STATEMENT OF THE CASE

01/24/2017 Motion in Limine
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

01/24/2017 Statement of the Case
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

01/24/2017 Witness List
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

01/24/2017 Exhibit List
Filed by Raymond DISMISSED Vasquez (Plaintiff); Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

01/24/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO.1 ETC.

01/24/2017 [PROPOSED] JOINT TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST

01/24/2017 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO.3 ETC.

01/24/2017 Motion in Limine
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

01/24/2017 Motion in Limine
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

01/06/2017 at 08:35 AM in Department 36
Hearing on Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – Held – Motion Granted

01/06/2017 Minute Order

01/05/2017 Partial Dismissal (w/o Prejudice)
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

12/13/2016 at 08:33 AM in Department 36
Unknown Event Type

12/06/2016 at 08:32 AM in Department 36
Final Status Conference – Held

12/06/2016 Minute Order

12/05/2016 CIVIL DEPOSIT

12/05/2016 Receipt
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 04/10/2017 11/30/2016 01/12/2016

11/30/2016 NOTICE OF RULING

11/30/2016 Notice of Ruling
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant)

11/29/2016 at 09:40 AM in Department 36
Ex-Parte Proceedings (Exparte proceeding; Denied) –

11/29/2016 Minute Order

11/29/2016 Ex-Parte Application
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/29/2016 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S, EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRIAL CONTINUANCE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATIONS OF PETER W. FELCHLIN AND REBECCA S. HUMMEL AND EXHIBITS

11/22/2016 at 09:35 AM in Department 36
Ex-Parte Proceedings (Exparte proceeding; Denied) –

11/22/2016 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC DBA DOLLAR SELF STORAGE OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF RELATED CASE

11/22/2016 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S, EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRIAL CONTINUANCE; ETC.

11/22/2016 Minute Order

11/22/2016 Ex-Parte Application
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/22/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Yoka & Smith LLP (Attorney)

11/18/2016 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

11/18/2016 Declaration
Filed by Raymond DISMISSED Vasquez (Plaintiff); Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

11/18/2016 Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel
Filed by Raymond DISMISSED Vasquez (Plaintiff)

11/18/2016 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant)

11/17/2016 at 09:10 AM in Department 36
Ex-Parte Proceedings (Exparte proceeding; Denied) –

11/17/2016 Ex-Parte Application
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/17/2016 Minute Order

11/17/2016 DEFENDANT, STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC’S, EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRIAL CONTINUANCE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; ETC.

11/16/2016 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL – CIVIL

11/16/2016 DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY’S MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL – CIVIL

10/28/2016 at 08:33 AM in Department 36
Unknown Event Type

10/21/2016 at 08:32 AM in Department 36
Final Status Conference

10/21/2016 ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL

10/21/2016 Association of Attorney
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

10/03/2016 Stipulation and Order
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

10/03/2016 ORDER AND STIPULATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL

08/11/2016 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF FIRM NAME

08/11/2016 Notice of Change of Firm Name
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

04/28/2016 ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

04/28/2016 Answer
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

04/04/2016 at 09:50 AM in Department 36
Ruling on Submitted Matter (Ruling on Submitted Matter; Overruled) –

04/04/2016 Minute Order

04/04/2016 Order
Filed by Court

04/04/2016 ORDER RE: DEMURRER & MOTION TO STRIKE

03/18/2016 at 08:36 AM in Department 36
Unknown Event Type – Held – Taken under Submission

03/18/2016 Minute Order

03/11/2016 Reply to Opposition
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

03/11/2016 Reply to Opposition
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant); Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

03/11/2016 REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

03/11/2016 REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

02/19/2016 at 08:35 AM in Department 36
Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration – Held – Motion Granted

02/19/2016 Order
Filed by Court

02/19/2016 Minute Order

02/19/2016 RULING RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO RECONSIDER RULINGS FROM 1/19/2016; ALTERNATIVELY FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO CCP 473.

02/17/2016 REPLY NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO RECONSIDER RULINGS FROM 1/19/2016; ALTERNATIVELY FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO CCP 473

02/17/2016 Reply to Motion
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/08/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

02/08/2016 OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO RECONDISER RULING FROM 1/1912016; ALTERNATIVELY FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO CCP 473(B)

02/03/2016 Notice of Ruling
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

02/03/2016 NOTICE OF RULING

01/20/2016 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO RECONSIDER RULINGS FROM 1/19/20 16; ALTERNATIVELY FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO CCP 473; POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION QF DALE WASHINGTON

01/20/2016 Motion for Reconsideration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

01/20/2016 OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

01/20/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

01/20/2016 OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

01/19/2016 at 08:35 AM in Department 36
Hearing on Demurrer – without Motion to Strike (Hearing on Demurrer; Demurrer sustained without leave) –

01/19/2016 RULING RE: DEMURRER OF STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT MOTION THEREOF TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT MOTION THEREOF TO SEVER PLAINTIFFS’ ACTION.

01/19/2016 Minute Order

01/19/2016 Order
Filed by Court

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 04/10/2017 11/30/2016 01/12/2016

01/12/2016 Reply/Response
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant)

01/12/2016 REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SEVER THE PLAINTIFFS IN THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

01/04/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Raymond DISMISSED Vasquez (Plaintiff); Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

01/04/2016 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE RE OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SEVER

01/04/2016 OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SEVER

01/04/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Raymond DISMISSED Vasquez (Plaintiff); Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

11/24/2015 STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC DBA DOLLAR SELF STORAGE’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO SEVER PLAINTIFFS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF RYAN REDFIELD; [PROPOSED] ORDER

11/24/2015 Motion
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/24/2015 Defendant’s Demurrer
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/24/2015 Motion to Strike
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/24/2015 DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; [PROPOSED] ORDER

11/24/2015 NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; [PROPOSED] ORDER

11/10/2015 Notice
Filed by Dollar Self Storage (Legacy Party)

11/10/2015 NOTICE OF ORDER

11/04/2015 at 08:35 AM in Department 36
Hearing on Demurrer – without Motion to Strike (DEMURRER; Off Calendar) –

11/04/2015 Minute Order

10/28/2015 OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SEVER

10/28/2015 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT

10/28/2015 Opposition Document
Filed by Raymond DISMISSED Vasquez (Plaintiff)

10/28/2015 Demand for Jury Trial
Filed by Raymond DISMISSED Vasquez (Plaintiff)

10/07/2015 at 08:30 AM in Department 36
Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Matter continued) –

10/07/2015 Minute Order

10/02/2015 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

10/02/2015 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

09/28/2015 Motion
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant)

09/28/2015 Demurrer
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant)

09/28/2015 STADIUM PROPERTIES, LLC DBA DOLLAR SELF STORAGE’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO SEVER PLAINTIFFS; ETC.

09/28/2015 Motion to Strike
Filed by Stadium Properties, LLC (Defendant)

09/28/2015 DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT; ETC.

09/28/2015 NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER; ETC.

08/24/2015 NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

08/24/2015 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Clerk

06/12/2015 COMPLAINT FOR: 1) BREACH OF CONTRACT; ETC

06/12/2015 SUMMONS

06/12/2015 Complaint
Filed by Raymond DISMISSED Vasquez (Plaintiff); Julie Halliburton (Plaintiff)

Warren v. Glenshire Residents Assoc. Case No. TCU18-7184

Superior Court of Nevada County
Tentative Ruling
Truckee Branch

Cross-Defendant Warren�s Anti-Slapp Motion is denied.

Moving parties have the initial burden to demonstrate that a cause of action is subject to a special motion to strike. Martinez v. Metabolife Inter. Ins. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 186; Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 304. Specifically, courts decide whether moving parties have made a prima facie showing that the attacked claims arise from a protected activity, including defendants� right of petition, or free speech, under a constitution, in connection with issues of public interest. Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation Corp., (2006) 137 Cal. App. 4th 1, 5; Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 278; Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 671; Quinlon Ent. v. Consumer Cause (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67; Gov. Gray Davis Committee v. Amer. Taxpayers Alliance (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 449, 458-59; Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Pro Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2012) �7:244.1; CCP �425.16(e).

Here, cross-defendant has failed to demonstrate that each cause of action arise from Warren�s protected activity.

Specifically, as to the conversion and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action, there are no allegations whatsoever set forth in the cross-complaint that the improperly applied comp time related to any right of petition, free speech, or has any public interest. In fact, the motion states only that this cause of action is based on a �malicious lie.� This is not a prima facie showing of a protected activity.

As to the causes of action for intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation, the cross-complaint does not allege that statements relating to whether or not the board meetings needed to be open or closed occurred during an open board meeting. Rather, this appears to be a private conversation between Pres. Pam stock and cross-defendant Warren. Thus, again, cross-defendant fails to show any protected activity whatsoever.

As to the cause of action for extortion, cross-defendant has failed to demonstrate that his statements were made in a public forum. In fact, the opposite is alleged. It is stated that these statements were set forth in a closed forum, not open to the public. Thus, this cause of action does not arise from any protected activity.

Moreover, even if this court were to find that each of the causes of action arise from conduct by cross-defendant during a protected activity, cross-defendant has failed to demonstrate that Glenshire cannot prevail on its claims.

A prevailing defendant as to a special motion to strike is entitled to mandatory, reasonable attorney fees and costs. Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141 -1142; CCP �425.16(c); Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Pro Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2012) �7:259.

The attorneys� fees and costs recoverable are only those incurred as to the special motion to strike, and not as to other litigation events. Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1383; Weil & Brown, Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2012) �7:261.

Here, the court finds that Glenshire�s request for attorneys fees as it relates to opposing this meritless motion at 15 hours at $250 per hour is reasonable. Thus, the court awards attorneys fees to cross-complainant in the amount of $3,750.

Glenshire�s attorney is to submit a formal order that sets out verbatim the tentative ruling herein and complies with California Rule of Court 3.1312 and is thereafter to prepare, file and serve notice of order.

This is the Court�s tentative ruling. In order to argue at the hearing, you must notify the parties and thereafter notify the court�s law and motion secretary at (530) 582-7835 by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing. If you do not so notify the parties and court, the tentative ruling shall become the final ruling. Any argument is limited to five minutes. California Rule of Court 3.1308, Local Rule 4.05.3.

Unless the court orders otherwise, the court does not provide court reporters for civil law and motion hearings and case management conferences at the court’s expense. Any litigant who wants a record of a law and motion matter or a case management conference must arrange for the presence of a court reporter at his or her expense. Local Rule 10.00.3B.

Party Information
MEJIA, ELISA
– PLAINTIFF

DOB
DOD
Disposition
Disp Date

Alias
More Party Information
RETAILERS’ CREDIT ASSOCIATION OF GRASS VALLEY
– DEFENDANT

DOB
DOD
Disposition
Disp Date

Alias
More Party Information
DIGNITY HEALTH, INC
– DEFENDANT

DOB
DOD
Disposition
Disp Date

Alias
More Party Information
Events
Date/Time Location Type Result Event Judge
11/21/2014 10:00 AM DEPT 6 MOTION TO STRIKE CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION Dept. 6
11/21/2014 10:00 AM DEPT 6 MOTION TO STRIKE CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION Dept. 6
12/05/2014 10:00 AM DEPT 6 MOTION TO STRIKE CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION Dept. 6
12/19/2014 10:00 AM DEPT 6 MOTION TO STRIKE GRANTED Dept. 6
12/22/2014 09:00 AM DEPT 6 FIRST CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION Dept. 6
01/12/2015 09:00 AM DEPT 6 CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION Dept. 6
02/13/2015 10:00 AM DEPT 6 MOTION OTHER CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION Dept. 6
02/23/2015 09:00 AM DEPT 6 CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION Dept. 6
03/06/2015 10:00 AM DEPT 6 MOTION OTHER CASE SUBMITTED Dept. 6
03/30/2015 09:00 AM DEPT 6 CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION Dept. 6
04/27/2015 09:00 AM DEPT 6 CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION Dept. 6
05/18/2015 09:00 AM DEPT 6 CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION Dept. 6
06/22/2015 09:00 AM DEPT 6 CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE DROPPED Dept. 6
Docket Information
Date Description Docket Text Amount Owed
09/02/2014 COMPLAINT UNLIMITED COMPLAINT UNLIMITED Receipt: 15432 Date: 09/02/2014 $435.00
09/02/2014 CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET
09/02/2014 CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE NOTICE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE NOTICE
09/02/2014 SUMMONS ISSUED & FILED SUMMONS ISSUED & FILED
09/02/2014 CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE NOTICE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE NOTICE
Event: FIRST CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE
Date: 12/22/2014 Time: 9:00 am
Judge: Dept. 6 Location: DEPT 6

Result: CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION
09/08/2014 PROOF OF SERVICE – SUMMONS PROOF OF SERVICE – SUMMONS BY PERS SVC ON 9-3-14
10/03/2014 ANSWER TO COMPLAINT UNLIMITED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT UNLIMITED
RETAILERS CREDIT ASSOCIATION Receipt: 16124 Date: 10/03/2014 $435.00
10/07/2014 AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
RETAILERS CREDIT ASSOCIATION
10/09/2014 PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL AMENDED PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL
10/20/2014 NOTICE OF MOTION (CIVIL) NOTICE OF MOTION (CIVIL)
Event: MOTION TO STRIKE
Date: 11/21/2014 Time: 10:00 am
Judge: Dept. 6 Location: DEPT 6

COMPLAINT Receipt: 16487 Date: 10/20/2014

Result: CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION $60.00
10/20/2014 POINTS & AUTHORITES IN SUPPORT OF DEFT RCA’S POINTS & AUTHORITES IN SUPPORT OF SPEICAL MOTION TO STRIKE PLA COMPLAINT
10/20/2014 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE DEFT RCA REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PL’S COMPLAINT
10/20/2014 DECLARATION DECLARATION OF SHEILA BAKER IN SUPPORT OF DEFT FCA SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PL’S COMPLAINT
10/20/2014 DECLARATION DECLARATION OF JENNIFER WALTERS IN SUPPORT OF DEFT FCA SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PL’S COMPLAINT
10/23/2014 NOTICE OF MOTION (CIVIL) DEFT DIGNITY HEALTH, INC.’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF BRENDA GREGG AND DONALD P. WAGNER
Event: MOTION TO STRIKE
Date: 11/21/2014 Time: 10:00 am
Judge: Dept. 6 Location: DEPT 6

DIGNITY HEALTH’S MOTION

Result: CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION $60.00
10/23/2014 FIRST PAPER PLEADING (BY DEFENDANT) FIRST PAPER PLEADING (BY DEFENDANT DIGNITY HEALTH, INC.) Receipt: 16602 Date: 10/23/2014 $435.00
10/31/2014 PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE (CCP 170.6) OF: PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE (CCP 170.6) OF: JUDGE SEAN P. DOWLING
10/31/2014 DECLARATION DECLARATION OF E. JOHN VODONICK IN SUPP
10/31/2014 MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTH OF E. JOHN VODONICK
11/03/2014 ORDER MINUTE ORDER
11/05/2014 DECLARATION DECLARATION OF ATTY VODONICK RE: OBJECTION TO HEARING BEFORE JUDGE DOWLING 170.3
11/06/2014 DECLARATION ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST TO RECUSAL
11/10/2014 POINTS & AUTHORITES IN SUPPORT OF POINTS & AUTHORITES IN SUPPORT OF: OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE (DIGNITY HEALTH)
11/10/2014 POINTS & AUTHORITES IN SUPPORT OF POINTS & AUTHORITES IN SUPPORT OF: OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE (RCA)
11/10/2014 OPPOSITION TO: OPPOSITION TO: DECLARATION BY JENNIFER WALTERS
11/10/2014 DECLARATION DECLARATION OF ELISA MEJIA
11/10/2014 DECLARATION DECLARATION OF E. JOHN VODONICK
11/14/2014 NOTICE OF JUDICIAL ASSIGNMENT NOTICE OF JUDICIAL ASSIGNMENT
11/14/2014 REPLY REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE
11/14/2014 NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE
DONALD WAGNER
11/14/2014 PC – (GC 70627(A)) PREPARING COPIES CIVIL PC – (GC 70627(A)) PREPARING COPIES CIVIL Receipt: 17081 Date: 11/14/2014 $1.50
11/14/2014 DECLARATION DEFT RCA’S RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATION OF JENNIFER WALTERS IN SUPPORT OF SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PL’S COMPLAINT
11/14/2014 REPLY DEFT RCA’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PL’S COMPLAINT
11/14/2014 OPPOSITION TO: DEFT RCA’S OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PL’S COMPLAINT
11/21/2014 CLERK’S MINUTES CLERK’S MINUTES

M8 General Civil Minutes
Sent on: 11/25/2014 10:24:37.77
12/05/2014 CLERK’S MINUTES CLERK’S MINUTES

M22 Civil Minutes
Sent on: 12/08/2014 13:55:02.10
12/08/2014 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT DEFT RCA CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT RE: 12-22-14
12/08/2014 CLERK’S MINUTES CLERK’S MINUTES

M8 General Civil Minutes
Sent on: 12/08/2014 13:54:36.40
12/09/2014 RULING RULING ON OBJECTION TO HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE SEAN P DOWLING ON GROUNDS OF DISQUALIFICATION
12/10/2014 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT PL’S CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT
12/11/2014 PROOF OF SERVICE – CIVIL PROOF OF SERVICE – CIVIL
12/19/2014 CLERK’S MINUTES CLERK’S MINUTES

M22 Civil Minutes
Sent on: 12/23/2014 12:48:38.51
12/22/2014 HEARING SET: HEARING SET:

The following event: FIRST CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE scheduled for 12/22/2014 at 9:00 am has been rescheduled as follows:

Event: CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE
Date: 01/12/2015 Time: 9:00 am
Judge: Dept. 6 Location: DEPT 6

Result: CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION
12/22/2014 CLERK’S MINUTES CLERK’S MINUTES

M8 General Civil Minutes
Sent on: 12/24/2014 10:12:13.14
12/24/2014 NOTICE OF MOTION (CIVIL) DIGNITY HEALTH INC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR MANDATORY FEES AND COSTS, MEMO OF POINTS AND AUTH; DECL OF DONALD P. WAGNER
Event: MOTION OTHER
Date: 01/30/2015 Time: 10:00 am
Judge: Dept. 6 Location: DEPT 6 Receipt: 17787 Date: 12/24/2014

Result: CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION $60.00
01/12/2015 HEARING SET: HEARING SET:

The following event: CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE scheduled for 01/12/2015 at 9:00 am has been rescheduled as follows:

Event: CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE
Date: 02/23/2015 Time: 9:00 am
Judge: Dept. 6 Location: DEPT 6

Result: CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION
01/12/2015 CLERK’S MINUTES CLERK’S MINUTES

M22 Civil Minutes
Sent on: 01/12/2015 15:12:26.28
01/23/2015 STIPULATION AND ORDER (CIVIL) STIPULATION AND ORDER CONTINUING HEARING DATE Receipt: 18204 Date: 01/20/2015 $20.00
01/29/2015 ORDER ORDER GRANTING DEFT RETAILERS CREDIT ASSOC OF GRASS VALLEY AND DIGNITY HEALTH SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
02/02/2015 PC – (GC 70627(A)) PREPARING COPIES CIVIL PC – (GC 70627(A)) PREPARING COPIES CIVIL Receipt: 18459 Date: 02/02/2015 $4.00
02/04/2015 NOTICE OF MOTION (CIVIL) NOTICE OF MOTION (CIVIL)
Event: MOTION OTHER
Date: 03/06/2015 Time: 10:00 am
Judge: Dept. 6 Location: DEPT 6 Receipt: 18512 Date: 02/04/2015

Result: CASE SUBMITTED $60.00
02/04/2015 POINTS & AUTHORITES IN SUPPORT OF POINTS & AUTHORITES IN SUPPORT OF: MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
02/04/2015 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FEES
02/04/2015 DECLARATION DECLARATION OF ANDREW STEINHEIMER
02/04/2015 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE
02/05/2015 POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO: POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO: DIGNITY HEALTH MOTION FOR MANDATORY ATTYORNEY FEES
02/09/2015 NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE) PL’S NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)
02/09/2015 CLERK’S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL DEPOSIT #5516 CLERK’S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL DEPOSIT #5516 Receipt: 18605 Date: 02/09/2015 $100.00
02/10/2015 REPLY REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION
02/10/2015 NOTICE OF: NOTICE OF: INTENT TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE AT MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
02/13/2015 CLERK’S MINUTES CLERK’S MINUTES

M8 General Civil Minutes
Sent on: 02/13/2015 14:35:24.00
02/20/2015 POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO: PL’S POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO: MOTION FOR ATTY FEES
02/20/2015 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE PL’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF OPPO
02/23/2015 HEARING SET: HEARING SET:

The following event: CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE scheduled for 02/23/2015 at 9:00 am has been rescheduled as follows:

Event: CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE
Date: 03/30/2015 Time: 9:00 am
Judge: Dept. 6 Location: DEPT 6

Result: CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION
02/23/2015 CLERK’S MINUTES CLERK’S MINUTES

