2016-00202688-CU-PA
Mina Habal vs. Nathan George Levinson
Nature of Proceeding: Motion Contesting Good Faith Settlement Determination
Filed By: O’Connor, Shelley
Defendant and Cross-Complainant Jessica E. Davis’ (Davis) motion contesting good faith settlement, in which Defendant Jonathan R. Lawrence (Lawrence) joins, is DENIED. The settlement is in good faith.
Background Facts/Procedure
This is a personal injury case involving a motor vehicle collision that occurred on 4/01/15. The plaintiffs are Mina Habal (Habal) and Rona Ayub (Ayub) (collectively “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs contend that the vehicle Habal was driving was struck from behind on the freeway. Ayub was Habal’s passenger. Both Plaintiffs allege physical and emotional injuries.
In their original, Judicial Council form complaint filed in October 2016, Plaintiffs only named Nathan G. Levinson (Levinson) as a defendant. Plaintiffs alleged that Levinson was liable in motor vehicle negligence. There were no specific allegations explaining Levinson’s liability. A 4/01/15 police report of the collision, however, identifies Levinson as the responsible party. (See Colvin Decl., Exh. B.) The same report describes the incident as a four-car pile up in which Lawrence stopped for traffic, Habal stopped behind Lawrence, Davis stopped behind Habal, but Levinson collided into Davis’ vehicle and pushed it into Habal’s.
Levinson deposed Davis, then only a witness, in June 2017. (See Colvin Decl., Exh. C.) Davis testified that the car directly in front of Habal’s (Lawrence’s, according to the police report) cut Habal off before suddenly stopping. She also testified that the driver of the first car (Lawrence) told her immediately after the collision that he could not stay, at which point he left the scene before police arrived. At Habal’s deposition a few days later, however, Habal testified she did not recall being cut off. (Id., Exh. D.) She did not recall other facts about the collision either. In her 8/28/17 responses to form interrogatories, Habal asserted that she was struck from behind “as [she] was slowing due to traffic conditions ahead[.]” (Id., Exh. E, p. 14.) Ayub’s 8/28/17 interrogatory responses are in accord. (Id., Exh. F, p. 14.)
On 6/28/18, Plaintiffs filed the operative first amended complaint (FAC), in which they joined Davis and Lawrence as defendants. Like the original complaint, the FAC is a Judicial Council form complaint without specific facts explaining how each defendant is liable.
Davis and Levinson have both filed cross-complaints for indemnity against the other defendants.
On 7/12/18, Lawrence filed his Application for Good Faith Settlement. The Application describes a settlement in which Lawrence pays each Plaintiff $2,500 in exchange for a release of claims. The instant motion contesting the settlement’s good faith followed.
Legal Standards
CCP § 877.6 empowers the court to find a settlement in good faith such that all joint tortfeasors’ claims against the settling defendant for equitable indemnity are barred. In addressing good faith, the question for the court is “whether the amount of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor’s proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff’s injuries.” (Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488. 499.) A number of factors are considered in making this determination, including: “a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.” (Id.) A settlement is not in good faith if it “is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute.” (Id., pp. 499-500.) “The dual equitable goals of section 877.6 are ‘equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault and encouragement of settlements. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Long Beach Memorial Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 865, 872.)
The party seeking a determination of good faith may file a “bare bones” motion, stating the grounds on which the determination is sought and supporting the motion with a declaration setting forth a brief background of the case and the settlement terms. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.) The party challenging the good faith of the settlement bears the burden of presenting evidence demonstrating that the settlement is not in good faith. (Id., pp. 1261-1262.) The settling party may then file responsive declarations or other evidence negating the asserted lack of good faith. (Id., p. 1262.)
The evaluation of the settlement must be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement. The settlement amount “‘must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.’ [Citation.]” (Tech-Bilt, p. 499.)
Discussion
Each Plaintiff claims approximately $25,000 in special (medical) damages. Given this, given that Plaintiffs further claim general damages consisting of physical and emotional injuries, and given Davis’ testimony that Lawrence cut Habal off just before the collision, Davis and Levinson argue that Lawrence’s settlement for $5,000 is in bad faith. The court disagrees.
Habal has no recollection of Lawrence cutting her off. Granted, there might be facts to explain the absence of such a recollection. Nonetheless, the fact that Habal does not recall Lawrence cutting her off casts doubt on the likelihood a fact-finder will conclude at trial that Lawrence contributed to the accident. Plaintiffs’ responses to interrogatories, in which neither asserts Lawrence cut Habal off, add to the uncertainty.
Because of the potential that Lawrence will be totally exonerated, his settlement for
$5,000 is not outside the ballpark of what is reasonable. The other Tech-Bilt factors do not compel a different conclusion.
In finding the settlement to be in good faith, the court rejects Davis’ suggestion that the Application should be denied because discovery is incomplete. Davis notes that Lawrence has not been deposed. She also notes that Ayub was subjected to an IME for her claim of depression, but the examiner has not issued his final report. That being the case, determinations under CCP § 877.6 are based on the information then-available. (See Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 864871, fn. 6.) Davis does not seek a continuance to complete discovery. (See Franklin Mint Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1561, fn. 5 [there is no absolute right to take discovery to oppose a good-faith settlement motion].)
The court also rejects Davis’ position that her motion should be granted because Lawrence did not file a declaration in which he denies cutting Habal off on the freeway. The burden of proof is on Davis, not Lawrence. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ testimony and interrogatory responses cast enough doubt on Lawrence’s liability to support a finding of good faith.
Disposition
The motion contesting good faith is DENIED.
Pursuant to CRC 3.1312, Lawrence shall lodge a formal order for the court’s signature