Case Number: BC681756 Hearing Date: June 25, 2019 Dept: 5
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Spring Street Courthouse, Department 5
isaiah solorio ,
Plaintiff,
v.
los angeles unified school district,
Defendant.
Case No.: BC681756
Hearing Date: June 25, 2019
[TENTATIVE] order RE:
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Isaiah Solorio (“Plaintiff”) alleges that while he was a student at a school operated by Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (“Defendant”), he tripped and fell on the blacktop area outside the locker room and cut his finger on broken glass. Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s complaint.
Plaintiff used a form complaint to assert causes of action for “premises liability” and “negligence,” though the complaint cites Government Codes 815.2 and 835, among others. Section 815 provides that “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person” except as provided by statute. (Govt. Code, § 815(a); see Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932.) “[D]irect tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine application of general tort principles.” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183.)
Government Code section 835 sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property. (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1129, citing Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829; see also Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112.) Per Government Code section 835, “a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: [¶] (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or [¶] (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition . . . a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.” (Gov. Code, § 835.) A public entity has actual notice of a dangerous condition “if it had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character.” (Gov. Code, § 835.2, subd. (a).) A public entity has constructive notice of a dangerous condition only if “the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character. (Gov. Code, § 835.2, subd. (b).)
The Court interprets the first cause of action (for premises liability) as asserting a claim for dangerous condition of public property under Government Code section 835. This is a proper basis for an action against a public entity. The Court interprets the second cause of action (for general negligence) as raising a common law claim. This is not a proper basis for an action against a public entity. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment on the second cause of action (for general negligence).
With respect to the first cause of action—dangerous condition of public property—the undisputed evidence suggest that the broken glass was on the blacktop for no more than 90 minutes. Kenneth Jefferson testified that the last time he would have inspected the blacktop area would have been between 1:30 p.m. and 1:45 p.m. (Evidence In Support Of Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. #2, p. 36.) Jefferson testified that he “clocked out” at 2:00 p.m. (Id., Exh. #2, p. 27.) Jefferson testified that Cole was responsible for inspecting the blacktop area after Jefferson left work. (Id., Exh. #2, p. 57.) Cole testified that he “clocks on” at 2:00 p.m. as Jefferson is “clocking off.” (Id., Exh. #3, p. 16.) Cole testified that he performs his duties in a certain pattern. (Id., Exh. #3, pp. 25-26.) Cole testified that he checks the blacktop “between 4:30 [p.m.] and 5:30 [p.m.].” (Id., Exh. #3, p. 26:5-6.)
There is no dispute that the accident occurred at approximately 3:00 p.m., so at most, the glass was on the blacktop for 90 minutes. The Court would like to hear argument on whether this is sufficient to provide constructive notice to Defendant. While the Court acknowledges that the cases cited by Plaintiff find constructive notice when a dangerous condition exists for 15 to 30 minutes, those cases involved grocery stores. Grocery stores are smaller areas with more enclosed spaces and an expectation of greater staffing than a school campus. Therefore, the Court has no tentative order on this motion. Both sides should appear at the hearing for oral argument. Should any party not appear at the hearing, they will waive their right to a hearing and shall submit to whatever decision the Court makes on this motion.
DATED: June 25, 2019 ___________________________
Stephen I. Goorvitch
Judge of the Superior Court