M8 General Civil Minutes
Sent on: 02/23/2015 10:22:42.18
02/27/2015 REPLY REPLY OF RCA IN SUPT OF ITS MOTION FOR ATTY FEES
03/06/2015 CLERK’S MINUTES CLERK’S MINUTES

M8 General Civil Minutes
Sent on: 03/10/2015 14:38:23.38
03/23/2015 MISC CLERICAL DOCKET NOTE RECVD LETTER FROM COA CASE NOT SUITABLE FOR MEDIATION APPEAL PROCEEDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT
03/30/2015 HEARING SET: HEARING SET:

The following event: CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE scheduled for 03/30/2015 at 9:00 am has been rescheduled as follows:

Event: CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE
Date: 04/27/2015 Time: 9:00 am
Judge: Dept. 6 Location: DEPT 6

Result: CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION
03/30/2015 APPELLANT’S NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL (UNLTD CIVIL CASE) APPELLANT’S NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL (UNLTD CIVIL CASE)
03/30/2015 CLERK’S MINUTES CLERK’S MINUTES

M22 Civil Minutes
Sent on: 04/01/2015 13:57:03.97
04/13/2015 NOTICE OF: NOTICE OF: DEFAULT / RESPONDENT’S FAILURE TO FILE DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL
04/13/2015 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT DEFT RCA’S CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT
04/21/2015 RULING RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER
04/22/2015 NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE DEFT DIGNITY HEALTH, INC. NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE
04/24/2015 RESPONDENT’S NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE) RESPONDENT’S NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)
04/27/2015 HEARING SET: HEARING SET:

The following event: CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE scheduled for 04/27/2015 at 9:00 am has been rescheduled as follows:

Event: CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE
Date: 05/18/2015 Time: 9:00 am
Judge: Dept. 6 Location: DEPT 6

Result: CONTINUED ON COURT’S MOTION
04/27/2015 CLERK’S MINUTES CLERK’S MINUTES

M22 Civil Minutes
Sent on: 04/27/2015 10:30:38.26
04/27/2015 APPEAL BY APPENDIX APPEAL BY APPENDIX SENT TO: E. JOHN VODONICK / MARK E. ELLIS / DONALD PAUL WAGNER
04/27/2015 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER NOTICE OF ENTRY ON RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER
04/28/2015 PAYMENT FROM CIVIL TRUST MONIES (NC) PAYMENT FROM CIVIL TRUST MONIES (NC)
Attorney: VODONICK, E JOHN (63089) $100.00
05/01/2015 MEMORANDUM OF COSTS (SUMMARY) MEMORANDUM OF COSTS (SUMMARY)
DIGNITY HEALTH, INC (DEFENDANT);
05/11/2015 MEMORANDUM OF COSTS (SUMMARY) MEMORANDUM OF COSTS (SUMMARY)
RETAILERS CREDIT ASSOCIATION
05/18/2015 HEARING SET: HEARING SET:

The following event: CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE scheduled for 05/18/2015 at 9:00 am has been rescheduled as follows:

Event: CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE
Date: 06/22/2015 Time: 9:00 am
Judge: Dept. 6 Location: DEPT 6

Result: DROPPED
05/18/2015 CLERK’S MINUTES CLERK’S MINUTES

M8 General Civil Minutes
Sent on: 05/19/2015 10:41:47.31
05/21/2015 MEMORANDUM OF COSTS (SUMMARY) MEMORANDUM OF COSTS (SUMMARY) BY M ELLIS FOR DEFT
06/05/2015 DECLARATION PL’S OBJECTIONS TO ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
06/12/2015 NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE / DONALD P WAGNER COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT DIGNITY HEALTH
06/18/2015 DECLARATION RCA’S RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS TO ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
06/22/2015 CLERK’S MINUTES CLERK’S MINUTES

M8 General Civil Minutes
Sent on: 06/23/2015 10:19:19.89
06/25/2015 JUDGMENT – COURT JUDGMENT
07/17/2015 PC – (GC 70627(A)) PREPARING COPIES CIVIL PC – (GC 70627(A)) PREPARING COPIES CIVIL Receipt: 21973 Date: 07/17/2015 $93.50
07/20/2015 PC – (GC 70627(A)) PREPARING COPIES CIVIL PC – (GC 70627(A)) PREPARING COPIES CIVIL Receipt: 21997 Date: 07/20/2015 $0.50
07/27/2015 BRIEF RECEIVED APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF FILED WITH COA
10/30/2015 BRIEF APPELLATE BRIEF OF RESPONDENT DIGNITY HEALTH, INC.
12/09/2015 BRIEF RESPONDENT’S BRIEF RECEIVED
12/09/2015 BRIEF RESPONDENT’S APPENDIX
12/18/2015 BRIEF RECIEVED RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
12/18/2015 BRIEF RECEIVED REPONDENT’S APPENDIX; PAGES R1-R159
02/01/2016 LETTER RECEIVED RECEIVED APPELLANT’S CLOSING BRIEF
05/28/2019 REMITTITUR REMITTITUR

Case Number: BC603506
MYONG HUI KIM VS MI HEE SUNG
Filing Courthouse: Stanley Mosk Courthouse

Filing Date: 12/08/2015
Case Type: Defamation (slander/libel) (General Jurisdiction)
Status: Motion for Nonsuit Granted 10/24/2017

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FUTURE HEARINGS
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

None

PARTY INFORMATION
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

ALC KEVIN H. JANG – Attorney for Plaintiff

EDWARD J. CHONG & ASSOCIATES INC. – Attorney for Defendant

JASON J. CHONG LAW OFFICES OF – Attorney for Defendant

KIM MYONG HUI – Plaintiff

MC ATTORNEY GROUP LLP – Attorney for Plaintiff

SUNG MEE HEE – Defendant/Respondent’s AKA

SUNG MI HEE – Defendant

SUNG MI HUI – Defendant/Respondent’s AKA

SUNG SELENA – Defendant/Respondent’s AKA

TEST PARTY FOR TRUST CONVERSION – Non-Party

Documents Filed
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

Documents Filed (Filing dates listed in descending order)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
02/14/2017

03/26/2018 Ntc to Prty re fee Clk’s Transcpt
Filed by Clerk

02/06/2018 NOTICE TO REPORTER TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

02/06/2018 Ntc to Reptr/Mon to Prep Transcrpt
Filed by Clerk

12/29/2017 NOTICE OF DEFAULT (UNLIMITED CIVIL APPEALS)

12/29/2017 Notice
Filed by Clerk

12/06/2017 NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL

12/06/2017 Ntc to Attorney re Notice of Appeal
Filed by Clerk

12/05/2017 NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE) (APPELLATE)

12/05/2017 Designation of Record on Appeal
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

12/05/2017 Notice of Appeal
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

11/15/2017 NOTICE OF RULING

11/06/2017 JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR NONSUIT

11/06/2017 Judgment
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

10/25/2017 CIVIL DEPOSIT

10/24/2017 Minute Order

10/23/2017 Minute Order

10/23/2017 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPRVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

10/23/2017 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

10/16/2017 Minute Order

10/06/2017 AMENDED JOINT WITNESS LIST

10/06/2017 JOINT TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST

10/06/2017 Witness List
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

10/06/2017 Exhibit List
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

08/28/2017 Minute Order

08/23/2017 DEFENDANT’S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND ETC.

08/23/2017 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER TO ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

08/23/2017 Minute Order

08/23/2017 REQUIST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

08/23/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

08/23/2017 Request for Judicial Notice
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

08/23/2017 Ex-Parte Application
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

08/21/2017 Minute Order

07/17/2017 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

07/17/2017 NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEY

07/17/2017 Minute Order

07/17/2017 Association of Attorney
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant)

07/17/2017 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

07/10/2017 Minute Order

05/15/2017 Minute Order

05/10/2017 JOINT WITNESS LIST

05/10/2017 JOINT TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST

05/10/2017 JOINT STATEMENT OF CASE

05/10/2017 Exhibit List
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

05/10/2017 Witness List
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

05/10/2017 Statement of the Case
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/15/2017 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF S REQUEST FOR EXPARTE NOTICE

02/15/2017 DECLARATION OF MYONG HUI KIM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF S EX PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL

02/15/2017 PLAINTIFF S EX PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF KEVIN JANG

02/15/2017 Minute Order

02/15/2017 DECLARATION OF KEVIN H. JANG, ESQ IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF S EX PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL

02/15/2017 Order
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/15/2017 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/15/2017 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/15/2017 Ex-Parte Application
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 02/14/2017

02/14/2017 CIVIL DEPOSIT

02/14/2017 Receipt
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

01/23/2017 Minute Order

01/13/2017 Minute Order

11/15/2016 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

11/15/2016 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant); Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party); Mi Hui Sung (Legacy Party) et al.

07/15/2016 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

07/15/2016 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

06/02/2016 ANSWER OF DEFENDANT MI HEE SUNG TO PLAINTIFF MYONG HUI KIM’S COMPLAINT

05/18/2016 Minute Order

05/05/2016 DEFENDANT MI HEE SUNG AKA MEE HEE SUNG AKA MI HUI SUNG AND AKA SELENA SUNG REPLY TO PLAINTIFF S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF S COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RES ID: 160106094843

05/05/2016 DEFENDANT MI HEE SUNG AKA MEI BEE SUNG AKA ML IWI SUNG AND AKA SELENA SUNG REPLY TO PLAINTIFF S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF S COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RES ID: 160106094843

05/05/2016 Reply/Response
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant); Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party); Mi Hui Sung (Legacy Party) et al.

05/05/2016 Reply/Response
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant); Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party); Mi Hui Sung (Legacy Party) et al.

05/02/2016 Answer
Filed by Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party)

04/26/2016 PLAINTIFF S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF S COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

04/26/2016 PLAINTIFF S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT S MOTION TO STRIKE TO PLAINTIFF S COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

04/26/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

04/26/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

03/03/2016 NOTICE OF RULING ON 2/25/2016

03/03/2016 Notice of Ruling
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant); Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party); Mi Hui Sung (Legacy Party) et al.

02/25/2016 Minute Order

02/17/2016 Case Management Statement
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant); Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party); Mi Hui Sung (Legacy Party) et al.

02/17/2016 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

02/09/2016 Case Management Statement
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

02/09/2016 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

01/07/2016 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION BY DEFENDANT SUNG TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF MYONG HUI KIM’S ENTIRE COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

01/07/2016 NOTICE OF DEMTJRRER AND DEMURRER OF DEFENDANT MI IIEE SUNG “AKA MEE LIFE SUNG” “AKA MI RUT SUNG” AND”AKA SELENA SUNG” TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

01/07/2016 DEFENDANT ML HEE SUNG’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF HER DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF MYONG HUI KIM’S COMPLAINT

01/07/2016 Request for Judicial Notice
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant); Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party); Mi Hui Sung (Legacy Party)

01/07/2016 Motion to Strike
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant); Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party); Mi Hui Sung (Legacy Party)

01/07/2016 Defendant’s Demurrer
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant); Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party); Mi Hui Sung (Legacy Party)

01/04/2016 NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

01/04/2016 PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

01/04/2016 Proof-Personal Service
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

01/04/2016 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

12/23/2015 NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

12/23/2015 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Clerk

12/08/2015 SUMMONS

12/08/2015 COMPLAINT FOR: 1. DEFAMATION; ETC

12/08/2015 Complaint
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 02/14/2017

Proceedings Held
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

Proceedings Held (Proceeding dates listed in descending order)

10/24/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 56
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Order of Dismissal) –

10/23/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 56
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Start of Trial) –

10/16/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Final Status Conference – Held

08/28/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 56
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Proceeding continued) –

08/23/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Ex-Parte Proceedings (Exparte proceeding; Motion Denied) –

08/21/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Final Status Conference – Held

07/17/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 56
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Proceeding continued) –

07/10/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Final Status Conference – Held

05/15/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Final Status Conference (Final Status Conference; Proceeding continued) –

03/02/2017 at 10:30 AM in Department 18
Mandatory Settlement Conference (MSC) (Mandatory Settlement Conference; Non-Agreement) –

02/15/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Ex-Parte Proceedings – Held – Motion Granted

01/23/2017 at 00:00 AM in Department 56
Court Order – Held

01/13/2017 at 08:31 AM in Department 56
Status Conference – Held

05/18/2016 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Hearing on Demurrer – without Motion to Strike (Hearing on Demurrer; Demurrer overruled) –

05/10/2016 at 08:32 AM in Department 56
Hearing on Demurrer – without Motion to Strike (Hearing on Demurrer; Continued by Court) –

02/25/2016 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Proceeding continued) –

Register Of Actions
Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

Register of Actions (Listed in descending order)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
02/15/2017

03/26/2018 Ntc to Prty re fee Clk’s Transcpt
Filed by Clerk

02/06/2018 Ntc to Reptr/Mon to Prep Transcrpt
Filed by Clerk

02/06/2018 NOTICE TO REPORTER TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

12/29/2017 Notice
Filed by Clerk

12/29/2017 NOTICE OF DEFAULT (UNLIMITED CIVIL APPEALS)

12/06/2017 Ntc to Attorney re Notice of Appeal
Filed by Clerk

12/06/2017 NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL

12/05/2017 Designation of Record on Appeal
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

12/05/2017 NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE) (APPELLATE)

12/05/2017 Notice of Appeal
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

11/15/2017 NOTICE OF RULING

11/06/2017 Judgment
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

11/06/2017 JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR NONSUIT

10/25/2017 CIVIL DEPOSIT

10/24/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 56
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Order of Dismissal) –

10/24/2017 Minute Order

10/23/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 56
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Start of Trial) –

10/23/2017 Minute Order

10/23/2017 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPRVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

10/23/2017 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

10/16/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Final Status Conference – Held

10/16/2017 Minute Order

10/06/2017 Witness List
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

10/06/2017 Exhibit List
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

10/06/2017 AMENDED JOINT WITNESS LIST

10/06/2017 JOINT TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST

08/28/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 56
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Proceeding continued) –

08/28/2017 Minute Order

08/23/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Ex-Parte Proceedings (Exparte proceeding; Motion Denied) –

08/23/2017 Ex-Parte Application
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

08/23/2017 DEFENDANT’S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND ETC.

08/23/2017 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER TO ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

08/23/2017 Minute Order

08/23/2017 REQUIST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

08/23/2017 Request for Judicial Notice
Filed by Defendant/Respondent

08/23/2017 Opposition Document
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

08/21/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Final Status Conference – Held

08/21/2017 Minute Order

07/17/2017 at 09:30 AM in Department 56
Jury Trial (Jury Trial; Proceeding continued) –

07/17/2017 NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEY

07/17/2017 Association of Attorney
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant)

07/17/2017 Minute Order

07/17/2017 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

07/17/2017 ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE

07/10/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Final Status Conference – Held

07/10/2017 Minute Order

05/15/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Final Status Conference (Final Status Conference; Proceeding continued) –

05/15/2017 Minute Order

05/10/2017 JOINT TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST

05/10/2017 Exhibit List
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

05/10/2017 Witness List
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

05/10/2017 Statement of the Case
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

05/10/2017 JOINT WITNESS LIST

05/10/2017 JOINT STATEMENT OF CASE

03/02/2017 at 10:30 AM in Department 18
Mandatory Settlement Conference (MSC) (Mandatory Settlement Conference; Non-Agreement) –

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:
TOP 02/15/2017

02/15/2017 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Ex-Parte Proceedings – Held – Motion Granted

02/15/2017 Order
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/15/2017 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/15/2017 Declaration
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/15/2017 Ex-Parte Application
Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

02/15/2017 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF S REQUEST FOR EXPARTE NOTICE

02/15/2017 PLAINTIFF S EX PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF KEVIN JANG

02/15/2017 Minute Order

02/15/2017 DECLARATION OF KEVIN H. JANG, ESQ IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF S EX PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL

02/15/2017 DECLARATION OF MYONG HUI KIM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF S EX PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL

02/14/2017 CIVIL DEPOSIT

02/14/2017 Receipt
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

01/23/2017 at 00:00 AM in Department 56
Court Order – Held

01/23/2017 Minute Order

01/13/2017 at 08:31 AM in Department 56
Status Conference – Held

01/13/2017 Minute Order

11/15/2016 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant); Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party); Mi Hui Sung (Legacy Party) et al.

11/15/2016 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

07/15/2016 Substitution of Attorney
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

07/15/2016 SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

06/02/2016 ANSWER OF DEFENDANT MI HEE SUNG TO PLAINTIFF MYONG HUI KIM’S COMPLAINT

05/18/2016 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Hearing on Demurrer – without Motion to Strike (Hearing on Demurrer; Demurrer overruled) –

05/18/2016 Minute Order

05/10/2016 at 08:32 AM in Department 56
Hearing on Demurrer – without Motion to Strike (Hearing on Demurrer; Continued by Court) –

05/05/2016 DEFENDANT MI HEE SUNG AKA MEE HEE SUNG AKA MI HUI SUNG AND AKA SELENA SUNG REPLY TO PLAINTIFF S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF S COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RES ID: 160106094843

05/05/2016 DEFENDANT MI HEE SUNG AKA MEI BEE SUNG AKA ML IWI SUNG AND AKA SELENA SUNG REPLY TO PLAINTIFF S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF S COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RES ID: 160106094843

05/05/2016 Reply/Response
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant); Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party); Mi Hui Sung (Legacy Party) et al.

05/05/2016 Reply/Response
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant); Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party); Mi Hui Sung (Legacy Party) et al.

05/02/2016 Answer
Filed by Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party)

04/26/2016 PLAINTIFF S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT S MOTION TO STRIKE TO PLAINTIFF S COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

04/26/2016 PLAINTIFF S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF S COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

04/26/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

04/26/2016 Opposition Document
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

03/03/2016 NOTICE OF RULING ON 2/25/2016

03/03/2016 Notice of Ruling
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant); Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party); Mi Hui Sung (Legacy Party) et al.

02/25/2016 at 08:30 AM in Department 56
Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Proceeding continued) –

02/25/2016 Minute Order

02/17/2016 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

02/17/2016 Case Management Statement
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant); Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party); Mi Hui Sung (Legacy Party) et al.

02/09/2016 CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

02/09/2016 Case Management Statement
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

01/07/2016 Defendant’s Demurrer
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant); Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party); Mi Hui Sung (Legacy Party)

01/07/2016 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION BY DEFENDANT SUNG TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF MYONG HUI KIM’S ENTIRE COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

01/07/2016 Motion to Strike
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant); Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party); Mi Hui Sung (Legacy Party)

01/07/2016 Request for Judicial Notice
Filed by Mi Hee Sung (Defendant); Mee Hee Sung (Legacy Party); Mi Hui Sung (Legacy Party)

01/07/2016 DEFENDANT ML HEE SUNG’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF HER DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF MYONG HUI KIM’S COMPLAINT

01/07/2016 NOTICE OF DEMTJRRER AND DEMURRER OF DEFENDANT MI IIEE SUNG “AKA MEE LIFE SUNG” “AKA MI RUT SUNG” AND”AKA SELENA SUNG” TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

01/04/2016 Proof-Personal Service
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

01/04/2016 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

01/04/2016 PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

01/04/2016 NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

12/23/2015 NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

12/23/2015 Notice of Case Management Conference
Filed by Clerk

12/08/2015 Complaint
Filed by Myong Hui Kim (Plaintiff)

12/08/2015 SUMMONS

12/08/2015 COMPLAINT FOR: 1. DEFAMATION; ETC

Dean Ventura vs R&R Motorworks
Case No: 16CV05772
Hearing Date: Wed Jun 19, 2019 9:30

Nature of Proceedings: Motion to Strike Costs

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s amended cost memorandum is denied.

BACKGROUND:

On December 21, 2016, plaintiff Dean Ventura filed his complaint for breach of contract, general negligence, fraud, and violation of the consumer protection statutes. In late 2014, plaintiff contracted with defendant Ralph Gold of R&R Motorworks regarding a broad range of repairs and modifications for his 1964 Corvette, including brake and suspension work. Plaintiff paid defendant $5,000.00 towards the costs of the repairs and upgrades he wanted and left the car with defendant. Plaintiff contends that he told defendant that he had a budget of $35,000.00 for the work to be performed, but was ultimately charged over $57,000.00. Plaintiff contends that he never received written estimates for the labor and materials and that the work performed by defendant was defective and created safety issues. Plaintiff sought a return of all money paid to defendant, plus damages for costs incurred to undo defendant’s work.

The parties tried the matter as a bench trial. On April 29, 2019, the court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the sum of $21,837.15. On May 10, 2019, plaintiff filed an amended memorandum of costs in the sum of $5,710.16. Defendant now moves to strike the cost bill pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1033, subdivision (a), on the ground that, given the damage award, the action should have been filed as a limited jurisdiction case.

ANALYSIS:

As a general rule, the prevailing party in an action is entitled to recover its costs. Code Civ. Proc. §1032, subd. (b). However, if a party brings an unlimited civil action and recovers a judgment within the $25,000.00 jurisdictional limit for a limited civil action, the trial court has discretion to deny costs to the plaintiff. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1033, subdivision (a), provides:

“Costs or any portion of claimed costs shall be as determined by the court in its discretion in a case other than a limited civil case . . . where the prevailing party recovers a judgment that could have been rendered in a limited civil case.”

