Case Name: NetEnrich, Inc. v. Jacqueline Duong, et al.
Case No.: 17-CV-314264
I. Background
Plaintiff NetEnrich, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) alleges its former employee, defendant Jacqueline Duong (“Duong”), embezzled $1,163,288.42. (Compl., ¶¶ 10-12.)
In 2008, Duong began working as a controller and was tasked with overseeing Plaintiff’s “financial statements, general ledger, cost accounting, payroll, accounts payable, accounts receivable, budgeting, and tax compliance.” (Compl., ¶ 7.) From 2010 through 2013, Duong executed unauthorized transactions and wrote checks for “petty cash” to take funds from Plaintiff. (Compl., ¶ 10.) Some of these unauthorized transactions involved payments to Global Equipment Services, where Duong’s husband, defendant Huan Nguyen (“Nguyen”), served as Chief Operating Officer. (Compl., ¶¶ 3, 8.) Plaintiff alleges Nguyen was somehow “involved” in the transactions with Global Equipment Services. (Compl., ¶ 9.)
Plaintiff confronted Duong about the funds she embezzled. (Compl., ¶ 12.) Duong asserted she only “‘borrowed’” $619,831.30. (Compl., ¶ 12.) Duong told Plaintiff she intended to repay the money and has repaid $50,000 to date. (Compl., ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff asserts causes of action against the defendants for: (1) breach of fiduciary duty (against Duong); (2) violation of Penal Code § 496 (against Duong and Nguyen); (3) violation of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (the “RICO Act”) (against Duong and Nguyen); (4) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (the “UCL”) (against Duong and Nguyen); (5) civil conspiracy (against Duong and Nguyen); (6) open book account (against Duong); (7) account stated (against Duong); and (8) declaratory relief (against Duong and Nguyen).
Currently before the Court are nearly identical demurrers to the complaint by Duong and Nguyen (collectively, “Defendants”); they each demur to all causes of action asserted against them, respectively, on the grounds of uncertainty and/or failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Additionally, Defendants filed nearly identical motions to strike allegations in the complaint about Duong’s offer to repay the money she took.
II. Demurrers
A. Uncertainty
Defendants demur to the third cause of action for violation of the RICO Act on the ground of uncertainty. Additionally, Nguyen demurs to all of the remaining causes of action in the complaint on the ground of uncertainty.
A party may demur on the ground of uncertainty to challenge a pleading as uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) “[D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Reg. Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)
Here, Defendants simply conclude the third cause of action is “fatally uncertain.” (Duong Mem. of Pts. & Auth. at p. 7:6; Nguyen Mem. of Pts. & Auth. at p. 4:12.) They do not argue, and it is not obvious, the pleading is so incomprehensible they cannot reasonably respond.
Instead, Defendants’ arguments address only whether Plaintiff pleads the essential elements of its claim. “A special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach the failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading, but is directed at the uncertainty existing in the allegations actually made.” (Butler v. Sequeira (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 143, 145-46.) Thus, the arguments actually presented do not justify sustaining the demurrer on the ground of uncertainty.
Nguyen also challenges the remaining seven causes of action, arguing they are “fatally uncertain.” (Nguyen Mem. of Pts. & Auth. at p. 8:19-20.) But as with Defendants’ joint position on the third cause of action, Nguyen does not substantiate his argument because he does not identify any ambiguity or unintelligibility in the allegations actually pleaded.
Consequently, Defendants’ demurrers on the ground of uncertainty are OVERRULED.
B. Failure to State Sufficient Facts
Duong demurs to all eight causes of action on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts. Nguyen demurs to the causes of action in which he is named as a defendant, particularly the second, third, fourth, fifth, and eighth causes of action. The Court collectively addresses the identical arguments advanced by Defendants and separately addresses the arguments advanced exclusively by Duong with respect to the first, sixth, and seventh causes of action.
1. First Cause of Action
Duong argues Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty because it does not allege the existence of a fiduciary relationship and the statute of limitations expired.
i. Existence of a Fiduciary Relationship
The existence of a fiduciary relationship is an essential element of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. (Meister v. Mensinger (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 381, 395.) “A fiduciary relationship is any relation existing between parties to a transaction wherein one of the parties is in duty bound to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other party.” (Wolf v. Super Ct. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 25, 29-30 [internal citations and quotations marks omitted].)