In moving to strike plaintiff’s amended cost memorandum, defendant does not contend that the costs were not incurred by plaintiff, that they were not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, or that they were not reasonable in amount. Code Civ. Proc. §1033.5, subd. (c). Rather, defendant contends that plaintiff should not recover his costs because the judgment entered by the court was less than the jurisdictional limits for a limited civil action. Factors the court may be consider in denying all or some of a prevailing party’s costs under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1033 include (1) plaintiff’s assessment of its chances of recovery beyond the jurisdiction of the limited civil court when it filed its action, and whether that assessment was reasonable and in good faith, (2) the amount of the recovery as compared to the maximum amount of the limited civil court jurisdiction, and (3) the amount of costs incurred. Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 984.

Defendant contends that when plaintiff filed his complaint, he had no good reason to believe that it belonged in the superior court as an unlimited civil action, but this court disagrees. Plaintiff asserted four separate causes of action in his complaint, including a claim for fraud. Plaintiff alleged that he overpaid defendant because he did not authorize $57,000.00 worth of repairs and because he did not receive the benefit of $57,000.00 worth of work. According to plaintiff, the overcharged amount was roughly $22,000.00 as the parties had agreed to a contract price of $35,000.00. In addition, plaintiff alleged that he was facing at least $20,000.00 in cost of repair damages in order to undo and correct the defective work performed by defendant. Finally, plaintiff claimed that defendant charged him $1,000.00 for work that was never done. Had the full amount of plaintiff’s alleged damages been awarded, the judgment would easily have been beyond the $25,000.00 jurisdictional limits for a limited civil action.

In Carter v. Cohen (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1053, the court stated:

“[T]he trial court may properly award costs to a plaintiff who recovers less than the jurisdictional amount for an unlimited civil case when he or she reasonably and in good faith initiated the action believing that the ultimate recovery would exceed the jurisdictional limit.”

Based on the foregoing, the court will deny defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s cost memorandum. The court finds that at the time of filing, plaintiff reasonably believed that unlimited jurisdiction was proper.

Linea Polk vs David Gerrity
Case No: 18CV00938
Hearing Date: Wed Jun 19, 2019 9:30

Nature of Proceedings: Compliance with Deposition Subpoena; Augment Expert Witness Designation; Strike Defendants Supplemental Expert Witness Designation

Tentative Ruling: 1. Plaintiffs Linea Polk and Shannon Morgan Polk’s motion to compel compliance with deposition subpoena is moot and the court denies all requests for sanctions. Because of the difficulty in scheduling Powers’s deposition, the court orders that deposition to go forward on June 19 at 1:30 p.m. absent an express agreement among counsel for plaintiffs, counsel for defendant, and Powers.

2. Plaintiffs’ Linea Polk and Shannon Morgan Polk’s motion to augment/amend their expert witness designation is withdrawn and off calendar.

3. The court grants plaintiffs’ Linea Polk and Shannon Morgan Polk’s motion to strike defendant David Gerrity’s supplemental declaration of expert witnesses and orders stricken from defendant’s supplemental expert witness designation Lester M. Zackler, M.D.,; and the designation of Gary Fuller as a retained expert, though he shall remain as a non-retained expert. The court denies the request for a monetary sanction.

Background: On February 23, 2018, plaintiffs Linea Polk and Shannon Morgan Polk commenced this action against defendant David Gerrity, individually and as trustee of the David W. Gerrity Revocable Trust. (Plaintiffs also named Janette Van Hirtum as a defendant but have since dismissed the complaint as to her.)

Plaintiffs are tenants of property at 512 E. Victoria Street in Santa Barbara and defendant is their landlord. Plaintiffs allege mold infestation on the premises and defendant’s failure to remediate the mold. Plaintiffs claim physical and emotional injuries to their health, strength, and activity. The causes of action in the complaint are 1) negligence (general, failure to disclose latent defects, violation of statutory duties, failure to perform covenant to repair), 2) negligent infliction of emotional distress, 3) breach of the implied warranty of habitability—common law, 4) breach of the implied warranty of habitability—statutory, 5) private nuisance, and 6) breach of contract.

Defendant answered the complaint and filed a cross-complaint for 1) breach of contract, 2) negligence, and 3) conversion. Trial is scheduled for August 7, 2019.

Motion to Compel Compliance with Deposition Subpoena and for Sanctions: Plaintiffs moved to compel deponent Cindy Powers’s compliance with a deposition subpoena and for sanctions against Powers and counsel for defendant. (Powers was formerly a property manager for defendant.) Powers has since been in contact with counsel for plaintiffs and has agreed to attend her deposition on June 19, 2019, at 1:30 p.m. Therefore, plaintiffs withdraw their requests for sanctions and for an order to show cause against Powers. Because of the difficulty in scheduling Powers’s deposition, the court orders that deposition to go forward on June 19 at 1:30 p.m. absent an express agreement among counsel for plaintiffs, counsel for defendant, and Powers.

The motion remains on calendar for the request for a monetary sanction against counsel for defendant. Defendant opposes the motion and requests a monetary sanction against plaintiffs.

1. Facts: The facts are not in dispute except for differing versions of a conversation on April 26. As best the court can determine, this is the sequence of events leading up to the present motion:

On March 9, defense counsel Lacy Taylor informed plaintiffs’ counsel John Richards that she would be unavailable for depositions from April 22 through May 10 due to a trial. On March 21, Taylor informed Richards that she would be unavailable for depositions from mid-April to mid-May. She reminded him of this on April 3.

On April 15, Richards issued a deposition subpoena for Powers’s deposition set for May 3. On April 23, at 9:39 a.m., Taylor’s assistant emailed Richards a notice of unavailability of counsel listing dates of April 30 – May 14. On April 23, at 4:30 p.m., Powers was served with the deposition subpoena. Richards sent the deposition subpoena to Taylor, et al., by email on April 24 at 2:03 p.m. Later that afternoon, Taylor informed Richards that she would be available the week of May 27 except May 28.

On April 26, Taylor emailed Richards regarding notices of depositions for times when she had informed him that she was unavailable. Richards sent an email that afternoon indicating he would move the deposition dates.

Taylor and Powers had a telephone conversation on April 26. Their recollections of the conversation differ. Taylor says that Powers said she did not know what to do about the documents plaintiffs were requesting. (The deposition subpoena includes a list of documents to be produced.) Taylor told Powers she could not give her any advice because she was not her attorney. Taylor “told her that the deposition date for May 3, 2019 was not going forward and that likely she would be re-served with another notice.” Powers wanted confirmation that the deposition was not going forward and Taylor forwarded Richards’s April 26 email to Powers. Taylor says she did not tell Powers not to show up on May 3 and that she merely passed on information that the deposition was going to be rescheduled and Taylor did not yet have a date.

In her declaration, Powers says that, during the April 26 conversation, Taylor twice advised her that she did not have to appear for the deposition on May 3 because the deposition date was going to be moved to another date. Powers says that if Taylor had not “instructed” her not to appear, she would have made arrangements to appear for the May 3 deposition.

Regarding documents, Powers says that she told Taylor that she had spent a considerable amount of time going through a storage space searching for documents requested in the deposition subpoena. She told Taylor that she had located leases and was ready to produce the leases at her deposition. Powers says: “I explained to Ms. Taylor that I was going to have to do more work to locate all of the documents responsive to my trial subpoena, but that I was willing to do it. I also told Ms. Taylor that I was not going to lie or destroy any of the documents. Ms. Taylor responded by saying ‘I would never tell you to shred the documents … however you do not need them.’ I understood her to be telling me that she didn’t think I had to go look for the other documents.

The notice for the May 3 deposition set the location at the Santa Barbara Courthouse library. At the time of the May 3 deposition, the courthouse was closed due to an investigation into a suspicious package.

In his declaration, Richards says that, on May 14, 2019, at an ex parte hearing held in Department 4 for the purposes of filing a motion on an expedited basis to compel compliance with the deposition subpoena, defendant’s co-counsel John Thyne told the court that his office had instructed Powers not to appear on May 3. (The minute order indicates the ex parte hearing was in Dept. 6.) There is no transcript of this hearing. Thyne was not the person who had the conversation with Powers.

2. Analysis: Plaintiffs have cited no legal authority for issuing a monetary sanction against defendant’s counsel in the context of a motion to compel the deposition of a third-party witness. Plaintiffs cite rules of professional conduct, but no rule providing for a sanction.

The court finds fault on both sides for Powers’s nonappearance on May 3. Richards set the May 3 deposition in a subpoena issued on April 15. Yet, he knew in March that Taylor was not available on that date. Taylor either “instructed” Powers not to attend the deposition or told her it was not going forward, which was true. There is no substantive difference between the two versions of the conversation. It is very likely that a deponent who was told the deposition was not happening would not attend whether or not instructed to not attend. It is also true that, had Powers shown up at 9:00 a.m. on May 3, she would not have been able to get to the place of the deposition as the entire courthouse was closed and the vicinity around it cordoned off.

No sanction against defendant’s counsel is authorized or warranted with respect to Powers’s nonappearance at the May 3 deposition. The motion was necessary to get Powers’s attention and have her agree to a deposition. No sanction against plaintiffs is warranted.

With the reply, plaintiffs raise the issue of documents to be produced at the deposition. Plaintiffs contend that Taylor attempted to either get Powers to destroy documents or not to produce them. Plaintiffs ask the court to refer Taylor to the State Bar for discipline.

First, it is clear from both Taylor’s and Powers’s declarations that Taylor did not tell Powers to destroy any documents. Any suggestion to the contrary is hyperbolic and inaccurate.

If Taylor said Powers did not need documents, it is not clear what she meant. There is no evidence that she told Powers not to produce anything. In any event, any statement by Taylor had no effect on Powers. She intends to locate all documents responsive to the deposition subpoena and produce them.

Plaintiffs Linea Polk and Shannon Morgan Polk’s motion to compel compliance with deposition subpoena is moot and the court denies all requests for sanctions.

Motion to Augment/Amend Plaintiffs’ Expert Witness Designation: Plaintiffs moved, pursuant to CCP § 2034.610, to augment their expert witness designation by changing the designation of Roy W. Harthorn, M.P.A, C.P.O, from a retained expert to a non-retained expert. After the designation, Harthorn told plaintiffs’ counsel that defendant is a client of his and he could not testify.

In a declaration, Harthorn says he was never retained as an expert. [Harthorn Dec. ¶2] Counsel for plaintiffs, John Richards, approached Harthorn about possibly needing his services. They did not discuss the case and Harthorn provided his CV and fees. Harthorn heard nothing further until he received a notice of deposition. [Harthorn Dec. ¶3] He has no knowledge of the case and is not prepared to testify in any capacity. [Harthorn Dec. ¶¶4, 5]

In light of Harthorn’s declaration and his production of some unspecified documents, plaintiffs do not intend to call him as a witness and no longer seek to amend or augment the expert witness designation.

In response to the motion, defendant’s counsel, Lacy Taylor, gratuitously recounts the history of the expert witness designation and the results of noticing expert depositions. Taylor says that Nathan Seward, one of plaintiffs’ designated experts, called her and said he was not retained. Apparently there was some confusion within Seward’s office—something of which Taylor could not have been aware. She then called another of the designated experts, Mark Schniepp, who said he was not retained because he had not yet been paid. None of this is germane to the now-withdrawn motion.

Taylor having opened that can of worms, Richards replies in kind with declarations from Schniepp and another expert, Steven Epcar, whom Taylor called. Schniepp says he told Taylor he was retained. Epcar says he returned Taylor’s call and attorney John Thyne inquired about his status as a retained expert, saying other experts designated as retained had not been retained. In his reply memorandum, Richards again asks the court to report Taylor to the State Bar for allegedly unlawfully obstructing plaintiffs’ access to evidence, including a witness.

There is nothing inappropriate about noticing depositions of designated experts. Once one of those experts indicated he was not retained, it was not improper to determine if the other experts had been retained in order to know who was going to be deposed and who was not. The better approach may have been to contact Richards. But the approach taken was not unethical or illegal.

Once again a relatively simple and ultimately unnecessary motion has generated heat over extraneous matters not germane to the motion. Quite simply, plaintiffs’ Linea Polk and Shannon Morgan Polk’s motion to augment/amend their expert witness designation is withdrawn and off calendar.

Motion to Strike Defendants’ Supplemental Designation of Expert Witnesses: Plaintiffs move to strike defendant’s supplemental expert designation of Lester M. Zackler, M.D., and the supplemental designation of Gary Fuller as a retained expert rather than as a non-retained expert. Plaintiffs seek a monetary sanction of $2,000. Defendant opposes the motion.

On April 16, 2019, defendant served his expert witness designation. As retained experts, he listed Jonathan Corren, M.D., and Brian P. Daly, an industrial hygienist, safety engineer, and environmental health scientist. As to Dr. Corren, defendant said he would “testify regarding injuries Plaintiffs claims to have suffered, causation, treatment, follow-up treatment, and the cause or potential causes of Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and injuries, and their prognosis and damages. Dr. Corren will also testify regarding any potential future treatment to Plaintiffs, the necessity of any future treatment, and the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s medical bills incurred to date as well as any and all potential or al1eged future symptoms, disabilities or care and treatment to Plaintiff.” Defendant listed Gary Fuller as an “unretained” expert.

On April 24 or 29, plaintiffs served their expert witness designation. (The parties dispute the date but timeliness of the designation is not an issue.) Plaintiffs designated four retained experts not relevant here. As non-retained experts, they designated four doctors, a nurse, Judy Wood of Wood Environmental Services, and other experts not relevant here. Plaintiffs stated: “The health care providers listed above may be called to testify at trial concerning any of the issues in this case, including, but not limited to, Plaintiff’s medical history and/or treatment, standard of care, duty, breach, liability, causation, damages, diagnosis, prognosis, and the reasonableness/necessity of medical care and treatment provided.”

On May 21, the parties exchanged supplemental expert witness designations. Defendant added Lester M. Zackler, M.D., and listed Gary Fuller as a retained expert (formerly non-retained). Defendant said Zackler would testify “regarding injuries Plaintiffs claims to have suffered, causation, including the potential causes of Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and injuries, and their prognosis and damages. Dr. Zackler will also testify regarding neurological symptoms, such as memory loss and fatigue, and whether such symptoms can be caused by mold exposure.” Defendant indicated that Fuller would testify at trial regarding his opinions as to the initial source of moisture intrusion in the bedroom and the bathroom based on his review of the property, the photographs of the property, the mold reports, deposition transcripts, and discovery exchanged in this case.”

The issues raised by plaintiffs’ motion are governed by CCP § 2034.280(a), which provides that any party who engaged in the initial expert exchange “may submit a supplemental expert witness list containing the name and address of any experts who will express an opinion on a subject to be covered by an expert designated by an adverse party to the exchange, if the party supplementing an expert witness list has not previously retained an expert to testify on that subject.”

Defendant says that plaintiffs stated in discovery responses that they suffer from “fatigue, lethargy, memory and vocabulary loss, cognitive loss, nerve pain in forearms and hands, joint pain and body aches throughout” and “fatigue, lethargy and memory problem.” [Opposition 3:19-22] Defendant says that Dr. Zackler “is being called as an expert to directly rebut Plaintiffs’ medical experts who have been designated to testify that any of the above mentioned symptoms may be linked to mold exposure.” [Opposition 3:22-24]

Defendant has not identified any of plaintiffs’ experts who are designated to testify about neurological issues. Plaintiffs’ designation listed healthcare providers who would testify about “Plaintiff’s medical history and/or treatment, standard of care, duty, breach, liability, causation, damages, diagnosis, prognosis, and the reasonableness/necessity of medical care and treatment provided.” Defendant previously obtained an expert, Dr. Corren, to testify on these subjects, i.e., “regarding injuries Plaintiffs claims to have suffered, causation, treatment, follow-up treatment, and the cause or potential causes of Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and injuries, and their prognosis and damages.”

Defendant does not say when plaintiffs identified neurological symptoms in response to discovery requests, submitting only pages from responses to form interrogatories. Defendant does not suggest these symptoms were identified after the expert witness designation in April 2019.

As to Dr. Zackler, defendant has not demonstrated either of the two conditions for a supplemental declaration in CCP § 2034.280(a), i.e., 1) to express an opinion on a subject to be covered by an expert designated by plaintiffs and 2) the defendant had not previously retained an expert to testify on that subject. The court will order Lester M. Zackler, M.D., stricken from defendant’s supplemental expert witness designation.

Defendant seeks to designate Fuller as a retained expert instead of non-retained because plaintiffs designated Judy Wood as a non-retained expert. This is based on Wood’s report that she prepared for defendant in October 2017. There is no authorization for re-designation of a witness from retained to non-retained in CCP § 2034.280(a).

Nor is it necessary to re-designate Fuller to permit him to offer his opinions on the cause of mold. What distinguishes a non-retained expert from a retained expert is not the content of the testimony, but the context in which he became familiar with the facts that were ultimately the subject of litigation, and which form the factual basis for his opinion. Schreiber v. Estate of Kiser, 22 Cal.4th 31, 35-36 (1999). The court will strike the designation of Gary Fuller as a retained expert; he shall remain as a non-retained expert.

The court grants plaintiffs’ Linea Polk and Shannon Morgan Polk’s motion to strike defendant David Gerrity’s supplemental declaration of expert witnesses and orders stricken from defendant’s supplemental expert witness designation Lester M. Zackler, M.D.,; and the designation of Gary Fuller as a retained expert, though he shall remain as a non-retained expert.

Plaintiffs request a monetary sanction. They argue that a sanction is authorized because defendant’s supplemental expert designation is a misuse of the discovery process, citing CCP § 2023.010(b): “Using a discovery method in a manner that does not comply with its specified procedures.” It is not clear that a supplemental expert designation is a “discovery method.” In any event, the court has discretion not to impose a monetary sanction pursuant to CCP § 2023.030. The court does not believe a monetary sanction is warranted here.

Case Number: B19STCV03013 Hearing Date: June 21, 2019 Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

MICHAEL MUNOZ,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

FITNESS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, ET AL.,

Defendant(s).

CASE NO: 19STCV03013

[TENTATIVE] ORDER

Dept. 3

1:30 p.m.

June 21, 2019

Background Facts

Plaintiff, Michael Munoz filed this action against Defendant, Fitness International, LLC for negligence, vicarious negligence, negligent hiring and retention, assault and battery, and vicarious assault and battery. Plaintiff’s operative complaint is his First Amended Complaint, which he filed on 3/25/19.

The crux of the complaint is the allegation that Plaintiff was working out at one of Defendant’s L.A. Fitness locations when Defendant’s employee approached him and asked him to stop making noises, which were bothering other guests. Plaintiff denied doing so, and Defendant’s employee was hostile and menacing. Plaintiff therefore took out his cell phone to videotape the interaction, and the employee became angry and grabbed Plaintiff, striking him by a heavy blow or grab that injured Plaintiff’s wrist, necessitating surgery.

Plaintiff does not know the employee’s identity, and has named him as Doe 1 to the action. The first and fourth causes of action are asserted solely against doe defendants, while the second, third, and fifth causes of action are asserted against the named defendant and also the doe defendants.

Initial Note

The attorneys for both sides met and conferred concerning Plaintiff’s original complaint, and the meet and confer conversation resulted in the filing of the operative First Amended Complaint. The attorneys also met and conferred concerning the demurrer and motion to strike directed at the FAC, but were unable to resolve their differences.

Procedural Defects

The Court previously continued the hearing on Defendant’s demurrer on the ground that the demurrer violated CRC 3.1320, which requires a separate notice of demurrer, demurrer, and points and authorities in support of demurrer. Defendant filed an amended demurrer, and Plaintiff correctly notes that the amended demurrer violates CRC 3.1320(a), which prohibits a defendant from combining multiple grounds for demurrer in one paragraph. The Court wishes to rule on the demurrer on its merits, and finds this procedural defect does not operate as a bar to doing so.

Demurrer

Vicarious Liability

Defendant demurs to the second and fifth causes of action, each of which sound in vicarious liability/respondeat superior, on the ground that they fail to state a cause of action and are uncertain. Defendant argues Plaintiff has pled conduct so far outside the normal employment relationship that it cannot support a claim for vicarious liability. Neither party cites on point applicable authority concerning whether and when an employer is vicariously liable for its employee’s intentional act on the job. The Court, therefore, provides the following general discussion of the issue for guidance.

Respondeat superior imposes vicarious (or derivative liability) upon the employer—i.e., it imputes the employee’s fault to the employer and thus makes the employer responsible in damages just as if he or she personally committed the tortious act. Respondeat superior is therefore a form of strict liability: The employer is responsible for the employee’s wrongful acts (whether negligent or intentional) notwithstanding the exercise of due care in hiring the employee or supervising his or her conduct. Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, 960.

Whether an employee’s wrongful acts were committed during the scope of employment is judged by a two-prong, alternative “test”:

• Whether the act was either required by the employer or “incidental” to the employee’s duties (“nexus” test); or

• Whether the employee’s misconduct was reasonably foreseeable by the employer (even if not “required” or “incidental”). Montague v. AMN Healthcare, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1515, 1521.