Duong argues Plaintiff does not allege the existence of a fiduciary relationship because she was an employee, not an officer, and it does not otherwise allege she was part of “the management team.” (Duong Mem. of Pts. & Auth. at pp. 4-5.) Yet the fact that Duong was an employee and not an officer is not apparent from the face of the pleading or facts subject to judicial notice. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a) [defect must be apparent from the face of the pleading or matters subject to judicial notice].) Moreover, Duong’s focus on titles is misguided. It is true that “[t]raditional examples of fiduciary relationships in the commercial context include trustee/beneficiary, directors and majority shareholders of a corporation, business partners, joint adventurers, and agent/principal.” (Wolf, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 30.) Nevertheless, these traditional examples are just that, examples. (See City of Hope Nat. Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 386 [“Those categories [enumerated above] are merely illustrative of fiduciary relationships in which fiduciary duties are imposed by law.”].) In other words, a defendant need not be an officer or part of a “management team,” such as a corporation’s board of directors, to owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation. (Ibid.)
Courts have held managing employees owe fiduciary duties to their employer. (Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 244, 249-50.) For example, an employee tasked with “receiving and disbursing monies and keeping accurate records of all transactions” owes a fiduciary duty to his or her employer. (Kennard v. Glick (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 246, 250-51; accord Michelson v. Hamada (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1580-81 [contractor tasked with managing and depositing funds, maintaining check registers, and preparing financial records owed a fiduciary duty to principal]; see also In re Arbuckle’s Estate (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 562, 569 [business manager owed fiduciary duty as agent of business owner].) Because an individual entrusted with the management of corporate funds and financial records regardless of title (e.g., bookkeeper, controller, accountant, business manager) owes a fiduciary duty to the owner of those funds, Plaintiff’s allegations that it entrusted Duong with such responsibilities suffices. Thus, Plaintiff adequately alleges the existence of a fiduciary relationship.
ii. Statute of Limitations
Duong argues the first cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is time-barred because Plaintiff filed the complaint more than three years after the cause of action accrued in 2013.
In general, a party may demur on the ground of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action if “‘the complaint shows on its face that the statute [of limitations] bars the action.’ [Citation.]” (E-Fab., Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) A court may only sustain a general demurrer on this basis if the challenged cause of action is clearly and affirmatively barred by the statute of limitations based on the allegations on the face of the pleading. (Id. at p. 1316.) In evaluating a demurrer on this basis, a court must determine (1) which statute of limitations applies and (2) when the claim accrued. (Ibid.)
Duong argues the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d) applies because the gravamen of the cause of action is fraud. In general, the statute of limitations for a breach of fiduciary duty claim is four years. (See, e.g., Thomson v. Canyon (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 594, 607 [applying four-year statute of limitations to breach of fiduciary duty claim in the absence of alleged misrepresentations].) Nevertheless, Duong is correct that California courts look to the gravamen of a cause of action when determining the applicable statute of limitations in order to prevent a plaintiff from evading this bar by artfully pleading and labeling an untimely cause of action. (Id. at p. 606.) With that said, Duong does not cite any authority or provide any analysis to support her conclusion that the gravamen of the first cause of action is fraud; she simply references the conclusory punitive damages allegation that her “actions were malicious, oppressive, and fraudulent.” (Compl., ¶ 17.)
The gravamen of a claim means “the point of a complaint or grievance,” (Garner, Dict. of Modern Legal Usage (3d ed. 2011) p. 396), often described as the “material part” of the complaint or grievance. (Lindros v. Governing Bd. of the Torrance Unified School Dist. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 524, 540, fn. 13.) Here, it appears the point or material part of the claim is simply Duong’s embezzlement. Although Plaintiff does allege Duong forged some checks and transaction entries, the complaint does not contain significant allegations about misrepresentations or attempts to cover up her misconduct. Accordingly, and in the absence of any explanation or authority from Duong, it is not clear the gravamen of the first cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is fraud. Duong therefore does not substantiate her argument that the three-year statute of limitations applies.
In conclusion, Duong does not demonstrate the first cause of action is clearly and affirmatively time-barred. Consequently, the demurrer is not sustainable on this basis.
iii. Conclusion
All of the arguments Duong advances in support of her demurrer to the first cause of action are unavailing. The demurrer to the first cause of action is therefore OVERRULED.
2. Second Cause of Action
The second cause of action is for violation of Penal Code section 496, which authorizes a victim of theft — including larceny, embezzlement, and theft by false pretenses — to bring a civil action for treble damages. (See Bell v. Feibush (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1044-48.) Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action because it does not allege all of the elements of the crime of theft by false pretenses. But Defendants do not cite any authority to support their argument. Furthermore, their argument is misguided because Plaintiff does not allege its cause of action is based on theft by false pretenses. Consequently, Defendants’ argument does not justify sustaining the demurrer to the second cause of action.