Normally, the question of scope of employment turns on the facts of each case. However, where the operable, overt, observable facts are indisputable, the question is one of law. Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 962, 968. The factual determination requires consideration of such matters as the employee’s “normal” activities; the time, place and purpose of the specific act; the extent to which the employer’s interests were advanced by the act; whether the employer had reason to know that the employee would likely so act, etc. Harris v. Trojan Fireworks Co. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 830, 835.

The court of appeals determined there was a triable factual issue concerning whether a retail employer could be liable for an employee’s assault upon a customer following a brief verbal altercation; the Court noted that an employee’s physical eruption, stemming from an interaction with a customer, “may well be” a predictable risk of retail employment. Flores v. Autozone West, Inc. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 373, 380-383.

In light of Flores, the Court cannot say, as a matter of law at the pleading stage, that Moving Defendant is not liable for its employee’s conduct detailed in Plaintiff’s complaint herein. The demurrer to the second and fifth causes of action is overruled.

Hiring, Training, and Retention

Plaintiff’s third cause of action is for negligent hiring, training, and retention. Defendant argues the cause of action is insufficiently pled per Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054. The Court therein held (citations omitted):

The eighth cause of action is labeled “Negligent Hiring, Training and/or Supervision.” In essence, plaintiff asserts that ABC’s negligence in either hiring or supervising Marshall resulted in the sexual assault and on that basis ABC can be held liable. California case law recognizes the theory that an employer can be liable to a third person for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee. (citations.) Liability is based upon the facts that the employer knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes. (citations). This is where plaintiff’s complaint flounders.

Plaintiff alleged that ABC knew or should have known that “Marshall engaged in the purchase and use of serious, mind-altering illegal drugs, that defendant Marshall used his position at ABC to gain sexual favors, and that use of a ‘casting couch’ is common within the entertainment industry.” Given the harm that plaintiff suffered–a brutal sexual assault after having been surreptitiously drugged–the pleading allegations are insufficient to allege a cause of action. ABC’s knowledge that Marshall personally used “serious mind-altering drugs” does not equate with knowledge that he would surreptitiously use drugs to place a prospective employee into a situation of helplessness before violently assaulting him. Nor does ABC’s knowledge that Marshall used his position “to gain sexual favors” have material relevance to this matter. Use of the word “gain” is consistent with the quid pro quo form of sexual harassment but that is not the basis of plaintiff’s claim. The “casting couch” allegation suffers from a similar infirmity. That is, knowledge that Marshall used his position of authority to extract or to coerce sexual favors is not knowledge that he would first drug and then attack a potential employee. In the context of negligent hiring, those are qualitatively different situations. In sum, the cornerstone of a negligent hiring theory is the risk that the employee will act in a certain way and the employee does act in that way. Plaintiff has failed to allege those necessary facts.

Plaintiff’s FAC herein, at ¶¶29-31, merely alleges the elements of a cause of action for negligent hiring, training, and retention without alleging any facts in support of those allegations. Plaintiff, in opposition to the demurrer, argues he has learned additional facts during discovery that support his cause of action. Defendant, in reply, argues the Court cannot consider any facts not pled in the FAC in ruling on the demurrer; the Court can only consider the facts pled in the FAC in deciding whether to sustain or overrule the demurrer, but can consider the other facts in determining whether or not to grant leave to amend.

Because the FAC states mere conclusions without factual support, the demurrer is sustained. Because this is the first ruling on a pleading challenge in the case, leave to amend is granted. Plaintiff is ordered to file a Second Amended Complaint, wherein he alleges facts in support of his claim for negligent hiring, training, and retention, within twenty days.

Motion to Strike

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages and related allegations from his FAC. Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to support imposition of punitive damages against it, a corporate employer, because it failed to allege authorization or ratification on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.

Plaintiff, in opposition to the motion, argues he has adequately pled that Doe 1 was acting in a managerial capacity, such that the requirements of §3294(b) are met. The Court has reviewed the complaint, and cannot find any allegation that Doe 1 was a “managing agent” of Defendant. The motion to strike is therefore granted. Again, because this is the first pleading challenge, leave to amend is granted. Plaintiff is ordered to file an amended complaint within twenty days.

When amending the complaint, the Court advises Plaintiff that not all “managers” of corporate entities are “managing agents” of those entities. In White v. Ultramar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, the Supreme Court explained what the term “manager” means in the context of §3294(b). The Court held (citations omitted):

Using these interpretive rules to guide us, we believe that in amending section 3294, the Legislature intended (citation) to limit corporate punitive damage liability to those employees who exercise substantial independent authority and judgment over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy. Our view finds support in a principle which “seeks to ascertain common characteristics among things of the same kind, class, or nature when they are cataloged in legislative enactments.” (citation.) The principle requires that when we interpret general statutory terms following the listing of specific classes of persons or things, we must construe the terms as applying to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those listed. The rule ” ‘ “is based on the obvious reason that if the [writer] had intended the general words to be used in their unrestricted sense, [he or she] would not have mentioned the particular things or classes of things which would in that event become mere surplusage.” ‘ ” (citation.) Using the doctrine to aid our interpretation of “managing agent,” we note that section 3294, subdivision (b), placed that term next to the terms “officer” and “director,” intending that a managing agent be more than a mere supervisory employee. The managing agent must be someone who exercises substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy. Thus, by selecting the term “managing agent,” and placing it in the same category as “officer” and “director,” the Legislature intended to limit the class of employees whose exercise of discretion could result in a corporate employer’s liability for punitive damages.

Conclusion

Defendant’s demurrer to the vicarious liability based causes of action (second and fifth) is overruled. Defendant’s demurrer to the negligent hiring, training, and retention cause of action (third) is sustained. Defendant’s motion to strike is granted. Plaintiff is ordered to file a Second Amended Complaint within twenty days. Defendant is ordered to file a responsive pleading within the statutory time thereafter.

Defendant is ordered to give notice.

Case Number: BC672655 Hearing Date: June 21, 2019 Dept: 4A

Motion to Compel Responses to Form Interrogatories and Demand for Production of Documents

Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. No opposition has been filed.

BACKGROUND

On August 18, 2017, Plaintiff Randi King (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Charles Guadagnoli (“Defendant”) and Does 1 through 100 for vehicular negligence and negligence per se.

On March 12, 2019, Defendant filed the instant motion to compel responses.

On April 4, 2019, the Court, on its own motion, advanced and continued the hearing from May 17, 2019 to June 21, 2019.

Trial is set for August 19, 2019.

PARTY’S REQUEST

Defendant requests a court order compelling Plaintiff to provide responses to Form Interrogatories (Set One) and Demand for Production of Documents (Set One).

Defendant also requests a court order imposing $606.65 in monetary sanctions against Plaintiff.

LEGAL STANDARD

If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses and for a monetary sanction. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290, subd. (b).) The statute contains no time limit for a motion to compel where no responses have been served. All that need be shown in the moving papers is that a set of interrogatories was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served. (See Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 905-906.)

Where there has been no timely response to a demand for the production of documents, the demanding party may seek an order compelling a response. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.300, subd. (b).) Failure to timely respond waives all objections, including privilege and work product. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.300, subd. (a).) Thus, unless the party to whom the demand was directed obtains relief from waiver, he or she cannot raise objections to the documents demanded. There is no deadline for a motion to compel responses. Likewise, for failure to respond, the moving party need not attempt to resolve the matter outside court before filing the motion.

Under California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030, subd. (a), “[t]he court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. . . . If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery is a misuse of the discovery process. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2023.010.)

California Rules of Court, rule 3.1348, subdivision (a) states: “The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.”

DISCUSSION

Defendant served Plaintiff with his Form Interrogatories (Set One) and Demand for Production of Documents (Set One) on May 1, 2018. (Kalpakian Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, Exs. A, B.) The responses were due on June 5, 2018. (Id., ¶¶ 2-3.) Defendant’s counsel received an email from Plaintiff’s counsel’s office on June 4, 2018 requesting an extension of time to respond to the discovery requests until June 19, 2018. (Id., ¶ 4, Ex. C.) Defendant’s counsel agreed to the extension of time. (Id.)

Having not received any responses, Defendant’s counsel emailed Plaintiff’s counsel’s office on July 24, 2018, requesting an update on the responses and granting Plaintiff an additional extension until July 31, 2018 to provide the discovery responses. (Id., ¶ 5, Ex. D.) After receiving no response to the July 24, 2018 email, Defendant’s counsel sent a follow-up email on September 5, 2018, requesting discovery responses or a dismissal of the case if Plaintiff was no longer interested in prosecuting her claims. (Id., ¶ 6, Ex. E.) Defendant’s counsel also granted an extension of time to respond until September 10, 2018. (Id.) After still not receiving any response, Defendant’s counsel sent another follow-up email on November 16, 2018, requesting the status of the discovery responses and discussing the need to continue the February 19, 2019 trial date because of Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the discovery requests. (Id., ¶ 7, Ex. F.)

Still receiving no responses, Defendant’s counsel emailed Plaintiff’s attorney on January 22, 2019 to inform him that he would be proceeding with motions to compel. (Id., ¶ 8, Ex. G.) Defendant’s counsel sent another email on January 29, 2019 granting a final extension of time to provide discovery responses until February 6, 2019. (Id., ¶ 9, Ex. H.) To date, Plaintiff has not served any responses to the discovery requests and there has been no reasons provided as to Plaintiff’s inability to serve responses. (Id., p. 9:14-17.)

As Defendant properly served discovery requests and Plaintiff failed to serve responses, the Court finds Defendant is entitled to an order directing Plaintiff to provide responses to the discovery requests served on Plaintiff.

Defendant requests $606.65 ($150/hr x 3.5 hrs, plus $61.65 filing fee and $20 parking) in monetary sanctions. (Kalpakian Decl., p. 9: 18-22.) The Court finds this amount to be reasonable and, thus, awards monetary sanctions in the amount of $606.65.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

The Court orders Plaintiff to provide verified responses, without objections, to Defendant’s Form Interrogatories (Set One) and Demand for Production of Documents (Set One) within 20 days of this order.

The Court also orders Plaintiff to pay Defendant $606.65 within 30 days of this order.

Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: BC685253 Hearing Date: June 21, 2019 Dept: 4B

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS

On November 29, 2017, Plaintiff Melissa Gursey (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Gabriel Jahleel Parker and Gregory Parker (collectively, “Defendants”) for general negligence and motor vehicle negligence arising out of a March 8, 2016 motor vehicle accident. On January 8, 2019, the parties participated in an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) regarding written discovery requests and defendant’s deposition. The parties’ counsel reached an agreement that Defendant would produce additional documents and to serve supplemental responses to form interrogatories. Defendant failed to produce the agreed-upon documents and supplemental responses.

On January 11, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant’s deposition, ordered Defendant to appear for a deposition within sixty days, and ordered Defendant to pay monetary sanctions. On March 5, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories and document requests, ordered Defendant to produce documents and further responses, and ordered Defendant to pay monetary sanctions. Defendant was ordered to provide responses and pay sanctions within ten (10) days. Defendant has not complied with these orders. Therefore, Plaintiff seeks terminating sanctions or alternatively, an order directing Defendant’s compliance and a six-month trial continuance to complete discovery.

Where a party fails to obey an order compelling answers to discovery, “the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, subd. (c), 2023.010, subd. (c); R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 495.) The Court may impose a terminating sanction against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d).) Misuse of the discovery process includes failure to respond to an authorized method of discovery or disobeying a court order to provide discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subds. (d), (g).) A terminating sanction may be imposed by an order dismissing part or all of the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d)(3).)

The court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including conduct of the party to determine if the actions were willful, the determent to the propounding party, and the number of formal and informal attempts to obtain discovery. (Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246.) If a lesser sanction fails to curb abuse, a greater sanction is warranted. (Van Sickle v. Gilbert (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1516.) However, “the unsuccessful imposition of a lesser sanction is not an absolute prerequisite to the utilization of the ultimate sanction.” (Deyo v. Killbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 787.) Terminating sanctions should not be ordered lightly, but are justified where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and there is evidence that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992.)

Before any sanctions may be imposed the court must make an express finding that there has been a willful failure of the party to serve the required answers. (Fairfield v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 113, 118.) Lack of diligence may be deemed willful where the party understood its obligation, had the ability to comply, and failed to comply. (Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 787; Fred Howland Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 605, 610-611.) The party who failed to comply with discovery obligations has the burden of showing that the failure was not willful. (Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 788; Cornwall v. Santa Monica Dairy Co. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 250; Evid. Code, §§ 500, 605.)

Defense counsel states he has been unable to locate Defendant for months. (Declaration of James H. Goldman, ¶ 3.) Defense counsel argues: (1) Defendant is unaware of the outstanding discovery and therefore he has not willfully refused to participate and terminating sanctions are not warranted; (2) Defendant’s participation in discovery is not pertinent and does not interfere with the court’s mission of “seeking truth and justice” since Plaintiff’s action can be litigated without deposing Defendant or obtaining his verified responses to written discovery; (3) monetary sanctions are not warranted because Plaintiff’s counsel knew defense counsel could not contact Defendant and chose to incur the costs/fees associated with filing these motions; and (4) Defendant’s insurance carrier should be afforded the opportunity to intervene in this matter, as they are the real party in interest who would be required to pay out any judgment against Defendant.

Plaintiff requests the Court strike Defendant’s answer and enter a default judgment against him. Before a defendant’s answer can be stricken and a default entered as a discovery sanction, the plaintiff must serve a statement of damages pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.11. (Van Sickle v. Gilbert (2011 196 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1521.) Plaintiff did not show she served a statement of damages.

Defense counsel contends his client does not know about the discovery orders because he has been unable to locate him. Plaintiff provides no evidence to the contrary. Plaintiff did not cite any cases holding that when a party is not aware of discovery orders, terminating sanctions may nonetheless be proper. The Court cannot find that Defendant is willfully failing to obey an order of which he is unaware, and for that reason cannot strike the answer and enter a default judgment.

Plaintiff asks in the alternative for an order that Defendant comply with the prior discovery orders. The Court previously issued orders that Defendant produce discovery. Those orders remain outstanding and do not have an expiration date. Therefore, there is no need for an additional order that Defendant comply with the already-outstanding orders.

Plaintiff also asks for a six-month continuance of the trial but did not show why the continuance is necessary or how continuing the trial will lead to Defendant complying with the outstanding discovery orders. If Defendant does not appear for trial, Plaintiff should be prepared to proceed to trial without Defendant, including by having all pre-trial documents (exhibit list, witness list, jury instructions, etc.) prepared and filed even if they cannot be joint documents given Defendant’s absence. If Defendant does appear at the last minute for trial, Plaintiff can be prepared for that contingency, for instance, by filing the appropriate trial motions concerning Defendant’s failure to provide the ordered discovery and comply with Court orders.

If Defendant’s insurer wants to intervene, it must make a motion for leave to intervene.

For these reasons, the motion for terminating sanctions is DENIED.

Plaintiff requested monetary sanctions of $7,210 against both Defendant and defense counsel. The request for monetary sanctions is DENIED because Plaintiff did not establish the basis for terminating sanctions or the need for the Court to reiterate the already-outstanding orders.

Moving party to give notice.

Filed 4/24/19 InChrist Community Church etc. v. Kim CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

INCHRIST COMMUNITY CHURCH VALLEY CHAPEL, et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

KEEDAE KIM, et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

B287139

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC568720)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Susan Bryant-Deason, Judge. Affirmed.

Obagi Law Group, Zein E. Obagi, and McCallion & Associates, Kenneth F. McCallion, for Defendants and Appellants.

Law Office of Gregory M. Lee, Gregory M. Lee, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Hyuk Choi (Pastor Choi) and his church, InChrist Community Church Valley Chapel (InChrist), successfully sued defendants for defamation based on their publication of internet articles criticizing plaintiffs’ operation of certain Korean-American churches in the Los Angeles area.

On appeal from the judgment awarding plaintiffs damages for defamation per se, defendants contend that the trial court erred when it ruled plaintiffs were not limited purpose public figures, as defined by relevant defamation case law. In addition, defendants challenge the trial court’s denial of their new trial motion, arguing that the trial court: (1) erred by including in the special verdict forms statements by defendants that were not defamatory as a matter of law; (2) abused its discretion by excluding two negative news articles about plaintiffs and testimony from the nonparty author; (3) abused its discretion by ruling that the damages awarded were not excessive; and (4) abused its discretion by delaying Pastor Choi’s cross-examination for one day due to his illness.

We hold defendants forfeited their challenges to the trial court’s rulings on the public figure issue, the contents of the jury verdict forms, and the exclusion of the nonparty articles and the testimony of their author. We further hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling the damages were not excessive and delaying Pastor Choi’s cross-examination for one day due to his illness. We therefore affirm the judgment.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Parties and Events Leading to Litigation

In October 2006, Pastor Choi was ordained a Presbyterian minister. From 2008 to 2013, he served at Light of Love Mission Church (Light of Love); he became senior pastor there in 2011. In April 2013, Pastor Choi resigned from Light of Love on short notice.

On May 1, 2013, Pastor Choi started a new church in Downey called InChrist Community Church (the Downey Church). In late May 2013, Pastor Choi was contacted by an assistant pastor of World Vision Church in Northridge about a vacancy in the senior pastor position at that church. After meeting and negotiating with church representatives, Pastor Choi accepted the position at the World Vision Church in June 2013 on the condition, among others, that the church change its name to InChrist Community Church Valley Chapel (Valley Chapel). In June 2013, Valley Chapel merged with the Downey Church to form plaintiff InChrist, and Pastor Choi became senior pastor of the merged entity.

Defendant NewsM was a Christian-based news website focusing on religious issues, including Korean churches in the Los Angeles area. It was wholly owned by NewsM, Inc. Defendant Byong In Choi was the sole shareholder and CEO of NewsM, Inc. and the CEO of NewsM.

Defendant Keedae Kim was the head pastor of Church of Peace, a Presbyterian church. He was also the editor-in-chief of NewsM beginning in April 2014. He reviewed and approved all of the articles written about plaintiffs by defendant Jae Young Yang.

B. The NewsM Articles

On June 9, 2013, NewsM published an article about Pastor Choi’s acceptance of the senior pastor position at World Vision Church soon after leaving Light of Love and planting the Downey Church. According to the article, “pastors in the [Los Angeles] region [were] reacting with the criticism that ‘it is like dumping the Downey congregation who took part in planting the church.’”

Sometime before June 25, 2014, defendant Yang telephoned InChrist and asked to speak to Pastor Choi, but was transferred to Pastor Dae Il Han. Yang told Pastor Han that he was writing an article about the church. Pastor Han spoke to Yang about the two different locations of InChrist. On June 25, 2014, NewsM published an article describing InChrist’s opening of a new chapel and attributed certain statements to Pastor Han, each of which he denied making. Following the publication of the article, Pastor Han left a voicemail message for Yang telling him that the quotes attributed to him were incorrect. Yang, however, did not return Pastor Han’s telephone call.

Between May 29, and September 18, 2014, NewsM published a series of critical articles about plaintiffs accusing them of being “professional church hunters,” akin to corporate raiders, who plundered church assets and misused church finances for their own personal gain. Among other things, the articles accused Pastor Choi of taking church revenues from the sale of CDs of his sermons for personal use and transferring World Vision Church real estate, including valuable “parkland,” to InChrist to artificially inflate InChrist’s asset value.

On September 23, October 23, and December 3, 2014, plaintiffs’ attorney wrote letters to NewsM demanding that it: cease publishing defamatory articles about plaintiffs; correct false statements in past articles; publish retractions of all past false articles; and publish acknowledgements of the falsity of past articles.

C. Defamation Complaint

On January 7, 2015, plaintiffs filed their complaint for defamation against defendants. The complaint alleged that, beginning in June 2014 and continuing through the present, defendants published a series of defamatory articles about plaintiffs. The complaint specified the following eight allegedly false statements as the basis for plaintiffs’ defamation claims: “(a) That Pastor Choi lacked theological training, [was] a bad pastor without religious conviction, and that his sole goal was as a professional church hunter and corporate raider to acquire church assets by false means for his own personal gain (and for the gain of [InChrist]), and that the corporation [InChrist] was his personal tool to acquire power and money. [¶] (b) That [P]astor Choi took power over World Vision Church, and somehow did a merger with [InChrist], for the sole purpose [of stealing] from World Vision Church the real property it owned, the church site as well as 10 acres of land called parkland. That [InChrist] was transferred such property under [its] name by [P]astor Choi. In other words, that Pastor Choi and [InChrist] ha[d] committed theft. [¶] (c) That Pastor Choi use[d] church assets as his own private property for his personal use and gain. As an example, that Pastor Choi conducted sermons placed on CD’s using church money for their production and sale, and that the entire sales income went personally to [P]astor Choi. In other words, that Pastor Choi ha[d] committed theft. [¶] (d) That Pastor Choi and [InChrist] ha[d] illegally terminated [a]ssociate[d] [p]astors [because] they were not obedient to Pastor Choi. [¶] (e) That Pastor Choi did not become president and head pastor of World Vision Church until July 21, 2013, but that he had already changed World Vision Church to InChrist . . . on May 1, 2013, and transferred the property of World Vision Church to InChrist . . . . In other words, that it was part of a fraudulent scheme perpetrated by Pastor Choi. [¶] (f) That Pastor Choi prior to becoming president and head pastor of World Vision Church became pastor of the Downey Church which became InChrist . . . . That as [a] result of Pastor Choi becoming Pastor of World Vision Church (which became [InChrist]), he abandoned the congregation of the Downey Church. [¶] (g) That a letter of the prior World Vision Church pastor Jae [Y]eon Kim aka Jae Young Kim was published that claimed that Pastor Choi used fraud, trickery[,] and betrayal to gain power over the World Vision Church, with promises that Pastor Kim would be Pastor Emeritus and would receive monies from the church. [¶] (h) That Pastor Choi and [InChrist] left a denomination that World Vision Church was a member.”