Defendants also argue the second cause of action is time-barred. Defendants assert Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d) supplies the statute of limitations for statutory claims to recover stolen property. But, as discussed above, that particular subdivision applies to fraud claims. Thus, Defendants’ statement of law is incorrect.
In actuality, the sole case Defendants cite to support their argument concerns an entirely different subdivision, specifically Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (c), which applies to “[a]n action for taking, detaining, or injuring goods or chattels, including actions for the specific recovery of personal property.” (See Naftzger v. Am. Numismatic Society (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 421, 428-29.) Courts have applied the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (c) to statutory claims brought pursuant to Penal Code section 496. (Ibid.) The Court thus considers whether Plaintiff asserted its claim more than three years after it accrued.
Defendants rely on Naftzger to establish the second cause of action accrued upon discovery of their theft in 2013. For the following reasons, Defendants’ reliance is misplaced.
Naftzger was a case involving theft of a museum’s rare and historic coins. (Naftzger, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 426.) Consequently, the appellate court in Naftzger evaluated the statute of limitations and related accrual provisions applicable to claims for the recovery of articles with “historical, interpretive, scientific, or artistic significance.” (Id. at p. 427, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (c)(2).) Here, Plaintiff does not allege Defendants stole such an article. Thus, Naftzger is not analogous and the particular statutory provisions at issue there do not apply to the case at bench.
In addition to this significant factual distinction, Naftzger is inapplicable because the appellate court explicitly limited its holding to a pre-1983 version of the statute that is not implicated here. (Naftzger, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at pp. 433-35.) For context, in 1983, the Legislature codified the discovery rule in section 338, subdivision (c)(2), which applies only to claims involving special artifacts. (Id. at pp. 426-27; accord Society of Cal. Pioneers v. Baker (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 774, 783-84.) In Naftzger, the historic coins were stolen before the 1983 amendment, but the lawsuit came after. (Naftzger, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at pp. 433-35.) The Naftzger court determined the discovery rule as codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (c)(2), upon amendment in 1983, did not apply retroactively, but ultimately allowed the plaintiff to rely on the discovery rule based on a finding that it was implicit in the statute prior to the 1983 amendment. (Ibid.) Because of this temporal limitation, Naftzger does not support Defendants’ interpretation of the statute in effect today.
Defendants do not provide any additional explanation or authority to support their position on accrual. Consequently, Defendants do not substantiate their statute of limitations argument.
Based on the foregoing, the demurrers to the second cause of action are OVERRULED.
3. Third Cause of Action
The third cause of action is for violation of the federal RICO Act. Congress passed the RICO Act to prevent “the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime” including “defendants who might be described as ‘mobsters,’ ‘gangsters,’ and similar appellations . . . .” (Gervase v. Super. Ct. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1229.) In order to plead a RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege “the defendant caused injury to the plaintiff’s business or property by engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity in connection with an enterprise which affects interstate commerce.” (Id. at p. 1232; accord Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 77.) Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to state a RICO claim because it does not allege the existence of an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity.
“The existence of an enterprise is an essential element of a RICO claim.” (People ex rel. Sepulveda v. Highland Fed. Savings & Loan (“Sepulveda”) (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1692, 1713.) “‘The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.’” (Ibid., quoting United States v. Turkette (1981) 452 U.S. 576, 583.) In the third cause of action, Plaintiff simply concludes Defendants participated in an enterprise. (Compl., ¶ 28.) Yet, the factual allegations upon which the third cause of action is based do not support this conclusion. Although Plaintiff alleges some of the irregular financial transactions “involved Duong and/or Nguyen,” it does not allege any other facts sufficient to show Defendants had an association for the common purpose of engaging in some particular course of conduct. Plaintiff therefore fails to allege the existence of an enterprise.
The existence of a pattern of racketeering activity, although related to the common purpose and course of conduct that define an enterprise, is a separate element of a RICO claim. (Gervase, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1235.) “Title 18, United States Code section 1961, subdivision (1), provides a lengthy list of the criminal actions that can constitute racketeering activities.” (Id. at p. 1241.) To plead a “pattern of racketeering activity,” a plaintiff must allege the defendant committed at least two predicate acts and facts sufficient to show the relationship between and continuity of the acts; multiple isolated incidents are not sufficient. (Id. at pp. 1232-33.) Here, Plaintiff does not clearly identify the predicate acts upon which its RICO claim is based. Plaintiff alleges Defendants made “wire transfers” without more. (Compl., ¶ 24.) Perhaps Plaintiff intended to base its RICO claim on “wire fraud,” which is an enumerated predicate act. (See Sepulveda, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1715.) Even so, a plaintiff must do more than allege wire fraud in a conclusory manner. (Ibid.) In addition to alleging use of wires, such as a wire transfer, a plaintiff must allege a scheme and an intent to defraud. (Ibid.) In sum, Plaintiff does not adequately identify and allege facts about the predicate acts sufficient to plead a pattern of racketeering activity.