D. Trial

A jury trial on plaintiffs’ defamation claims began on August 14, 2017, and concluded on September 13, 2017, after 18 days of trial, testimony from multiple witnesses, and the admission of numerous documents. Following the evidentiary phase of the trial, the parties agreed to submit four special verdict forms to the jury on plaintiffs’ defamation per se and defamation per quod claims. The two special verdict forms for plaintiffs’ defamation per se claims asked jurors whether defendants made “one or more of the following statements, to persons other than plaintiff[s],” and then listed 15 published statements. The special verdict forms did not, however, ask jurors to specify which, if any, of the statements were defamatory.

Following trial, the jury returned special verdicts in favor of plaintiffs which awarded them actual damages as follows: For defamation per se, InChrist was awarded $1.00 for harm to its property, business, trade, profession, or occupation; and $100,000 for harm to its reputation. But InChrist was not awarded any actual damages for defamation per quod.

For defamation per se, Pastor Choi was awarded actual damages of $75,000 for harm to his property, business, trade, profession, or occupation; $250,000 for harm to his reputation; and $250,000 for shame, mortification, or hurt feelings. Pastor Choi was also awarded $300,000 in actual damages for defamation per quod. Plaintiffs’ total damage award was $975,001. The trial court entered judgment on the verdicts on September 18, 2017, and an amended judgment on October 17, 2017, that added a cost award of $35,422.63.

E. Posttrial Motions

On November 14, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on defendants’ motions for new trial and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). That same day, the trial court issued a minute order denying defendants’ motion for new trial, but granting, in part, defendants’ motion for JNOV as to the $300,000 awarded Pastor Choi for defamation per quod. On January 29, 2018, the trial court entered an amended judgment that eliminated the $300,000 damage award to Pastor Choi for defamation per quod. The amended judgment awarded $100,001 to InChrist and $575,000 to Pastor Choi, plus $35,422.63 in costs to plaintiffs.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Limited Purpose Public Figure

Defendants contend the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs were not limited purpose public figures under the defamation law. According to defendants, the “weight of the substantial evidence introduced at trial show[ed] that [plaintiffs] . . . were limited purpose public figures, not private one[s]. The jury was, therefore, given an erroneous jury charge on this issue [which omitted the element of malice].”

1. Background

Following the defense case, the trial court held a hearing and determined that plaintiffs were not limited purpose public figures, reasoning as follows: “The Court: . . . I agree that this [case] is like Grenier [v. Taylor (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 471] because . . . [Pastor Choi] made decisions about not being with one church and going with another church. And then he received an invitation to merge with a third church, and he took it, and it looks like that [decision] ruffled some feathers along the way. Clearly . . . people got very upset for their various reasons. [¶] But the allegations that were then made was that he was involved in a scheme, to put it lightly, to steal church funds and that this whole thing was a plot. . . . [¶] And . . . some of [the allegedly defamatory statements were] per quod, but [others] per se. When somebody says, . . . ‘Where’s the money? What have you done with all the money? And you’re doing this so you don’t ever have to answer to anybody anymore, and you can use the money however you want,’ that is per se. That’s defamation per se because you’ve alleged a crime, . . . . [¶] So [Pastor Choi] chose not to engage, and that’s the voluntary aspect of it. . . . But once the allegation comes out [that] . . . he has got this big scheme to steal money and to steal the money from the church and the church members, it changes the whole . . . basis. It changes the whole groundwork of what’s happened. [¶] And that is what . . . he did not voluntarily put himself in. He was drawn in and he didn’t respond. I mean, this could have been an all-out battle, but interestingly enough, it hasn’t been. It’s been attack mode. [¶] . . . I think he’s a private figure. I’m sure the community that belonged to this church or to . . . the other churches who don’t agree may feel that he’s a very public figure, but I don’t think so. Not in terms of the law. [¶] . . . That’s my ruling.”

2. Legal Principles

“When a defamation action is brought by a public figure, the plaintiff, in order to recover damages, must show that the defendant acted with actual malice in publishing the defamatory communication. (Mosesian v. McClatchy Newspapers (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1685, 1688-1689 . . . .) Because of this increased burden, defendants in defamation actions . . . obviously attempt to establish that the plaintiff was such a public figure. This is a question to be determined by the court, rather than the jury. (Kahn v. Bower (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1610 . . . .)” (Denney v. Lawrence (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 927, 933.)

“There are two types of public figures: ‘The first is the “all purpose” public figure who has “achieve[ed] such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts.” The second category is that of the “limited purpose” or “vortex” public figure, an individual who “voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.”’ [Citation.]” (Sipple v. Foundation for National Progress (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 226, 247.)

“‘Copp v. Paxton (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 829, 845-846 . . . sets forth the elements that must be present in order to characterize a plaintiff as a limited purpose public figure. First, there must be a public controversy, which means the issue was debated publicly and had foreseeable and substantial ramifications for nonparticipants. Second, the plaintiff must have undertaken some voluntary act through which he or she sought to influence resolution of the public issue. In this regard it is sufficient that the plaintiff attempts to thrust him or herself into the public eye. And finally, the alleged defamation must be germane to the plaintiff’s participation in the controversy.’ [Citation.]” (Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 24.)

3. Standard of Review

“At trial, whether a plaintiff in a defamation action is a public figure is a question of law for the trial court. [Citations.] On appeal, the trial court’s resolution of disputed factual questions bearing on the public figure determination is reviewed for substantial evidence, while the trial court’s resolution of the ultimate question of public figure status is subject to independent review for legal error. [Citations.]” (Khawar v. Globe Internat., Inc. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 254, 264 (Khawar); see also Denney v. Lawrence, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 933 [“The trial court’s decision on the question whether a plaintiff is a limited public figure is a mixed question of law and fact. It must determine the predicate facts upon which it then concludes whether, as a matter of law, a plaintiff is or is not a limited public figure. [Citation.] When the appellate court is called upon to review the trial court’s decision in this regard, its standard of review is whether, after an independent review of the entire record, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision. [Citation.]”]; Stolz v. KSFM 102 FM (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 195, 204.)

“When the trial court has resolved a disputed factual issue, the appellate courts review the ruling according to the substantial evidence rule. If the trial court’s resolution of the factual issue is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed.” (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.) Under the substantial evidence standard, the reviewing court engages in a two-part analysis. “First, [the court] must resolve all explicit conflicts in the evidence in favor of the respondent and presume in favor of the judgment all reasonable inferences. [Citation.] Second, [the court] must determine whether the evidence thus marshaled is substantial.” (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1632-1633.)

Under the substantial evidence standard, the reviewing court does not make credibility judgments, reweigh the evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) Rather, the reviewing court’s task is limited to determining whether any rational finder of fact could have reached the decision below based upon the evidence presented. (Alberda v. Board of Retirement of Fresno County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 426, 435.)

4. Burden on Sufficiency Challenge

“[I]t is settled that: ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown [by the appellant]. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) The appellant has the affirmative burden to provide an adequate record on appeal to allow the reviewing court to assess the claimed error. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295.)

In addition, when an appellant contends that a finding of the trial court is not supported by the evidence, he or she is required to set forth all of the material evidence on that finding, not merely the evidence favorable to his or her position. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) “In furtherance of its burden, the appellant has the duty to fairly summarize all of the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment. [Citation.] Further, the burden to provide a fair summary of the evidence ‘grows with the complexity of the record.’” (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1658.) “‘[An appellant] cannot shift this burden onto [the] respondent, nor is a reviewing court required to undertake an independent examination of the record when [the] appellant has shirked his responsibility in this respect.’ [Citation.]” (Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 400, 409.) If the appellant fails to carry this burden, the reviewing court may deem the substantial evidence contention waived. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881; Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 209, 218.)

5. Analysis

Here, defendants’ statement of facts highlights portions of their evidence at trial, in a light most favorable to their various defenses at trial. Defendants, however, do not specify the evidence―from both sides―on the discrete issue of whether plaintiffs were limited purpose public figures. Moreover, in their discussion of the public figure issue, defendants make no attempt to set forth fairly all the evidence which arguably supports the trial court’s finding, or to explain why that evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiffs were not limited purpose public figures. Instead, they urge us on appeal to reconsider and reweigh their evidence on the issue and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court in direct contravention of the mandates of the substantial evidence rule discussed above.

Absent a good faith attempt in the opening brief to set forth all of the evidence on the limited purpose public figure issue, we are hampered in our ability to conduct a review for substantial evidence. Based on the defamation authorities cited above, the trial court was tasked with the threshold determination of whether plaintiffs had voluntarily thrust themselves, or were otherwise drawn, into a public controversy to such an extent that they became limited purpose public figures as a matter of law. After reviewing the parties’ respective evidence on the issue and considering the arguments of counsel, the trial court concluded that plaintiffs had not voluntarily become involved in such an issue.

We presume the trial court was correct in its predicate findings on the public figure issue. In light of that presumption, the burden was on defendants to affirmatively demonstrate in their opening brief a lack of substantial evidence to support the court’s conclusion. Because defendants have failed at the outset to carry their burden on their public figure claim, we must affirm the trial court’s finding that plaintiffs were private figures.

Moreover, even if we were to reach the merits of defendants’ limited purpose public figure contention based on the evidence cited in their abbreviated factual discussion of the public figure issue, we would nevertheless affirm the trial court’s decision. According to defendants, the following facts demonstrated that plaintiffs were limited purpose public figures, not merely private ones: Pastor Choi (1) was able to sell CDs of his sermons for “$22-$25 each;” (2) was not merely a priest, but a pastor or “spiritual overseer;” (3) was a past president of a regional board of Korean-American churches, the Council of Korean Churches of Southern California, which was purportedly comprised of about 1,300 churches; (4) was the center of a controversy involving the administration of three Korean-American churches; and (5) in his complaint, alleged that he was a pastor of renown in the Korean community.

Under the substantial evidence standard discussed above, we presume that the trial court considered each of these facts and any arguments and conflicting evidence concerning them and concluded they were insufficient, either separately or collectively, to show that plaintiffs were public figures. Defendants repeatedly assert that Pastor Choi was the past president of a regional council of Korean churches, which defendants describe as including 1,300 churches. The record on the significance of Pastor Choi’s position, however, was disputed at trial. Defendant Yang testified that he understood the council included 1,300 members, but he did not explain the basis for his understanding on this point. Pastor Choi, by contrast, testified that no churches were registered with the council, and only five churches “helped” with council affairs. Under the governing standard of review, we must presume that the trial court resolved this factual dispute in favor of plaintiffs, i.e., the trial court believed Pastor Choi’s testimony about the council’s lack of church membership and thus gave little, if any, weight to the fact that Pastor Choi was its past president.

More importantly, none of these facts—that Pastor Choi was able to sell CDs, was a pastor or spiritual overseer, or was president of the council—was relevant to the finding challenged on appeal, that plaintiffs had not voluntarily injected themselves into an issue of public controversy of consequence to the members of the community who had an interest in it. “[A]lthough [Pastor Choi] thrust himself into the public eye as an expert on the Bible and its teachings, that alone did not cause him to become a limited purpose public figure in the context of this case[,]” namely, whether he was a church hunter, thief, or fraudster. (Grenier v. Taylor, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 485 [a pastor who published a book, ran a website, hosted a radio show broadcast to numerous states, and made sermons available on YouTube, iTunes, and Twitter was not a limited purpose figure in the context of the lawsuit, where defendants accused him of committing child abuse, child molestation, tax evasion, and theft].)

As to the controversy involving Pastor Choi’s administration of the three churches in issue, as the trial court explained in its ruling, although defendants’ news articles may have attempted to implicate Pastor Choi in certain alleged controversies involving those churches and his alleged misuse of their assets and revenue for his own gain, plaintiffs submitted evidence showing that the pastor tried to quell any such controversies that may have arisen in the community based on the articles. Among other things, he immediately instructed his counsel to send letters to defendants demanding that that they cease publication of future articles about the controversies and retract the past false articles. That evidence supported a reasonable inference that Pastor Choi had not voluntarily injected himself into the controversies created by defendants’ articles. While there was evidence that Pastor Han spoke on one occasion to defendant Yang, we decline to find that Pastor Han’s single response to Yang’s telephone call was sufficient to render InChrist or Pastor Choi a limited purpose public figure because it did not demonstrate the type of “media access sufficient to effectively counter media-published defamatory statements.” (Khawar, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 266.)

Our Supreme Court’s decision in Khawar, supra, 19 Cal.4th 254 is instructive. In that case, the plaintiff was interviewed by a local television station after defendant newspaper published the defamatory newspaper article identifying the plaintiff as Robert F. Kennedy’s assassin. (Id. at pp. 260-261.) Although Han’s interview in our case occurred before the publication of defendants’ newspaper articles, the reasoning of Khawar applies with equal force here: “‘[T]hose charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure.’ (Hutchinson v. Proxmire [(1979)] 443 U.S. 111, 135 . . . .])” (Id. at p. 266.)

Finally, contrary to defendants’ suggestion, the trial court was not required to treat plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that Pastor Choi was a “renowned” pastor as fact. Generally, allegations of such conclusions of fact or law, opinions, or speculation are disregarded by trial courts when construing the factual basis of a complaint. (See Bettencourt v. Hennessy Industries, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1103, 1111.) Given that it was the exclusive province of the trial court to weigh such “evidence,” the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the “renown” allegation was otherwise factually unsupported and on that basis accorded it no weight.

B. Defective Special Verdict Forms

1. Contentions

Defendants next contend that the “evidence at trial was insufficient to justify the jury’s finding of liability [for defamation per se] as a matter of law.” As stated, defendants’ contention appears on its face to be a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. But, defendants then argue that one or more of the allegedly defamatory statements included on the per se special verdict forms was not defamatory as a matter of law (i.e., one or more of the statements, on its face, constituted protected opinion, fair comment, or hyperbole) and therefore should not have been included in the forms. According to defendants, because the verdict forms premised liability on a finding that only one of the many statements was defamatory, “the jury verdict may well have been based on a statement that had no basis in law or evidence to permit a verdict as a matter of law. [¶] Where there is an error in a special verdict form submitted to the jury, a new trial is [the] appropriate remedy.” Defendants thus raise a challenge―not to the sufficiency of the evidence―but to the content of the special verdict forms themselves.

In response to defendants’ challenge to the special verdict forms, plaintiffs argue, among other things, that defendants waived their challenge to the forms by not only failing to object to the content of the special verdict forms, but by agreeing to the content of those forms. According to plaintiffs, during the conference about jury instructions and special verdict forms, “counsel for . . . [d]efendants did not make a single objection to the wording of the fifteen [defamatory] statements” and “there was agreement on the fifteen statements found in the special verdicts for defamation per se.”

2. Forfeiture

It is well established that a party may forfeit purported errors in a special verdict form by failing to object before the trial court discharges the jury. “[W]e agree with [the plaintiff] that [the defendant] has waived this alleged defect in the special verdict form. The rules are well settled. ‘“If the verdict is ambiguous the party adversely affected should request a more formal and certain verdict. Then, if the trial judge has any doubts on the subject, he may send the jury out, under proper instructions, to correct the informal or insufficient verdict.” [Citations.]’ (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equip. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 456 . . . .) A party who fails to object to a special verdict form ordinarily waives any objection to the form. (Lynch v. Birdwell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 839, 851 . . . ; Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 131 . . . .) However, waiver is not automatic, and there are many exceptions. (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equip. Co., supra, [69 Cal.2d] at p. 456, fn. 2.) For example, ‘[w]aiver is not found where the record indicates that the failure to object was not the result of a desire to reap a “technical advantage” or engage in a “litigious strategy.” [Citations.]’ (Ibid.) Nor is an objection required when the verdict is fatally inconsistent. (Morris v. McCauley’s Quality Transmission Service (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 964, 972 . . . .)” (Behr v. Redmond (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 517, 529-530; Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1242 [when a purported defect in the verdict form was apparent at the time the jury rendered the verdict, the failure to object and request clarification or deliberation before the trial court discharged the jury precludes a party from later challenging the verdict].)

3. Analysis

In their posttrial motions for new trial and JNOV, defendants argued, as they do here, that the verdict forms were defective because they included some statements that were not, on their face, defamatory, but rather merely opinion, fair comment, or hyperbole. In response, plaintiffs argued that because defendants’ proposed special verdict forms contained all of the defamatory statements about which they were complaining posttrial, “[d]efendants may not claim error for the defamatory statements they requested in their own [s]pecial [v]erdict forms.”

In ruling on the posttrial motions, the trial court rejected defendants’ belated challenge to the verdict forms, reasoning as follows. “As a procedural matter, the court notes that [d]efendants failed, with one exception, to cite to the record regarding any court order, or [d]efendants’ claimed objections to that order, regarding which statements were to be included on the jury instructions or verdict forms. Defendants broadly state that they ‘repeatedly challenged these statements before trial, submitted a proposed verdict form containing such statements for trial only at the [c]ourt’s request, and continued to challenge these statements at trial.’ . . . Defendants fail to identify when the court requested such statements be included, and fail to cite to examples of their argument at trial regarding these statements. As for pretrial matters, [d]efendants’ only evidence is that they raised the issue in their motion for summary judgment. However, due to procedural errors with that motion, the court never reached the issue of factual statements versus opinion statements. . . . [¶] In sum, the court is highly skeptical of [d]efendants’ assertion that [they] previously, repeatedly raised the issue of factual statements versus opinion statements, except in the context of the summary judgment motion. At a minimum, the court has reviewed its own copy of the transcript for September 1, 2017, at which time the court and counsel for both parties went through . . . CACI [No.] 1702, which is the jury instruction containing the disputed statements, and the special verdict forms, and there does not appear to be any discussion of whether the statements constituted facts or opinions. In other words, as far as the court can tell, this issue was never addressed. Defendants filed no motion for reconsideration or motion for new trial following denial of the motion for summary judgment; filed no motions in limine; and raised no objections to the content of the statements included in the jury instructions and the verdict forms.”

We agree with plaintiffs that defendants have forfeited their challenge to the special verdict forms by failing to object in the trial court to the inclusion of any of the 15 statements in those forms. The record at trial strongly suggests that not only did defendants fail to affirmatively object to the statements on the grounds now advanced on appeal, they either agreed to or, at a minimum acquiesced in, their inclusion in the subject verdict forms. Under the authorities discussed above, they cannot at this stage challenge them on appeal.

C. Exclusion of Nonparty News Articles and Testimony from The Author

Defendants contend that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded two articles from a Korean-American newspaper, the Korea Daily, and testimony from the author concerning the content of those articles. According to defendants, the articles “were highly relevant to the issues concerning [plaintiffs’] status [as limited purpose public figures], as well as the issue of damages.” Defendants maintain that, because the two articles showed that “the issues underlying [plaintiffs’] defamation claims were ‘reported from other agencies as well,’” they were relevant to the issue of “causation.” Defendants further maintain not only that the excluded testimony of the articles’ author, Yeol Jang, would have “helped establish that Pastor Choi was a limited purpose public figure in the Korean-American Christian community,” but also that plaintiffs’ damages could not have been the result of defendants’ published statements because the Korea Daily articles were published to a much larger audience.

1. Background

Toward the end of trial, defendants called Jang to testify. After stating at the outset of his testimony that he had been employed by Korea Daily since 2007, Jang was asked whether he had received any awards in journalism, and he responded that he “was awarded by the American Media for highest honor for the international religious aspect.”

At that point, the trial court called a sidebar conference during which it asked defense counsel for an offer of proof as to the relevance of Jang’s testimony. Counsel stated that Jang was a reporter from the Korea Daily and “[t]here are some articles[,]” written in “2013 to 2015[,]” which contained the “same contents of NewsM articles.”

When the trial court inquired about the relevance of the similarity between the Korea Daily and NewsM articles, counsel stated, “That NewsM did not have an agenda to attack Pastor Choi and/or [InChrist]. The matters written about and reported are from other agencies as well. They were very widely controversial matters that many other newspapers wrote about and dealt with. Pastor Choi made it sound like NewsM only wrote about them because he suspected he didn’t give donation. Pastor . . . Choi said yesterday that it’s because NewsM likes to write negative articles about churches.”

The trial court disagreed that the articles were relevant to the trial and asked again for the relevance of Jang’s testimony, “I’m not sure what this has to do with [NewsM’s] alleged defamation . . . of [InChrist] and Pastor Choi.”