In conclusion, Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to transform its claim of embezzlement into a claim for damages caused by organized crime within the scope of the RICO Act. The demurrers to the third cause of action are therefore SUSTAINED with 10 days’ leave to amend.
4. Fourth Cause of Action
Defendants categorically state Plaintiff fails to state a UCL claim because it does not allege “a violation of an independent statute, regulation, or law.” (Duong Mem. of Pts. & Auth. at p. 5:23-24; Nguyen Mem. of Pts. & Auth. at p. 5:15-16.) To the extent Defendants advance this argument as an adequate independent basis for sustaining the demurrer, it is insufficient because it addresses only a portion of the UCL claim, which is actually based on unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices. (See PH II, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682 [“A demurrer does not lie to a portion of a cause of action.”]; see also Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) Defendants do, however, subsequently address the other two prongs of the UCL claim, and so the Court also considers whether Defendants’ arguments, in combination, demonstrate no UCL claim has been stated.
Defendants’ first argument as directed to the unlawful prong lacks merit because Plaintiff does in fact allege five unlawful acts, including embezzlement, forgery, and conversion. Defendants otherwise assert in a conclusory manner that Plaintiff fails to allege fraudulent or unfair conduct without offering any analysis or explanation to support this assertion. “‘Where a point is merely asserted by counsel without any argument of or authority for its proposition, it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 282.) Thus, Defendants’ arguments, individually or in combination, do not justify sustaining the demurrer. The demurrers to the fourth cause of action are therefore OVERRULED.
5. Fifth Cause of Action
The fifth cause of action is identified and pleaded as an independent cause of action for “civil conspiracy.” (Compl. at pp. 6:22-7:4.) Defendants argue conspiracy is not a recognized cause of action. Defendants are correct. “Conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 510-11.) Plaintiff thus cannot state a cause of action for conspiracy.
With that said, in ruling on a demurrer, a court is not bound by the label on a cause of action. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Ibid.) Here, however, Plaintiff does not allege a cause of action under any other theory. Plaintiff simply alleges Defendants “operated a civil conspiracy.” (Compl., ¶ 38.) Thus, even assuming Plaintiff intended to rely on a conspiracy theory to hold Defendants liable for a recognized tort, it does not actually allege any theory of tort liability in the fifth cause of action or identify another cause of action in the complaint to which its conspiracy theory relates.
In sum, Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action for conspiracy and does not allege facts sufficient to constitute some other recognized cause of action.
Defendants also argue the fifth cause of action is time-barred based on the three-year statute of limitations for fraud claims. Defendants’ analysis of the applicable statute of limitations suffers from the same flaws addressed above with respect to their analysis of the first cause of action. Furthermore, given no cause of action has been stated, it is impossible to determine the applicable statute of limitations and accrual of the cause of action at this juncture. Accordingly, the demurrer is not sustainable based on the running of the statute of limitations.
For the reasons set forth above, the demurrers to the fifth cause of action are SUSTAINED with 10 days’ leave to amend.
6. Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action
The sixth and seventh causes of action are common counts to recover money owed based on an open book account and an account stated. Duong argues Plaintiff does not plead facts sufficient to constitute a common count under either theory because it does not allege an agreement between the parties as to the specific amount owed.
“A common count is not a specific cause of action [ ]; rather, it is a simplified form of pleading normally used to aver the existence of various forms of monetary indebtedness. . . .” (McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 394.) The elements of a common count claim include: “(1) the statement of indebtedness in a certain sum, (2) the consideration, i.e., goods sold, work done, etc., and (3) nonpayment.” (Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Zerin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 460.)
Although a common count claim may be based on an account stated or an open book account, these theories of recovery are similar in that a sum certain of indebtedness is an essential element of both claims. (See Maggio, Inc. v. Neal (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 745, 753.) The primary distinction, as explained below, is the manner in which the sum of indebtedness is evidenced.
Specifically, a book account is a detailed statement of debits and credits on an account from which “‘it can be reasonably determined what amount is due to the claimant.’ [Citation.]” (Interstate Group Administrators, Inc. v. Cravens, Dargan & Co. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 700, 708 [“The most important characteristic of a suit brought to recover a sum owing on a book account is that the amount owed is determined by computing all of the credits and debits entered in the book account.”].) A book account is considered open if the debtor has made some payments, but has not paid the full outstanding balance on the account. (Ibid.)
“An account stated is an agreement, based on prior transactions between the parties, that the items of an account are true and that the balance struck is due and owing.” (Maggio, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 752.)
Plaintiff alleges Duong took $1,163,288.42, repaid $50,000, and currently owes “at least $1,113,288.42.” (Compl., ¶¶ 10, 45, 49-50.) Plaintiff simultaneously alleges that Duong claims she owes only $619,831.30. (Compl., ¶¶ 12, 49.) Consequently, Plaintiff does not allege the parties reached an agreement as to the amount of Duong’s debt for purposes of an account stated. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges it credited the $50,000 Duong repaid but does not allege the existence of a book account or history of transactions between the parties. Finally and most significantly, by alleging Duong owes “at least $1,113,288.42,” Plaintiff does not allege she owes a debt in a certain sum. (Compl., ¶ 10.) Thus, Plaintiff does not adequately plead a common count under either theory. Accordingly, the demurrer to the sixth and seventh causes of action is SUSTAINED with 10 days’ leave to amend.
7. Eighth Cause of Action
The eighth cause of action is for a declaration that Defendants owe Plaintiff the money they embezzled. Defendants argue the eighth cause of action for declaratory relief “should be dismissed because it is based on an offer to compromise made by Duong to [Plaintiff] pursuant to Evidence Code section 1152.” (Duong Mem. of Pts. & Auth. at p. 12:22-23; Nguyen Mem. of Pts. & Auth. at p. 8:3-5.)
For context, Evidence Code section 1152, subdivision (a) states: “Evidence that a person has, in compromise or from humanitarian motives, furnished or offered or promised to furnish money or any other thing, act, or service to another who has sustained or will sustain or claims that he or she has sustained or will sustain loss or damage, as well as any conduct or statements made in negotiation thereof, is inadmissible to prove his or her liability for the loss or damage or any part of it.” In other words, a settlement offer is not admissible to prove liability. Because Evidence Code section 1152 is a rule governing the admissibility of evidence, it is entirely unclear how it relates to the legal sufficiency of the pleading.
Defendants cite no cases in which courts have relied on Evidence Code section 1152, either directly or indirectly as an interpretive aid, for purposes of evaluating whether a cause of action has been stated. Defendants do not otherwise explain how their argument relates to the pleading standard for declaratory relief claims or advance any other arguments. The demurrers to the eighth cause of action are therefore OVERRULED.
III. Motions to Strike
Defendants filed nearly identical motions to strike allegations in paragraphs 12, 49, and 52 of the complaint, which concern Duong’s promise to repay the money she took from Plaintiff.
Defendants quote Code of Civil Procedure section 436, which authorizes a court to strike out “irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” and “all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” Defendants then state their motions are “on the basis [the allegations] constitute privileged confidential settlement negotiations pursuant to California Evidence Code section 1152.” (Duong Mem. of Pts. & Auth. at p. 1:6-7; Nguyen Mem. of Pts. & Auth. at p. 2:7-9.) Thus, although Defendants identify the statutory grounds for a motion to strike, it is not clear their motions are actually based thereupon.
Evidence Code section 1152 excludes evidence of offers to compromise for the purpose of proving liability. Thus, Evidence Code section 1152 is a rule governing the admissibility of evidence; it is not a rule of pleading and procedure that justifies striking allegations in a pleading. Moreover, Defendants do not otherwise tie their argument about admissibility to an actual statutory ground for striking the allegations. Defendants’ reliance on this particular statute is therefore misguided.
Nguyen also states the allegations are irrelevant to any causes of action asserted against him specifically. But Nguyen fails to support his argument with a coherent explanation and citation to legal authority. An irrelevant allegation is an allegation that is not essential to, pertinent to, or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)-(c).) Significantly, Nguyen does not argue the allegations are not essential, pertinent, or relevant to any otherwise sufficient claim in the complaint. Nguyen simply asserts the allegations are irrelevant to him. Nguyen thus does not substantiate his argument that the allegations may be stricken as irrelevant.
In conclusion, Defendants do not demonstrate the allegations may be stricken based on a statutory ground, and so they fail to substantiate their motions. Defendants’ motions to strike are therefore DENIED.