Counsel responded, “One of the articles, Exhibit 1, is Pastor Choi dumping of the Downey Church, which was around May of 2013. That’s one of the Reporter Yang articles as well. [¶] There’s other articles that he’s written not in evidence, and that’s what we’re going to get to.”

The trial court responded that “We’re not going to get to anything that we don’t have a copy of here. I can say that right now.”

The trial court then reviewed copies of proposed Exhibits 116 and 117, and observed, “Exhibit 116 was written May 27, 2013. Are there any allegations in the complaint about this because I am looking at 116 and 117, and I don’t recall any allegations of this. Yes, some of it has been talked about because he left the church suddenly, went away, and didn’t come back. That doesn’t have anything to do with the allegations in this case, as far as I can see.”

Counsel responded: “Yes, Your Honor. It has to do with the first article which Reporter Jung wrote. That is what plaintiff is alleging is to be defamatory, that he left the church, dumped the church, and went ahead and opened up a new church. That was also Mr. Jung’s article that he wrote. [¶] There was also mention of Mr. Jung by Pastor Choi in which he said he went to Korea[] Daily to make some type of complaint, he did so with Korea[] Daily. Not with NewsM because NewsM wasn’t an agency who would listen to him, versus Korea[] Daily who would listen to Pastor Choi. That was his testimony yesterday.” (Italics added.)

The trial court disagreed, “No, that was not his testimony yesterday.”

Counsel then additionally argued that Jang’s testimony was relevant because Pastor Choi had testified that “Korea[] Daily is a reputable source who would listen to him, versus NewsM who had closed ears.”

The trial court then stated, as referenced in defendant’s opening brief, “Well, we’re not going to get into this, so I’m going to excuse him [Jang] as a witness.” But when defense counsel inquired whether she could ask the witness about Jang’s encounter with Pastor Choi and other topics, the court decided not to excuse the witness and modified its ruling, “I’ll let him off the stand. You can call your next witness. Maybe you can call him back again after you find out and you give me [an] offer of proof [of] what’s going to be said.”

After defense counsel completed her examination of the next witness, the trial court inquired, “Did you want to break to speak to your other witness, or not?” Defense counsel responded that she did not need a break, and the court then excused the witness. The defense rested.

2. Analysis

As an initial matter, given the record on appeal, it is not clear that counsel made an adequate offer of proof as to the relevance of the evidence which defendants now claim the trial court excluded. (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 282 [“[T]he failure to make an adequate offer of proof in the court below ordinarily precludes consideration on appeal of an allegedly erroneous exclusion of evidence”].)

On appeal, defendants contend that the articles and Jang’s testimony were relevant to Pastor Choi’s status as a limited purpose public figure, damages, and causation. But during her offer of proof, counsel never used the terms “limited purpose public figure,” “damages,” or “causation.” While counsel did point out that the proffered articles contained “the same contents of NewsM articles,” she did not specifically articulate the argument that defendants now pursue on appeal. Rather, counsel argued that the similarity between the articles was relevant to NewsM’s lack of “an agenda to attack Pastor Choi and/or [InChrist],” which can fairly be interpreted as bearing on the issue of whether defendants acted with malice, which the jury concluded they did not. Moreover, our review of the entirety of counsel’s offer of proof suggests that any potentially salient argument about the relevance of the proffered evidence was buried in the varied and disparate additional relevance arguments presented by counsel.

Even if we were to conclude that counsel’s offer of proof fairly preserved defendants’ argument on appeal, the record demonstrates that the trial court did not make a final determination on whether to exclude Jang’s testimony or the admission of Exhibits 116 and 117. Rather, the trial court precluded defendants from introducing such testimony until a later time, based upon a further offer of proof. “‘“‘Where the court rejects evidence temporarily or withholds a decision as to its admissibility, the party desiring to introduce the evidence should renew his offer, or call the court’s attention to the fact that a definite decision is desired.’”’ (People v. Moore (1954) 43 Cal.2d 517, 523 . . . .)” (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 133.) Thus, defendants have not been aggrieved by the trial court’s purported failure to admit relevant evidence.

D. Excessive Damages

Defendants argue that the jury’s damage award was excessive and unsupported by the evidence. According to defendants, the “weight of the evidence did not support the excessive damages of $675,000 awarded to [plaintiffs] for defamation per se. [Pastor Choi] was awarded $75,000 for harm to his property, business, trade, or profession, $250,000 for harm to reputation, and $250,000 for shame, mortification, or hurt feelings. . . . There was no evidence of actual damages presented at trial that supported such an . . . award.”

1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

“‘The amount of damages is a fact question, first committed to the discretion of the jury and next to the discretion of the trial judge on a motion for new trial. They see and hear the witnesses and frequently. . . see the injury and the impairment that has resulted therefrom. As a result, all presumptions are in favor of the decision of the trial court [citation]. The power of the appellate court differs materially from that of the trial court in passing on this question. An appellate court can interfere on the ground that the judgment is excessive only on the ground that the verdict is so large that, at first blush, it shocks the conscience and suggests passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury.’ [Citation.] ‘“The question is not what this court would have awarded as the trier of fact, but whether this court can say that the award is so high as to suggest passion or prejudice.”’ [Citation.] [¶] ‘In making this assessment, the court may consider, in addition to the amount of the award, indications in the record that the fact finder was influenced by improper considerations.’ [Citation.] The relevant considerations include inflammatory evidence, misleading jury instructions, improper argument by counsel, or other misconduct. [Citations.] [¶] ‘There are no fixed or absolute standards by which an appellate court can measure in monetary terms the extent of the damages suffered by a plaintiff as a result of the wrongful act of the defendant. The duty of an appellate court is to uphold the jury and trial judge whenever possible. [Citation.] The amount to be awarded is “a matter on which there legitimately may be a wide difference of opinion” [citation].’ [Citation.] . . . [¶] We review the jury’s damages award for substantial evidence, giving due deference to the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s denial of the new trial motion. [Citations.] ‘In considering the contention that the damages are excessive the appellate court must determine every conflict in the evidence in [the] respondent’s favor, and must give him the benefit of every inference reasonably to be drawn from the record [citation].’ [Citation.]” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 299-300.)

2. Analysis

Contrary to defendants’ assertion, there was substantial evidence submitted at trial supporting plaintiffs’ claims for actual damages. Pastor Choi testified that his congregation lost 800 members and that he and his wife suffered emotional and physical injury due to defendants’ conduct. Although Pastor Choi’s testimony in that regard was arguably sufficient, by itself, to support the jury’s verdict, the testimony of his expert, Bang Gul Lee, corroborated in detail the financial losses sustained by plaintiffs. Among other things, the expert confirmed that over 800 members had left during the time period the defamatory articles were published and that InChrist sustained financial losses of at least $3.7 million. Plaintiffs’ documentary evidence included a list of over 800 people who left the church during the relevant time period, and Pastor Choi testified that he spoke to the majority of those members who said their departure was influenced by defendants’ articles.

Given plaintiffs’ evidence on damages―which is largely ignored by defendants―and the amount of the award, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendants’ motion for a new trial on the grounds of excessive damages. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the jury’s actual damages award was influenced by improper considerations or otherwise the product of passion or prejudice; and the amount of the award, when viewed in light of plaintiffs’ evidence, cannot be said to shock the conscience.

E. Irregularity in Proceedings

Defendants’ final contention is that the trial court erred when it denied their motion for new trial on the grounds of irregularity in the trial proceedings. Defendants base this claim on a one-day delay in Pastor Choi’s testimony during the defense case because he was not feeling well. According to defendants, the one-day delay “adversely affected [d]efendants’ ability to properly obtain testimony from [Pastor] Choi, and likely drew undue sympathy from the jury.”

1. Background

On Thursday, August 31, 2017, during defendants’ case, following the testimony of defendant Keedae Kim, defense counsel attempted to recall Pastor Choi in her case. When court staff informed the trial court that Pastor Choi was not present, the court asked defendants’ counsel if she had informed plaintiffs’ counsel that she intended to call the pastor and was informed by counsel for the parties that no prior notice of defendants’ intent to recall the pastor had been provided. In response, the trial court stated, “Normally everybody lines that up the day before and tells everybody.” The trial court then inquired whether someone was going to contact Pastor Choi and was informed that the pastor “didn’t feel too good today. That’s why [he is] not here.” Based on that information, the trial court asked defense counsel to call her next witness and, without objection or any request for further information about the pastor’s condition, counsel called defendant Jae Young Yang who proceeded to testify until the noon break. At the break, the trial court inquired whether Pastor Choi had been contacted and was informed the he had been and had agreed to appear for further testimony at 1:30 p.m. The trial court then took the noon recess.

Following the noon recess, plaintiffs’ counsel informed the trial court that Pastor Choi had been to urgent care, but that he was present in court and available to testify. The trial court then asked Pastor Choi if he was ill, and the pastor replied “a little,” explaining that “they ran some tests” and prescribed medication, but that he did not have a fever.

Defendants’ counsel called Pastor Choi to the stand, but after only a few questions, the pastor stated, “In fact, I am not quite able to concentrate because the state of my heart is not stable.” When defense counsel asked if the pastor was unable to proceed, he replied, “I may, if I can–based on the things I can recall at this time, but I don’t think I am quite able to concentrate to remember things.” The trial court and the witness then engaged in the following exchange: “The Court: Pastor Choi, is this a recurring problem that you have? The Witness: Yes, it is. [¶] The Court: So would it be better for you–because you have gone to urgent care, and we know that. Would it be better for you if you were to testify [the next court day, Tuesday, September 5] instead? [¶] . . . [¶] The Witness: If you would allow it, I would very much appreciate it. [¶] The Court: It’s okay with the court, because if [you are] not well, I’m not going to make you testify. I’m okay with that. [¶] If he has a heart problem, I’m okay with that. He can go and he can come back on Tuesday. No one knew he was going to be called today. He didn’t know he was going to be called. No one knew. [¶] Pastor Choi, you are ordered back on Tuesday morning. [You will] be our first witness. [¶] The Witness: Yes. [¶] The Court: Thank you very much. You may leave. . . . See you Tuesday. Thank you very much. [¶] Let’s resume with Mr. Yang. We were on the subject of the grant deeds and the title insurance. [Defense Counsel]: Thank you, Your Honor.” Defendant Yang then resumed his testimony without any objection from defense counsel.

The following Tuesday, Pastor Choi appeared as ordered and completed his testimony, again without any further objection from defense counsel.

Defendants first raised the purported irregularity in the trial proceedings in their posttrial motion for a new trial. The trial court, however, rejected that claim, ruling as follows. “The court disagrees that [the delay in the pastor’s testimony] was prejudicial error. As [p]laintiffs note, [Pastor] Choi was not even aware he would be testifying on the day in question. . . . Defendants were able to cross-examine him on the next available court day. . . . Defendants never objected when the court indicated it would delay [the pastor’s] testimony due to his illness. . . . In any event, there is no evidence before the court suggesting this brief event had any lasting impact on the jury.”

2. Standard of Review

A ruling on a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. “‘The determination of a motion for a new trial rests so completely within the court’s discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears, and the order will be affirmed if it may be sustained on any ground, although the reviewing court might have ruled differently in the first instance. . . .’” (Malkasian v. Irwin (1964) 61 Cal.2d 738, 747; see also Schelbauer v. Butler Mfg. Co. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 442, 452; Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 379, 387.)

3. Analysis

We disagree that the trial court’s denial of the new trial motion on the ground of irregularity in the proceedings was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. The record reflects that the one-day delay in Pastor Choi’s testimony during the defense case was the result of an illness. Pastor Choi represented to the trial court that he had gone to urgent care the morning of his testimony for treatment of a recurring heart problem. While there, he underwent testing and was prescribed medication. At the beginning of his testimony that afternoon, the pastor indicated that he was having difficulty concentrating on the questions and that he was not feeling well. Based on that information, which was not challenged or questioned by the defense, the trial court decided to delay the pastor’s testimony until after the long Labor Day weekend to allow him to recover from his illness.

The trial court’s decision to delay the testimony was grounded in fact and reasonable under the circumstances. Faced with a seemingly ill witness, the trial court took a prudent and careful approach by delaying the testimony until the next court day. Under the court’s ruling, defense counsel was still able to continue her exam of another witness so that the completion of defendants’ case was not hindered or delayed in any manner. Indeed, defense counsel recognized the reasonableness of the ruling by not objecting to it. Moreover, defense counsel did not request the trial court to admonish the jury regarding sympathy for the pastor due to the brief illness, likely because, as the trial court concluded, the event had no potential to have a lasting impact on the jury. Based on the record of this issue, there was no abuse of discretion.

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Plaintiffs are awarded costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM, J.

We concur:

RUBIN, P. J.

MOOR, J.

Filed 4/24/19 P. v. Wilson CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CURTIS ANDRE WILSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

E070348

(Super.Ct.No. RIF1604888)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Samuel Diaz, Jr., Judge. Affirmed with directions.

Erica Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Michael D. Butera, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury found defendant and appellant Curtis Andre Wilson guilty of one count of assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a).) Defendant admitted that he had served five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), had one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), and one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). A trial court sentenced him to a total term of 17 years in state prison, which consisted of the upper term of four years, doubled pursuant to the prior strike conviction; a consecutive five years for his prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)); and one year each for four of his prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court struck the fifth prior prison term, since it was based on the same offense as the prior serious felony enhancement.

On appeal, defendant contends the matter should be remanded for resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1393). We agree. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On the night of October 1, 2016, William H. (the victim), a mechanic, received a phone call from defendant’s wife. He had worked on her car before because he knew defendant. She was in a parking lot, having car problems again. The victim drove to the parking lot and parked next to her. She exited her car and got into his car. While the two of them spoke in the victim’s car, defendant suddenly jumped into the car and started punching the victim in the face. Defendant yelled for the victim not to mess with his wife. He then yelled for his wife to get his hammer. The victim fell in between the two front seats and slid into the backseat. Defendant was on top of him, and bit down on his ear and shook his head. Defendant’s wife came back to the car and handed him a gun. Defendant hit the victim in the head with it three times.

ANALYSIS

The Matter Should Be Remanded for Resentencing

On September 30, 2018, the Governor signed SB 1393 which, effective January 1, 2019, amends sections 667, subdivision (a), and 1385, subdivision (b), to allow a court to exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss a prior serious felony conviction for sentencing purposes. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1-2.) (People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 971 (Garcia).) Defendant contends SB 1393 applies retroactively to all cases or judgments of conviction in which a five-year term was imposed at sentencing, based on a prior serious felony conviction, provided the judgment of conviction was not final when SB 1393 became effective on January 1, 2019. Thus, the matter should be remanded to the trial court to allow it to exercise its discretion to dismiss his prior serious felony enhancement, pursuant to SB 1393. The People concede that SB 1393 applies here, but argue that remand is unnecessary. We agree with defendant.

We initially note the general standard for assessing when remand is required for a trial court to exercise sentencing discretion. “ ‘[W]hen the record shows that the trial court proceeded with sentencing on the . . . assumption it lacked discretion, remand is necessary so that the trial court may have the opportunity to exercise its sentencing discretion at a new sentencing hearing. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425 (McDaniels).) In other words, “a remand is required unless the record shows that the trial court clearly indicated when it originally sentenced the defendant that it would not in any event have stricken a firearm enhancement.” (Ibid.) Courts have applied this standard in the context of Senate Bill No. 620 (SB 620), which gave trial courts discretion to strike allegations subjecting a defendant to sentence enhancements under section 12022.53, where such discretion had previously been prohibited (former § 12022.53, subd. (h)). (McDaniels, at pp. 424-425; People v. Chavez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 663, 712-713.) We see no reason why this same standard would not apply in assessing whether to remand a case for resentencing in light of SB 1393. The People agree that authority pertaining to SB 620 is instructive.

Here, it is not clear whether or not the trial court would have stricken the prior serious felony enhancement if it had the discretion to do so. The People claim the trial court “clearly indicated, through its statements and sentencing decisions, that it would not have dismissed the enhancement[] even if it had discretion.” They stress the serious nature of the present offense and argue that the court “placed great weight on the probation report, which strongly recommended imposition of the maximum allowable sentence.” The People also assert that the court’s remarks and decisions at sentencing clearly indicated it intended to impose the maximum sentence allowable. They point out the court repeatedly remarked that defendant had an extensive history of violence, he was on active parole at the time of the offense, and his convictions were increasing in violence. While the court did cite these aggravating factors, it did so in support of its decision to sentence defendant to the upper term on his conviction. The court went on to double the upper term pursuant to the admitted strike and then imposed the rest of the sentence pursuant to the prior serious felony and prior prison enhancements. Moreover, although the court did rely on the probation report in its sentencing, we cannot say the report “strongly recommended imposition of the maximum allowable sentence,” as the People assert. Rather, the probation report concluded that “the defendant is ineligible for probation, as such, and for the severity of the defendant’s actions, a prison sentence appears appropriate and is respectfully recommended.”

We additionally note the probation report was written at a time when the imposition of the five-year prior serious felony enhancement was mandatory. Thus, it had to recommend imposing this term. Furthermore, the sentencing court was not aware of the discretion it now has under SB 1393, and “ ‘[d]efendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391; see id. at pp. 1391-1392 [remand was appropriate because the record did not clearly indicate the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it been aware of the full scope of its discretion after a change in the law].)

In sum, we are not persuaded the sentencing court clearly indicated that it would not, in any event, have exercised its discretion to lessen defendant’s sentence. Nothing in the trial court’s imposition of the sentence demonstrates what it would do with the newly afforded discretion under SB 1393. We conclude the trial court must be afforded the opportunity to exercise this sentencing discretion. (See McDaniels, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 425; Garcia, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at pp. 973-974.)

DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of allowing it to exercise its discretion pursuant to sections 667, subdivision (a), and 1385, as amended by SB 1393. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

McKINSTER

Acting P. J.

We concur:

SLOUGH

J.

MENETREZ

J.

Filed 4/24/19 Johnson v. Nguyen CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

RENEÉ POLK JOHNSON,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DIEM T. NGUYEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

G055960

(Super. Ct. No. 30-2017-00955741)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Timothy J. Stafford, Judge. Affirmed.

Diem T. Nguyen, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, Ernest L. Bell and Jacquelyn T. Morenz for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *

Defendant and appellant Diem T. Nguyen, a designated vexatious litigant, appeals from the issuance of a restraining order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 527.6 and 527.9 in favor of plaintiff and respondent Reneé Polk Johnson. The restraining order prohibits defendant from harassing, stalking or molesting plaintiff and requiring defendant to stay at least 100 yards away from plaintiff. Defendant contends the restraining order improperly infringed on her free speech rights under the United States and California Constitutions and plaintiff’s fear was irrational.

The evidence supports issuance of the restraining order and the order did not improperly infringe defendant’s constitutional rights. Therefore, we affirm the order.

CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT VIOLATIONS AND DEFECTIVE BRIEFS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) (all further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court) requires “any reference to a matter in the record” to be supported by a citation to its location. These citations must be included in both the summary of facts and the argument portion of the brief even if duplicative. (City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239, fn. 16.) Defendant failed to include any record references in her abbreviated statement of facts. (Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1110-111, fn. 8 [“When a brief fails to refer to the record in connection with the points raised on appeal, the appellate court may treat those points as having been waived [citations], ignore unsupported contentions [citation], or strike portions of the brief entirely [citation.]”].)

Rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) requires defendant to “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts.” Defendant failed to include most of the material facts necessary for us to decide this appeal. We were required to rely on the respondent’s brief and our own examination of the record. (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738 [“‘It is neither practical nor appropriate for us to comb the record on [a party’s] behalf’”].)

The fact defendant is appearing in propria persona makes no difference. A self-represented litigant is not entitled to “special treatment” (Stebley v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 522, 524) but is held to the same standards as a party represented by counsel (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 [appellant’s issues forfeited due to defects in opening brief]). We could consider defendant’s arguments forfeited (Clark v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 37, 53) but to the extent we are able we will consider them on the merits unless otherwise stated below.

Finally, defendant makes claims not included within the argument part of her briefs. For example, in the “Statement of the Case” she contends the court admitted inadmissible hearsay and prejudicial irrelevant material. Each point must have a discrete section with a separate heading and must be supported by reasoned legal argument and authority. (Provost v. Regents of University of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1294 [“we do not consider all of the loose and disparate arguments that are not clearly set out in a heading and supported by reasoned legal argument”]; rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [each point must be separately headed and supported by argument and authority if available].) Any contentions not included within the argument section are forfeited and we do not consider them. In addition, if defendant intended to make any other arguments or claims, they are forfeited for lack of separate headings, authority, or reasoned legal argument.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant’s three children were removed from her custody in March 2016 due to allegations of neglect and child abuse. The children were placed with defendant’s sister (sister), who was designated as the holder of Lucas’s education rights.

Sister enrolled one of defendant’s children (student) at the elementary school where plaintiff serves as principal. Sister advised plaintiff defendant had no custodial rights, including educational rights, over student and student should not be released to defendant. Subsequently, defendant’s parental rights were terminated.

The dependency court had ordered an individualized education plan (IEP) assessment for student. After student was enrolled at the school defendant attempted to contact plaintiff several times by phone and e-mail, asking to attend the IEP assessment. Plaintiff advised defendant by e-mail that defendant had no educational or custodial rights to student and could not be present. Nevertheless defendant continued to contact plaintiff.

In May 2016 plaintiff received a subpoena issued by defendant to appear at a hearing on June 6 in the dependency action. When plaintiff appeared on the designated date she learned no hearing was scheduled. She spoke with defendant’s attorney who had no knowledge of defendant’s subpoena and apologized. Plaintiff became “terrified” she had been “lured to the courthouse” and sought security to walk her to her car.

Defendant also filed a federal court action against plaintiff and several other defendants for approximately 20 causes of action including defamation, fraud, infliction of emotional distress, assault, battery, false imprisonment, and violation of federal and state civil rights, based on essentially the same facts as those underlying defendant’s claims against plaintiff here.

In November 2017, defendant began standing at the entry to the walkway at the school with a sign stating plaintiff and other school employees had “manipulated and kidnapped” child and another sign stating plaintiff “bullie[d], manipulate[d], terrorize[d] and kidnappe[d]” child. Defendant has continued to stand at the school at the only ingress and egress virtually every day. She also filmed plaintiff coming from and going to her car. Plaintiff testified defendant’s behavior terrified her and caused her “significant emotional distress.” Further, plaintiff received numerous calls from parents asking about defendant’s presence and signs, “significantly impact[ing]” plaintiff’s work.

Plaintiff filed a request for civil harassment restraining orders seeking to prevent defendant from harassing her and coming within 1000 yards of plaintiff. In the application plaintiff stated defendant had “untreated mental health issues” and noted she was concerned defendant’s “behavior will escalate and could potentially be more dangerous.” She also stated defendant believed plaintiff was “responsible for [defendant’s] children being taken away from her.”

The court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting defendant from harassing, intimidating stalking, molesting, threatening, abusing, or disturbing the peace of plaintiff or contacting her in any manner, ordering defendant to stay at least 100 yards away from plaintiff. The court set a hearing on plaintiff’s order to show cause (OSC).

At the OSC hearing, after hearing testimony of both plaintiff and defendant and another school employee and admitting five exhibits offered by plaintiff, the court granted the restraining order with an expiration date of January 10, 2021.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

We review issuance of a civil harassment restraining order for abuse of discretion. (Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226 (Parisi).) In applying the abuse of discretion standard we consider whether there is substantial evidence to support the order, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff. (City of Glendale v. Marcus Cable Associates, LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1385.) We do not reweigh evidence or evaluate witness credibility. (Ibid.)

Additional analysis is required when a restraining order allegedly violates constitutional rights of expression. (Parisi, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1226.) “‘“[F]acts that are germane to” the First Amendment analysis “must be sorted out and reviewed de novo, independently of any previous determinations by the trier of fact.” [Citation.] And “the reviewing court must ‘“examine for [itself] the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see . . . whether they are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment . . . protect.”’”’” (Ibid.)

2. General Principles of Civil Harassment Restraining Orders

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1) a victim of harassment may seek a temporary restraining order and an injunction to prohibit harassment. “‘The elements of unlawful harassment, as defined by the language in section 527.6, are as follows: (1) “a knowing and willful course of conduct” entailing a “pattern” or “a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose”; (2) “directed at a specific person”; (3) “[that] seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person”; (4) “[that] serves no legitimate purpose”; (5) [that] “would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress” and “actually cause[s] substantial emotional distress to the [the person to be protected by the order]”; and (6) which is not a “[c]onstitutionally protected activity.”’” (Parisi, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1227.) The purpose of the statute is “‘“to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution’”” (ibid.) and to “provid[e] expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412).

3. No Abuse of Discretion

In challenging the Order, defendant argues the statements on her signs were not threatening but were merely a “hyperbolic” “expression of [her] opinion.” She claims plaintiff’s fears “were irrational” and no reasonable person would fear defendant’s actions. We disagree.

We do not consider the signs to contain mere hyperbole. She has accused plaintiff of manipulating, kidnapping, terrorizing, and bullying student “warn[ing]” and “caution[ing]” those who view the signs, i.e., parents and plaintiff’s colleagues. Nor does the speech have to contain a threat. Statements and conduct that “‘“seriously . . . harasses”’” are subject to a restraining order. (Parisi, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1227.)

Defendant filed a federal lawsuit against plaintiff and others alleging similar criminal conduct. This is despite the fact that plaintiff had nothing to do with student’s removal from defendant’s custody. This supports a reasonable inference defendant is seeking to tarnish plaintiff’s reputation and interfere with plaintiff’s employment. In addition, defendant suffers from mental illness. These facts taken together support a finding both a reasonable person and plaintiff would suffer emotional distress.

We reject defendant’s claim plaintiff must show irreparable injury. That is not one of the elements required to obtain a civil harassment restraining order. (Parisi, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1227.)

Finally, we do not consider much of the legal authority defendant cites as it is inapt, irrelevant, or “‘discuss[ed] in a vacuum.’” (In re Marriage of Schnabel (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 747, 754.)

4. Freedom of Speech

Defendant claims the statements on her signs were constitutionally protected free speech under the United States and California Constitutions. She contends plaintiff, as a government employee, may not infringe on her free speech rights.

But defendant’s free speech rights were not infringed. The court did not prohibit her from carrying her signs. It merely restricted her ability to do so within 100 yards of plaintiff. R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181 is instructive. There, the defendant, a former patient of the plaintiff psychologist, repeatedly called the plaintiff at home, followed her, filed false police reports about her, filed an untrue complaint about the plaintiff psychologist with the licensing board, and posted several derogatory comments about the plaintiff on various Web sites. The trial court issued a restraining order requiring the defendant to stay 100 yards from the plaintiff and her family and barred the defendant from harassing, attacking, threatening, and stalking them.

The appellate court affirmed. In so doing it rejected the defendant’s claim her conduct was constitutionally protected, stating: “To the extent the order limits [the defendant’s] speech, it does so without reference to the content of her speech. The restraining order does not prevent [the defendant] from expressing her opinions about [the plaintiff] in any one of many different ways; she is merely prohibited from expressing her message in close proximity to [the plaintiff] and her family. [¶] The order does not mention or explicitly prohibit [the defendant] from engaging in any particular form of speech with respect to [the plaintiff]—including the sorts of speech about which [the plaintiff] had complained in her restraining order requests. It does not mention or prohibit [the defendant] from making statements on any subject or of any content, as long as she does so at a distance, and the statements’ contents do not constitute illegal harassment within the meaning of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 527.6. It does not prohibit [the defendant] from contacting [the plaintiff’s] licensing agency, from distributing flyers about [the plaintiff], or from posting derogatory criticisms of [the plaintiff] on Internet sites. It only restrains [the defendant] from doing those acts (or any others) within 100 yards of [the plaintiff] and members of her immediate family, their home, workplaces, vehicles, and schools. The order thus cannot be accurately characterized as a content-based prohibition on speech.” (R.D. v. P.M.; supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 191, fn. omitted.) Such is the case here.

The free speech protection in the California Constitution does not mandate a different result. Defendant’s speech was not prohibited. Nor is it correct that plaintiff is acting on behalf of the government in seeking the injunction just because she works for a public agency.

Further, free speech is not unlimited. Case law does not provide “that any injunction impinging upon the right of free expression constitutes an invalid prior restraint.” (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 143, 145 [injunction enjoining “continuing a course of repetitive speech that had been judicially determined to constitute unlawful harassment” properly issued].)

In addition, defamation is not constitutionally protected. (Parisi, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1229.) Defendant presented no evidence plaintiff is in fact a terrorist or kidnapper. We are not persuaded the statements are protected as opinions or hyperbole. Further, the record makes clear plaintiff did not have anything to do with defendant losing her custodial rights. There is nothing plaintiff can do to return those rights to defendant. As plaintiff argues, defendant appears to have no motive other than to harass and frighten plaintiff. The restraining order was proper.

DISPOSTION

The order is affirmed. Plaintiff is entitled to costs on appeal.

THOMPSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

IKOLA, J.

Filed 4/25/19 De Salles v. Neurosigma, Inc. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ANTONIO A.F. DE SALLES, et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

NEUROSIGMA, INC.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B287127

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. LC105572)

APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, John J. Kralik, Judge. Affirmed.

Baker & Hostler, Michael D. Mortenson, Andrew A. Wood, F. Lucas Paule, for Defendant and Appellant.

Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt, Glen E. Turner III, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

_______________________

Defendant and appellant NeuroSigma, Inc., appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs and respondents Antonio A.F. De Salles and Alessandra Gorgulho in this action to confirm an arbitration award. On appeal, NeuroSigma contends: (1) the state court did not have jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award, because the federal court had jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings until the federal case was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the parties, barring relitigation of the issues; and (2) even if the state court had jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award, the award should have been modified to delete sanctions and interest imposed in the final award in excess of the arbitration panel’s authority. Specifically, NeuroSigma contends the final award improperly modified a prior award, was issued more than 30 days after the close of the hearing, and provided unauthorized enforcement of the prior award.

We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award. The parties’ stipulation to voluntarily dismiss the federal matter required the federal court to retain jurisdiction over enforcement of a settlement agreement. The federal court entered an order of dismissal on the stipulated terms. Subsequently, however, the federal court vacated all orders in the case, including the dismissal order pursuant to the stipulation. The federal court entered a new and different order dismissing the case for lack of diversity jurisdiction, which did not bar an action to confirm the arbitration award in state court.

NeuroSigma did not oppose confirmation of the arbitration award on the ground that a valid settlement agreement existed, nor did NeuroSigma raise the enforceability of the settlement agreement as a disputed issue for the trial court to adjudicate. In fact, NeuroSigma represented that the settlement agreement was invalid and ineffective. NeuroSigma had the opportunity to raise issues related to the settlement agreement in opposition to the petition to confirm the arbitration award and failed to challenge the award on those grounds, waiving the issues.

The arbitrators had authority to issue the final award, which added remedies to enforce the prior award without modifying the substance of the prior award.

New issues raised for the first time in the reply brief concerning the release provisions of the settlement agreement and the requirements for rescission have been waived. The judgment, therefore, is affirmed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Dispute, Arbitration, and Federal Action

NeuroSigma is a medical technology company formed in Los Angeles in 2007. De Salles participated in the formation of NeuroSigma and was its Chief Medical Officer. Gorgulho is De Salles’ wife. De Salles purchased 50,000 shares of NeuroSigma on September 2, 2008, pursuant to a stock purchase agreement. Section 10.8 of the stock purchase agreement required any controversy involving any claim arising out of or related to the agreement to be arbitrated under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). De Salles transferred the shares to the De Salles Children’s Trust.

De Salles and Gorgulho moved to Brazil in 2012. Leon Ekchian is the Chief Executive Officer of NeuroSigma, while Lodwrick M. Cook III, is the chairman of NeuroSigma. In early 2013, NeuroSigma terminated De Salles’ employment and attempted to repurchase the shares held by the trust.

In August 2013, NeuroSigma initiated a demand for arbitration with AAA against De Salles, individually and as co-trustee of the trust, to obtain a declaration that NeuroSigma’s attempt to repurchase the shares was justified under the stock purchase agreement. De Salles filed his own claims in arbitration.

On October 29, 2013, NeuroSigma filed an action in federal court against De Salles and Gorgulho in their individual capacities for misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, breach of implied contract, quantum meruit, and accounting (Federal Action 1). On January 31, 2014, the federal court granted a motion by De Salles to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration of the proceedings against De Salles.

On May 20, 2014, NeuroSigma filed an amended demand for arbitration. In addition to declaratory relief, NeuroSigma alleged claims for rescission, statutory and common law misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, statutory and common law unfair competition, breach of implied contract, and accounting.

On January 16, 2015, the federal court granted Gorgulho’s motion to compel arbitration of all claims against her and to stay the federal action pending decision in the arbitration. On March 2, 2015, NeuroSigma brought a second amended demand for arbitration, which added Gorgulho as a respondent, individually and as a co-trustee of the trust.

A panel of three arbitrators began hearings in June 2015. AAA issued a letter on December 2, 2015, stating that no further evidence would be submitted, the hearings were declared closed, and the panel would render an award by January 4, 2016.

On December 29, 2015, the arbitration panel issued a “partial final arbitration award.” The panel found NeuroSigma did not have the right to repurchase the shares, because there were no unvested shares. NeuroSigma’s actions in terminating De Salles and attempting to repurchase his shares were arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. The panel also found no misappropriation of trade secrets or grounds for rescission. The award voided the involuntary repurchase of shares. The panel ordered NeuroSigma to reinstate the shares held by the trust and issue new share certificates to the trust. NeuroSigma was also to allow De Salles and Gorgulho access to the books and records of the company. No punitive damages were available on the contract claims. The panel awarded attorney fees of $1,801,698, plus costs, to the trust. De Salles and Gorgulho sought sanctions for NeuroSigma’s conduct during discovery, but because they were not entitled to recover more than attorney fees and costs caused by the conduct, which they were recovering already, the panel found they were not entitled to any additional award as sanctions. NeuroSigma’s claims were denied.

The partial final award resolved “all claims and counterclaims submitted in this arbitration, except those arising out of the implementation of the Award as it relates to the issuance of Shares without restrictions, and conduct, rights and remedies of the Parties associated thereto. [The panel reserved] jurisdiction to resolve any disputes regarding the transfer of the Shares without the restrictions enumerated in [the] award in the section on equitable relief.” The panel retained jurisdiction for 60 days from the date of the partial final award, or until completion of the issuance of the shares and implementation of the other remedies set forth in the partial final award. Upon expiration of 60 days, the partial final award would become the final award, unless the panel determined additional remedies or orders were necessary to fully resolve the matter.

On January 27, 2016, the panel requested briefing concerning additional remedies. On February 2, 2016, NeuroSigma objected that the panel had no authority to impose additional remedies because the time for issuing the award had passed and it was prior to enforcement of the award. On February 26, 2016, the panel issued a final arbitration award. In the final award, among other remedies, the panel ordered NeuroSigma to provide a corporate surety bond in favor of De Salles and Gorgulho for the amount of the shares to be transferred, and if NeuroSigma failed to transfer the shares or post the bond, interest would accrue on the value of the shares until transferred. The panel also ordered NeuroSigma to pay $2,000 per day in sanctions until it provided full access to the books and records of NeuroSigma.

On February 17, 2016, De Salles filed an action in federal court against Cook and Ekchian (Federal Action 2). De Salles alleged causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion related to the involuntary share repurchase.

On February 29, 2016, in Federal Action 1, De Salles filed a motion to reopen the case and dissolve the stay. On March 3, 2016, De Salles filed a petition to confirm the final arbitration award. NeuroSigma filed a motion to modify or vacate the final award on the grounds that the panel exceeded its authority under the commercial arbitration rules by issuing an award after the hearing closed and time expired.

On May 12, 2016, the federal court in Federal Action 1 granted De Salles’s motion to reopen the case. The court denied NeuroSigma’s motion to vacate or modify the arbitration award, and granted De Salles’s petition to confirm the arbitration award. The court entered judgment on May 24, 2016, in favor of De Salles and Gorgulho based on the final arbitration award.

On May 27, 2016, the parties entered into a global settlement agreement on the record before the federal court. A written settlement agreement was prepared over several months to resolve all the disputes of the arbitration and the federal actions. The agreement contained a mutual release and a waiver of unknown claims under Civil Code section 1542. It also provided for the federal court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. NeuroSigma refused to sign the written settlement agreement, arguing that the only material terms of the agreement were contained in a portion of the transcript of the oral settlement. On January 31, 2017, the federal court ordered NeuroSigma, Ekchian, and Cook (the NeuroSigma parties) to sign the settlement agreement no later than February 3, 2017. The NeuroSigma parties sought an emergency stay, which was denied. On February 16, 2017, the NeuroSigma parties filed a notice in federal court that they had executed the settlement documents to comply with the federal court’s order. NeuroSigma reasserted and reaffirmed all objections previously made as to the settlement documents, and stated that execution of the settlement documents to comply with the federal court’s order did not waive the NeuroSigma parties’ objections or appellate rights.

On March 9, 2017, De Salles filed a stipulation by NeuroSigma, De Salles and Gorgulho as follows: “[Whereas], on May 27, 2016, the Parties reached a settlement on the record of all claims in the Action wherein it was agreed that the Action be dismissed with prejudice; [¶] [Whereas], on February 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit in Case No. 17-55128 (consolidated with Case No. 17-55129). [¶] Based on the foregoing facts, Plaintiff and Defendants stipulate and agree as follows: [¶] 1. This Court should dismiss the above-captioned Action in its entirety against Defendants with prejudice. [¶] 2. All upcoming hearings and deadlines are hereby vacated and the Action is hereby terminated. [¶] 3. This Court should retain jurisdiction to administer and enforce the Settlement Agreement between the Parties.” A proposed order was attached for dismissal of the action with prejudice. The proposed order directed the clerk to close the case and retained jurisdiction over the matter for the purpose of administration and enforcement of the settlement agreement between the parties. The federal court entered the order that same day.

NeuroSigma delivered share certificates, but failed to make the first payment due under the settlement agreement. De Salles filed a motion in federal court on March 22, 2017, to enforce the settlement agreement. NeuroSigma moved to vacate all prior orders in the federal court on the basis that the court lacked diversity jurisdiction. On April 20, 2017, the federal court found there was not complete diversity, based on the information from the parties that De Salles and Gorgulho were United States citizens living abroad. The federal court dismissed Federal Action 1 with prejudice and vacated all federal court orders previously issued.

Action to Confirm Arbitration Award in Superior Court and Opposition

On April 25, 2017, De Salles and Gorgulho, in their individual capacities, filed the instant action in superior court to confirm the final arbitration award. On June 12, 2017, NeuroSigma filed a combined opposition to the petition to confirm the award and motion to vacate the arbitration award on multiple independent procedural and substantive grounds. NeuroSigma stated the pertinent facts, including that the federal court had ordered causes of action to arbitration over NeuroSigma’s objection and an oral settlement was entered into on May 27, 2016, “which was never effected because De Salles attempted to add material terms to the parties’ oral agreement to which NeuroSigma did not, and would not, agree.” NeuroSigma argued there was no valid order compelling NeuroSigma to arbitrate claims for which the arbitration panel awarded damages. NeuroSigma noted that parties may petition to confirm, modify or vacate an arbitration award, and a party opposing confirmation may move the court to correct or vacate the award on multiple different grounds.

NeuroSigma made the following arguments in the trial court. Two of its three claims had been ordered to arbitration, when the federal court never had jurisdiction, and therefore, the void federal court order rendered the arbitration void. The federal court never had jurisdiction over the parties or the disputes, the order compelling arbitration of NeuroSigma’s claims was void, and the invalid federal court orders tainted every aspect of the arbitration. Alternatively, the state court had to reconsider the original motions to compel arbitration, and if the court found the motions to compel arbitration should not have been granted, vacate the arbitration award.

In addition, the arbitration should have applied California laws governing arbitration, rather than federal laws. NeuroSigma noted that arbitrators have broader ethical disclosure requirements under California law, and one of the arbitrators on the panel had failed to disclose material information that she served as general counsel for a corporation. AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules require an arbitration award be made no later than 30 calendar days from the date of closing the hearing, but the final award in this matter was issued 85 days after the close of the hearings, and therefore, should be vacated.

The petition was also barred because De Salles and Gorgulho voluntarily filed a stipulation in federal court to dismiss the federal case with prejudice, before the federal court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction. A dismissal entered with prejudice bars a subsequent action. NeuroSigma argued that “De Salles may not now complain that his dismissal with prejudice is ineffective because he filed the dismissal pursuant to an invalid settlement agreement.” De Salles and Gorgulho could have protected themselves by refusing to dismiss the underlying action. The stipulation to dismiss the federal action remained effective because it was voluntary, not a federal court order, and not covered by the federal court order vacating all prior orders. De Salles and Gorgulho are, therefore, barred from relitigating the matter in state court.

NeuroSigma argued that the arbitration award was defective because it required illegal conduct. De Salles had worked as a neurosurgeon at the University of California at Los Angeles and as co-director of the Epilepsy Surgery Program for the West Los Angeles Veteran’s Administration Hospital (VA) within the Department of Veterans Affairs. He brought technologies that he helped develop as a VA employee to NeuroSigma, which licensed the technology from the VA. The arbitration panel exceeded its authority by ordering compensation to De Salles for work that he performed for NeuroSigma while employed at the VA.

The arbitration panel also exceeded the scope of its power by ordering NeuroSigma to remove transfer restrictions from stock certificates. Awarding stock directly to an unrelated third party, the Regents of the University of California, exceeded the panel’s authority. The attorney fees award exceeded the panel’s authority, because NeuroSigma requested attorney fees with respect to misappropriation of trade secrets only, and the panel could not award attorney fees that were incurred in a separate litigation between De Salles and the Regents.

The arbitration panel had no authority to require immediate compliance with the award before the award was confirmed by a court of law. Until the award is confirmed by a court and final, NeuroSigma cannot be forced to perform or penalized for failing to perform. The provision requiring immediate compliance exceeded the arbitration panel’s authority. Lastly, NeuroSigma was deprived of due process in the arbitration by being ordered to arbitrate claims by a federal court that had no authority to order arbitration and for the failure to grant a continuance to allow new counsel to prepare for arbitration. NeuroSigma requested that the trial court vacate the arbitration award in its entirety and deny the petition to confirm it.

The trial court provided a written tentative ruling to the parties, which is not contained in the record on appeal, prior to hearing argument on the petition to confirm the arbitration award on August 3, 2017. During the hearing, among other arguments, NeuroSigma asserted that the voluntary dismissal of the federal case, once signed and filed, was self-executing. The trial court asked, “What happened to that? Wasn’t there a settlement of the whole thing including this case?” NeuroSigma responded that there was a settlement on the record, and De Salles and Gorgulho wanted to adopt additional terms into the settlement on the record. NeuroSigma objected to the additional terms, litigated the issue, and the federal court ordered NeuroSigma to sign the agreement. NeuroSigma added, “And we said we can’t agree to it. So we signed the agreement under protest and under objection.” The voluntary dismissal of the federal action had been filed in the interim. NeuroSigma looked at all issues from the beginning and concluded the federal court never had jurisdiction.

Neither party argued before or during the hearing that the settlement agreement itself presented any issue for the trial court’s determination, and there was no further discussion of the settlement agreement. NeuroSigma requested a written statement of decision.

The court issued a tentative statement of decision on August 8, 2017, which is not part of the record on appeal. NeuroSigma filed objections to the tentative statement of decision. NeuroSigma stated that the trial court found the voluntary dismissal of the federal action did not bar the state court action, because (1) the dismissal only became effective upon a federal court order of dismissal, which had been vacated, and (2) as a matter of equity, it would be an injustice to allow NeuroSigma to enforce the dismissal after repudiating the settlement agreement that induced it. The trial court observed that NeuroSigma had apparently taken the position that the settlement was null and void.

NeuroSigma objected to the trial court’s statements about the settlement agreement as unsupported by the evidence. NeuroSigma argued that it never repudiated the oral or written settlement, other than to object to the inclusion of certain disputed terms. NeuroSigma had complied with the settlement by transferring shares. De Salles and Gorgulho had noted that NeuroSigma objected to certain terms being incorporated in the settlement and had breached the agreement by failing to comply with a payment obligation, but they had not stated that NeuroSigma repudiated the agreement. The oral and written settlement agreements required De Salles and Gorgulho to dismiss their claims for relief with prejudice.

Any conclusion that the settlement and the resulting voluntary dismissals were invalid because the federal court vacated the order compelling NeuroSigma’s execution of the written settlement agreement was incorrect. Voluntary dismissals were effective without court action, unless the court expressly retained jurisdiction over the settlement agreement or by incorporating terms of the settlement agreement in the order. NeuroSigma argued that the settlement agreement had not been repudiated, and therefore, the voluntary dismissal pursuant to the settlement was effective and barred De Salles and Gorgulho from pursuing relief. For the first time, NeuroSigma also argued that because NeuroSigma had not repudiated the written agreement, De Salles and Gorgulho’s only option was to bring a new action to enforce the settlement. NeuroSigma objected that the effect of the settlements and the dismissal with prejudice were key controverted factual issues that the statement of decision failed to address.

On September 12, 2017, the trial court issued its statement of decision granting the petition to confirm the arbitration award. The court found, as the federal court had, that the causes of action were so intertwined that arbitration of the disputes was required under the stock purchase agreement. The selection of the arbitrators had been made independent of the federal court, and the arbitrators’ impartiality was not affected by the federal court’s lack of jurisdiction, so there was no need to re-arbitrate the claims decided by the arbitrators. Although the hearings in the arbitration concluded on December 2, 2015, and AAA rules required the panel to issue an award within 30 days, the panel had authority under the arbitration agreement and AAA rules to fashion any remedy, including a partial final award that identified the prevailing parties and reserved jurisdiction to later issue a final award resolving all issues.

The parties’ stipulation to dismiss the federal action with prejudice did not bar relief, because the dismissal was effective only upon the federal court’s order, which was vacated when the federal court determined that it did not have jurisdiction. In addition, the dismissal was pursuant to a settlement agreement giving the federal court continuing jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. As a matter of equity, it would be an extreme injustice to allow NeuroSigma to enforce the dismissal with prejudice, while seeking to divest the federal court of jurisdiction, and without showing NeuroSigma’s full performance under the settlement agreement. NeuroSigma has apparently taken the position that the settlement agreement is void, so cannot argue that actions taken in reliance on the agreement are effective.

The court noted that the statement of decision had been revised to find that NeuroSigma’s course of conduct prevented reliance on the dismissal of the federal action, rather than a technical finding that NeuroSigma repudiated the settlement agreement. The court added that NeuroSigma had not raised the settlement agreement in response to the motion to confirm the arbitration award or in its own motion to vacate the arbitration award. If NeuroSigma believed there was a settlement agreement in effect, NeuroSigma could have raised it as a bar to confirmation of the arbitration award. NeuroSigma did not raise the settlement agreement, however, until after the tentative statement of decision was issued. In NeuroSigma’s objections to the tentative statement of decision, NeuroSigma raised new contentions and evidence about the settlement agreement and sought findings on an issue that was not raised by the extensive filings in the record. The new evidence, even if considered, would not change the court’s conclusion that NeuroSigma could not equitably rely on a proceeding in the federal court that NeuroSigma sought to divest of jurisdiction. The trial court entered a judgment confirming the final arbitration award on September 29, 2017.

NeuroSigma filed a motion for reconsideration, or alternatively, for a new trial, which the trial court denied. NeuroSigma filed a notice of appeal from the judgment on December 19, 2017.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review and Statutory Scheme

“The trial court’s decision granting respondent’s petition to confirm the cost award is reviewed de novo. (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 376, fn. 9.) If the trial court’s ruling relies on a determination of disputed factual issues, we apply the substantial evidence test on those particular issues. (Toal v. Tardif (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1217.) Where error is shown, this court may not set aside the order unless the error prejudiced the appellant. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.)” (EHM Productions, Inc. v. Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1063 (EHM Productions).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1285 allows a party to an arbitration proceeding in which an award is made to petition the court to “confirm, correct or vacate the award.” “Once a petition to confirm an award is filed, the superior court must select one of only four courses of action: It may confirm the award, correct and confirm it, vacate it, or dismiss the petition. (Cooper v. Lavely & Singer Professional Corp. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1, 11.) ‘[I]t is the general rule that, with narrow exceptions, an arbitrator’s decision cannot be reviewed for errors of fact or law.’ (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 11.) Under section 1286.2, the court may vacate the award only under ‘“very limited circumstances.”’ (Roehl v. Ritchie (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 338, 347.) Neither the trial court, nor the appellate court, may ‘review the merits of the dispute, the sufficiency of the evidence, or the arbitrator’s reasoning, nor may we correct or review an award because of an arbitrator’s legal or factual error, even if it appears on the award’s face. Instead, we restrict our review to whether the award should be vacated under the grounds listed in section 1286.2. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (EHM Productions, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1063–1064, fn. omitted.) One of the grounds for a court to vacate an arbitration award is that “[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (4).)

Stipulation for Dismissal of Federal Action

NeuroSigma contends the parties’ stipulation to dismiss Federal Action 1 was a self-effectuating stipulation of dismissal under rule 41(a)(1)(ii)(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which did not require a court order to be effective. NeuroSigma further contends, as a result of voluntarily dismissing the federal action with prejudice, De Salles and Gorgulho were barred from pursuing confirmation of the arbitration award in state court. We conclude the parties’ stipulation was not self-effectuating but effective only because it was ordered by the federal court. When the federal court vacated all of its orders, the stipulation of dismissal was no longer effective. The federal court’s dismissal of the federal actions for lack of diversity jurisdiction did not prevent De Salles and Gorgulho from later filing a state court action.

Rule 41(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.), provides for voluntary dismissal of an action by the plaintiff without a court order as follows: “Subject to Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66 and any applicable federal statute, the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing: [¶] (i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment; or [¶] (ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.”

Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.), provides for voluntary dismissal of an action by court order as follows: “Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper. If a defendant has pleaded a counterclaim before being served with the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the action may be dismissed over the defendant’s objection only if the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication. Unless the order states otherwise, a dismissal under this paragraph (2) is without prejudice.”

“If the parties wish to provide for the court’s enforcement of a dismissal-producing settlement agreement, they can seek to do so.” (Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America (1994) 511 U.S. 375, 381 (Kokkonen).) In ordering a dismissal under rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal court may exercise its discretion to require the parties’ compliance with the terms of the settlement contract or the court’s retention of jurisdiction over the settlement contract as one of the terms set forth in the order. (Ibid.) The United States Supreme Court stated in dicta in Kokkonen that although the plain language of rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) does not empower a federal court to impose terms on the parties’ stipulation of dismissal, the court is authorized to incorporate the settlement contract in its dismissal order or retain jurisdiction over the settlement contract, if the parties agree. (Id. at pp. 381–382.)

“When a court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of a suit, its jurisdiction continues until a final judgment is entered. [Citation.] When there is a voluntary dismissal of an entire action, the court’s jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter terminates.” (Wackeen v. Malis (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 429, 437.)

In this case, the request for dismissal of the federal action was based on the parties’ stipulation, which asked the federal court to enter an order of dismissal containing certain terms. The stipulation urged that the federal court should dismiss the action with prejudice and should retain jurisdiction to administer and enforce the settlement agreement. De Salles attached a proposed order for entry by the federal court that retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The plain language of the request for dismissal, taken as a whole, asked the federal court to enter an order of dismissal containing specific terms. The stipulation was not an automatic dismissal under rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) made without a court order. We conclude that the trial court properly found the dismissal of Federal Action 1 was made pursuant to rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which required entry of a court order to be effective. Since the federal court vacated the order of dismissal entered pursuant to the stipulation, and instead entered a new and different order dismissing the federal action for lack of diversity jurisdiction, De Salles and Gorgulho were not barred from pursuing confirmation of the final arbitration award in state court.

The cases relied upon by NeuroSigma on appeal are distinguishable. The plaintiffs in Wackeen v. Malis, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th 429, Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200, and Kokkonen, supra, 511 U.S. 375, dismissed actions in their entirety, without requesting that the court retain jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement, in contrast to the dismissal request in this case.

In opposition to the motion to confirm the arbitration award, NeuroSigma did not timely raise any argument that, by entering a valid and enforceable settlement agreement, DeSalles and Gorgulho were barred from seeking to confirm the arbitration award. In fact, rather than suggest that a prior settlement agreement deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to address the arbitration award, NeuroSigma insisted that the trial court had jurisdiction to address NeuroSigma’s own motion seeking “to vacate the Award in its entirety.” NeuroSigma contended that the federal court lacked authority to order the arbitration, that it impermissibly expanded the scope of arbitrable issues, and that it applied the wrong law, resulting in incurable procedural defects. NeuroSigma asked to send the parties back to the position they were in prior to arbitration, imploring the trial court to revisit and hear arguments on the original motion to compel arbitration. Further, NeuroSigma invited the trial court to review the arbitration panel’s compliance with AAA procedural rules, and to find that the award made was substantively defective. In making these requests, it is clear NeuroSigma was not contending that a valid and enforceable settlement agreement deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to address the arbitration. Moreover, with respect to any prior settlement, NeuroSigma expressly stated that the parties’ stipulation to dismiss the federal case was made pursuant to an “invalid” settlement agreement. De Salles and Gorgulho did not argue or concede that the settlement agreement was valid or enforceable simply by including the facts about the settlement and the rule 41 dismissal in their general recitations of the facts of the case.

To the extent that NeuroSigma contends on appeal that a valid settlement agreement exists that bars relitigation of settled issues, we find NeuroSigma has waived issues related to the settlement agreement. “‘Ordinarily the failure to preserve a point below constitutes a waiver of the point. [Citation.] This rule is rooted in the fundamental nature of our adversarial system . . . . “‘In the hurry of the trial many things may be, and are, overlooked which could readily have been rectified had attention been called to them. The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s attention to any infringement of them.’” . . . [¶] The same policy underlies the principles of “theory of the trial.” “A party is not permitted to change his position and adopt a new and different theory on appeal. To permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the trial court, but manifestly unjust to the opposing party.” [Citation.] The principles of “theory of the trial” apply to motions . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Sommer v. Gabor (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1468 (Sommer).)

“Although an appellate court, in its discretion may allow an appellant to raise a new issue of law on appeal, appellate courts ‘“are more inclined to consider such tardily raised legal issues where the public interest or public policy is involved.”’ [Citation.] However, if the new theory contemplates a factual situation the consequences of which are open to controversy and were not put in issue or presented at trial the opposing party should not be required to defend against it on appeal. [Citation.]” (Sommer, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1468.)

If NeuroSigma had desired a ruling on the enforceability of the settlement agreement or the application of specific provisions, it could have raised the issues in its opposition to the motion to confirm the arbitration award. Instead, NeuroSigma stated that the settlement agreement was invalid and ineffective. After the trial court’s ruling, NeuroSigma objected that there was no evidence to support finding that NeuroSigma repudiated the settlement agreement. The trial court removed the portion about repudiation and relied on a different basis to support the ruling. Although NeuroSigma made additional arguments about the settlement agreement in objection to the statement of decision, the trial court concluded that the effectiveness of the settlement agreement had not been a controverted issue at trial. Based on our review of the record, this conclusion was clearly correct. The statement of decision resolved all of the controverted issues presented in the pleadings and the hearing. NeuroSigma has not challenged the trial court’s ruling denying the motion for a new trial, and NeuroSigma cannot raise issues related to the effectiveness of the settlement agreement for the first time on appeal.

Remedies Provided in Final Arbitration Award

On appeal, NeuroSigma contends that the trial court should have deleted provisions for sanctions and interest in the final arbitration award. Specifically, NeuroSigma contends that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority by (1) modifying an award that resolved all the issues, (2) issuing an untimely final award, and (3) providing enforcement measures. NeuroSigma, however, never requested that the trial court modify or correct the final arbitration award by deleting the provisions allowing sanctions and interest. Even were we to construe NeuroSigma’s arguments in the lower court as a request to modify the final arbitration award, none of NeuroSigma’s contentions have merit.

A. Construction of the Partial and Final Awards

NeuroSigma contends that the partial arbitration award resolved all the issues submitted to the panel, and therefore, the final arbitration award exceeded the arbitrator’s authority by reconsidering the merits of issues that had been decided and modifying the partial award to add new damage elements. This is incorrect.

The partial award expressly stated that it did not resolve claims arising out of implementation of the award related to issuing shares and the associated conduct, rights and remedies of the parties. The panel reserved jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ disputes over these issues in the final award and allowed further briefing from the parties on the proper remedies. The final award provided that interest would accrue until NeuroSigma transferred the shares or posted a bond, and imposed sanctions of $2,000 per day until NeuroSigma provided full access to the books and records. Since the partial award did not resolve these issues and reserved jurisdiction to decide the proper remedies related to implementation of the award, the provisions included in the final award were not a modification of the partial award as to these issues. The final award did not change the substance of the partial award; it added a ruling on issues that were not resolved by the partial award.

B. Timeliness

NeuroSigma contends the final award issued by the arbitration panel violated the time limitations for issuing a final award. This is incorrect.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1283.8, which governs arbitration proceedings, provides in pertinent part: “The award shall be made within the time fixed therefor by the agreement or, if not so fixed, within such time as the court orders on petition of a party to the arbitration.” The stock purchase agreement provides for arbitration under the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, which requires an award to be issued within 30 days from the date of closing of the arbitration hearing. (AAA, Commercial Arbitration Rules (2013), rule 45, p. 27.)

Rule 47 of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules provides: “(a) The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties, including, but not limited to, specific performance of a contract. [¶] (b) In addition to a final award, the arbitrator may make other decisions, including interim, interlocutory, or partial rulings, orders, and awards. In any interim, interlocutory, or partial award, the arbitrator may assess and apportion the fees, expenses, and compensation related to such award as the arbitrator determines is appropriate.” (AAA, Commercial Arbitration Rules (2013), rule 47, p. 28.)

“The limitations placed on judicial review and oversight of an arbitration award have resulted in a substantial deference to the arbitrator’s own assessment of his or her authority to resolve an issue. (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 372–373 [Advanced Micro].) ‘[C]ourts should generally defer to an arbitrator’s finding that determination of a particular question is within the scope of his or her contractual authority.’ (Id. at p. 372.) Section 1283.4 states that an arbitrator’s written award shall determine all submitted questions ‘necessary in order to determine the controversy.’ It is, however, for the arbitrator to determine what issues are ‘necessary’ to the ultimate decision. (Morris v. Zuckerman (1968) 69 Cal.2d 686, 690.)” (Hightower v. Superior Court (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1434 (Hightower).)

“The same deference extended to an arbitrator’s determination as to the scope of his or her authority also applies to the arbitrator’s choice of a remedy. (Advanced Micro, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 381.) ‘In providing for judicial vacation or correction of an award, our statutes (§§ 1286.2, subd. (d), 1286.6, subd. (b)) do not distinguish between the arbitrators’ power to decide an issue and their authority to choose an appropriate remedy; in either instance the test is whether the arbitrators have “exceeded their powers.” Because determination of appropriate relief also constitutes decision on an issue, these two aspects of the arbitrators’ authority are not always neatly separable.’ (Id. at p. 373.)” (Hightower, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1434–1435.)

“What is mandated by statutory and case law is that the arbitrator decide all of the submitted issues and that such decision, once rendered, may be subject to judicial review, only upon certain limited conditions not here applicable. This does not come close to foreclosing the utilization of a multiple incremental or successive award process as a means, in an appropriate case, of finally deciding all submitted issues.” (Hightower, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1434.)

“We view this incremental process structured by the arbitrator as reasonably necessary, if not essential, to the effective establishment and enforcement of the remedy that the arbitrator has fashioned. . . . The arbitrator has not improperly left undecided issues ‘necessary in order to determine the controversy.’ Rather, he has determined all issues that are necessary to the resolution of the essential dispute arising from [the cause of action]. The arbitrator’s judgment on this point must be respected. (Advanced Micro, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 367, 372–374; Morris v. Zuckerman, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 690.) Nothing remains to be resolved except those potential and conditional issues that necessarily could not have been determined . . . when the Partial Final Award was issued. [¶] Thus, the arbitrator’s choice of a remedy must be viewed as including this incremental or multistep process involving an initial and a final award, both of which would be subject to confirmation by the court. In order to sustain the Partial Final Award, it is only necessary that we find a link between relief granted in the award and the contractual terms of the Shareholders Agreement as (1) actually interpreted by the arbitrator or (2) an interpretation implied in the award itself or (3) a plausible theory of the contract’s general subject matter, framework or intent. (Advanced Micro, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 381.) We have no trouble finding the required link in this case.” (Hightower, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1439, fn. omitted.)

In Hightower, the appellate court held that “the arbitrator’s Partial Final Award was entirely proper, even though there remained a number of potential and conditional issues that the arbitrator will have to address in a final order in order to give total and complete relief to [the prevailing party] and to enforce [petitioner] Hightower’s rights under the Partial Final Award. This process does not offend section 1283.4 or any other statutory provision; nor was it precluded by the terms of the Shareholders Agreement or the rules applicable to the arbitration.” (Hightower, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1440–1441, fn. omitted.)

We conclude that the arbitration panel had authority to issue the partial award resolving the merits of the parties’ claims within the time required under the AAA rules, while reserving jurisdiction to determine proper remedies arising from enforcement of the award. The partial award resolved the issues necessary to determine the controversy, but reserved jurisdiction to address the issues that could arise in effectuating the award. The arbitration rules and the case law allow for this two-step procedure in complex matters, and NeuroSigma has not demonstrated any prejudice as a result.

C. Enforcement

NeuroSigma contends the arbitration panel exceeded its authority by adding enforcement measures in the final arbitration award in the form of sanctions and interest, which NeuroSigma contends were the province of the trial court. We disagree.

As cited above, the arbitration panel’s choice of remedies is accorded substantial deference. (Hightower, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1435.) The panel was well within the scope of its powers to determine and remedy the harm that would result from NeuroSigma’s failure to transfer shares and provide access to the company’s books and records in compliance with the partial award. The remedies provided in the final award do not usurp the court’s power to confirm the arbitration award or enforce the judgment. NeuroSigma was able to immediately seek relief from the award in court. NeuroSigma has not demonstrated any prejudice as a result of the remedies ordered by the panel.

Issues Raised for the First Time in Reply

NeuroSigma raises several contentions for the first time in its reply brief on appeal concerning specific provisions of the written settlement agreement, as well as the requirements for rescission of the settlement agreement. None of these issues were raised or considered in the trial court. “Consistent with well-established authority, absent justification for failing to present an argument earlier, we will not consider an issue raised for the first time in a reply brief. [Citations.] Moreover, it does not appear that this argument was raised in the trial court. It cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” (Save the Sunset Strip Coalition v. City of West Hollywood (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1181–1182, fn. 3.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents Antonio A.F. De Salles and Alessandra Gorgulho are awarded their costs on appeal.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

RUBIN, P. J.

KIM, J.